Fairness of operation and union-management 'partnership'

LSE study of the Green Paper pay system for teachers and its effects

Teachers before the 'Threshold'

5. Fairness of operation and union-management 'partnership'

If it is to succeed, the Threshold and Performance Management system must be seen to operate fairly. The CEP's earlier research on performance pay has highlighted just how far perceptions of unfair operation can blight incentive schemes, causing them to demotivate rather than to motivate staff. This opens up one of the most important challenges for the Government's and the TUC's belief in social partnership. Our survey provides several examples of where this might be achieved, and where partnership between the employers, school management and the teachers' unions can help reduce the risk of the scheme going badly wrong and demotivating teachers

The fear of unfair operation mentioned earlier doubtless explains why over 80% of our respondents saw the need for an appeals procedure. As a general rule, appeals procedures need a strong measure of independence if they are to be seen to be fair. Beyond this, the unions can also help get the balance right on the measures to help teachers achieve Threshold performance standards. Economists often argue that employers need to link pay to performance when jobs involve a lot of discretion and effort is hard to monitor because employees will take the easy option if they are paid the same no matter how hard they work. Our survey probes this factor by asking teachers for their views about whether there are significant variations in teacher effectiveness, and what might be their causes. Around 60% believe there are such variations. So at first glance, one might think the economist's view is vindicated: there is plenty of scope for incentives to get more people up to the higher standard.

However, the reasons teachers gave cast a more subtle light. Differences in teaching skills were cited by a quarter of teachers, and another quarter mentioned the ability to motivate their pupils. Both of these might be addressed by training. Hence, one way to make the Threshold more effective, both raising standards and rewarding teachers, would be to encourage teachers and their schools to invest more in professional development. One in seven mentioned difficult workloads suggesting that the Threshold would lead to higher performance by encouraging some schools to address the workload issues. Only one third mentioned the issue stressed most by the economic theory of incentives: differences in motivation and morale. Without closer analysis it is not possible to say how far such differences in motivation are due to lack of financial incentives or to other causes.

Sources of variation in teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in my school	% citing as main factor
different levels of teaching skills	25
differences in motivation or morale	32
differences in age	1
ability to motivate their pupils	22
some teachers have a very difficult workload	14
Other	7
Total	100

One very important role for the teachers' unions then would seem to be to keep the pressure on the government, and school management to ensure that the necessary professional development and other procedures are in place to help teachers achieve the standards necessary to pass their Threshold assessment.

Finally, union pressure may help to avoid the injustices that could arise from uncertainty about future government funding of the pay increases for those passing the Threshold. The Government has pledged that salary increases arising from teachers passing the Threshold successfully will be funded for the first two years, and has assured that it has budgeted for its medium-term costs. It is very important that the Government should not be 'blown off course'. Should financial constraints make it harder to pass the Threshold in the future there is a clear a danger of inequity between 'first' and 'second generation' applicants. It is just such feelings of unfair operation that emerged in the CEP's previous research as undermining the legitimacy of performance management in the eyes of public servants.

When considering the implementation of PM, which groups do you feel share broadly the same interests as yourself?	Broadly the same	Mostly different	It's hard to say
a) Your school's governors	24	16	60
b) The leadership group/management team in your school	49	19	32
c) Other teachers in your school	79	5	16
d) Other teachers in your union or professional association	65	5	30
e) Your union or professional association	61	7	32
f) The DfEE or your LEA	9	36	54

Are the unions the right groups to do this? A telling piece of evidence from our provisional results shows how far teachers trust their unions to represent their interests faithfully in this area. Two thirds replied they felt they shared the same interests with other teachers in their unions, and sixty percent felt their unions themselves shared their interests. Indeed, half of the teachers feel the leadership team in their school shares their interests on the Green Paper. Of the remainder, most found it 'hard to say'. In contrast, most teachers either thought the DfEE's interests were different, or found it hard to say how close their interests were. Our previous research shows how important it is that performance management systems are seen to be fairly operated. The DfEE might well be as capable as the other parties of administering the procedures fairly, but what counts are teachers' perceptions. On our evidence so far, if the teachers' unions were to judge the scheme to be fairly operated, teachers would be far more likely to believe them than the DfEE or other government bodies, and they would therefore be far less likely to find the scheme demotivating. The stakes are high. On the success of these management reforms, hangs the success of the Government's ambition for a world-class education service.

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