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Alessandro Tavoni
Assistant Professorial Research Fellow
Alessandro’s research spans several topics in environmental economics, primarily related to the drivers of cooperation in the (climate) commons. This is tackled through a combination of non-cooperative and evolutionary game theory models, as well as laboratory experiments, surveys and simulations, in an effort to shed light on the potential solutions to environmental dilemmas.
Background
Alessandro holds a PhD in Economics from Universita’ Ca’ Foscari di Venezia (2011). He is also an Associate Researcher at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), as well as a member of the Levin Lab at Princeton University and an International Fellow of the Sogang Experimental Economics Laboratory in Korea.
Research interests
- Game theory;
- International environmental agreements;
- Experimental economics;
- Coupled social-ecological systems.
Prospective PhD students
Allesandro welcomes prospective PhD students interested in the above topics, and who have a solid background in economics.
– Visit the ‘Study with us’ page for further information on applying to be a PhD student with us.
Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements
We investigate the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic stage game of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by special-interest groups. In … read more »
Reserves and trade jointly determine exposure to food supply shocks
While a growing proportion of global food consumption is obtained through international trade, there is an ongoing debate on whether this increased reliance on trade benefits or hinders food security, and specifically, the ability of global food systems to absorb shocks due to local or regional losses of production. This paper introduces a model that simulates the short-term response to a food supply shock originating in a single country.
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A bargaining experiment on heterogeneity and side deals in climate negotiations
The recent global climate change agreement in Paris leaves a wide gap between pledged and requisite emissions reductions in keeping with the commonly accepted 2°C target. A recent strand of … read more »
How green are economists?
The market for voluntary carbon offsets has grown steadily in the last decade, yet it remains a very small niche. While 10% of greenhouse gas emissions generated by transportation are … read more »
Tipping points and loss aversion in international environmental agreements
We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of catastrophic damages, which we jointly call threshold concerns, on international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether a threshold for … read more »
Tipping and reference points in climate change games
We live in a world characterized by discontinuities, where thresholds for abrupt and irreversible change are omnipresent, both in economic and ecological dynamics. Such thresholds, often referred to as tipping … read more »
Past and present biophysical redundancy of countries as a buffer to changes in food supply
Spatially diverse trends in population growth, climate change, industrialization, urbanization and economic development are expected to change future food supply and demand. These changes may affect the suitability of land … read more »
Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons
We assess the robustness of cooperation to environmental variability in a stylized model of a community that harvests a shared resource. read more »
2015
Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspectives
Local interactions and network structures appear to be a prominent feature of many environmental problems. This paper discusses a wide range of issues and potential areas of application, including the … read more »
Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game: theory and experimental evidence
The provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and managing fisheries to avoid overharvesting, requires the coordination of national contributions. read more »
Luring others into climate action: Coalition formation games with threshold and spillover effects
Cooperation between countries is required to overcome major societal problems, such as climate change. However, rational logic dictates that individual countries are incentivised not to act, instead preferring to … read more »
2014
Managing the climate commons at the nexus of ecology, behaviour and economics
Academic contributions to climate change policy have been constrained by methodological and terminological differences, so we discuss how programmes aimed at cross-disciplinary education and involvement in governance may help to unlock scholars' potential to propose new solutions. read more »
Strategies in Climate Negotiations: Theory and Experiments
Papers from the ‘Strategies in Climate Negotiations: Theory and Experiments’ session at the Fifth World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists. Session chaired by Alessandro Tavoni, London School of Economics … read more »
Climate engineering reconsidered
Stratospheric injection of sulphate aerosols has been advocated as an emergency geoengineering measure to tackle dangerous climate change, or as a stop-gap until atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are reduced. But it may not prove to be the game-changer that some imagine. read more »
On the provision of public goods with probabilistic and ambiguous thresholds
Many natural systems involve thresholds that, once triggered, imply irreversible damages for the users. Although the existence of such thresholds is undisputed, their location is highly uncertain. read more »
Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons to environmental variability
Growing empirical evidence points to the importance of social norms for achieving sustainable use of common pool resources (CPR). Social norms can facilitate the cooperation and … read more »
Network economics and the environment: insights and perspectives
Recent research in the field of network economics has shown how explicitly modelling the network structure of social and economic relations can provide significant theoretical insights, … read more »
2013
Regime shifts in a social-ecological system
Ecological regime shifts are rarely purely ecological. Not only is the regime shift frequently triggered by human activity, but the responses of relevant actors to ecological dynamics are often … read more »
Game theory: Building up cooperation
Reference Tavoni, A. 2013. Game theory: Building up cooperation. Nature Climate Change.
Coordinating to protect the global climate
Reference Tavoni, A., and Dannenberg, A. February 2013. Coordinating to protect the global climate. Chapter 2 of book, ‘Analyzing Global Environmental Issues: theoretical and experimental applications and their policy implications’ (Ariel … read more »
Regime shifts in a social-ecological system
Ecological regime shifts are rarely purely ecological. Not only is the regime shift frequently triggered by human activity, but the responses of relevant actors to ecological … read more »
2012
Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements
The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple … read more »
The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management
This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling … read more »
Climate Change Policies: global challenges and future prospects (edited by Cerdá, Labandeira [book review])
Reference Tavoni, A. 2012. Climate Change Policies: global challenges and future prospects (edited by Cerdá, Labandeira [book review]). Government and Policy, v.30.
2011
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the … read more »
Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game
International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and freeriding incentives. In … read more »
The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management
This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental … read more »
Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change
Paper 34 International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding … read more »
2015
COP21: Can game theory predict a global deal on climate change?
Climate change is a ‘wicked problem’, in the terms of game theorists. Collectively, all countries should act on climate change. But it may not always be in a country’s individual … read more »
2014
Climate engineering offers little hope of mitigation
Injecting particles into the stratosphere to shade and cool the Earth will never stop climate change. This is the shocking claim made in the July issue of Nature Climate Change by an international group of prominent scientists read more »
2013
México y el cambio climático
La Gran Historia
2012
Why do we see unilateral action on climate change?
In keeping with expectations, recent multilateral climate change talks in Doha have achieved very little. Yet, the good news is that unilateral action is on the up. This column argues … read more »
