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Work in Progress Seminars 2025-26

Winter Term 2025 - 2026

Tuesdays 12-1pm
Winter Term Venue: CBG.2.02

20 January

There will be two 25-minute presentations of ongoing PhD projects by:

  • Aris Grivokostopoulos
  • Pricing Sovereignty: Financial Control and Borrowing Costs in the Age of Empire
  • Abstract : Did capital markets place a measurable price on the loss of fiscal sovereignty? This paper examines whether distressed states that accepted external financial control received a "credibility dividend" in the form of lower borrowing costs, and how any such effect compares with other institutional signals studied in the literature: gold standard adherence, imperial affiliation, and regime type. Using monthly bond quotations from the London market drawn from the Investor's Monthly Manual and related archival series, I construct sovereign spreads over British Consols for Greece, the Ottoman Empire, and Egypt around the establishment of their respective international supervision regimes. The empirical strategy employs synthetic control methods, but pays close attention to a distinction largely overlooked in prior work: whether spreads are calculated using original contractual coupons or the restructured coupons investors actually received. In the Greek case, this distinction produces a sign flip. Spreads based on original coupons suggest a supervision premium, while spreads based on realized coupons reveal a discount. Markets simultaneously priced enforced losses on legacy claims and enhanced credibility of restructured, externally monitored debt. Comparing these effects across all three cases yields a market-based estimate of what contemporaries implicitly paid for solvency restoration, and how they learned and adapted from one case to the next.
  • Andrés Irarrázaval
  • How Much Can Elites Extract? Subsistence Constraints and the Long-Run Evolution of Top Incomes, 1700s-2025
  • Abstract : In poor countries, about 50% of national income is tied to subsistence and therefore cannot feasibly flow to the top 1%. Most studies ignore this hard constraint on income concentration. Extending Milanovic et al. (2011), I set a subsistence floor and derive the maximum feasible top 1% share, distinguishing extractable from non-extractable income. I then adjust for how this inequality frontier rises with growth: income above the subsistence floor expands and so does the scope for extraction by elites. This enables meaningful top 1% comparisons across countries and history. Using long-run data, I document three findings. First, colonial slave economies—historically the most extractive—cluster near the predicted inequality frontier (maximum feasible top 1%), while today's democracies lie far below. Second, today, in poor countries, despite similar top 1% income shares to rich countries (16-17%), the top 1% holds 42% of feasibly extractable income—they sit 2.5 times closer to the frontier. Third, while the world's top 1% income share rose from 17% in 1820 to 18% today, their share of feasibly extractable income fell from 40% in 1820, 32% in 1920, to 21% today. Modern economic growth has radically liberated income from subsistence, yet elites have captured a declining share of this rising surplus. This was driven by the rise of the middle 40% between 1880-1980, with the bottom 50% benefiting only after 1920. Finally, using panel data, I show that this secular decline in elite extraction was driven by democratization and decolonization.

10 February

There will be two 25-minute presentations:

  • Luisa Bicalho-Ritzkat (LSE)
  • Investing Outside the Financial System: Art Markets as Alternative Investments in the Nineteenth Century
  • Abstract : Alternative investments are often motivated by the prospect of diversification away from traditional financial assets, and by extension exposure to financial markets. This paper studies investing in the art market as an early example of such diversification in the nineteenth century. Using newly constructed annual hedonic art price indices for Britain and France spanning 1800 to 1900, the paper compares art market performance to equities and government bonds along three dimensions: risk-adjusted returns, correlation of returns, and market integration across countries. The analysis distinguishes between periods of financial distress, allowing for an assessment of whether art markets—operating through institutions separate from banks and stock exchanges—behaved differently when core financial institutions came under strain.
  • Zane Jennings (Oxford)
  • The legal and political foundations of permanent capital for the English East India Company and the Bank of England
  • Abstract : Permanent capital is a defining feature of the modern business corporation. Its historical foundations matter for how we understand the ‘constitutive role of law’ in capitalist institutions (Deakin et al., 2017). Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire (2006) propose that ‘special legal rules’ are required for ‘strong entity shielding’, a necessary condition for permanent capital. This paper tests that proposition by examining the legal foundations of permanent capital in the English East India Company (EIC) and the Bank of England (BoE). Historians have long asserted the EIC acquired its permanent capital by Oliver Cromwell’s 1657 charter (Hunter, 1898; Stern, 2011; Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2017). No copy of Cromwell’s charter exists, and none has for some time. EIC meeting minutes offer contrary evidence. Cromwell’s charter likely granted perpetual corporate succession, as did James I’s in 1609. But a withdrawal clause in the preamble to the 1657 New General Stock indicates the charter did not make the capital permanent. Instead, permanence emerged through contract and through the EIC’s political-economic position. The minutes show that in March 1665 the share capital was locked in by contract within the Company’s corporate governance, meeting a necessary condition for permanent capital and strong entity shielding (Blair, 2003; Squire, 2021). The de facto transition to permanent capital was then completed in 1698, when the EIC lent its entire share capital to the Crown, a loan legally redeemable in theory but not in practice. For external validity, the paper considers the permanence of the BoE’s capital. It examines the Bank of England Act of 1694 and an abstract of the 1694 charter, finding a similar pattern. Law shaped but did not design for permanent capital for the EIC and BoE. In both cases, what ultimately made the capital permanent was fiscal-political entanglement, not statutory innovation.

17 February

  • Joan Roses
  • Quantifying Property and Financial Markets' Role in Agrarian Development: Spain, 1860–1932 (with Sergi Baso -UB- and Juan Carmona -UC3m).
  • Abstract: In their previous study, Carmona and Roses (2025) emphasised the critical role of the institutional development of the property rights system in influencing market access, particularly in the context of land registration and mortgage availability across various Spanish regions. They observed that the financial burdens associated with land registration and securing mortgages were disproportionately higher for lower-value plots of land. This phenomenon created a barrier for landowners in provinces where plots were more affordable, hindering their ability to engage in the formal property market for transactions and mortgage acquisition.
    Given these preliminary observations, this paper aims to explore the repercussions of restricted market access on economic outcomes within the agrarian sector. The specific objectives include:
    1. Evaluating Agrarian Production: We will analyse how limited access to the formal property system, including mortgages, affects overall agrarian output. By examining agricultural production metrics across different regions with varying land registration capabilities, we aim to identify trends and discrepancies arising from these barriers.
    2. Assessing Productivity: The study will assess productivity levels within the agrarian economy, comparing regions with easy access to the formal market against those facing restrictions. This analysis will investigate factors such as yield per hectare, resource allocation efficiency, and labour productivity.
    3. Exploring Innovation: Innovation, which ranges from adopting new technologies to implementing advanced farming techniques, is an essential aspect of agricultural growth. We will measure how market access constraints influence the rate of innovation and the diffusion of new practices among farmers. This includes examining credit availability for investment in innovative tools and methods that enhance productivity.
    4. Regional Variations: This paper will highlight the regional disparities in economic outcomes due to differences in market access. By isolating factors specific to each province, we can better understand the broader implications of institutional development on agrarian economic dynamics.
    This detailed analysis aims to provide insights into the economic consequences of restricted market access and contribute to policy discussions to enhance property rights systems to foster equitable market participation and stimulate agrarian growth in developing economies.

17 March

  • Youssef Ghallada
  • Foreign banks’ competition in Asia in the Age of Imperialism: a network analysis - joint with Stefano Battilossi (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Florian Ploeckl (University of Adelaide), and Aditi Dixit (Wageningen University)
  • Abstract : Our paper studies the evolution of the financial geography of South and South-East Asia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In this period, the region saw an intensification of commercial and geopolitical rivalries between traditional colonial powers (Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal) and emerging regional or global powers (US, Germany, Russia, Japan). One key dimension of this process was the massive entry of banks of different nationalities.
    The main objective of the paper is to empirically study the geographical, economic, and geopolitical factors that drove the expansion of the network of foreign branches in Asia. For this purpose, we used primary and secondary sources to build a unique and original dataset that includes 60 banks from different home-countries and their branches in 360 locations in host-countries across Asia at three benchmark years: 1880, 1900, and 1913. While recent historical research deals with the effect of international banking connections on trade (Kisling 2020 and 2022; Xu 2022; Ghallada 2024) and lending (Kisling and Molteni 2024) at country level, we are the first to explore the spatial characteristics and determinants of international bank networks before 1914 at this high level of granularity. The inclusion of a geopolitical dimension of analysis also connects the paper with the emerging stream of research in geoeconomics (Mohr and Trebesch 2025).
    The originality of our contribution is also methodological. While studies of international banking, either in a historical or contemporary setting, rely on slightly different versions of gravity models, we study the spatial competition between individual banks and the resulting spatial dynamics of their branch networks and interconnectedness of local credit markets in Asia using a two-mode Stochastic Actor-Oriented Network model (Koskinen and Edling 2012; Snijders et al. 2010). This type of models provides a joint representation of the stochastic dependence between structure and agency in the form of co-evolution of networks and behaviour. In our case, we are able to model simultaneous entry/exit decisions in multiple locations with strategic interactions with rival banks and its own branch network, thus considering the endogeneity in the dynamics of branch expansion.

24 March

  • Pamfili Antipa
  • The Political Economy of Britain’s Return to Gold in 1925—a comparison with the resumption of 1821”, co-authored with Kirsten Wandschneider
  • Abstract : Why are certain internal revaluations successful and others are not? We attempt to answer this question by comparing the British gold standard resumptions in 1821 and 1925. While the 1821 resumption served as a reference point for the later episode, no formal comparisons have so far allowed to evaluate and juxtapose the costs of internal adjustments. We find that resuming the gold standard in 1925 imposed costs on the British economy that were substantially larger than what had been sustained in 1821. Moreover, the return to gold in 1925 came with a very large increase in unemployment that seems politically unsustainable, regardless of the advent of the Great Depression. In addition, our analysis of high-frequency exchange rate data suggests that the return to gold in 1925 was surrounded by a high level of political uncertainty. This uncertainty aggravated inflationary tensions precisely when the return to gold necessitated a decline in prices.

31 March

  • Logan Spencer
  • Local Demand, Local Disorder? The Beerhouse Act and Crime in Nineteenth-Century London
  • Abstract : TBC