GalleryIdeally Value-Free Coronavirus Science
How does the role of scientist relate to the role of policy-maker? Philip Thonemann looks at coronavirus science, public policy and the value free ideal.
GalleryA Virus Is Not a Thing, Part 3: What virology can tell us about philosophy
How can findings in virology help answer ontological questions of process and substance? In the final post in this series, Stephan Guttinger looks at viral life cycles and the role of intrinsic properties.
GalleryA Virus Is Not a Thing, Part 2: Do viruses jump? Process-thinking and the question of pandemics
What happens when a virus crosses species? Stephan Guttinger looks at viral jumps and the origins of pandemics.
GalleryA Virus Is Not a Thing, Part 1: The case for a process view of viruses
It seems natural to picture viruses as individual microscopic entities, but might there be another more accurate way to think about them? In the first of this three-part series, Stephan Guttinger presents the case for a process view of viruses.
GalleryThe Naturalistic Case for Free Will, Part 3: Indeterminism as an Emergent Phenomenon
Could the universe be deterministic at some levels and indeterministic at others? In the final post in this series, Christian List looks at micro and macro levels of description.
GalleryThe Naturalistic Case for Free Will, Part 2: An Indispensability Argument
What are the requirements of free will, and how can we show that these requirements are met? In the second post in this series, Christian List proposes an indispensability argument for the existence of free will.
GalleryThe Naturalistic Case for Free Will, Part 1: The Challenge
Is there space for free will within a scientific worldview? In the first of this three part series, Christian List looks at free will scepticism and outlines his own compatibalist response.
GalleryHow do we know how to act together?
How are humans able to act cooperatively and why don’t we see such behaviour in other primates? Jonathan Birch looks at the concept of “joint know-how”.
GalleryGetting the Details Just Right: Solving the “Goldilocks Problem” of Scientific Explanation
How much detail is the right amount of detail for a scientific explanation? David Kinney looks at getting things just right.
GalleryAfricana Philosophy and the Social Epistemology of Science: an interview with Liam Kofi Bright
Liam Kofi Bright, currently at Carnegie Mellon University, joins LSE Philosophy in September. We thought we’d celebrate his imminent arrival with some questions.
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