The research focuses on NATO because there is currently a readiness to listen to alternative thinking and the core of the nuclear problem is the nuclear rivalry between the United States and Russia. This opening for new approaches to deterrence is partly a consequence of the war in Ukraine, as well as other factors such as the enlargement of NATO to include Finland and Sweden, the increased role of the European pillar, especially during the Trump years. In particular, the frontline states (those states bordering on Russia, particularly the Baltic states and Poland) already favour what they call comprehensive defence or deterrence by denial as an alternative to the tripwire.
The project covers four main topics:
1. The history and current debate around the concept. It will cover discussions in the 1980s as well as current ideas about deterrence by denial instead of deterrence by retaliation and punishment, and parallel concepts such as the Nordic idea of comprehensive defence or the recent adoption by NATO of human security.
2. What the concept might mean for conventional postures, especially in NATO and the front-line states, the implications for the balance between spending on procurement, logistics, and manpower as well as types of equipment, and levels of military spending; and how it might affect the evolution of new technologies such as AI, cyber, space or robotics. The project also considers the so-called frontline states for hybrid threats, such as the Balkan countries and other countries in the Southeast Europe. Countries like Poland and the Baltic countries are NATO frontline states for conventional military threats, but the Balkan countries are increasingly targeted by hybrid threats, such as disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks.
3. Political and economic aspects of non-nuclear deterrence. Deterrence is all about political signalling and messaging, so communication and co-operation are also important elements of deterrence. The role of civil society is critical, both as a way of mobilising around comprehensive defence or defence in depth, and as a way of creating spaces within authoritarian states where peace issues can be discussed. Threats of economic sanctions are also components of non-deterrence but there needs to be analysis of the way sanctions affect attitudes both at the level of regimes and at the level of civil society, and how far they can provide obstacles to the development of technology and military capabilities.
4. The implications of adopting non-nuclear deterrence for nuclear arms control and disarmament. The project will come up with some specific recommendations such as ending NATOs opposition to TPNW, reinstating already existing agreements such as INF or START, what might be done to slow down and even halt current modernisation plans.