Alexander Bird (Cambridge): “Against Empiricism”

30 March 2021|

 

Alexander Bird (Cambridge): “Against Empiricism”

Most philosophers of science are realists. Most philosophers of science are, at least implicitly, empiricists. But, I argue, it is not reasonable to be both an empiricist and a realist, because empiricism is motivated by epistemological internalism and realism requires the rejection of internalism. Nor is instrumentalism a reasonable position. So an empiricist […]

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    Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”

Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”

16 March 2021|

 

Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”

Revealed preference approaches to modeling choice in the social sciences face seemingly devastating predictive, explanatory, and normative objections. In this talk, I will focus on predictive and explanatory objections, and offer two defenses. First, I argue that when revealed preferences are multiple realizable, revealed preferences can causally explain behavior well. […]

Ella Whiteley (LSE): “Harmful Salience Structures”

2 March 2021|

 

Ella Whiteley (LSE): “Harmful Salience Structures”

Physical and psychological violence, to false beliefs and credibility deficits, have already been identified as potentially harming an individual or group, but facts about salience have not seemed particularly relevant to harm. In this talk, I argue that certain salience structures can indeed be harmful. One can harm an individual or group […]

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    Ulrich Meyer (Colgate): “Topology and Action at a Distance”

Ulrich Meyer (Colgate): “Topology and Action at a Distance”

16 February 2021|

 

Ulrich Meyer (Colgate): “Topology and Action at a Distance”

This paper presents a novel argument against the possibility of action at a distance, with realism about space-time topology as its main premise.

 

Ulrich Meyer is a Professor or Philosophy at Colgate University. His research interests include metaphysics, logic, philosophy of science and the philosophy of time.

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    Michael Diamond-Hunter (LSE): “The limits of accuracy for retrospective descriptions of racial groups”

Michael Diamond-Hunter (LSE): “The limits of accuracy for retrospective descriptions of racial groups”

17 November 2020|

 

 

Michael Diamond-Hunter (LSE): “The limits of accuracy for retrospective descriptions of racial groups”

In this paper, I will provide a discussion and solution for a phenomenon that has been left untouched by contemporary philosophical accounts of race: the understanding of groups in history. This paper is centrally concerned with retrospective description: the usage of contemporary racial terms as […]

Marius Backmann (LSE): “Time for Freedom”

27 October 2020|

 
Marius Backmann (LSE): “Time for Freedom”
Views on free will are classically classified along their compatibility with determinism. Accounts that require a power to do otherwise require the existence of alternative future possibilities, which are taken to be incompatible with determinism. I argue that determinism does not automatically imply that the future is not settled, and neither does […]

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    Ali Boyle (Cambridge): “Don’t Ask: Classification in Comparative Cognitive Science”

Ali Boyle (Cambridge): “Don’t Ask: Classification in Comparative Cognitive Science”

12 May 2020|

 

Ali Boyle (Cambridge): “Don’t Ask: Classification in Comparative Cognitive Science”

Many projects in comparative cognitive science (which I mean to include research in both comparative psychology and artificial intelligence) are structured around what I’ll call ‘classificatory questions’ – that is, questions about whether nonhuman cognitive systems have the same cognitive capacities as humans. These projects […]

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    Lewis Ross (LSE): “Statistics, Epistemic Gaps, and Legal Risk”

Lewis Ross (LSE): “Statistics, Epistemic Gaps, and Legal Risk”

19 November 2019|

 

Lewis Ross (LSE): “Statistics, Epistemic Gaps, and Legal Risk”

Many philosophers suggest that using statistics to attribute legal liability is deeply problematic. A primary worry is that it would be unfair to hold the defending party responsible on the basis of probability alone. My previous work, focusing on criminal law, suggests that this refusal […]

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    Fernand Gobet (LSE): “Automatic generation of scientific theories using genetic programming”

Fernand Gobet (LSE): “Automatic generation of scientific theories using genetic programming”

29 October 2019|

 

Fernand Gobet (LSE): “Automatic generation of scientific theories using genetic programming”

The aim of this research is to develop a novel way to use computers to ‘evolve’ scientific theories automatically. By using techniques based on genetic programming and simple building blocks (primitive cognitive mechanisms), theories are automatically built, evolved and tested.  I will present a system […]

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    Liam Kofi Bright (LSE): “The Scientists Qua Scientist Makes No Assertion”

Liam Kofi Bright (LSE): “The Scientists Qua Scientist Makes No Assertion”

15 January 2019|

Liam Kofi Bright (LSE): “The Scientists Qua Scientist Makes No Assertion”

 

Assertions are, speaking roughly, descriptive statements which purport to describe some fact about the world. Philosophers have given a lot of attention to the idea that assertions come with special norms governing their behaviour. Frequently, in fact, philosophers claim that for something to count as an […]