




# **Best Dissertation 2016**

## **Humanizing Warfare: Measuring the Post-Conflict Effects of Militarized Interventions In Civil Conflicts**

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# Humanizing Warfare: Measuring the Post-Conflict Effects of Militarized Interventions in Civil Conflicts

A quantitative comparative study on 30  
post-conflict nations looking at multiple  
economic and social wellbeing indicators

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*To my beautiful family for their patience and unique insights, and my siblings for pushing me through every step of the way.*

- *and a special thank you to F.M – crunch time wouldn't have been possible without your support.*

## Abstract

The past decades have seen a dramatic increase in civil conflict intervention by third-parties, and with the increased militarization of conflict that seems to rebound with unintended global consequences, the long-term effects of militarized foreign intervention in civil conflicts is primordial. This study will therefore attempt to combine and compare the economic and social wellbeing of thirty post-civil conflict nations, by graphically assessing the means trends of both intervened nations and non-intervened nations. The quantified results will clarify the severity of impact that neo-liberal peace-building has on a given population's economic and social wellbeing. While previous literature has looked at individual case studies and quantified the effects on the conflict itself, this paper will measure long term trends to prove that foreign intervention only disrupts the natural local development of the peoples in question.

## Acronyms:

|      |   |
|------|---|
| IC   | Intervened Conflicts                          |
| NIC  | Non-Intervened Conflicts                      |
| DDR  | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| NGO  | Non-Government Organization                   |
| PCPB | Post-Conflict Peacebuilding                   |
| UN   | United Nations                                |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council               |

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*“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”*

*- Sun Tzu*

*Chinese general, military strategist and philosopher (544 B.C – 496 A.D)*

## 2 INTRODUCTION

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The twentieth century has seen a string of violent civil conflicts which often escalate to prolonged years of warfare and humanitarian disasters. Intrastate wars occur much more frequently, and have resulted in higher casualties in the past decades, as legal and watchdog institutions have increasingly protected state sovereignty, rather than the citizens within each state in itself (Ignateff 2012, Ikenberry, Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003). The debate on the role of third-party actors in civil conflict has thus gained substantial momentum in recent years, raising questions on the long term effects that biased interventions are argued to have. Such effects are not only the direct result of increased military presence, but also the result of politicized material backing of belligerent actors – drastically altering the trajectory of the conflict and the nation (Stojek and Chacha 2015). Human rights has consequentially become a concept questioned in and of itself; as the selective action of states and coalitions has brought activists and academics to criticize the current world leaders for their violations and lack of action in humanitarian disasters that take place during and after violent conflicts. With the political discourse revolving around humanitarian justifications as the motivating factor for involvement in civil conflict, the unmistakable selectivity has directed the attention of critics to how and why foreign intervention must be carried out in times of conflict.

More often than not, military interventions in civil wars have resulted in a range of unintended consequences and effects that can be felt on a global scale. The emergence of certain global terrorist organizations and refugee ‘crisis’ from places like Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan has thus emphasized this common denominator in global dilemmas – that of aggressive foreign military presence in the civil conflicts. With the long-standing presence of moral and conceptual controversies surrounding military interventions, recent developments in policy studies have attempted to assess the measured effects of such interventions, looking at the conflicts and interventions’ motivations as key factors of analyses.

The qualitative debate on the issue centers around the conflict-related effects first and foremost, as the added military presence has been argued to intensify conflict, conflate social divisions, and even increase the likelihood of reoccurring and intensified violence (Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007; Gleditch 2007)<sup>1</sup>. From the critical theoretical standpoint, humanitarian interventions of recent decades have often been referred to as peace-building ‘packages’ – with set institutional agendas in the form of liberal

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<sup>1</sup>More research and details in chapter 2.2 of the literature review. Also see Regan (2000, 2002, 2009 2016)

democratic governments and free market economies. The effect of this militarized liberalization has been heavily criticized for the imposition of culturally alienating institutions, and for its heavy-handed approach of politicized humanitarian action which is driven by market interest rather than the true benefit of the local population. As such, and as will be assessed, we will be measuring the extent of such effects to assess the militarized liberal peace-building in civil conflicts after the conflicts have ended.

What is yet to be tested, and what must be examined in order to have any weight on foreign policy planning is an examination into the direct social and economic effects that third party interventions have on conflict-ridden populations. This paper will therefore attempt to assess such effects, building on previous academic works that argue against third-party interventions which looked at other conflict related factors, case studies and theory. The method used is a comparative analyses of averages for a total of thirty nations over the span of ten years' post-conflict; for 14 total economic and social wellbeing indicators. These means measures will test for trends for the Intervened-Conflicts (IC's) and Non-Intervened Conflicts (NIC's), and compare them for an effective visualization of the suggested economic and social effects. The general economic hypothesis of the paper will be that foreign military interventions in civil conflicts will directly affect the local economy following a hyper-capitalized and liberalized model. This would entail an initial economic boost, a rise in corporate presence, and thus an initial rise in national income and exports of resources and services. Over the span of ten years' however, I predict that this initial boost will start to decline, while export levels (namely natural resources) will continue to remain high as the presence of foreign corporations will continue to export these regularly, and the overall economic wellbeing of the nation will slowly start to suffer for most major wellbeing indicators in the long term. The social hypothesis of this paper relates to the economic factors, in that the general wellbeing of the nations will benefit from the levels of employment, income inequality, poverty and governance, which will then peak and start on a general downward trend. As with any capitalized economy, the market factors will most likely fluctuate quite drastically, and the prediction is that this would also be reflected in the social trends that are related such as income levels and unemployment rates.

In terms of the type of interventions, we will be limiting the research to that of a military and directly operative nature. This predicted outcome spans from the previously established literature which emphasizes the effect of military interventions on intensity and duration of conflict, thus, as will be tested, would have detrimental rebound effects in the following years.

Additionally, it has been known that the introduction of third-parties into the conflicts is often biased and furthers social divisions, tilting the balance of power in manners that may not have the true interests of the population in mind (Asad 2015, Regan 2016, Stojek and Chacha 2015). This effectively causes cyclical violence and upon the withdrawal of foreign peace-keeping forces, will breed further instability with new forms of power set in place. Quantitative data has been conducted for this occurrence, and will be assessed for the conflict-ridden nations in this study as well.

Essentially, this paper aims to compile a larger comparative picture of the long-term effects of foreign interventions, which are often disassociated after the initial period of relative stability and growth has passed.

## 2.1 THE THEORY

In order to attempt to measure the effects of foreign interventions on the market forces that drive much of the populations wellbeing, a select set of indicators were necessary to distinguish. I proceeded to select economic factors from the World Bank datasets that were relevant in the context of militarized liberal peace-building<sup>2</sup>. The economic indicators varied starting with general factors such as *GDP growth per year*, *national debt*, *import and exports of goods*, and *adjusted national income* figures. For each selected economic or social indicator, the data on all thirty selected nations where the conflicts took place were collected, standardized and displayed on two separate linear plots, (one with intervened conflicts vs. without interventions), after which the average rate of change of each plotted set was calculated, charted and compared. This method allows for the average change of each index to be measured over time, allowing for intervened conflicts (IC's) and non-intervened conflicts (NIC's) to be compared using numerous economic and social wellbeing indicators.

For the main indicators, the predicted results include a sharp rise in *GDP growth* for IC's, compared to a steady or even declining growth for NIC's, as they are expected to face more development obstacles without the increased foreign asset presence. A similar peak and decline pattern is predicted for *adjusted national income* levels of IC's compared to NIC's slower but steady pattern (also related to foreign market presence). *National debt* is predicted to be higher for NIC's initially, but grow at a slow pace compared to the IC nations where *national debt* is expected to start low with the influx of aid and third-party support from the high-income economies; it is expected to rise dramatically over time however, following the liberal-market models of the third-party actors – which is heavily reliant on debt.

Additional indicator data sets were calculated as support to the general hypotheses above, and are relevant factors to the main indicators. Gathering data on these supporting index measures helps provide additional analyses and reduces the likelihood of false general assessments based on limited factors such as *GDP* and *national income* levels alone. These indicators include valuable resource management, looking at fuel sources in particular due to the found connections between conflict and oil. The supporting resource index's to be tested were: *fuel exports*, *fuel imports*, *export of goods and services*, *imports of goods and services*, and *oil rents*. The explanation for the hypothesis for each of these includes an extraction of the resources at a high initial rate – where *fuel exports* for IC's will see a regularly increasing trend, compared to its NIC's counterpart which will continue to export at a steady and lower rate. The *fuel import* data is predicted to show an opposite trend, and was tested to verify or nullify the *fuel export* findings. *Oil rent* levels are also expected to rise drastically for IC's from the end of the conflict, and remain relatively stable for the NIC's. Both *imports* and *exports* of goods

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<sup>2</sup> Refer to appendix for a compiled list of all the used indicators and plotted results

and services are predicted to rise drastically in the IC nations, with a massive variance between IC and NIC *export* trade levels. This is expected due to the aforementioned extraction of resources and improved trade relations, where opportunity has driven the intervention in the first place.

The social indexes to be tested proved more challenging due to the lack of data collected for many of the selected indicators and the wide range of potential indicators to be tested. As such, the tests were limited to social indicators that are linked to the economic factors above. The *GINI index* (a common index of income inequality used by the World Bank and UN), *Total Unemployment*, *Youth Unemployment*, *Corruption levels* and *Poverty Headcount* were the initial factors to be tested. Measuring for income inequality was an initial selection due to the numerous and proven social effects that result; such as crime, gender inequality, mental health issues, physical health issues, and even civil conflict (Collier 2003, 2004; Keen 2012; Wilkinson 2000, 2004). As a result of this, *total unemployment* and particularly *youth unemployment* levels were of special interest, both in terms of the conceptual framework of the test, and to support the *GINI index* test. To ensure the trends were in fact relevant and to limit the wide scope of social index's to be tested, the additional indicators gathered were *unemployment rates with secondary education*, *percentage of children out of school*, *children in employment*, and *accountability and governance corruption*.

Measuring the unintended consequences that children would bear is also vital in assessing future social issues that may arise. I have therefore focused on employment and education in measuring effects on children, and *poverty* as an important factor that cuts through all population sectors in a post-war era.

The predicted outcomes would be a sharp decline in the *GINI index* means value (the closer to 0 the more equal and therefore a downward trend is more equal) – followed by a general decline in equality values (a graphed rise) for the IC nations. The NIC trends are expected to equalize (decline steadily), as conflicts that are self-resolved have been argued to ensure local ownership of new democratic institutions and market forces (Pouliny 2005, 2000). In terms of the IC's, the prediction is based on the economic forces at play, which includes an entrance of foreign investors in such areas of interest that extract natural resources and create higher resource rents, and thus higher levels of inequality.

*Poverty headcount* trends are related to both the *GINI index* and *unemployment levels*, and the index was not only added to assess the potential effects, but also as a supportive argument or nullification of the results yielded by the *GINI* and *unemployment* comparisons. The predicted outcome for *poverty headcount rates* is therefore in line with the economic trends of hyper-capitalism. However, with the transition from a war economy to a legitimate economy, poverty rates are expected to drop for both groups respectively at the start of the post-war era. For IC's, a drop in *poverty* levels is expected with the initial 'jumpstart' to the economy, but then very gradually increasing over the next years. The pattern is again expected to be erratic in nature following liberal market patterns. NIC's are expected to have elevated levels of *poverty* respective of its counterpart, and remain at its level with a steady decrease as

local post-conflict reconstructive efforts evolve. The elevated and longer period of high *poverty headcount rates* for NIC's is predicted due to the lack of aid from the intervening country and international bodies, as well as a slower, yet more stable economic recovery (in line with the *GDP growth* predictions).

*Unemployment levels* both for the *youth* and as a *total* percentage, are relevant in this context as well. Interventions of a military nature are often the result of biased interests, and the hyper-capitalization and democratization of intervened nations will reflect the extremes of capitalism without the gradual stages. One of the main factors of capitalism is wealth inequality and higher rates of unemployment – this is simply due to the mechanics of a system that is based upon the generation and accumulation of profit (Marx and McLellan 1977). As such, what is predicted follows the earlier models, in that there will be a drop in unemployment levels (expected post-conflict) followed by an erratic pattern and eventual rise in both *youth unemployment*, *unemployment with secondary education* and *unemployment total*.

Looking at the recovery of children in a post-conflict era is indispensable in the prevention of cyclical conflicts and educating the minds of the future of the given society, whose impressionable psyche has been affected by the traumas of war and an interrupted education (Ramirez-Barat and Duthie 2015). The measurement of potential harms or affects that foreign intervention may have on children is therefore particularly significant, in that the effect is compounded in the following generations that determine the inheritance of conflict. The prediction for *children out of school* follows the predicted initial benefit (in this case decline) followed by a rise in rates as the need for profit to survive increases for IC's. In comparison, NIC's are expected to have relatively stable levels of *children out of school*, but the figure is expected to remain high in comparison nonetheless.

A final index measuring *accountability and corruption* will be tested in the same manner. The hypotheses for this index will be a rise in *corruption and accountability* for nations with NIC, and expected to drop significantly for IC's, as foreign forces tend to maintain governance in the first following years. However, as with the other indicators, the trend is expected to change, with a rise in *corruption* levels eventually. This is predicated on the withdrawal of third-parties that often results in a political power-vacuum, as the majority of interventions maintain, rather than genuinely reconstruct stability.

This thesis will therefore graphically combine the average post-conflict trends of fifteen nations where military interventions have taken part of the conflict, compared to fifteen conflicts that have been self-resolved. A total of fourteen indicators have been selected and the data standardized to reflect a neutralized set of data that can measure for potential economic and social effects.

Despite the well-researched conclusions of modern scholars and the enormous amount of literary work concerning humanitarian interventions, little work delves into the post-war environment of the intervened countries. The majority of the quantitative texts on civil wars differentiate between negotiated war settlements and military victory,

but few concern the hidden foreign footprint that resides in the “solved” civil wars we’ve put away as closed history.

### 3 REVIEWING THE LITERATURE

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Although it is true that in some cases a powerful third party can end in government triumphs more quickly when outside armed support is provided, it is undeniable that there is a lasting foreign hallmark lingering on both economic and social aspects of those nations they “helped” (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008). The question at hand is what those effects are, and to what extent are they harmful. These imprints are the unseen influences within the post-war nations that have been effectively pushed aside as unconsidered past victims are pulled into an entirely new system, often incompatible with the local culture and society. This paper shows evidence that uncovers and proves the lasting effects of the humanitarian intervention left for those past sufferers, who now seem to be victims of a neo-Imperialist movement that hides behind the claims of “humanitarian aid” (Asad 2015; Cubukcu 2013; Wigell 2015).

#### 3.1 QUALITATIVE LITERATURE: CONCEPTS AND DEBATES ON INTERVENTIONS

Militarized interventions have been criticized theoretically since the heavily intervened conflicts of the 1970’s onwards, which yielded extremely high rates of human casualties (Anand 2005; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008; Brinkerhoff 2005; Law 2006). The post-Vietnam era brought about questions of legitimacy in international interventions, and added increasing pressure on international bodies to assess and approve the military presence of foreign parties in intrastate wars. While this is a welcomed development that can help avoid biased opportunism, the United Nations remains a platform of legitimation that is determined by a select number of states. The qualitative literature on the role of interventions has often circled around the concepts of neo-imperialism at its most critical (Asad 2015; Cubukcu 2013; Ludwig 2010; Roberts 1993; Wigell 2015) to arguments of previous interventions being too soft or incomplete (Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis 2000; Collier 2003, 2004; Jervis 2015). One aspect of the debate, as Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000) argue, is that the failure of foreign interventions is due to the inefficiency and incompleteness of strategic objectives, with too little soft and hard capital being utilized. Effectively, many would argue that interventions need stronger force and military presence to complete the DDR process and ensure the newly formed institutions were put in place and maintained – with or without a higher presence governing temporarily.

Law (2006) points to a relevant and clear issue in interventions strategy and implementation, which also refers to the accountability question. In terms of interventions: “Whichever organization or country has had the lead in a particular situation, it has not been able to create a platform where all decisions are taken in a transparent manner. It’s extremely difficult to ensure accountability in such conditions”

(Law 2006, p.16). This essentially relates to the aspect of the debate that discusses half-hearted interventions, however instead of promoting further intervention, Law (2006) points out in his study the selective efforts placed into interventions, and thus calls for more accountability and a shift in priority in situations where interventions are deemed necessary and legitimate on a local level. With the increase in accountability and transparency in decision making, it is likely that the responsible bodies will carry out the necessary operations with increased caution and awareness of the repercussions of failure.

Much of the literature on post-conflict peacekeeping revolves around the issues of premature concentration on democracy which leads to destabilization and renewed conflict (Brinkerhoff 2005; Cubukcu 2013; Goodman 2006; Ignatieff 2012). Economic discussions in post-conflict zones center around related issues of imposition and the lack of cultural compatibility with liberal economic models. It's important to note, that in such conflict zones, the social and political fabrics are entirely de-structured, and an extremely localized form of re-structuring has been found to be the only effective means for social and economic development (albeit at a slower pace, it yields greater stability in the long run).

Furthermore, most intervened civil wars end in negotiations. This is because third parties act as a more trusted party that both sides are more willing to put trust into than each other (Regan, Frank and Aydin 2009; Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007). Peace settlements, on the other hand, most often result in a limited peace because negotiations are made to ensure that both sides keep some sort of power, which is a perfect foundation for a growing violence (Findley and Teo 2006; Regan, Frank and Aydin 2009; Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007). In a combat victory however, the enemy is immobilized or completely defeated leaving no room for a future recurrence, but with a peace negotiation "renewed war is one broken promise away" (Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007). Therefore, it can be concluded that if outsiders help settle a war with a settlement, and a settlement hardly serves as a permanent solution, it brings into question why greater powers would risk their troops and capital for a known likelihood of reoccurring conflict.

Effectively, many case studies were carried out to assess post-conflict settings, and Kurth (2006), after reviewing and analysing international civil wars, concluded that our "historical record of humanitarian interventions is more one of failure than success," since massacres persisted in cases like Rwanda, Sudan, and Haiti after the humanitarian aid left the country. Kurth (2006) even went on to describe the deep-rooted ethnic strifes that typically restrict involvements from conducting effective controls of violence. In fact, many argue that interventions can (un)knowingly empower sectors or ethnic groups, which further brands the groups as separate and opposing. Ethnic factors are argued by some to be an *evolved effect* of civil war (the early support of ethno-nationalists in Yugoslavia for example which resulted in an ethnic war) compared to the debate that ethnic fragmentation is a *predictor* of the *reoccurrence* of violence (Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis 2008). This predictive argument however, neglects the aforementioned fragmentation through early intervention of empowering parties, and therefore does not nullify the argument.

Issues of legitimacy – who is the intervention intervening for? R2P in Libya and Iraq – legitimize a leader that is legitimate in the eyes and standards of the West, but not in the eyes of the people.

### 3.2 QUANTITATIVE LITERATURE: EFFECTS OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

Much of the quantitative data on third-party interventions revolves around the intensity of fighting, duration of conflict and re-occurrence of violence among other related civil conflict factors. The measures often attempt to predict trajectories and influences on conflicts using multiple correlative methods and often refer to the Correlates of War (COW) datasets and variables.

The majority of the readings use variables related to negotiated or militarized cessation of violence, and what factors affect the outcome of conflict (Sullivan and Karreth 2014). What creates such a skeptical receiving view of interventions by the local populations on the ground, is the simple mistrust due to what is seen as the world powers race for supremacy titles – which is often done via indirect approaches, most commonly through Proxy Wars or humanitarian interventions. In the recent decades, our history has observed multiple civil wars that have claimed to solve global issues, more so than solving the original intrastate hostilities and humanitarian violations. Much research has gone into such internal conflicts to determine the different effects of foreign intervention. They have analysed details in search of conclusions of the overall impact, namely Regan’s (2002, 2009) work on the effects of interventions, Sullivan and Karreth’s (2014) research on the impacts of military intervention, Shirkey’s work on the subsequent war severity (2012), and Kurth’s (2006) analysis of the most infamous intrusions and their outcome on the war. Despite diverse conclusions and strategies in the literary work investigating military interventions, the one aspect of these intrastate wars that most academia converge on, is the *immediate consequent surge of violence* and the lack of actual humanity involved in the militarized aid. These consequences of the now international civil wars are seen directly through the reduction “of indecisive, low activity outcomes” (Sullivan and Karreth 2014), the ability to “inflict and absorb high levels of casualties” (Shirkey 2012) and the indirect complication of bargaining that prolongs the war and “in turn increases the number of casualties” (Hultman, Shanon and Kathman 2013; Shirkey 2012).

Putting it simply, outside intervention only serves to confound and compound a war. With a stronger force lending resources and war capacity to one side, the other is thus weakened – with no real consideration of local legitimacy (Brinkerhoff 2005; Pouligny 2000, 2005). In some cases, the weaker side is depleted in comparison to such a degree that it is left with only guerrilla tactics to escape looming odds in head-to-head combat with increased enemy presence (Hultman, Shannon and Kathman 2013; Sullivan and Karreth 2014; Regan 2002). Additionally, with third party involvement comes newly surfaced issues that the local troops are unknowingly fighting for and against, which more often than not changes the entire trajectory of the war (Ikenberry, Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003; Shirkey 2012). This constant avoidance of large battles through

unorganized warfare combined with a delayed bargaining process due to uncertainty of new issues only prolongs the war and leaves more room for war casualties (Sullivan and Karreth 2014). In fact, Shirkey's (2012) findings of War severity found that factors that increased uncertainty lengthened the wartime and lowered the chances that a war would conclude "at any given point by between 87.2% and 93.1%." Sullivan and Karreth's (2014) findings also found that low activity, which is characterized by 25 annual deaths or less, was the most common outcome of intervened civil wars in 45% of third-party interventions, further proving the ineffectual result of third-party humanitarian aid.

From a purely economic perspective, the debate of whether civil strife emerges from 'grievance' or 'greed' allows for useful insight into post-conflict reconstruction. Collier (2003, 2004), and Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000) argue that civil wars are often a result of specific 'risk factors' including natural resource rents (that are argued to attract belligerent rebels), GDP growth per capital (opportunity of entrance into the market), and an ethnic dominance of 50% - 80% (argued to double the likelihood of conflict, following the Collier – Hoeffler model). This argument, while tailored to explain why 31% of civil wars have resumed within ten years, is also a limited approach to analyzing civil conflicts. Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000) highlight these three risk factors, arguing that belligerent rebellions are more likely to take hold and continue to rebel as long as this is not controlled, and the conclusion they arrive at is twofold: creating an inclusive system of governance, and effectively disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating belligerent groups effectively (including an increase in international intervention:

“...interventions should be broadened from the observer role which has been most common in Africa to date. We show that multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations, in combination with peace treaties and aid inflows, are much more effective than traditional peacekeeping interventions.” (Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis 2000, p. 325)

While these 'inherited risk-factors' provide incentive for intervening parties to step in and stop the violence, this brings about the issues of legitimacy which have been previously mentioned. Collier's (2000, 2003, 2004) arguments on the matter have been argued to be extremely limited scope, and while his observations on the attraction of rebel related faction groups to nations with high rents and natural resources, further investigation of a wider geopolitical and geo-economic scope is necessary. The high prevalence of natural resources has been argued to attract conflict in general, be it of interstate or intrastate nature.

Rentier states in particular have been found time and time again to attract conflict. The prevalence of civil conflict is more related with the wider scope of grievance which derives from the economic inequality that is linked to rentier-ism. From a Marxist analyses of the capitalist forces at play, rentier states have limited sources wealth generation, and this emerges from a single or limited resources. This in turn, creates a very limited network of profiteers, or those who own the means of production. In effect, this breeds a highly unequal distribution of income, generating grievances that are related to economic factors. Such grievances are a major factor in civil conflict. Keen

(2012) further argues for the financial beneficiaries of civil wars, and their impact at prolonging conflict. In line with this argument, beneficiaries from the civil war economies are not necessarily limited to rebel groups, but may vary to include government forces, armies, third-parties and transnational institutions that range from the legitimate to the illegitimate networks.

## 4 THE SELECTION PROCESS: CONSIDERATIONS AND GENERAL METHODS

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As was seen in the literature and as is expected in such studies, civil wars are complex and intersectional social occurrences that are made up of unique factors and outcomes. The introduction of militarized third-parties is often carried out for political interests and thus is argued to have unintended consequences on a given population which is what this paper is attempting to assess (Findley and Teo 2006, Kathman 2010, Ludwig 2010, Stojek and Chacha 2015). The quantified *post*-conflict effects that foreign interventions in civil wars has not yet been carried out to support these claims however, and while individual case studies and qualitative data reveals significantly about the argued negative effects, the collection of these effects on a larger quantified scale is a crucial addition to research.

As such, the importance of limiting the post-conflict effect trends to ones that can be measured and are truly affected by foreign interventions proved problematic initially. It was necessary to gather data that was relevant to the wellbeing of the population, could be affected by foreign relations, and is measurable (and has been measured) over time. To depict such trends, the final method selected was a comparative means analysis of thirty total nations, and 14 total indicators over a continuous period of ten years' post-conflict. Of these thirty conflicts, fifteen of them had a significant military intervention and fifteen were self-resolved conflicts, providing us with two sets of data to analyze and compare for each indicator. The dependent variable for each means test was the regulated value of the wellbeing index chosen, plotted to the time elapsed after the conflict had ended as the independent variable. The elapsed time frame for the collection of data also played a major role. The data strings for each indicator had to be adjusted to the year the conflict had ended; in order to obtain an optimal trend measure of ten years' post-conflict. This was done for each country individually and applied to the full datasets to filter out the needed information.

The ten-year post-conflict data for fifteen of the nations was plotted on a single multi linear-plot and standardized<sup>3</sup>, before an *average linear trend was calculated*; the process was then duplicated for the remaining fifteen nations to be compared<sup>4</sup>. In the final graphs presented, the linear *average of both* intervened and non-intervened plots were

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<sup>3</sup> See appendix 8.1 for both intervened and non-intervened nation plots

<sup>4</sup> See appendix 8.1 for examples of intervened and non-intervened total trend plots

then combined on a single plot, and again the starting point was standardized in order to visually depict the rates and trends of change for each indicator over time.

The selection of intrastate conflicts was the fundamental first step in the data collection process, and many considerations had to be taken into account to regulate the data. My initial case selection derived from the Correlates of War (2010) online datasets<sup>5</sup>. The selection process had to minimize as many external factors as possible that may have impacted the data outcomes in order to limit the effects to those of third-party interventions. As such, the selection threshold was based on the intensity of conflict, or casualty rate per year. This was due to the fact that a conflict with minimal losses of life and infrastructure would yield largely dissimilar affects to conflicts with extremely *high* rates of social and capital losses. Furthermore, and after starting the process of data collection it was found that conflicts ending prior to the 1960's had little or no recorded social or economic data that could be of significant use, and thus the selected conflicts were adjusted to those ending post 1960<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, to neutralize bias in selection, the threshold remained at intensity of violence and only eliminated conflicts ending prior to 1960 and nations that had little or no data post-conflict. The conflicts names, nation and years of conflict:

In terms of the indicator data to be measured, what proved problematic was finding available datasets that were consistent in methodology and had a range of information available for the selected years. These were taken from the World Bank, United Nations, and Human Rights organizations in order to provide a varied set of indicators that did not focus on one aspect of development, yet were able to reflect any economic and social aspects that could be affected by third-party interventions. The economic and social data collected were from the World Bank (2016) and the United Nations (2015) online databases, and it was necessary to obtain the data for each indicator from a single source in order to maintain a unified and verified method of data collection with minimal bias or limitations.

Additionally, I have carried out the test on two other indexes' that would have no foreseen impact from foreign military interventions in civil war outcomes. This was done to verify the validity of the results, and ensure the final means test would not be carried out completely at random. For these indicators, it is expected that both the IC and NIC nations will yield very similar patterns or trends. The selected indicators varied from economic to social to mirror the major factors being tested. They were: *maternal death rates* and *mean of population total (rate of growth)*<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> See Correlates of War online datasets for rankings of intensity of conflict

<sup>7</sup> For the test of methodology results refer to Appendix 8.2


## 5 DISCUSSED PREDICTIONS AND RESULTS

It's necessary to note that while the trend measures are indicative and can be assessed for trends in comparing IC's to NIC's, it is by no means a singular causation or simple reflection of reality. The effects seen below are factors that map out a larger picture of post-conflict settings and the influences of foreign interventions in a long term manner. These effects are complex and vary from nation to nation, depending on an extensive combination of factors that influence the outcome and wellbeing of each. This being said, external factors were neutralized to the maximum ability given the indicators, conflicts and methodology chosen. For the purposes of the study, the results below reflect the variance of trend between the IC's and NIC's respectively, and the data selected and discussed were those where inferences could be made, and were therefore relevant for discussion.

### 5.1 ECONOMIC INDICATORS: DISCUSSIONS AND METHODS

The reading of the data provides an insight into the major economic impacts seen in post-conflict settings. In terms of *GDP growth*, the average rate of change for IC's is much less stable and seems to drop significantly between the third and fifth years' post-conflict. The direct causation of this drop may relate to the previous research that confirms the likelihood of reoccurrence of conflict.


Figure 1




In terms of the hypothesis set out earlier, the *GDP growth* for NIC's was in fact much more stable and regular over the ten years' post-conflict, and the IC nations did also see a dramatic and erratic decline. IC's did not see an initial peak as was predicted however, and the index implies a general economic decline for conflicts with military interventions.

*National debt* trends were very close to the predicted outcome, however NIC's were never higher than IC nations. The initial expectation was for NIC nations to have a heavier reliance on debt in the years following the conflict, but for IC nations to catch up and exceed their levels at a dramatically higher pace due to the hyper-liberalization of the markets. What was seen was in fact an eventual decline in *national debt* levels for NIC's, compared to an escalation and gradual increase of debt for IC's over time, peaking once again around years 5 and 6. The two averages continue to diverge, and further time elapsed research would be needed in order to obtain an optimal understanding of debt levels and third party interventions.

Figure 2




*Adjusted net national income* however, yielded results that counteracted the hypothesis somewhat. The predicted spike in the first years was clear and present for IC's in comparison to the NIC nations, but the decline of IC's *net national income* was not



erratic and stabilized at around five years post conflict. The *net national income* average for the NIC's was highly erratic (changing from the value of one to fifteen in one year) and therefore no significant trend could be noted without further enquiry.

*Exports of goods and services* resulted in mixed outcomes in terms of the hypothesis when looked at individually. The initial hypothesis predicted a sharp increase in the years immediately following the war, with a steadily increasing rate of export for IC's. While there was a massive increase in export growth in the years immediately following the conflict, the initial spike drops to the level of the NIC nation exports and remains with a similar trend and value.

Figure 4



Independently, this economic indicator has been found to provide little inferences, except for the variance seen in the initial years' post-conflict. However, when compared to the *GDP growth* indicator above, the years coincide, implying the IC nations do see an economic boom and sudden decline, which also includes *exports of goods and services*.

In line with the theories and hypotheses, *oil rents* and *fuel exports* significantly increased in the ten years' post-conflict, and continued to do so for the following years at a steadily increasing rate. This result confirms that the extraction of resources post-interventions is carried out after the initial violence cessation. *Fuel exports* for IC nations were up to three times higher than the NIC nations by ten years' post-conflict, with the initial years remaining quite stable unlike the hypothesis set forth. What confirms this trend is the paralleled measure of *fuel imports* over ten years; the results slightly mirrored the *fuel export* means, in that the IC's had a stable and relatively low rate of import this time, compared to an extremely erratic import rate for the NIC's. This not only implies the higher rate of fuel extraction from IC's, but also ascertains for the increased presence of fuel resources in the IC nations. As their rates of import were extremely low, declining to five times less over time than the imports of NIC nations just in the initial years' post-conflict. What proved most significant however, was the means

Figure 5




Figure 6






Figure 7



of oil rent over the ten years post conflict, seen in Figure 5 below.

While more time post-conflict would benefit the analyses greatly, we can see a severe variance in the trends of IC vs. NIC countries above – with *oil rents* reaching up to twenty-five times higher in IC countries, and increasing dramatically at around seven years’ post-conflict. The interest in this index derives from the many critiques on the selectivity and motivations of military interventions for economic interests. As a general picture, *oil rents*, *fuel exports* and the *fuel imports* trend measures have yielded clear results for the post-conflict effects on natural resource extraction specifically, which greatly effects the economy in question.

An additional indicator means analyses was carried out in relation to the *oil rents* indicator above. This was carried out on theoretical grounds, where the literature on rentier states and civil conflicts brought to my attention the linkages between



militarization and oil. As such, the additional indicator added was for central government *military expenditure*. The results yielded results that mirrored the above *oil rents* index, seen in Figure 3 below.

Figures 7 and 8 yield extremely similar trend levels, with IC countries seeing a sudden spike in years 7 and 8 post-conflict. The NIC's for both *oil rents* and *military expenditure* have been relatively stable with no significant variations in comparison. This index fits the theoretical arguments for rentier-ism and militarization; and the findings here link this to international interventions and the post-conflict effects.


As a whole, the indicator means values show a clear variance in both sets of data for the majority of the indicators, which fit the main hypothesis set forth. The economic situations of IC's as compared to NIC's, is shown to suffer in the manner of resource extraction (*fuel exports, oil rents and military expenditure*), *GDP growth*, and *national debt levels*.

As a final assessment, my conclusion would be that military interventions in these conflicts has led to a very significant impact on the respective economies, which seems to be negative and thus reflective of related social issues to be assessed in the following chapter.

## 5.2 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND WELLBEING

The social wellbeing indicators proved especially challenging, with much of the data on children's wellbeing yielding no findings (no average and no data at all) and thus a multitude of tests had to be carried out to find a relevant index which yielded any result.


The *GINI index* means comparison yielded results that were unexpected overall, but the variance in IC and NIC's fit the hypothesis. Initially, it was expected that the *GINI index value* would drop, with increased third party presence playing an equalizing role, before their withdrawal and sudden increase in inequality. The results however (Figure 9 below), reveal a different trend. IC states more or less maintained their levels of inequality, declined until around year seven, then saw a sharp rise which was consistent with the timeline of the remaining findings. However, what proves slightly



problematic in deriving conclusions is the average trend for NIC's. The results, rather than the predicted relatively regular decline, showed a trend that nearly paralleled the rate of decline for IC's, albeit at a much lower value, and with an initial very significant drop in inequality. The massive drop in inequality in self-resolved conflicts fits the previous conceptual literature, in that civil-society reconstruction of the newly developing institutions is in no danger of being entirely alienated from the local population. This value does see a sharp rise in the years following the halfway point, which reach an extreme low. The results of the *GINI index* mean test verify that countries with foreign interventions tend to maintain a higher level of income inequality, which may be attributed to the biased intervention process that often involves elements of the former power network when supporting the rebels, or the government in itself – thus reinforcing previous inequalities (Cubukcu 2013; Shirkey 2012; Pouligny 2005).

As for the *Poverty headcount*, the trends were predicted based on the aforementioned economic patterns, and highly related to the *GINI index*. In terms of the results however, the prediction for the initial years that included a drop in poverty levels for IC's and respectively higher, but stable levels for NIC's were false. What was seen was a contrary start, with IC's peaking to a higher *poverty headcount* and NIC's dropping significantly in the first years. The levels of *poverty count* for NIC's remained relatively stable as expected, and gradually declined over the ten-year span. IC's saw a rise and decline which ultimately marks the index as largely unaffected by third-party interventions, or warrants further research if any affects are present.

Figure 10



*Unemployment percentages* for both *youth* and *total* rates yielded very similar results and trends. For the IC nations, the rates fluctuate drastically, peaking and declining regularly over the ten years' post-conflict before declining *youth unemployment* and rising slightly for *total unemployment*. In both instances, IC countries suffer from a higher and much more unstable employment rate, despite being relatively close to the NIC nations. For both *youth* and *total unemployment percentages*, NIC nations were relatively stable and on a downwards trend from the point of reference.

Figure 11






Figure 12




The comparison for *unemployment percentage with secondary education* yielded interesting results, albeit the data for the IC nations was unavailable after the six-year mark, warranting definite need for further research. The results however, followed a trend that followed the predicted hypothesis, with IC *unemployment rates* showing an extremely erratic and unstable trend in comparison to the NIC's whose rates were relatively stable and declining over the ten years. While the data corresponds with the

hypothesis and other means index readings, a repeated test with more data over longer periods of time is needed for this index, as the graphs indicate a shortage of data.

As was discussed earlier, the assessment of conflicts on children is essential, as it can predetermine a multitude of future factors and the general wellbeing of the nation. The predicted outcome for *children outside of school* in terms of third-party interventions yielded results that were relatively similar to what was predicted, (a drop then rise for IC nations and stable increased rates for NIC nations) – however the variance in the resulting averages was unexpected. For IC's the average trend increased over ten years at a higher rate each year, ending at a value that is six times higher than the NIC countries' average. This result, although coinciding with the main hypothesis and in sync with the economic patterns that take hold of post-conflict nations, also warrants further inquiry into related factors. However, no other indicator dataset provided enough data to be placed in the study as a comparative measure. As such, standing as the only index for children's wellbeing in a post-conflict state, this result fits the conclusion in question, but begs additional index measures to understand the effects on children as a whole. This does however, fit with the social wellbeing indicators as a whole.


Figure 13



The final index was taken as an assessment of governance based on data collection from the World Bank. The measure of *accountability, corruption and transparency in public sector ratings* ranks each nation on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 ranking the lowest and 6 the highest. The results for this comparison proved to be inconclusive, with little data available for the IC nations. While this comes as a surprise, the NIC results fit the

hypothesis in question and continued to climb up, reflecting a higher rating in *corruption, accountability and transparency in the public sector* overall.

Figure 14



As an attempt at measuring the effects of international interventions on social wellbeing indicators, what proved to be most limiting was the data restrictions. Surprisingly little data has been gathered on indicators to do with governance, child wellbeing and social cohesion, as opposed to the economic indicators which were available on an annual basis for nearly every indicator. While *employment* rates and income inequality for the fifteen IC nations are greatly influenced by the intervention, *corruption and accountability* testing remains inconclusive, and the average rates of change for *children outside of school* was also highly conclusive, yet stood independently.

The effects that third-party interventions have on social factors warrants much more detailed assessment in future research, with specific conditions needed to coincide with the available data and tailored to specific aspects of social wellbeing. My reading of the data –and as a result of the high levels of impact that foreign interventions have on a given economy – would still conclude a visible, albeit mediocre negative effect on a given population.

## 6 REFLECTIONS: SYNTHESIZING THE RESULTS

The research conducted has provided a useful first step in synthesizing the long-term effects of military interventions in the most violent civil wars. With the intensity of

conflict being a threshold, this equalization of varying degrees of conflict-recovery was able to provide clearer results when looking at trends. However, and following the conclusion of the research and in the final stages of analyses some issues of consideration for future results were discovered.

Firstly, the duration and type of conflict plays a major role in the variance of data. While such considerations are more significant for in depth case-studies rather than a more generalized statistical analysis, in order to truly neutralize such factors, it will be necessary to use a much larger data set with a greater selection of nations and time elapsed to measure larger trends. As the conflicts were chosen in a neutral manner and the results were as expected, this factor did not seem to have a significant effect. This consideration however, would allow for outlier data to have less of a weight on the total average measures of the nation groups, and allow for larger trends to appear with the added data. With such added considerations, this same method could be applied to test for the effects of international interventions on any specific subset of wellbeing indicators. It would be necessary to use a range of related dependent variables in order to verify the reading of data, rather than a singular index which has a higher chance of yielding irrelevant correlations.

While the social aspect of the experiment proved to be less conclusive, the factors still reflect a clear impact of third-party interventions in the post-conflict process due to the large variance, which confirms much of the case studies and theoretical critiques in the majority of the literature on foreign interventions. The main reason for this intensive critique derives from the selectivity of the interventions, alluding to the subjective priorities of post-conflict reconstruction for outside organizations. The links of colonial histories and interventions has long forth been assessed, and is evident in nearly every intervention process thus far. This additionally points out the overwhelmingly interest related motivations for interventions, which automatically place humanitarian issues in the backseat of operations, despite being at the forefront of political and public discourse.

The economic factors that were assessed were selected based on their potential relation to third-party interventions, which have overwhelmingly been carried out by liberal-market democracies'. Thus the predictions expected trends that would mirror this model, and the results yielded matching outcomes. The interrelation of the indices was crucial for the final analysis, as one confirmed index result can easily be an anomaly.

The comparative means analysis method was composed of first selecting the thirty conflicts, then gathering the data for each index for the ten consecutive years' post-conflict, then filtering and plotting this data on two separate tables and plots, then standardizing the data to assess trends, then finding an average trend rate for both IC's and NIC's. These two averages were then placed on a single plot and standardized once again. This method helps visually assess the trend changes over the same amount of time post-conflict, and gathers hundreds of data sets to be summarized in the 14 graphs presented. For future research, this method has the potential to gather larger volumes data, and represent it in a simplified visual and quantified manner. In order to truly compare intervened and non-intervened nations' effects, case studies provide singular information that can be attributed to multiple justifications and further alienate any

negative effects from accountability. Kofi Annan (2012), Talal Asad (2015), Ayca Cubukcu (2013) and Beatrice Pouligny (2000, 2005) among multiple others have pointed out the issues of accountability in failed interventions, which far outweigh the ‘successful’ interventions that have yet to measure any long-term effects. As Kofi Annan writes in his reflections titled *Interventions: A life in War and Peace*:

“What is the United Nations for? That is the question that I found myself asking more and more as I looked at the range of issues facing us, and how we address them. My years in peacekeeping had brought me face-to-face with the deepest tragedies suffered by men and women in conflict. Too often they have looked to the United Nations for safety and found an organization unable to secure it. As I thought to rethink our responsibility to our mission, I realized that we needed to make clear whom we were fighting for.

An organization of member states jealously guarding their privileges, the United Nations had drifted toward becoming an institution focused, above all, on self-preservation. In so doing, we had in many respects lost our way – forgetting the first words of the charter: ‘We the Peoples’” (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2012)

What Kofi Annan (2012) refers to in this manner is the lack of clear objectives for interventions in relation to human tragedies in conflict-ridden areas. If the main global organization that often justifies interventions is riddled with doubt and lack of clarity, it becomes monumentally important to question such ‘legitimate’ interventions in order to assess and prevent the dangerous undesired outcomes that seem to emerge years after the conflict. For the legitimation of interventions, humanitarian issues are meant to be the main and foremost objective, as economic and political ones have been evidenced to recoil and affect both the local and global population in later coming years.

## 7 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

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The past decades have seen a dramatic shift of attention to humanitarian and peace-building interventions as their frequency in violent conflicts has increased. The potential effects of such interventions is significant not only in the local humanitarian effects it may have, but also the unintended global repercussions’ that evolve from such conflicts – namely Iraq and Syria in the most recent intrastate conflicts. Testing to see the local effects of foreign interventions (in this case military rather than diplomatic and material intervention), will allow for a clearer picture on how nations should react to civil strife in order to truly maximize the benefits of the civilian and local populations in question. The debate on foreign interventions varies from complete non-intervention, to increased intervention and pressure from third-parties. As was seen however, the complexities of war often result in imperfect interventions, which yield dramatic, and often negative effects on the given population.

This paper was an attempt at quantifying the real effects of military interventions in domestic conflicts. While there are varying degrees of intervention, there is clearly a

selective manner in which intensive operations are carried out. These operations are overwhelmingly done with some benevolent public discourse sold to justify warfare and an opportunist or former colonial maintenance. The failure of these operations has continuously raised questions on why such actions are still considered 'legitimate', and what effects are felt by the local population, and what we have seen is a clear depiction of the strong economic influences that are felt in post-conflict states where interventions have been carried out. The erratic economic powers, extraction of natural resources and utilization of the market force for those objectives is bound to have a detrimental social impact also. This aspect of the research begs further research, and would need more elapsed time for the data to be collected and social impacts to be quantified for multiple conflicts. However, what has been observed time and time again is the strong alienating process that interventions have had, as well as an increase in the intensity of conflict and post-conflict employment and poverty levels.

Time and time again, we have been faced with a war in which interventions into the war were done for the greater good, peace, humanitarianism, or defeating a common enemy. However, waging an ideal war and adding more troops and weapons into the mix only seems to prolong the issues that dwell in a given society. Meddling in the issues of nations that are far removed from the situation of the intervening nations is a dangerous game, and it seems we have yet to learn from our histories. Cyclical violence is inevitable where foreign institutions and values are imposed as 'correct', and this has been proven in a multitude of ways in academia and through lived experience. The Middle East, Africa and Asia have seen decades of militarized and political interventions, and decades of warfare to match.

The humanitarian tragedies of our world are by no means independent and singular issues, however before we are able to responsibly engage and intervene in such wars, the best solution seems to be staying *out* rather than creating further economic and social issues with the façade of a temporary stability. Interventions can be carried out in a multitude of manners, and if they were truly of a humanitarian nature, perhaps nations that engage in such military operations overseas can redirect the capital to their own domestic humanitarian issues; such as the assimilation of refugees and migrants, provision of welfare and education for those travelling the dangerous journeys across oceans, or prevention of atrocious human rights violations that occur on their soil in prisons and refugee camps on a regular basis. The irony of using 'human rights' or 'morality' to justify war from nations that are unwilling to treat humans on their own soil, as they are deemed 'illegitimate' simply by means of identification, is a main indicator in the illegitimate actions of these states. It's absolutely crucial to end the irresponsible and opportunist interventions in civil wars that are often necessary in the process of socializing democracy on a local scale. Such opportunism, mixed with the observable lack of accountability is a dangerous formula for destabilization on a substantial scale, whether it is done intentionally or unintentionally.



In order to be considered a true democracy of the people, *it needs to truly come from the people.*

*“We make war, that we may live in peace”*


- *Aristotle*

*Greek philosopher and scientist (384 B.C – 324 A.D)*

# 8 APPENDIX GENERAL CONFLICT DATA





## 8.1 RAW DATA: TOTAL GRAPH SAMPLES



## 8.2 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS: METHODOLOGY TEST AND GENERAL CONFLICT DATA

Methodology Test:



| Conflicts with US <sup>3066</sup> MJ         | Forces / Type of Intervention           | Years of Intervention | Years of Conflict | Combat Years | Total Casualties (Max. Est.) | Casualties per year |
|--|---|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------|------------------------------|---------------------|
| Indonesia (Indonesian <u>Politicide</u> )    | Command Operation                       | 1965                  | 1965 - 1966       | 1            | 500,000                      | 500,000.00          |
| South Vietnam (Second Indochina War)         | Troops, bombing, naval, nuclear threats | 1960 - 1975           | 1955 - 1964       | 9            | 1,310,000                    | 145,555.56          |
| Cambodia (Cambodian Civil War)               | Bombing, troops, naval                  | 1969 - 1975           | 1967 - 1975       | 8            | 400,000                      | 50,000.00           |
| Iraq (First Kurdish-Iraqi War)               | Command Operation                       | 1963                  | 1961 - 1970       | 9            | 320,100                      | 35,566.67           |
| Bosnia (Serbia) (Yugoslav Wars)              | Jets, bombing                           | 1993 - 1994           | 1992 - 1995       | 3            | 100,000                      | 33,333.33           |
| Congo (Congo Crisis)                         | Command Operation                       | 1960 - 1965           | 1960 - 1965       | 5            | 100,000                      | 20,000.00           |
| Angola (Angolan Civil War phase)             | Command Operation                       | 1976 - 1992           | 1975 - 2002       | 27           | 500,000                      | 18,518.52           |
| Lebanon (Lebanese Civil War)                 | Troops, naval                           | 1958                  | 1975 - 1990       | 15           | 170,000                      | 11,333.33           |
| Guatemala (Guatemalan Civil War)             | Command Operation                       | 1966 - 1967           | 1960 - 1996       | 36           | 200,000                      | 5,555.56            |
| El Salvador (Salvadorian Civil War)          | Command Operation, troops               | 1981 - 1992           | 1972 - 1992       | 20           | 88,000                       | 4,400.00            |
| Philippines ( <u>Hukbalahap</u> , Rebellion) | Command Operation                       | 1948 - 1954           | 1942 - 1954       | 12           | 43,000                       | 3,583.33            |
| Laos (Laotian Civil War)                     | Command Operation, bombing              | 1962 - 1973           | 1953 - 1975       | 22           | 70,000                       | 3,181.82            |
| Dominican Republic                           | Troops, bombing                         | 1965 - 1966           | 1965 - 1966       | 1            | 3,000                        | 3,000.00            |
| Nicaragua (Contra War)                       | Command Operation, naval                | 1981 - 1990           | 1961 - 1990       | 29           | 60,000                       | 2,068.97            |
| Serbia (Kosovo War)                          | Naval, bombing, missiles                | 1992 - 1999           | 1991 - 2001       | 10           | 14,000                       | 1,400.00            |

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