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    Marc Fleurbaey (Paris School of Economics): “Measuring Well-Being and Lives Worth Living”

Marc Fleurbaey (Paris School of Economics): “Measuring Well-Being and Lives Worth Living”

3 March 2021|

 

Marc Fleurbaey (Paris School of Economics): “Measuring Well-Being and Lives Worth Living”

We study the measurement of well-being when individuals have heterogeneous preferences, including different conceptions of a life worth living. When individuals differ in the conception of a life worth living, the equivalent income can regard an individual whose life is not worth living as being better […]

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    Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

10 February 2021|

Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

Are there ever good epistemic reasons to misrepresent base rates? I investigate this question in the context of recent legislation restricting the presentation of gender stereotypes, and the representation of minority groups in children’s books. I argue that our hesitancy around certain base rates makes sense […]

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    Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

20 January 2021|

 

Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

In this paper, we ask: how should an agent who has incoherent credences update when they learn new evidence? The standard Bayesian answer for coherent agents is that they should conditionalize; however, this updating rule is not defined for incoherent starting credences. We show […]

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Time for Caution”

25 November 2020|

 

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Time for Caution”

Precautionary principles are frequently appealed to both in public policy and in discussions of good individual decision-making. They prescribe omission or reduction of an activity, or taking precautionary measures whenever potential harmful effects of the activity surpass some threshold of likelihood and severity. One crucial appeal of precautionary principles has been that […]

Richard Bradley (LSE): “Social Ethics Under Ambiguity”

28 October 2020|

 

Richard Bradley (LSE): “Social Ethics Under Ambiguity”

In his two famous papers of 1953 and 1955 defending Utilitarianism, Harsanyi draws on the same simple idea: that to determine what is morally best we should put ourselves in the shoes of an impartial, but sympathetic, rational evaluator of states of affairs that differ in terms of the wellbeing of […]

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    David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

14 October 2020|

 

David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

Formal and social epistemologists have devoted significant attention to the question of how to aggregate the credences of a group of agents who disagree about the probabilities of events. Most of this work focuses on strategies for calculating the mean credence […]

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    Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

7 October 2020|

 

Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

Suppose that an altruistic and morally motivated agent who is uncertain between evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) finds herself in a situation in which the two theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act […]

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    Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

18 March 2020|

 

Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

We propose a ‘Cautionary News Principle’ when justifying the decision to commit an irreversible act, such as one that involves killing. The principle states that whether such a decision is justified depends on the extent of possible cautionary news in the future, whereas confirmatory news can […]

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    Richard Pettigrew (Bristol): “What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?”

Richard Pettigrew (Bristol): “What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?”

13 November 2019|

 

Richard Pettigrew (Bristol): “What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?”

Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. […]

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    Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and `Debiased’ Welfare Analysis”

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and `Debiased’ Welfare Analysis”

30 October 2019|

 

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and `Debiased’ Welfare Analysis”

Economics has traditionally been opposed to paternalism. However, the findings of behavioural economics have made popular one kind of paternalism that appears to be more innocuous: The kind of paternalism that respects an agent’s ends, or her non-instrumental, intrinsic valuations, […]