Decision Theory and Social Choice

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    Lisa Hecht (Stockholm): “Permissible Risk-Inclination in Other-regarding Choices”

Lisa Hecht (Stockholm): “Permissible Risk-Inclination in Other-regarding Choices”

24 November 2021|

 
Lisa Hecht (Stockholm): “Permissible Risk-Inclination in Other-regarding Choices”

Faced with two or more options, a decision-maker may choose a riskier option for herself even if this option does not maximize her expected utility. When it comes to other-regarding choices, it is less clear whether a decision-maker may permissibly choose a riskier option that does not maximize the expected […]

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    Wolfgang Schwarz (Edinburgh): “Believing Against the Evidence”

Wolfgang Schwarz (Edinburgh): “Believing Against the Evidence”

10 November 2021|

 
Wolfgang Schwarz (Edinburgh): “Believing Against the Evidence”

I will look at cases in which a proposition is supported by an agent’s evidence at an earlier time but not by their evidence at a later time, even though the agent does not receive any new information that is relevant to the proposition. In such a case, I argue, the […]

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    Franz Dietrich (CNRS): “Dynamically Rational Judgment Aggregation”

Franz Dietrich (CNRS): “Dynamically Rational Judgment Aggregation”

25 June 2021|

 

 

Franz Dietrich (CNRS): “Dynamically Rational Judgment Aggregation”

A key goal in judgment aggregation theory has always been to make collective judgments rational. So far, rationality has been understood in purely static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, where ‘coherence’ could for instance mean consistency, or completeness, or deductive closure, or combinations thereof. By contrast, this […]

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    Franz Dietrich (PSE & CNRS) & Kai Spiekermann (LSE): “Does Deliberation Improve Voting Outcomes”

Franz Dietrich (PSE & CNRS) & Kai Spiekermann (LSE): “Does Deliberation Improve Voting Outcomes”

25 June 2021|

 

 

Franz Dietrich (PSE & CNRS) & Kai Spiekermann (LSE): “Does Deliberation Improve Voting Outcomes”

Does prior deliberation increase the epistemic quality of majority voting? This depends on whether the deliberators have private information to share (they are, in a certain sense, “diverse”) and on how the information is aggregated. Without prior deliberation, voting can display three epistemic failures: […]

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    Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”

Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”

16 March 2021|

 

Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”

Revealed preference approaches to modeling choice in the social sciences face seemingly devastating predictive, explanatory, and normative objections. In this talk, I will focus on predictive and explanatory objections, and offer two defenses. First, I argue that when revealed preferences are multiple realizable, revealed preferences can causally explain behavior well. […]

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    Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

10 February 2021|

 

Jessie Munton (Cambridge): “Base rate neglect in the service of modal knowledge”

Are there ever good epistemic reasons to misrepresent base rates? I investigate this question in the context of recent legislation restricting the presentation of gender stereotypes, and the representation of minority groups in children’s books. I argue that our hesitancy around certain base rates makes sense […]

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    Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

20 January 2021|

 

Julia Staffel (Colorado): “Updating Incoherent Credences – Extending the Dutch Strategy Argument for Conditionalization”

In this paper, we ask: how should an agent who has incoherent credences update when they learn new evidence? The standard Bayesian answer for coherent agents is that they should conditionalize; however, this updating rule is not defined for incoherent starting credences. We show […]

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Time for Caution”

25 November 2020|

 

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Time for Caution”

Precautionary principles are frequently appealed to both in public policy and in discussions of good individual decision-making. They prescribe omission or reduction of an activity, or taking precautionary measures whenever potential harmful effects of the activity surpass some threshold of likelihood and severity. One crucial appeal of precautionary principles has been that […]

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    David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

14 October 2020|

 

David Kinney (Santa Fe): “Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences”

Formal and social epistemologists have devoted significant attention to the question of how to aggregate the credences of a group of agents who disagree about the probabilities of events. Most of this work focuses on strategies for calculating the mean credence […]

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    Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

7 October 2020|

 

Aron Vallinder (Forethought Foundation, Oxford): “The Evidentialist’s Wager”

Suppose that an altruistic and morally motivated agent who is uncertain between evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) finds herself in a situation in which the two theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act […]