Teruji Thomas (Oxford): “The Veil of Ignorance Revisited”
The rough idea of what I call “the veil of ignorance principle” is to identify the moral or “social” point of view with the point of view of a self-interested individual who is uncertain of his or her own identity. In conjunction with expected utility theory (EUT), such a principle […]
Anneli Jefferson (Birmingham): “Moral self image and moral decision making”
Our moral decisions and actions are guided by what we take to be morally permissible and impermissible. In this talk I consider another factor which may affect both our judgment of moral permissibility and our moral conduct, our moral self-image. In particular, I ask whether a positive view […]
Hugh Mellor (Cambridge): “Chances and Conditionals”
In a projected book, “Most Counterfactuals Are False”, Alan Hájek infers the truth of its title from the ubiquity of chance. I argue in this talk that he is wrong: the ubiquity of chance does not verify his title: chances do not falsify counterfactuals. Single-case chances are perfectly consistent with determinism, i.e. […]
Mike Otsuka (LSE): “Reciprocity versus Redistribution: The Case of Collective Pensions”
Pensions involve transfers from those who are young, healthy, able-bodied, and productive to those who are elderly, infirm, and out of work. Are these justified as redistributive transfers between distinct individuals – from those who are lucky to others who are unlucky – in order to eliminate […]
Remco Heesen (Cambridge): “Statistical Biases in Peer Review”
Various biases are known to affect the peer review system, which is used to judge journal articles for their suitability for publication and grant proposals for their suitability for funding. These biases are generally attributed to cognitive biases held by individual peer reviewers. For example, gender bias in peer review […]
Alex Voorhoeve (LSE): “Egalitarianism under Ambiguity”
Decision-makers are in an ambiguous situation when they are not in a position to assign precise probabilities to all of the relevant possible outcomes of their actions. Such situations are common – novel medical treatments and policies addressing climate change are two examples. Many people respond to ambiguous situations in a cautious, or […]
Bart Engelen (Tilburg): “Nudging and Rationality”
The literature on nudging has rekindled normative and conceptual debates surrounding both the aims liberal and democratic governments can aim for and the means they can employ. An oft-heard criticism is that nudging governments, by exploiting people’s psychological mechanisms, manipulate them and insufficiently respect their rational decision-making capacities. Bypassing and/or perverting people’s […]
Koen Decancq (Antwerp): “Non-parametric well-being comparisons”
Abstract: We study the problem of making interpersonal well-being comparisons when individuals have heterogeneous – possibly incomplete – preferences. We present a robust – also incomplete – criterion for well-being comparisons that states that one individual is better off than another one if the intersection between the extended upper contour set of […]
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