

Inequality and Progressivity: An approach to tax justice

Frank Cowell

Department of Economics and STICERD, LSE

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Outline

Introduction

Standard approaches

Foundations

Tax progression: pragmatic approach

Tax progression: analytical approach

Extension 1: Relaxing scale independence

Extension 2: Horizontal inequity

Alternative approach

Conclusions

Connections

- Economics of tax justice connected to economic inequality
- Mainly concerned with the measurement of income inequality
- Also concerned with meaning of tax progression in connection with inequality
- How are changes in inequality linked to changes in the apparent justice of the tax system?

Approach

- Lessons from standard treatment of the problem
- An alternative view
- Discussion of implications

Methods

- Compare approaches to inequality and to tax design
- In both fields methodologically distinct sub-literatures:
 - intuition
 - utilitarian welfare analysis
 - appeal to an axiomatic method.
- Lessons to be learned from each of these

Foundations 1

- Foundations already in Feldstein (1976)
 1. “equalisand”
 2. how to incorporate taxation into the distributional analysis
 3. how to evaluates income of different taxpayers
- On point 1: Apply Haig-Simons principle to income y
- Other points need more discussion

Foundations 2

- Net tax payment: $t = \tau(y)$
- Maps distribution of y into distribution of x : $x = y - \tau(y)$
- Musgrave and Thin (1948): four (local) concepts of progression:

average rate progression: $\frac{d[\tau(y)/y]}{dy}$

marginal rate progression: $\frac{d^2 \tau(y)}{dy^2}$

tax liability progression: $\frac{y}{t} \frac{dt}{dy} = \frac{y}{\tau(y)} \frac{d\tau(y)}{dy}$

residual income progression: $\frac{y}{x} \frac{dx}{dy} = \frac{y}{y - \tau(y)} \frac{d[y - \tau(y)]}{dy}$

Foundations 3

- Three approaches to evaluation and aggregation of incomes
 1. Intuition
 2. Social welfare basis
 3. Axiomatic method

Distributional concepts


- Distribution of pretax income y in the population:
 $\mathbf{y} := (y_{(1)}, y_{(2)}, \dots, y_{(n)})$
- Distribution of tax receipts t in the population:
 $\mathbf{t} := (t_{(1)}, t_{(2)}, \dots, t_{(n)})$
- Distribution of posttax income x in the population:
 $\mathbf{x} := (x_{(1)}, x_{(2)}, \dots, x_{(n)})$
- Cumulations of incomes, taxes:
 $Y_{(i)} := \sum_{j=1}^i y_{(j)}, \quad T_{(i)} := \sum_{j=1}^i t_{(j)}, \quad X := \sum_{j=1}^i x_{(j)}$
- Shares of incomes, taxes of the first i taxpayers:
 $Y_{(i)}/Y_{(n)}, \quad T_{(i)}/T_{(n)}, \quad X_{(i)}/X_{(n)}$

Analytical tool

- Use Lorenz curve as essential tool
- Pretax Lorenz curve for a typical income distribution, $(i/n, Y_{(i)}/Y_{(n)})$
- Lorenz curve of tax burden, $(i/n, T_{(i)}/T_{(n)})$
- Posttax Lorenz curve for a typical income distribution, $(i/n, X_{(i)}/X_{(n)})$
- Use to give Kakwani (1977), Suits (1977) measures of tax progression
- Overviews in Formby et al. (1981) and Gerber et al. (2020)

Lorenz curves and progression 1

- L-curves of income and tax for three different $\tau(\cdot)$




ONS and income

- The UK's ONS regularly produces data series for five income concepts
1. **Original income:** roughly speaking what one might consider as market income plus private pensions
 2. **Gross income:** the line above *plus* public cash benefits (including state pensions)
 3. **Disposable income:** the line above *minus* direct taxes (including income tax, national insurance and council tax payments)
 4. **Post tax income:** the line above *minus* indirect taxes (including value-added tax, alcohol and tobacco duties)
 5. **Final income:** the line above *plus* public non-cash benefits (including health and education)

Lorenz curves and progression 2

- L-curves for different concepts of income



Difficulties

- Some income adjustments come from imputations, not direct observations
- Some taxes or benefits may cause rank reversals.
 - use $\mathbf{x}_{[]} := (x_{[1]}, x_{[2]}, \dots, x_{[n]})$ where $[\]$ means ordering of the components follows the ordering in the y -incomes
 - resulting curve $(i/n, X_{[i]}/X_{[n]})$ will no longer be convex
- Focus only on mechanical effect of taxes and benefits
 - no economics of tax incidence?
 - no agent responses?
- What basis for choosing Kakwani, Suits, or ONS empirics as appropriate way to consider tax progression?

Inequality and Lorenz dominance

- Social welfare depends on each taxpayer's posttax income
- W , representing social welfare, has the properties
 1. an increase in one person's income increases social welfare
 2. transfer to a richer person from a poorer person reduces welfare
- Attractive result (Atkinson 1970)
 - compare distributions with the same mean:
 - for any such W , it is true that $W(\mathbf{x}) > W(\mathbf{y})$ if and only if $\mathbf{x} \mathbf{L} \mathbf{y}$

Tax progressivity and welfare comparisons

- Theorem on progressivity and dominance (Jakobsson 1976)
 - assume that $\tau(\cdot)$ does not induce rerankings
 - use residual progression
 - elasticity of residual progression $\eta(y) := \frac{y}{x} \frac{dx}{dy}$.
- Given $\tau_1(\cdot)$ and $\tau_2(\cdot)$ with residual progression elasticities $\eta_1(\cdot)$ and $\eta_2(\cdot)$: $\mathbf{x}_1 \mathbf{L} \mathbf{x}_2$ if and only if $\eta_1(y) < \eta_2(y)$ for all y .
- Implications:
 - pretax distribution Lorenz-dominated by resulting posttax income distribution if and only if $\tau(\cdot)$ progressive everywhere
 - redistributive effect of $\tau(\cdot)$ unaffected by a proportionate change in all incomes if and only if $\eta(y)$ is constant for all y

Tax progressivity and welfare comparisons 2

- Development of the result (Eichhorn et al. 1984)
- Take three propositions:
 1. “the average tax rate $\tau(y)/y$ never decreases with y ”
 2. “disposable income x never decreases with y ”
 3. “inequality of x is not greater than inequality of y ”
- Theorem:
 - Propositions 1 and 2 jointly hold if and only if proposition 3 holds
 - If proposition 1 strengthened to “ $\tau(y)/y$ always increases with y ” then this and proposition 2 jointly hold if and only if “inequality of x is less than inequality of y ”.

Inequality and income levels 1

- Inequality remains unchanged under proportionate income changes?
 - usual assumption
 - avoids spurious changes resulting from changes in monetary unit
 - but misses an important issue
- How should inequality *comparisons* be made at different levels of real income?
- Imagine an “iso-inequality” contour map
 - specific to a given level of aggregate income
 - how should the map be adapted for different income levels?
- There are several answers

Inequality and income levels 2

- An assumption about how contour maps should change with level
- Standard : contours adapted by proportionate expansion
 - implicit in so-called “relative inequality indices”
 - rescaling all incomes by same factor leaves inequality unaltered
- Alternative: contours adapted by simple translation
 - implicit in so-called “absolute inequality indices”
 - shifting all incomes by same amount leaves inequality unaltered
- Intermediate position is also possible

Inequality and income levels 3

- Suppose Austria has more income per head than Belgium but they have the same level of inequality
- What changes in income in the two countries would leave this inequality judgment unaltered?
 - same income growth for everyone in the two countries?
 - same absolute changes for everyone in the two countries?
- What happens to tax progressivity and welfare comparisons if absolute inequality approach adopted?
- Moyes (1988) : results of Eichhorn et al. (1984) still hold

Two dimensions of inequity? (1)

- “vertical inequity”: income disparities examined using Lorenz analysis
- “horizontal inequity”: a government intervention should follow “equal treatment of equals”
- Taxpayers with the same circumstances should be liable for the same taxes or transfers
- But tax systems can alter the rankings of the pretax and posttax income distributions
- Narrow interpretation of HI focuses on reranking analysis (Atkinson 1980, King 1983, Duclos 1993, Plotnick 1981)

Two dimensions of inequity? (2)

- No natural way of quantifying degrees of horizontal inequity
- Several pragmatic methods that have been applied to the problem
- Kaplow (1989): what exact distributional principles to apply to changes in HI?
- Rerankings violate the “incentive preservation” property (Fei 1981)
- The issue of HI perhaps should be treated as just another type of distributional comparison

Comparing distributions

- Approach to measuring progressivity based on other systematic ways of comparing two distributions
 - for example Cowell et al. (2013)
 - similar to a “norm income” concept (Almås et al. 2011, Jenkins and O’Higgins 1989)
- Use the idea of a reference distribution
- Quantify the distance from the actual to the reference distribution
 - actual: the posttax distribution x
 - reference: the pretax distribution y

Individualistic approach

- Builds on methods used for individual mobility
 - get individual “history” tracking each i 's “movement” relative to the reference distribution $z_i := (x_i, y_i)$
 - and the profile of histories in the population (z_1, z_2, \dots, z_n)
- Key principles:
 - movement
 - independence
 - consistency
- Use a priori axiomatisation
 - capture principles precisely
 - characterise an ordering over all profiles
 - gives a class of aggregation indices

A class of mobility indices

- Axioms yield a whole class of measures, given by

$$J_{\alpha}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) := \begin{cases} \frac{1}{n\alpha(\alpha-1)} \sum_{i=1}^n \left[\left[\frac{x_i}{\mu_x} \right]^{\alpha} \left[\frac{y_i}{\mu_y} \right]^{1-\alpha} - 1 \right] & \text{if } \alpha \neq 0, 1 \\ -\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{y_i}{\mu_y} \log \left(\frac{x_i}{\mu_x} / \frac{y_i}{\mu_y} \right) & \text{if } \alpha = 0 \\ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{x_i}{\mu_x} \log \left(\frac{x_i}{\mu_x} / \frac{y_i}{\mu_y} \right) & \text{if } \alpha = 1 \end{cases}$$

- The parameter α characterises individual members of the class:
 - $\alpha > 0$: J sensitive to cases where $x_i > y_i$
 - $\alpha < 0$: J sensitive to cases where $x_i < y_i$

Conclusion

- For discussion!

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