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Term-limited leaders are more likely to respond to financial crises by helping banks—and themselves—over the public

Monday 2 November 2026

When a financial crisis hits, do politicians act in the interests of the public or the banks?

Writing for ProMarket, Visiting Senior Fellow Dr Orkun Saka, Dr Yuemei Ji, and Dr Clement Minaudier share findings from their recent research in the International Economic Review. Drawing on their dataset compiling four decades of financial policy in 88 democracies, they show that leaders facing a binding term limit respond to crises differently from those seeking re-election.

After a crisis, financial liberalisation falls by around 3% under leaders facing re-election, while it falls by more than 9% under term-limited leaders. Term-limited leaders are also more likely to raise barriers to entry and bail out banks. The authors write that these policies favour incumbent banks without improving financial stability. Thus, they argue that crises are not always good for reform and who holds power during a crisis shapes whose interests new rules serve.

Orkun Saka
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