Dr Timothy Liau

Dr Timothy Liau

Assistant Professor of Law

LSE Law School

Room No
Cheng Kin Ku Building 6.14
Languages
English, French, Mandarin
Key Expertise
Private Law

About me

Tim is a private and commercial lawyer with specialist research and teaching expertise in the laws of contract,  restitution, remedies, and private law theory. Before joining LSE, Tim was Assistant Professor (tenure-track) at the National University of Singapore, and prior to that Stipendiary Lecturer in Law at Merton College, University of Oxford, where he also taught Commercial Remedies on the BCL.

Tim’s research has involved issues and themes which cut across the laws of obligations and property. He is the author of Standing in Private Law: Powers of Enforcement in the Law of Obligations and Trusts (OUP 2023) (synopsis and reviews below), awarded the Society of Legal Scholars’ Peter Birks prize in 2024. He has also written about narrower topics like contractual interpretation, misrepresentation, no-oral-modification clauses, privity of contract, and proprietary restitution. Currently he is working on several projects, including on contractual remedies, restitution from public authorities, the enforcement of trusts, and declaratory judgments.

His work has been cited by the Singapore High Court and Court of Appeal, and Australia’s apex court: the High Court of Australia. It has also been cited in leading texts like Goff & Jones on Unjust Enrichment, Lewin on Trusts, and Chitty on Contracts.

Tim obtained his BCL, MPhil, and DPhil from the University of Oxford, where he was a Clarendon Scholar and Graduate Prize Scholar at Merton College. He graduated as top student from the National University of Singapore, where he read for his LLB.

Research interests

Private law, especially contracts, restitution, remedies, and private law theory

Teaching

Books

Standing in Private Law (OUP 2023)

Standing in Private Law: Powers of Enforcement in the Law of Obligations and Trusts develops the idea that we should attend more to 'standing', conceived as a power to hold another accountable before a court as a distinct private law concept. Prominent lawyers have claimed that private law does not have or need standing rules, yet this seems implausible. If private law is obligation-imposing, we need rules about who can sue on these obligations to hold their bearers accountable. This book argues that a reason why standing has been relatively overlooked and under-conceptualized, receiving meagre attention from private lawyers, is because it has been obscured from plain sight: it has been swallowed up by the more dominant and capacious concept of a 'right'. However, standing is a distinct and separable private law concept that can and should be distinguished more clearly from 'right'. Doing so is necessary for the continued rational development of private law doctrine. It is also necessary for a deeper theoretical understanding of standing's significance, and its place within the remedial apparatus of private law. This book argues that an implicit standing rule exists across the law of obligations. It examines its justifiability, and the justifiability of exceptions to the rule. It also shows how and why recognising standing's distinctiveness can help us to interpret, develop, and resolve debates within different areas of private law, including the laws of contract, torts, unjust enrichments, and relatedly, the law of trusts.

click here for publisher's site

Foreword to the book by the Honourable Justice James Edelman, High Court of Australia

Reviews:
Alexander Georgiou, (2024) 83(1) Cambridge Law Journal 184
- Ross Cranston KC FBA, (2023) 38(9) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 638

Publications