Dr Tak-Huen Chau

This course is compulsory on the MSc in Political Science (Political Science and Political Economy). This course is available with permission as an outside option to students on other programmes where regulations permit. This course uses controlled access as part of the course selection process. For information on controlled access courses, including eligibility, application processes, deadlines, and departmental contact details, please refer to the Controlled Access Courses webpage.

Students enrolled on the MSc in Political Science (Political Science and Political Economy) are guaranteed a place, as this is a compulsory course for their programme (no written statement is required).

How to apply: Applicants from other streams within MSc in Political Science or from other programmes should submit a short statement of no more than 200 words (via LfY) demonstrating how they meet all of the requisites. Please include: the titles and course codes of relevant game theory and empirical methods courses taken, the institution and programme of study, a link to the course syllabus or regulations if available, the main textbook(s) used, and your grades (if available). Places on controlled access courses cannot be guaranteed. In previous years we have been able to provide places for all qualified applicants from other streams or programmes, but that may not continue to be the case.

Priority for places on Government (GV) courses will be given first to students for whom the course is compulsory. Where applicable, priority will then be given to students on the Department of Government programmes listed in the ‘Availability’ section of the course guide, followed by students on other programmes listed in that section. Students on all other programmes will be considered next, where a course is available as an outside option. Where a course is oversubscribed, places will be allocated based on programme priority and the written statement.

Deadline for applications: The deadline for applications is 12:00 noon on Friday 25 September 2026. You can expect to be informed of the outcome of your application by 12:00 noon on Monday 28 September 2026. Any places remaining after this date will be allocated based on priority and written statement - up until course selection closes.

For queries contact: gov.msc@lse.ac.uk.

Students must either have attended 1.) both GV4C8 and GV481, or 2.) equivalent courses to the level of both GV4C8 and GV481. 

Knowledge of game theory at the level of GV4C8 and empirical methods at the level of GV481 is required. Students should be comfortable with core concepts from both courses, including (but not limited to): Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfection, Bayesian updating, and Perfect Bayesian equilibrium from GV4C8; and the potential outcomes framework (including notation, average treatment effects, and selection bias decompositions), hypothesis testing, regression, differences in differences, and regression discontinuity from GV481. The course builds directly on these foundations from the first week.
 

GV482 is the integrating course of the Political Science and Political Economy stream. It combines the game theoretic tools of GV4C8 with the empirical methods of GV481. Students learn to use game-theoretic models to structure causal questions, and to use empirical evidence to evaluate theoretical claims. This integration of theory and evidence is the course's defining feature.

The motivation for integration is substantive. Empirical estimates — even from well-identified designs — can mislead when the underlying environment is strategic: actors respond to policies, and the effects observed in one setting may not generalise to another. Game theoretic models make these strategic responses explicit, generating predictions that discipline empirical analysis. The course trains students to move between theory and evidence, a skill central to academic research in political economy, to policy evaluation, and to analytical roles in the public and private sectors.

Topics vary by year and are organised around a thematic narrative connecting contemporary challenges to democracy. Recent topics have included populism and representation, discrimination and inclusion, and democratic versus autocratic governance. The lectures move between models, data, and identification.

Students should expect the course to be technical. Formal derivation and mathematical reasoning are integral to the lectures, problem sets, and assessments. Students should be comfortable with the game-theoretic and empirical tools listed under Requisites from the outset, as the course builds on them immediately.

20 hours of lectures and 20 hours of seminars in the Winter Term.
2 hours of lectures and 3 hours of seminars in the Spring Term.

This course has a reading week in Week 6 of Winter Term.

There will be a three-hour in-person mock exam and a two-hour revision lecture in the Spring Term.

Seminars take several formats, including problem-solving exercises that integrate game-theoretic derivations with empirical reasoning, and sessions in which students present and discuss existing or their own developing research ideas. Further details will be provided in the course syllabus at the start of term.

Presentation.

Mock exam in Spring Term Week 1.

Problem sets.

Students may submit one problem set for written formative feedback. Students will also give a presentation of their coursework ideas in a seminar towards the second half of term, receiving feedback from the convenor and peers. In addition, feedback will be given for open-ended questions for the mock exam. Details of requirements and deadlines will be provided in the course syllabus.

Mostly journal articles. The reading list varies each year.

Exam (70%), duration: 180 Minutes in the Spring exam period.

Research design (30%) in Spring Term Week 1.

The coursework is a research design memo in which students develop a research idea by connecting a theoretical mechanism to an empirical strategy — or, for theory-oriented students, by developing a model that illuminates a mechanism or reveals an identification problem. Students choose their own topic and are encouraged to use the memo as a prototype for their MSc dissertation. Further details will be provided in the coursework brief.

The exam presents students with a novel political economy problem and asks them to work through it as a researcher would: derive equilibrium predictions from a game-theoretic model, then assess what can and cannot be learned from data generated by that model — including potential outcomes decompositions, identification strategies, and connections to the course's academic literature. The exam is open-book (all written and printed materials permitted; electronic devices prohibited).