In this issue, Niamh Dunne (WP6/2017) explores the concept of market liberalisation in both its technical and more-disputed normative dimensions, seeking to situate the latter within an understanding of the functioning—and limitations—of the former;
Joanna Benjamin (WP7/2017) proposes the recognition of two categories of holding—traditional securities and collateral depositary receipts—as a solution to the disenfranchisement of investors in indirectly held securities;
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens (WP8/2017) argues for a richer, substantive conception of democracy in UK constitutional law;
Mathias Habersack (WP9/2017) questions the ongoing legitimacy of the non-frustration rule and the mandatory bid rule principles underlying the Takeover Bid Directive, and argues for reform;
Emmanuel Melissaris (WP10/2017) argues that solidarity has no normative antecedent and lies at the foundation of all political relations, generating reasons to treat everyone in an open and inclusive manner;
Kai Möller (WP11/2017) reconstructs Dworkin’s theory of rights as ‘trumps’ and reconciles it with the dominant, proportionality-based strand of rights discourse;
Jo Braithwaite (WP12/2017) considers recent cases to assess the extent and implications of the spread of the doctrine of contractual estoppel after Springwell, explaining the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ limits of the doctrine;
Philipp Paech (WP13/2017) discusses financial institutions’ repo and derivatives portfolios, arguing that their systemic stability concerns are best addressed through regulation, whereas specific insolvency safe harbours are guarantors of high levels of liquidity;
Kai Möller (WP14/2017) argues that ritual male circumcision is not covered by parental authority because it violates the human rights of the boy on whom it is imposed, and proposes to supplement the best interest of the child test with the autonomy conception of parental authority, according to which parental authority must be exercised such as to ensure that the child will become an autonomous adult;
Michèle Finck (WP15/2017) examines digital data-driven platforms and their impact on contemporary regulatory paradigms to conclude that co-regulation is more suitable than self-regulation or top-down legislative intervention as the legal framework for the platform economy;
and Philipp Paech (WP16/2017) develops a conceptual framework for the governance of blockchain-based networks in financial markets through financial regulation and private law, in order to protect market participants and societies at large while at the same time allowing room for innovation.