China’s new Environmental and Ecological Code: systemic governance reform or business as usual?
China’s model of governance over climate action is developing: where before the country used policy plans rather than laws, it has now adopted a new Environmental and Ecological Code. Carol Yuen and Catherine Higham explore the contents of the Code and explain how it maps onto climate framework legislation practice around the world.
With its centralised, authoritarian political system, China has until now exercised climate governance through its Five-Year Plans and other climate policies, instead of legally binding documents. However, in March 2026, at the country’s annual ‘Two Sessions’ meetings — the plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee which set China’s strategic targets and policy directions — a new Environmental and Ecological Code was enacted.
The Code incorporates existing environmental statutes — such as for environmental protection and air, water and waste pollution — and functionally establishes a binding legal regime for climate action equivalent to a climate framework law. Outlining the state’s responsibilities on climate change mitigation and adaptation, the creation of climate action plans, carbon trading initiatives, and green and low-carbon development, the Code supports both China’s industrial growth and its climate goals.
Below, we outline the provisions within the climate change chapters of the new Code, considering the degree to which they adhere to or deviate from common models of framework laws. We consider lessons learned through the adoption of such framework laws in more than 70 countries around the world, unpacking the benefits these laws bring. We find that despite missing elements commonly found in other framework laws, the Code continues China’s policymaking modality and is tailored to its national circumstances. It may therefore prove to be a more effective governance tool in China’s unique political context.
How does the Code compare to other framework laws around the world?
Though some have argued that a climate framework law may not have been necessary for China, by codifying key aspects of its climate policy response it has now created a legal regime for climate action that shares many commonalities with climate framework laws in other jurisdictions. With a growing literature on the design of such laws, and new tools to support governments in implementing this type of legislation, it is worth situating the legislative developments in China in the broader global context and considering whether the specificities of the Code are appropriate to China’s national context.
Researchers have identified nine core climate governance functions that are essential to any country’s climate response, and which can be used to assess framework climate legislation. The World Bank has also outlined 12 key principles for framework climate legislation needed for countries to plan, implement and sustain a commitment to increasingly ambitious policies over multiple policy cycles.
Below, we consider how the Code approaches four of the key issues highlighted in the climate governance functions policy brief and the World Bank report:
1. A strong narrative but without targets
While the Code sets the direction for green and low-carbon development and solidifies China’s carbon peaking and carbon neutrality narrative, it noticeably does not contain any timebound targets, which many other jurisdictions have passed into legislation. The Code only contains fairly general responsibility provisions: the state is to take effective mitigation and adaptation measures to actively respond to climate change.
Legislative targets in other framework laws, particularly in developed countries, have been framed as commitment devices, a critical way for governments with majoritarian electoral systems to bind future governments to a clear pathway for climate policy. Given that China is a one-party state with power concentrated in the Chinese Communist Party, the absence of targets in the Code may reflect a context in which the agenda-setting role of the legislation rightly focuses on other issues. However, the absence of targets may be cause for concern given that the ‘dual carbon’ goals of achieving peak emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 set out in the 14th Five-Year Plan were not repeated in the same form in the 15th Five-Year Plan. The 15th Five-Year Plan instead contains only a carbon intensity target — to reduce carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 17% by 2030.
Despite the lack of targets, the law may still provide a signalling effect to all stakeholders that the government is working proactively towards creating a decarbonised economy. It has been suggested, however, that this signalling effect is likely to be weaker than an exclusively climate-focused piece of legislation. This may be one key reason that plans for such legislation still remain in the legislative pipeline.
2. Integration and mainstreaming of obligations
The Code assigns responsibilities to different governmental departments. The National Development and Reform Commission — a powerful body which has broad administrative and planning control over China’s economy and produces China’s Five-Year Plans — remains responsible for the management and coordination of the national carbon peaking and carbon neutrality work. However, other relevant departments of the State Council are explicitly made responsible for dealing with climate change and achieving carbon peaking and carbon neutrality within the scope of their respective responsibilities. By requiring different actors to engage with climate policy, framework laws can facilitate the mainstreaming of climate change across different sectors, supporting policy coherence and policy integration.
In addition, local governments (at the provincial, prefectorial and county levels) are required to strengthen their response to climate change, by taking mitigation and adaptation measures. Governments of provinces, autonomous regions and direct-controlled municipalities are obligated to formulate and organise the implementation of local action plans for carbon peaking and carbon neutrality according to local conditions, though there is no stipulated timeline.
3. A lack of coordinating provisions
Despite the assignment of responsibilities, the Code does not contain provisions that facilitate coordination among governmental departments and between different levels of government. Framework laws, alternatively, can enable cross-sectoral coordination and avoid piecemeal approaches in policy planning. This logic has several similarities to that driving environmental codification processes. While it has been suggested previously that a dedicated climate law in China could address issues with overlapping responsibilities and insufficient coordination between government agencies, it is unclear that the provisions of the Code will do so. The requirement for local governments to report their climate response to the senior level of government is also unclear; this is a common issue in climate framework laws and one that can weaken their effectiveness in many contexts.
4. A lack of oversight provisions
The Code does not contain provisions relating to independent expert advice or oversight. There are no provisions supporting judicial oversight and accountability for state inaction — this is contrary to practice in several other framework laws in developing countries which introduce broad requirements for who can raise concerns to the courts (i.e. who has legal standing to do so) about inadequate implementation of the legislation.
Environmental litigation provisions in the Code allow for lawsuits to be brought against perpetrators of acts of environmental pollution and ecological destruction where there is proof of ecological damage. While it remains to be tested whether the national or local governments can be sued in relation to their climate responses, standing requirements are highly restrictive. Civil society organisations that wish to commence a suit must register with the civil affairs governmental department of, at minimum, the level of cities with municipal jurisdiction (i.e. Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin), and have specialised in ecological and environmental protection activities for more than five consecutive years with no criminal record. Further, the Code has been criticised for restricting cases to those involving harms that have already occurred, as opposed to allowing for preventative actions. In any case, the lack of specific targets and requirements in the Code increases the difficulty of finding plausible grounds to claim.
What does the Code add to China’s governance landscape?
Overall, the climate-related portions of the Environmental and Ecological Code signal China’s clear intent to enhance its climate governance and obligate local governments to take action. China may, however, have missed an opportunity to re-emphasise its targets and bolster coordination among governmental departments and various levels of government. Despite these missing elements which are commonly found in other framework laws, this legislation is a continuation of China’s policymaking modality and is tailored to its national circumstances. As such, it may prove to be a more effective governance tool in the unique political context of China.