Dr Daniel Gottlieb

Dr Daniel Gottlieb

Associate Professor of Managerial Economics and Strategy

Department of Management

Telephone
+44 (0)20 7107 5677
Room No
NAB 5.30
Languages
English
Key Expertise
Theory of contracts, behavioral economics, insurance markets

About me

Daniel Gottlieb is an Associate Professor at the London School of Economics. His research interests focus in the theory of contracts and in behavioral economics, especially as they apply to insurance markets. His research blends theory with field experiments, lab experiments, and observational data. His work has been published in Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Financial Economics, and many other journals. Previous to the London School of Economics, Professor Gottlieb was at Washington University’s Olin School of Business and at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and a visiting researcher at Harvard University and Princeton University. He received his PhD from MIT in 2009 and is originally from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Publications:

  • Time Lotteries and Stochastic Impatience with Patrick DeJarnette, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva, Econometrica, Forthcoming
  • Moral Incentives in Credit Card Debt Repayment: Evidence from a Field Experimentwith Leonardo Bursztyn, Stefano Fiorin, and Martin Kanz, Journal of Political Economy, 2019
  • The Generalized Informativeness Principle with Pierre Chaigneau and Alex Edmans, Games and Economic Behavior, 2019
  • An Example of Non-Existence of Riley Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection with Eduardo Azevedo, Games and Economic Behavior, 2019
  • Narrow Framing and Long-Term Care Insurance: Evidence from the HRS with Olivia S. Mitchell, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2019
  • Does Improved Information Improve Incentives? with Pierre Chaigneau and Alex Edmans, Journal of Financial Economics, 2018
  • Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection with Eduardo Azevedo, Econometrica, 2017
  • Experimentation and Project Selection: Screening and Learning with Renato Gomes and Lucas Maestri, Games and Economic Behavior, 2016
  • Imperfect Memory and Choice Under Risk, Games and Economic Behavior, 2014
  • Risk-Neutral Firms Can Extract Unbounded Profits from Consumers with Prospect Theory Preferences with Eduardo Azevedo, Journal of Economic Theory, 2012
  • Should Educational Policies Be Regressive? with Humberto Moreira, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012
  • Competition Over Time-Inconsistent Consumers, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008
  • A Model of Mixed Signals with Applications to Countersignaling with Aloisio Araujo and Humberto Moreira, RAND Journal of Economics, 2007
  • Asymmetric Information in late 19th century Cooperative Insurance Societies, Explorations in Economic History, 2007

Working papers:

  • Lapse-Based Insurance with Kent Smetters
  • Long-Term Contracting with Time-Inconsistent Agents with Xingtan Zhang
  • Will You Never Learn? Self Deception and Biases in Information Processing
  • Prospect Theory, Life Insurance, and Annuities
  • Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Humberto Moreira
  • The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability with Pierre Chaigneau and Alex Edmans
  • Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Humberto Moreira
  • Thinking and Deciding with Matthew Rabin

 Twitter

Expertise Details

Theory of contracts; behavioral economics; insurance markets