Hili Razinsky (University of Lisbon): “Rational judgement and action under ambivalence”

Abstract: Ambivalence can typically be defined as the holding by a single person of two opposing attitudes towards the same thing. Ambivalence is denied and marginalized by a variety of approaches, and yet is pervasive and central both in the lives of individuals and in public life. My book argues that ambivalence is a rational and unitary (yes!) engagement, and defends revised accounts of subjectivity, rationality, belief, and desire-action relations. Analysing ambivalence of value judgement, I argue that we often aptly judge that two irreducibly conflicting things hold together, for example we ambivalently judge that some action both ought and ought not to be done. This goes hand in hand with a study of the relations of ambivalence with deliberation on the one hand, and with action on the other. Here I argue that it is inherent to action that people can quite successfully act on both of their opposing attitudes together. In the talk we’ll retrace some of the problems and consider some aspects of my positive investigation.