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June 2022

Miriam Schoenfield (University of Texas at Austin): “Bayesian and Less than Bayesian Treatments of Higher Order Defeat”

1 June 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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In this talk I'll describe the phenomenon of higher order defeat and explain why it isn't well accommodated in a classical Bayesian framework. I'll then discuss two alternatives to the Bayesian picture and explain why I favor one over the other.

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Sara Aronowitz (University of Arizona): TBA

8 June 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
Online via Zoom + Google Map

Abstract: TBA

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Olivier Roy (Bayreuth): “Deliberation, Coherent Aggregation, and Anchoring”

15 June 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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In this talk, I will report on results obtained in collaboration with Soroush Rafiee Rad (UvA, Amsterdam), Maher Abou Zeid (Bayreuth), and Sebastian Braun (Bayreuth) regarding some positive and negative effects of group deliberation. In the first part, we will look at what has been called the meta-agreement hypothesis. The hypothesis states that deliberation can help avoid incoherent group preferences by fostering the creation of meta-agreements, which should ensure single-peaked preferences. I will present results that provide qualified support for this hypothesis. More precisely, the results point toward conditions under which deliberation does help avoid intransitive or cyclic group preferences, either in terms of how open-minded the participants are or the number of alternatives they can choose from. In the second part, I will look at one form of path dependence in deliberation, the so-called anchoring effect, which is when the first speakers carry substantially more weight than the others on the final result of deliberation. Our results show that anchoring frequently occurs, in a way that is correlated with the creation of single-peaked profiles, and that its effect is the strongest in comparison with other factors like expertise or the popularity of opinions. I will conclude by reflecting on balancing such positive and negative effects to arrive at a more nuanced view of what deliberation can and cannot achieve.

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September 2022

Boris Babic (University of Toronto): ‘Resolute and Correlated Bayesians’

21 September 2022, 5:00 pm6:30 pm
Online via Zoom + Google Map

This event will take place online via Zoom. To join online just follow these instructions: Download Zoom Join the event using this link: https://umich.zoom.us/j/94960424116 (Passcode: Ramsey) Please note that these events are routinely recorded, with the edited footage being made publicly available on our website and YouTube channel. We will only record the audio, the slides and the speaker and will not include…

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Dario Krpan (LSE): ‘How to Increase the Amount of Knowledge That Psychological and Behavioural Science as a Discipline Produces?’

28 September 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: The fundamental goal of science is to increase scientific knowledge—that is, to continuously generate more accurate explanations of various natural phenomena, from black holes to human behaviour. In an ideal world, finding the best possible explanations would require testing and comparing “all possible theories”, because this would allow objectively identifying the most accurate ones. In practice, however, this is not…

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October 2022

Shlomi Segall (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem): How It Matters that One (Necessary) Person is Worse off than Another (Possible) Person

5 October 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Suppose you could either do (A.) bring about Tom at 50 and Harry at 71, or (B.) Tom at 70 and Dick at 50. According to Derek Parfit’s No Difference View we should opt for A. Perhaps the most prominent alternative to Parfit’s view, namely Michael Otsuka and Larry Temkin ‘Shortfall Complaints’ view holds that we should opt for B.…

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Adam Lovett (LSE): ‘Deontology and Contact with Value’

12 October 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: On the face of it, there are many different kinds of deontological duty. We should keep our promises; we should pay our debts of gratitude; we should compensate those we’ve wronged; we should avoid doing or intending harm. These constitute, some worry, an unconnected heap of duties: the deontological realm is messy and disorganized. In this paper, we provide a…

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Helen Frowe (Stockholm University): Assisting the Assisters: The Comparative Claims of Afghan Refugees

19 October 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Many people believe that Western states withdrawing from Afghanistan owe especially stringent duties of rescue to Afghans who provided ‘frontline’ assistance to their armed forces – for example, by working alongside troops as translators or interpreters. These putative duties are typically defended by pointing to the gratitudinal or promissory duties that Western states owe to these assisters. In this…

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Kevin Zollman (Carnegie Mellon University): Individual rationality and social pathology: the case of pluralistic ignorance

26 October 2022, 5:00 pm6:30 pm
Online via Zoom + Google Map

Abstract: Social epistemic pathologies plague our society. We perpetually find polarization, pluralistic ignorance, the spread of fake news, online mobbing, and others. Some scholars attribute these social pathologies to individual irrationality. Fake news spreads because people are not careful consumers of news. Polarization occurs because of irrational attachments to political positions. And so on. In this talk, I will argue…

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November 2022

Choice Group Seminar: PhD Session with Bele and Kangyu

9 November 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Special PhD Session including two talks! What makes life meaningful? Speaker: Kangyu Wang, PhD student at LSE Philosophy Abstract: What, if anything, gives rise to the meaning of life? I aim to propose a novel subjectivist answer, which I shall call meaning-in-deed. I will, after introducing the background, proceed as follows: first, I explain meaning-in-deed and clarify some crucial points.…

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Choice Group Seminar: PhD Session with Lea Bourguignon and Somayeh Tohidi

16 November 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Special PhD Session including two talks! On the possibility of Act Contractualism Speaker: Lea Bourguignon, PhD student at LSE Philosophy Abstract: A well-known debate in the normative ethical literature is that between proponents of Act Consequentialism and Rule Consequentialism. Given the structural similarities between Rule Consequentialism and Scanlonian Contractualism, one might expect a similar debate to arise among contractualists. However, this…

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Andrew Reisner (Uppsala University): An ecumenical argument for pragmatic reasons for belief

23 November 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Although philosophical opinion has begun to shift in the last decade, it remains the dominant view in philosophy that all normative reasons for belief are in a broad sense alethic – that they related to the truth or indicators of the truth of the belief for which they are reasons. In this talk, I shall present what might be…

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Toby Solomon (LMU): Libertarian Decision Theory

30 November 2022, 5:00 pm6:30 pm
Online via Zoom + Google Map

Abstract: Causal Decision Theory has difficulty dealing with the possibility that our choices are predetermined. Many have responded to this problem by suggesting that rational decision-making in some sense presupposes that our choices are free. In this talk I offer a new decision theory—Libertarian Decision Theory—which precisely formalises this idea while retaining what Causal Decision Theory gets right. The primary…

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December 2022

CANCELLED! Atoosa Kasirzadeh (The University of Edinburgh)

7 December 2022, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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  This event has been cancelled.    

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January 2023

Nikhil Venkatesh (LSE): ‘Collectivist Consequentialism: what utilitarians can learn from Marx’

18 January 2023, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Sometimes, some individual could be the proximate cause of a bad outcome; however, if they do not play this role, someone else will, with even worse consequences. In such cases, act-consequentialism provides reasons for agents to cause the bad outcome themselves: even though, if everybody refrained from such actions, the outcome would be better. Call these cases of pre-emption. Such…

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Polaris Koi (University of Turku): ‘What are my options?’

25 January 2023, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: This paper seeks to understand decision set constituents, that is, options. When agents form intentions and make choices, the intending and choosing is only meaningful because the agent is selecting from a set of options. In much theorizing about intending, choosing and acting, including philosophical approaches to neuroscience and free will as well as decision theory, the presence of a…

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March 2023

Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick): On trusting your own political judgment

8 March 2023, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: A standard view in political philosophy holds that citizens are entitled to trust their own political judgment and that they thus can’t be required to politically defer to others. The entitlement for political self-trust appears to be well-supported on political, moral, and epistemic grounds. Yet, contemporary political debate appears to be hampered by too much political self-trust. Excessive political self-trust…

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Gerard Rothfus (UNC Chapel Hill): ‘Dignity and Uncertainty’

22 March 2023, 5:00 pm6:30 pm
Online via Zoom + Google Map

Abstract: The application of deontological moral principles in contexts of factual uncertainty has received increased attention within moral philosophy in recent years. While consequentialist reasoning is thought to be easily extendable to such contexts via standard decision theory, there is less consensus regarding how deontologists should approach moral deliberation when potentially relevant empirical facts are unknown. This talk surveys some…

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Daniel Hoek (Virginia Tech): ‘The Trouble with Belief Fragmentation, Or: Why You Can’t Steer By an Atlas’

29 March 2023, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: According to fragmentation theories of belief, our decision making is guided by a multiplicity of independent, compartmentalized belief states. In this paper, I raise a challenge to this increasingly popular view, arguing that the purported benefits of fragmentation come at the cost of abandoning some of the central explanatory roles of belief. This is not a price worth paying. Adequately addressing this challenge,…

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May 2023

Jussi Suikkanen (University of Birmingham): ‘Act- and Rule-Consequentialism – Two Syntheses’

24 May 2023, 4:30 pm6:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: As an indirect ethical theory, rule-consequentialism first evaluates moral codes in terms of how good the consequences of their general adoption are and then individual actions in terms of whether the optimific code authorises them or not. There are three well-known and powerful objections to rule-consequentialism’s indirect structure: the ideal world objection, the rule worship objection, and the incoherence objection.…

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