Ali Boyle (Cambridge): “Don’t Ask: Classification in Comparative Cognitive Science”
Many projects in comparative cognitive science (which I mean to include research in both comparative psychology and artificial intelligence) are structured around what I’ll call ‘classificatory questions’ – that is, questions about whether nonhuman cognitive systems have the same cognitive capacities as humans. These projects […]
Lewis Ross (LSE): “Statistics, Epistemic Gaps, and Legal Risk”
Many philosophers suggest that using statistics to attribute legal liability is deeply problematic. A primary worry is that it would be unfair to hold the defending party responsible on the basis of probability alone. My previous work, focusing on criminal law, suggests that this refusal […]
Fernand Gobet (LSE): “Automatic generation of scientific theories using genetic programming”
The aim of this research is to develop a novel way to use computers to ‘evolve’ scientific theories automatically. By using techniques based on genetic programming and simple building blocks (primitive cognitive mechanisms), theories are automatically built, evolved and tested. I will present a system […]
Liam Kofi Bright (LSE): “The Scientists Qua Scientist Makes No Assertion”
Assertions are, speaking roughly, descriptive statements which purport to describe some fact about the world. Philosophers have given a lot of attention to the idea that assertions come with special norms governing their behaviour. Frequently, in fact, philosophers claim that for something to count as an […]
Catrin Campbell Moore (Bristol): “Imprecise probabilities and undermining scenarios”
Sometimes one ends up in an unfortunate situation when you cannot come to a stable opinion: whatever belief you adopt makes you want to change your mind. I suggest that in such scenarios you should adopt imprecise probabilities.
John D. Norton (Pittsburgh): “The Infinite Lottery”
An infinite lottery machine induces a non-standard inductive logic that turns out to be the same logic appropriate to a problem in inductive inference arising in present theories of eternal inflation.
John D. Norton is Distinguished Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, and author of the […]
Anna Alexandrova (Cambridge): “Defining Mental Health”
Today mental health is a universally valued outcome. It is prioritised by governments, hospitals, schools, employers, charities. And yet mental health appears to be prized more as a label than as a concept, because remarkably for a state so uncontroversially prized, it has no accepted definition. In this talk based on joint […]
Jeff McMahan (Oxford): “Might We Benefit Animals by Eating Them?”
Leslie Stephen once wrote that “The pig has a stronger interest than anyone in the demand for bacon. If all the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all.” In recent debates about the ethics of eating animals, some have advanced the related claim that if […]
Hasok Chang (Cambridge): “If you can spray phlogiston, is it real? A pragmatist conception of reality”
Any statements we make in science are about some presumed entities (e.g., hormones, electrons, or the gross national product), unless it is a pure report of sensation within oneself. Entity-realism is prior to truth-realism, since it would not make sense to maintain […]
Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow): “Scrutability and the Problem of Cross-Family Quantification”
In Constructing the World, David Chalmers aims to defend strong reductionist claims he calls “scrutability theses”. One such thesis says, roughly speaking, that every truth about the world could, in principle, be “read off” a complete list of the physical facts and the facts about conscious experience. However, […]
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