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November 2013

Mike Otsuka (LSE): How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one would have been

12 November 2013, 2:00 pm

Tuesday 12th November; 14:00pm POPPER Speaker: Professor Mike Otsuka (LSE) Title: How it Makes a Moral Difference that One is Worse Off than One Would Have Been

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Igal Kvart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem): The Semantic Autonomy of Knowledge

26 November 2013, 2:00 pm3:30 pm

Tuesday 26th November; 14:00pm POPPER Speaker: Igal Kvart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Title: The Semantic Autonomy of Knowledge

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December 2013

Hanna Pickard (Oxford): “Responsibility without blame… but with forgiveness?”

3 December 2013, 2:00 pm3:30 pm

Popper Seminar Tuesday 3rd December

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January 2014

Ben Sachs (St Andrews): Moral Theorising as an Explanatory Project

14 January 2014, 2:00 pm3:30 pm

Tuesday 14th January

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March 2014

Miklos Redei (LSE): Defusing Bertrand’s Paradox

4 March 2014, 2:00 pm3:30 pm

Speaker: Miklos Redei (LSE) Date/Time: March

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June 2014

Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund): From Values to Probabilities

10 June 2014, 2:00 pm3:30 pm

Tuesday 10th June

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October 2014

John Worrall: ACES high? Or “Placebo Mania”?

28 October 2014, 2:00 pm4:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract tbc

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November 2014

Tom Dougherty: The Communication of Consent

18 November 2014, 2:00 pm4:00 pm

Abstract tbc

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December 2014

Catherine Z. Elgin (Harvard): The Value of Fallibilism

9 December 2014, 2:00 pm4:00 pm

Abstract: Fallibilism is a concession to the permanent possibility of error. As a stance, it teeters between skepticism and dogmatism. 'I know but I might be wrong' seems to give assurance with one breath and take it away with the next. 'I know even though I might be wrong' seems to combine intellectual arrogance with mock modesty. I argue that…

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March 2015

Bryan Roberts (LSE): On the meaning of time reversal

10 March 2015, 2:00 pm4:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Time reversal is a 20th century concept that led to major advances in the foundations of physics, as well as the philosophical analysis of the direction of time. But its meaning is far from obvious. In part this is because "reversing time" is not a transformation that anyone can operationally carry out. In this talk, I discuss the variety…

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May 2015

Peter Achinstein (Johns Hopkins): Who needs proof: James Clerk Maxwell on Scientific method

5 May 2015, 2:00 pm4:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Isaac Newton famously claimed that hypotheses, i.e., unproved propositions, have no place in "experimental philosophy."  James Clerk Maxwell disagreed and proposed three methods that can legitimately be employed when a scientist lacks proof for a theory, or even a theory to be proved.  What are these methods, and are they legitimate?

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June 2015

David Liggins (Manchester): Truth without truths

2 June 2015, 2:00 pm4:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: I introduce a new account of truth, called ‘alethic nihilism’. Alethic nihilism is modelled on sceptical theories in other areas, such as the nominalist view that there are no abstract objects, and the moral nihilist view that nothing is objectively prescribed. The most striking part of alethic nihilism is its claim that nothing is true. So, according to alethic…

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Sherri Roush (KCL): Knowledge of our own Beliefs

16 June 2015, 2:00 pm4:00 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: I argue that knowledge of our own beliefs is not required by probabilistic coherence, because, contrary to long-standing consensus, failure to be confident or accurate about one's degrees of belief need not make one vulnerable to sure loss. I discuss the implications of this, e.g., for decision-making about implicit bias.

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October 2015

Heather Dyke (LSE): “On Methodology in the Metaphysics of Time”

13 October 2015, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: I examine some of the methodologies employed in recent and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, and argue that we cannot expect them to be fruitful in helping us discover the fundamental nature of time. The strategies I focus on are: the burden-of-proof strategy, the appeal to common sense intuitions, and the appeal to the nature of ordinary…

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November 2015

Jonathan Birch (LSE): “Shared Know How”

3 November 2015, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Know how is distinguished from other epistemic states by its special role in basic intentional action. I argue that we can characterize a shared epistemic state, 'shared know how’, that plays an analogous role in basic intentional joint action. This leads to the question: how does shared know how relate to individual know how? Does the former reduce to the latter, or…

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Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge): “Responding to Wrongdoing”

17 November 2015, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: When we engage in moral criticism, it matters to us what the other party did intentionally. We blame others for their wrong actions by saying that they "did it on purpose" or that they "knew exactly what they were doing". We say that we didn't mean to harm, didn't intend to offend, or didn't know which consequences our action…

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January 2016

Cecile Fabre (Oxford): “Third-Party Economic Sanctions”

12 January 2016, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: Economic sanctions have become a staple of foreign policy. The relatively scant philosophical literature on the topic tends to focus on three questions, and tackles one kind of cases. It focuses on the question of whether just war theory provides a useful normative framework for assessing the morality of sanctions; whether sanctions are effective; and whether the harms which…

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March 2016

Susanne Burri (LSE): “How Death is Bad for the Person Who Dies”

22 March 2016, 2:00 pm3:30 pm
LAK 2.06, Lakatos Building
London, WC2A 2AE United Kingdom
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Abstract: It is uncontroversial that a person's death can be a terrible misfortune for other people. To lose someone you love can be an immensely painful and disruptive experience. But is there also a sense in which death can be bad for the person who dies? Most people intuitively think so. In the philosophical literature, the currently most favoured explanation of…

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