Richard Bradley (LSE): “Social Ethics Under Ambiguity”
In his two famous papers of 1953 and 1955 defending Utilitarianism, Harsanyi draws on the same simple idea: that to determine what is morally best we should put ourselves in the shoes of an impartial, but sympathetic, rational evaluator of states of affairs that differ in terms of the wellbeing of […]
David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”
Formal and social epistemologists have devoted significant attention to the question of how to aggregate the credences of a group of agents who disagree about the probabilities of events. Most of this work focuses on strategies for calculating the mean credence […]
Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”
Suppose that an altruistic and morally motivated agent who is uncertain between evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) finds herself in a situation in which the two theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act […]
Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”
We propose a ‘Cautionary News Principle’ when justifying the decision to commit an irreversible act, such as one that involves killing. The principle states that whether such a decision is justified depends on the extent of possible cautionary news in the future, whereas confirmatory news can […]
Richard Pettigrew (Bristol): “What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?”
Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. […]
Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and `Debiased’ Welfare Analysis”
Economics has traditionally been opposed to paternalism. However, the findings of behavioural economics have made popular one kind of paternalism that appears to be more innocuous: The kind of paternalism that respects an agent’s ends, or her non-instrumental, intrinsic valuations, […]
Paul Menzel (Pacific Lutheran): “The Subjective Value of Life: What Is It?”
One kind of value that a person’s life has is subjective – the value of life to the person whose life it is. This value plays an important role in certain moral philosophies, in health economics and health policy, and in a wide range of normative […]
Matthew Adler (Duke) “The structure of luck prioritarianism”
Matthew D. Adler is the Richard A. Horvitz Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, Philosophy and Public Policy at Duke University, and is the founding director of the Duke Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy.
Glen Weyl (Yale/Microsoft): “Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society”
Many blame today’s economic inequality, stagnation, and political instability on the free market. The solution is to rein in the market, right? We challenge this thinking— as well as most arguments in favor of and against markets. We offer new, but historically rooted, ways to […]
Simon Beard (Cambridge): “Risk, Relevance and the Aggregation of Competing Claims View”
Alex Voorhoeve has developed his Competing Claims view as a way of mediating between, and quantifying, our pro and anti-segregationist leanings concerning the evaluating of consequences, especially in relation to distributive fairness. Voorhoeve however has declined to consider the implications of this view for how we […]
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