On the Coevolution of Cooperation and Social Institutions (with Balazs Szentes). R&R at the European Economic Review.
This paper considers an environment cohabited by selfish individuals andunconditional cooperators. Individuals are randomly matched and play thePrisoner’s Dilemma Game. Institutional capital facilitates cooperation amongplayers and selfish individuals have to pay a cost in order to identify situationswhere defection is unpunished. This paper considers the coevolution of typesand institutional capital. Both the type distribution and capital evolve accord-ing to a myopic best-response dynamics. The set of equilibria are shown to bePareto ranked. The main result is that any equilibrium level of institutionalcapital exceeds the long-run optimal amount. So, the long-run optimal insti-tutions don’t only maintain a more cooperative culture but are also cheaperthan equilibrium ones.
Works in progress
Equilibrium Effects of a billion trees on ecosystems and livelihoods: Evidence from Pakistan (with Amen Jalal and Mathieu Decuyper)
Land titling and anticipatory land use change in Colombia's 1961 Land Reform