GalleryCan beliefs be morally wrong?
It’s clear that beliefs can be wrong about the way the world is, but can they also be wrong in a moral sense? Lewis Ross looks at the moral status of belief.
GalleryScience and policy in extremis, part 2: the limits of SAGE’s neutrality and independence
Scientific advice cannot be completely neutral or independent, says Jonathan Birch. But records from autumn 2020 suggest that the Cabinet Office leant on SAGE to build in optimistic assumptions about the government’s ability to control the pandemic.
GalleryFreedom and Reason: A workshop in honour of Christian List
On 25 June, this one-day workshop will bring together scholars from around the world to celebrate the work of Professor Christian List, who recently moved from LSE to LMU Munich.
Apply Now: One-Year LSE Fellowship in Philosophy
LSE Philosophy seeks applications for a one-year LSE Fellowship in philosophy, to start 1 September 2021.
Apply Now: Assistant Professorship in Philosophy
LSE Philosophy seeks applications for an Assistant Professorship in Philosophy, to start 1 September 2021.
GalleryApply Now: Two-Year LSE Fellowship in Philosophy
LSE Philosophy seeks applications for a two-year LSE Fellowship in Philosophy, to start 1 September 2021.
GalleryAlexander Bird (Cambridge): “Against Empiricism”
Alexander Bird (Cambridge): “Against Empiricism”
Most philosophers of science are realists. Most philosophers of science are, at least implicitly, empiricists. But, I argue, it is not reasonable to be both an empiricist and a realist, because empiricism is motivated by epistemological internalism and realism requires the rejection of internalism. Nor is instrumentalism a reasonable position. So an empiricist […]
GalleryJohn Dougherty (LMU): “I ain’t afraid of no ghost”
John Dougherty (LMU): “I ain’t afraid of no ghost”
This paper criticizes the traditional philosophical account of the quantization of gauge theories and offers an alternative. On the received view, gauge theories resist quantization because they feature distinct mathematical representatives of the same physical state of affairs. This resistance is overcome by a sequence of ad hoc modifications, […]
GalleryZoë Johnson King (USC): “Varieties of Moral Mistake”
Zoë Johnson King (USC): “Varieties of Moral Mistake”
Some philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her action is permissible, this moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one […]
GalleryKate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”
Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”
Revealed preference approaches to modeling choice in the social sciences face seemingly devastating predictive, explanatory, and normative objections. In this talk, I will focus on predictive and explanatory objections, and offer two defenses. First, I argue that when revealed preferences are multiple realizable, revealed preferences can causally explain behavior well. […]
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