Investigating Non-nuclear Deterrence
Investigating Non-nuclear Deterrence
Project Duration: March 2024 - January 2026
This two-year research project seeks to cover the history and current debates about non-nuclear deterrence; the idea of defensive, comprehensive or in-depth defence and what this means for manpower, equipment, and new technologies; the economic and political aspects of non-nuclear deterrence; and the implications for nuclear arms control and disarmament.
Project Aims
The aim of this project is to rethink the concept of deterrence as a non-nuclear concept. It draws on earlier concepts of defensive defence or deterrence by denial and investigates what these ideas might mean in practical terms. The project also aims to show that such an approach is practicable and indeed may be effective as a mechanism for preventing war since it is likely to be more credible than the threat of nuclear retaliation and more capable of mobilising public support. Were such an approach to be widely adopted, this would greatly strengthen a rules-based international system and enable progress in reducing nuclear arsenals.
Research Design and Methodology
The project seeks to build on an existing collaborative framework so as to draw on a range of skills and knowledge in different areas, both geographical and thematic. Through evidence-based research guided and supervised by a core group of practitioners, academics, and civil society activists from Europe and North America, the project will commission background research papers and co-author a final report. The final report will be disseminated widely in the media and among relevant institutions. Members of the research group will engage in debates about the topic taking place in various for a, including NATO and the EU. The research will result in a report from the core group as well as background papers.
Project Objectives
- The history and current debate around the concept. It will cover discussions in the 1980s as well as current ideas about deterrence by denial instead of deterrence by retaliation and punishment, and parallel concepts such as the Nordic idea of comprehensive defence or the recent adoption by NATO of human security.
- What the concept might mean for conventional postures, especially in NATO and the front-line states, the implications for the balance between spending on procurement, logistics, and manpower as well as types of equipment, and levels of military spending; and how it might affect the evolution of new technologies such as AI, cyber, space or robotics. The project also considers the so-called frontline states for hybrid threats, such as the Balkan countries and other countries in the Southeast Europe. Countries like Poland and the Baltic countries are NATO frontline states for conventional military threats, but the Balkan countries are increasingly targeted by hybrid threats, such as disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks.
- Political and economic aspects of non-nuclear deterrence. Deterrence is all about political signalling and messaging, so communication and co-operation are also important elements of deterrence. The role of civil society is critical, both as a way of mobilising around comprehensive defence or defence in depth, and as a way of creating spaces within authoritarian states where peace issues can be discussed. Threats of economic sanctions are also components of non-deterrence but there needs to be analysis of the way sanctions affect attitudes both at the level of regimes and at the level of civil society, and how far they can provide obstacles to the development of technology and military capabilities.
- The implications of adopting non-nuclear deterrence for nuclear arms control and disarmament. The project will come up with some specific recommendations such as ending NATOs opposition to TPNW, reinstating already existing agreements such as INF or START, what might be done to slow down and even halt current modernisation plans.
