Decision Theory and Social Choice

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    Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

18 March 2020|

 

Susanne Burri and Bryan Roberts (LSE): “The Good News About Killing People”

We propose a ‘Cautionary News Principle’ when justifying the decision to commit an irreversible act, such as one that involves killing. The principle states that whether such a decision is justified depends on the extent of possible cautionary news in the future, whereas confirmatory news can […]

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    Richard Pettigrew (Bristol): “What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?”

Richard Pettigrew (Bristol): “What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?”

13 November 2019|

 

Richard Pettigrew (Bristol): “What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?”

Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. […]

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    Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and `Debiased’ Welfare Analysis”

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and `Debiased’ Welfare Analysis”

30 October 2019|

 

Johanna Thoma (LSE): “Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and `Debiased’ Welfare Analysis”

Economics has traditionally been opposed to paternalism. However, the findings of behavioural economics have made popular one kind of paternalism that appears to be more innocuous: The kind of paternalism that respects an agent’s ends, or her non-instrumental, intrinsic valuations, […]

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    Catrin Campbell Moore (Bristol): “Imprecise probabilities and undermining scenarios”

Catrin Campbell Moore (Bristol): “Imprecise probabilities and undermining scenarios”

6 November 2018|

 

Catrin Campbell Moore (Bristol): “Imprecise probabilities and undermining scenarios”

Sometimes one ends up in an unfortunate situation when you cannot come to a stable opinion: whatever belief you adopt makes you want to change your mind. I suggest that in such scenarios you should adopt imprecise probabilities.

Catrin Campbell […]

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    Matthew Adler (Duke) “The structure of luck prioritarianism”

Matthew Adler (Duke) “The structure of luck prioritarianism”

30 May 2018|

 

Matthew Adler (Duke) “The structure of luck prioritarianism”

Matthew D. Adler is the Richard A. Horvitz Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, Philosophy and Public Policy at Duke University, and is the founding director of the Duke Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy.

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    Teruji Thomas (Oxford): “The Veil of Ignorance Revisited”

Teruji Thomas (Oxford): “The Veil of Ignorance Revisited”

7 February 2018|

 

Teruji Thomas (Oxford): “The Veil of Ignorance Revisited”

The rough idea of what I call “the veil of ignorance principle” is to identify the moral or “social” point of view with the point of view of a self-interested individual who is uncertain of his or her own identity. In conjunction with expected utility theory (EUT), such a principle […]

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    Anneli Jefferson (Birmingham): “Moral self image and moral decision making”

Anneli Jefferson (Birmingham): “Moral self image and moral decision making”

31 January 2018|

 

Anneli Jefferson (Birmingham): “Moral self image and moral decision making”

Our moral decisions and actions are guided by what we take to be morally permissible and impermissible. In this talk I consider another factor which may affect both our judgment of moral permissibility and our moral conduct, our moral self-image. In particular, I ask whether a positive view […]

Hugh Mellor (Cambridge): “Chances and Conditionals”

17 January 2018|

 

Hugh Mellor (Cambridge): “Chances and Conditionals”

In a projected book, “Most Counterfactuals Are False”, Alan Hájek infers the truth of its title from the ubiquity of chance. I argue in this talk that he is wrong: the ubiquity of chance does not verify his title: chances do not falsify counterfactuals. Single-case chances are perfectly consistent with determinism, i.e. […]

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    Remco Heesen (Cambridge): “Statistical Biases in Peer Review”

Remco Heesen (Cambridge): “Statistical Biases in Peer Review”

29 November 2017|

 

Remco Heesen (Cambridge): “Statistical Biases in Peer Review”

Various biases are known to affect the peer review system, which is used to judge journal articles for their suitability for publication and grant proposals for their suitability for funding. These biases are generally attributed to cognitive biases held by individual peer reviewers. For example, gender bias in peer review […]

Bart Engelen (Tilburg): “Nudging and Rationality”

1 March 2017|

 

Bart Engelen (Tilburg): “Nudging and Rationality”

The literature on nudging has rekindled normative and conceptual debates surrounding both the aims liberal and democratic governments can aim for and the means they can employ. An oft-heard criticism is that nudging governments, by exploiting people’s psychological mechanisms, manipulate them and insufficiently respect their rational decision-making capacities. Bypassing and/or perverting people’s […]