British Society for the Philosophy of Science Lecture

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November 2013

David Corfield (Kent): “Homotopy Type Theory; a revolutionary language for philosophy of logic; mathematics; and physics?”

25 November 2013, 5:15 pm

Monday 25th November; 17:15pm BSPS Speaker: David Corfield (Kent) Title: Homotopy Type Theory; a revolutionary language for philosophy of logic; mathematics; and physics?

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January 2014

Joseph Melia (Leeds; Oxford): The Hole Argument; Particle Permutations and Structuralism

27 January 2014, 5:15 pm6:45 pm

27 January 2014 Joseph Melia (Leeds; Oxford) The Hole Argument; Particle Permutations and Structuralism

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March 2014

Julian Reiss (Durham): Two Approaches to Reasoning from Evidence or Why We Need a Theory of Inferential Judgement

10 March 2014, 5:15 pm6:45 pm

Abstract: There are two paradigms of reasoning from evidence at work in the biomedical and social sciences: the experimental and the inferential. The experimental paradigm is currently dominant in all the domains labelled

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June 2014

Katie Steele (LSE): Climate Models; Calibration and Confirmation

9 June 2014, 5:15 pm6:45 pm

9 June 2014 Katie Steele (LSE) Climate Models; Calibration and Confirmation Model-Selection Methods & the

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October 2014

Ellen Clarke (Oxford): How to count organisms

13 October 2014, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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abstract tbc

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November 2014

Bryan W. Roberts (LSE): Curie’s hazard: From electromagnetism to symmetry violation

24 November 2014, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom

Abstract: We explore the facts and fiction regarding Curie’s own example of Curie’s principle, one of the more famous symmetry principles in modern science. Curie’s claim is vindicated in his suggested example of the electrostatics of central fields, but not without difficulty, and Curie’s claim turns out to fail in many others. Nevertheless, the failure of Curie’s claim is still…

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March 2015

Peter Vickers (Durham): Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Challenge from the History of Science

16 March 2015, 5:15 pm6:45 pm

abstract tbc

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June 2015

Nicholas Shea (KCL): Functions for Representation

8 June 2015, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom

Abstract: In the cognitive sciences, representations play a central role in explaining behaviour. Characteristically, representing correctly explains successful behaviour and misrepresentation explains failure. The standards of success and failure at play here are often tacit. What are they based on? Teleosemantics offers one answer: success is a matter of performing an evolutionary function. This paper uses case studies from cognitive…

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October 2015

Jonathan Birch (LSE): “Kin selection, group selection and cultural change”

12 October 2015, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: The relationship between kin and group selection is a vexed issue in evolutionary theory, and matters are not helped by a tendency to conflate questions of methodology with questions of causal reality. Drawing inspiration from W. D. Hamilton, I suggest we conceptualise the distinction between kin and group selection in terms of differences of degree in the structural features of…

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November 2015

Eran Tal (Cambridge): “The Shifting Economies of Measurement Uncertainty”

23 November 2015, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: TBA

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March 2016

Anna Mahtani (LSE): “Knowledge and the Sure Thing Principle”

14 March 2016, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Suppose that you were to discover that there is some piece of evidence E that you don't currently know, and that E is evidence in favour of some proposition P. Should you increase your credence in P in the light of this piece of information? I argue that this suggestion seems compelling, but it cannot always be rational to adjust…

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May 2016

James Ladyman (Bristol): “The Hole Argument and Homotopy Type Theory”

16 May 2016, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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It has been argued that thinking in terms of univalent Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT) blocks the Hole Argument. In this talk I consider how this kind of argument might be made rigorous and whether it works. I argue that HoTT can be used to block the hole argument but that, contrary to what is some have claimed, it does not automatically do so … #BSPSLecture

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October 2016

Wendy Parker (Durham): “Scientific Modelling and Limits to the Value-Free Ideal” (BSPS Lecture)

10 October 2016, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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According to the value-free ideal, the internal workings of science, including the evaluation of evidence, should be kept free from the influence of non-epistemic values as much as possible. We identify an underappreciated limit on the extent to which the value-free ideal can be achieved in practice.

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November 2016

Luke Fenton-Glynn (UCL): “Probabilistic Actual Causation” (BSPS Lecture)

21 November 2016, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Actual (token) causation – the sort of causal relation asserted to hold by claims like the Chicxulub impact caused the Cretaceous-Paleogene exitinction event, Mr. Fairchild’s exposure to asbestos caused him to suffer mesothelioma, and the H7N9 virus outbreak was caused by poultry farmers becoming simultaneously infected by bird and human ‘flu strains – is of significance to scientists, historians, and tort and criminal lawyers. It also plays a role in theories of various philosophically important concepts, such as action, decision, explanation, knowledge, perception, reference, and moral responsibility. Yet there is little consensus on how actual causation is to be understood, particularly where actual causes work only probabilistically. I use probabilistic causal models to cast some light on the nature of probabilistic actual causation.

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January 2017

Marta Halina (Cambridge HPS): “The role of values in animal cognition research” (BSPS Lecture)

16 January 2017, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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In this talk, I argue for the importance of non-epistemic values in evaluating claims about nonhuman animal mindreading. I show how taking these values into account reveals that the consequences of false negatives are much worse than traditionally conceived.

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March 2017

Karim Thébault (Bristol): “Cosmic Singularity Resolution via Quantum Evolution” (BSPS Lecture)

13 March 2017, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Classical models of the universe generically feature a big bang singularity. That is, when we consider progressively earlier and earlier times, physical quantities stop behaving in a reasonable way. A particular problem is that physical quantities related to the curvature of spacetime become divergent. A long standing hope is that a theory of quantum gravity would "resolve" the big bang…

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June 2017

Heather Dyke (LSE): “Experience of Passage in a Static World” (BSPS Lecture)

12 June 2017, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: The view that experience seems to tell us directly that time flows has long been accepted by both A-theorists and B-theorists in the philosophy of time. A-theorists take it as a powerful endorsement of their position, sometimes using it explicitly in an argument for their view, and other times more implicitly, as a kind of non-negotiable, experiential given. B-theorists…

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October 2017

Parallel Universes (the Forum/BSPS Lecture)

23 October 2017, 6:30 pm8:00 pm
Wolfson Theatre, New Academic Building, London School of Economics
London, WC2A 3LJ United Kingdom
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Is Schrödinger’s cat alive or dead? This thought experiment was devised to illustrate a fundamental puzzle in quantum mechanics. A radical solution is that the cat is both alive and dead, but in different, parallel universes. This is the ‘many-worlds interpretation’ of quantum mechanics and our panel of philosophers and physicists will discuss why it is controversial and its strange consequences.

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March 2018

Tudor M Baetu (Bristol): “Pain in Psychology, Biology and Medicine. Implications for Eliminativist and Physicalist Accounts” (BSPS Lecture)

12 March 2018, 5:15 pm6:45 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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An analysis of arguments for pain eliminativism reveals two significant points of divergence between assumptions underlying scientific research on pain and assumptions typically endorsed by physicalist accounts. The first concerns the status of the term ‘pain’, which is an operationalized description of a phenomenon, rather than an explanatory construct. The second concerns an explicit cause-effect model according to which pain is produced by neural mechanisms and causally determined by a variety of biological, psychological and social factors, as opposed to an identity model according to which pain is a physical structure, process or mechanism. These discrepancies undermine eliminativism, rendering it untenable from the standpoint of contemporary scientific research. More generally, they also hinder attempts to integrate scientific findings under the conceptual frameworks of physicalism.

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May 2019

Replication Crisis? (Forum for Philosophy)

28 May 2019, 6:30 pm8:00 pm
Old Theatre, Old Building, London School of Economics, Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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The hallmark of good science is often supposed to be experiments that produce the same results when repeated. But over the last number of years, scientists have replicated a number of established, high-profile experiments and produced different results. Does it point to serious flaws and biases in the sciences? Or it is evidence of the power of science to self-correct? And what can be done to make science more replicable? We explore whether the replication crisis undermines our trust in science.

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