Ewan Rodgers

About Ewan Rodgers

Communications and Marketing Manager, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science. E.D.Rodgers@lse.ac.uk

Can beliefs be morally wrong?

4 May 2021|

It’s clear that beliefs can be wrong about the way the world is, but can they also be wrong in a moral sense? Lewis Ross looks at the moral status of belief.

A Morality of Belief?

The bread-and-butter of ethics is working out what sort of actions are morally right and wrong. Is it wrong to spend thousands of pounds on a […]

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    Science and policy in extremis, part 2: the limits of SAGE’s neutrality and independence

Science and policy in extremis, part 2: the limits of SAGE’s neutrality and independence

20 April 2021|

Scientific advice cannot be completely neutral or independent, says Jonathan Birch. But records from autumn 2020 suggest that the Cabinet Office leant on SAGE to build in optimistic assumptions about the government’s ability to control the pandemic.

Freedom and Reason: A workshop in honour of Christian List

1 April 2021|

On 25 June, this one-day workshop will bring together scholars from around the world to celebrate the work of Professor Christian List, who recently moved from LSE to LMU Munich.

Apply Now: One-Year LSE Fellowship in Philosophy

1 April 2021|

LSE Philosophy seeks applications for a one-year LSE Fellowship in philosophy, to start 1 September 2021.

Apply Now: Assistant Professorship in Philosophy

1 April 2021|

LSE Philosophy seeks applications for an Assistant Professorship in Philosophy, to start 1 September 2021.

Apply Now: Two-Year LSE Fellowship in Philosophy

1 April 2021|

LSE Philosophy seeks applications for a two-year LSE Fellowship in Philosophy, to start 1 September 2021.

John Dougherty (LMU): “I ain’t afraid of no ghost”

29 March 2021|

 
John Dougherty (LMU): “I ain’t afraid of no ghost”

This paper criticizes the traditional philosophical account of the quantization of gauge theories and offers an alternative. On the received view, gauge theories resist quantization because they feature distinct mathematical representatives of the same physical state of affairs. This resistance is overcome by a sequence of ad hoc modifications, […]

Zoë Johnson King (USC): “Varieties of Moral Mistake”

17 March 2021|

 
Zoë Johnson King (USC): “Varieties of Moral Mistake”

Some philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her action is permissible, this moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one […]

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    Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”

Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”

16 March 2021|

 
Kate Vredenburgh (LSE): “Causal explanation and revealed preferences”
 
Revealed preference approaches to modeling choice in the social sciences face seemingly devastating predictive, explanatory, and normative objections. In this talk, I will focus on predictive and explanatory objections, and offer two defenses. First, I argue that when revealed preferences are multiple realizable, revealed preferences can causally explain behavior well. […]

Animals, humans and pandemics: what needs to change?

9 March 2021|

How can we mitigate the risks of future pandemics? Jonathan Birch looks at the role of human behaviour in the emergence of new zoonotic diseases.