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    Alex Voorhoeve & Veronika Luptakova (LSE): “How Do People Balance Death Against Lesser Burdens?”

Alex Voorhoeve & Veronika Luptakova (LSE): “How Do People Balance Death Against Lesser Burdens?”

19 May 2021|

 
Alex Voorhoeve & Veronika Luptakova (LSE): “How Do People Balance Death Against Lesser Burdens?”

When the number of people one can save from harm is fixed and the difference in harm one can save people from is substantial, standard principles for health resource allocation prioritize by severity. Standard principles are also fully aggregative: one death can be outweighed […]

Zoë Johnson King (USC): “Varieties of Moral Mistake”

17 March 2021|

 
Zoë Johnson King (USC): “Varieties of Moral Mistake”

Some philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her action is permissible, this moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one […]

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    Marc Fleurbaey (Paris School of Economics): “Measuring Well-Being and Lives Worth Living”

Marc Fleurbaey (Paris School of Economics): “Measuring Well-Being and Lives Worth Living”

3 March 2021|

 

Marc Fleurbaey (Paris School of Economics): “Measuring Well-Being and Lives Worth Living”

We study the measurement of well-being when individuals have heterogeneous preferences, including different conceptions of a life worth living. When individuals differ in the conception of a life worth living, the equivalent income can regard an individual whose life is not worth living as being better […]

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    Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

10 February 2021|

 

Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

Are there ever good epistemic reasons to misrepresent base rates? I investigate this question in the context of recent legislation restricting the presentation of gender stereotypes, and the representation of minority groups in children’s books. I argue that our hesitancy around certain base rates makes sense […]

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    Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

20 January 2021|

 

Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

In this paper, we ask: how should an agent who has incoherent credences update when they learn new evidence? The standard Bayesian answer for coherent agents is that they should conditionalize; however, this updating rule is not defined for incoherent starting credences. We show […]

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Time for Caution”

25 November 2020|

 

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Time for Caution”

Precautionary principles are frequently appealed to both in public policy and in discussions of good individual decision-making. They prescribe omission or reduction of an activity, or taking precautionary measures whenever potential harmful effects of the activity surpass some threshold of likelihood and severity. One crucial appeal of precautionary principles has been that […]

Richard Bradley (LSE): “Social Ethics Under Ambiguity”

28 October 2020|

 

Richard Bradley (LSE): “Social Ethics Under Ambiguity”

In his two famous papers of 1953 and 1955 defending Utilitarianism, Harsanyi draws on the same simple idea: that to determine what is morally best we should put ourselves in the shoes of an impartial, but sympathetic, rational evaluator of states of affairs that differ in terms of the wellbeing of […]

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    David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

14 October 2020|

 

David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

Formal and social epistemologists have devoted significant attention to the question of how to aggregate the credences of a group of agents who disagree about the probabilities of events. Most of this work focuses on strategies for calculating the mean credence […]

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    Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

7 October 2020|

 

Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

Suppose that an altruistic and morally motivated agent who is uncertain between evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) finds herself in a situation in which the two theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act […]

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    Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

18 March 2020|

 

Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

We propose a ‘Cautionary News Principle’ when justifying the decision to commit an irreversible act, such as one that involves killing. The principle states that whether such a decision is justified depends on the extent of possible cautionary news in the future, whereas confirmatory news can […]