Quality signaling and demand for renewable energy technology: evidence from a randomized field experiment | Josh Graff

Josh Graff Zivin will be presenting the paper ‘Quality Signaling and Demand for Renewable Energy Technology: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment‘. Please note, this is an in-person event. 

Abstract

‘In a randomized field experiment in Senegal, we assess the potential of three types of quality signaling—third-party certification, warranty, and money-back guarantee—on demand for solar lamps. We find no impacts on consumer demand under the money-back guarantee but increased demand under a third-party certification or warranty, which is consistent with the notion that consumers are uncertain about products’ durability rather than their utility. Surprisingly, we also find that these efforts to overcome an information asymmetry problem stimulate demand for low-quality products by creating product-class effects among those least familiar with the product.’