All pages with keywords: CCS


Ana Mijic and Sun Chun – Carbon Capture and Storage

Seminar 24 Nov 2010

Part of the LSE-Imperial Grantham PhD seminar series (Michaelmas term) Speaker: Ana Mijic and Sun Chun


A UK ‘dash’ for smart gas

A UK ‘dash’ for smart gas

a policy publication by Samuela Bassi, Sam Fankhauser, Bob Ward 1 March, 2013

Shifting from coal to natural gas for electricity generation can help the UK power sector to decarbonise in the near term. With good planning and investment, natural gas can support the development of a low-carbon power sector by providing essential backup for intermittent renewables, but could only play a bigger role longer-term if fitted with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology.

However, a new UK ‘dash’ for gas on the assumption of low prices is a risky economic and environmental option. A lower risk option is a ‘dash’ for smart gas; using natural gas in those areas where it offers the greatest value in decarbonising the power sector. read more »


Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration’

Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration’

a research article by Charles Palmer 20 April, 2012

Opportunistic behaviour due to imperfect contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands a … read more »


Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration

Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration

a research article by Charles Palmer 5 December, 2011

Opportunistic behaviour due to imperfect contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands a … read more »


Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration

Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration

a working paper by Charles Palmer 1 September, 2010

Opportunistic behaviour due to incomplete contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions, such as forest carbon sequestration contracts. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive … read more »


The European and global potential for carbon sequestration in tackling climate change

The European and global potential for carbon sequestration in tackling climate change

a research article by Roger Fouquet 3 June, 2001

Grimstom, M., Karakousis, V., Fouquet, R., van der Vorst, R., Pearson, P.J.G, and Leach, M. 2001. Climate Policy, v.1, pp.155-171.