EC476     
Contracts and Organisations

This information is for the 2019/20 session.

Teacher responsible

Prof Gilat Levy 32L.4.31 and Prof Philippe Aghion 32L.2.02

Availability

This course is available on the MPhil/PhD in Accounting, MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, MSc in Economics, MSc in Economics (2 Year Programme) and MSc in Environmental Economics and Climate Change. This course is available with permission as an outside option to students on other programmes where regulations permit.

Pre-requisites

Students on the MSc Econometrics and Mathematical Economics programme must have completed the Pre-sessional Course for MSc EME (EC451).

All other students must have completed the Introductory Course in Mathematics and Statistics (EC400).

In exceptional circumstances, students may take this course without EC400 provided they meet the necessary requirements and have received approval from the course conveners (via a face to face meeting), the MSc Economics Programme Director and their own Programme Director. Contact the Department of Economics for more information (econ.msc@lse.ac.uk) regarding entry to this course.

Course content

The course will cover topics from: social learning, reputation and career concerns, strategic information transmission, contract theory, incomplete contracts, the economics of moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic settings,  dynamic theory of incentive contracts, optimal auctions and regulation, and the theory of mechanism design with multiple agents (multiple agents screening and common agency).

Teaching

20 hours of lectures and 10 hours of seminars in the MT. 20 hours of lectures and 10 hours of seminars in the LT.

Formative coursework

Two marked assignments per term.

Indicative reading

No one book covers the entire syllabus; a list of references will be provided at the start of the course. The following textbooks provide a treatment of part of the material presented in the course: Jean-Jacques Laffont, The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, MIT Press; D Fudenberg & J Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press; Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement Regulations, MIT Press; Bernard Salanié, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press, Bolton, P., and M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press, Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.

Assessment

Assessment path 1
Exam (100%, duration: 2 hours, reading time: 15 minutes) in the summer exam period.

Assessment path 2
Exam (50%, duration: 2 hours, reading time: 15 minutes) in the summer exam period.
Essay (50%, 6000 words) in the ST.


MSc Econometrics and Mathematical Economics students must follow Assessment path 1.

Non-MSc Econometrics and Mathematical Economics students must follow Assessment path 2.

Key facts

Department: Economics

Total students 2018/19: 20

Average class size 2018/19: 21

Controlled access 2018/19: No

Value: One Unit

Guidelines for interpreting course guide information