Mapping Minorities and their Media: The National Context – Greece

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Introduction

The conditions and shifts in the map of migrant and diasporic minorities living in Greece are rather distinct in their particularities. The history of Greece, being a country in the southeast end of Europe, on one hand reflects the meeting of Europe with Asia and on the other, it bears all the historical and cultural richness and conflicts of the Balkans. In that sense, the case of Greece, when discussing issues of ethnicity, minorities and cultural diversity, is very different to that of most other countries in the European Union. National and ethnic identities have for long been in the core of political tensions and even military conflicts within Greece and between Greece and its neighbours. The concept of *ethnic minority* still remains a taboo and unacceptable concept for many policy makers, politicians and for the majority of the mainstream media; it is considered as a threatening political/propaganda concept that challenges, or even threatens the national interests and boundaries of Greece. It is not for us to discuss the complexities of Greek history and the extreme politicisation of the ethnic identity here. Nevertheless, we are aware and reflexive regarding the way Greek history and politics have shaped debates and developments around issues of identity, Otherness and exclusion of Others. We consider this background knowledge as important when drawing the map of the ethnic and migrant minorities in Greece, their experience of exclusion and the way they have developed their media and got involved in the ICTs; we are aware that minority media, issues of exclusion and participation are formed in an environment where the ideology of national homogeneity is still dominant.

Greece is one of those countries of the European periphery (like Portugal and Ireland) that have only recently known the phenomenon of immigration. In its long history – and more than ever during the last two centuries – Greece has been a country of emigration rather than of immigration, *exporting* large numbers of immigrants around the world (Hassiotis, 1993; Kiliari, 1997). This is one of the two main reasons that explain how an ideology of ethnic and cultural homogeneity has dominated modern Greece and led to extensive resistance to
the integration of the immigrant communities. Apart from the fact that Greece has not been a receiving country of immigrants until the 1980's, the second reason relates to the complexities in the history of the ethnic and national minorities that have inhabited Greece for centuries. Such populations, especially Slavs, Turks and other Muslims, have found themselves in the centre of conflicts between Greece and neighbouring states throughout the centuries. In many areas of the Balkans the mixing of populations of different ethnic backgrounds is the norm rather than the exception. But these populations have often been used in justifying and sustaining nationalist or segregation projects. For this reason, the Greek state has chosen to undermine multiethnicity; rather historically it has chosen to recognise that there are religious and not national or ethnic minorities in its territory.

This political project of ethnic and cultural homogenisation of Greece has had important consequences for the lack of recognition and for the exclusion of populations that have sustained ethnic and cultural particularity (Christopoulos and Tsitselikis, 1997; Christopoulos, 2001). Minority groups such as the Turks, the Pomaks and the Slavs are excluded from the focus of this research, as their experience of ethnicity relates to the complex history of Greece and its building of national identities and borders. These groups are national communities, with characteristics of borderline or indigenous communities. The issues around their experience of identity, community and exclusion are distinct and different to that of the migrant and diasporic communities. Because of the particularities of these groups, we do refer to them when relevant and include some related demographic and historical data. In the mapping of minority media, we include their media (especially Turkish ones) for reference. But we are aware of the complexities and the particularities that relate to national and indigenous minority identities and cultural production; and we are aware that these surpass the focus and the theorisation of this study.

Another community with distinct presence, but with a particular historical and cultural identity is the Rom. There are ongoing debates around the identity of Roma in Europe. Are they indigenous, nomad people or diasporas? Though a
definite answer to this question requires extensive research, we have not found enough evidence to sustain the argument that the Greek Roma form a diaspora; there is no evidence that they identify or long for a distant homeland or that there is a myth of return to India. Thus, we would argue that their experience, like that of the Muslim groups already mentioned, surpasses the scope of this research. We do make references to them when relevant, but their particular case, as well as the fact that there does not seem to be a Rom media culture, excludes them from our focus.

The third distinct category that is relatively underrepresented in this report, is that of the Greek Jews. Though there is no doubt that this is a diasporic community, it is such a small community that is almost invisible in contemporary Greece, making it difficult for us to gather any relevant data. The difficulty in collecting data about the contemporary Jewish culture applies to Jewish media production in Greece as well. The scale of Jewish cultural projects in Greece is very small, so is that of the relevant research. It has to be noted that the past lively and visible presence of the Jewish community, including a flourishing print media culture, has been violently interrupted during WWII. It never recovered since and now Greek Jews are no more than 5,000. This radical change of the Jewish community has changed its media profile as well. Today, the Greek Jewish media presence is almost exclusively on the Internet. And interestingly, the Greek Jewish Internet production appears to be primarily transnational. Most of the on-line Greek Jewish presence appears on sites of the Jewish and Israeli global diaspora, not on servers based in Greece. The contemporary domination of a transnational Jewish mediated presence seems to reflect and encourage transnational mediated expressions of identity, community and cultural production (even local Jewish communities – e.g. the Chabad community in Athens www.chabadonline.com/default.asp?Inscode=athens&a=a have established their on-line presence through Jewish transnational portals). In that

way, the study of the Jewish media in the national Greek context becomes both limited and limiting.

For the reasons explained briefly here, and while taking into account the Greek particularity, we argue that for the purpose of this research we have to focus primarily on the migrant communities, that have altered extensively the demographic and cultural scene in Greece during the last 20 years and who are the ones subject to multiple expressions of exclusion, struggling at the same time with newly-born minority media cultures. These communities’ experience cannot be characterised as experience of diasporas – primarily because of their short life in the new country. Yet, there are definite diasporic characteristics in their experience; it can be argued that these are *diasporas in the making* (Jordanova, 2001). The majority of the migrants in Greece come from the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. These post-communist diasporas are still going through the first period of settlement and continue their struggle for integration (ibid.). Yet, and especially as the media offer them opportunities for self-representation in the new country – in parallel to disseminating information about the new country and about their homeland – it has been argued that they are becoming *diasporised* (ibid.).

Changes in communication and transportation technologies have enabled the development of viable networks of communication and mobility between the old and the new country. In this context, the new ethnic groups around Europe have benefited from increased opportunities to feel rooted in their country of settlement. Their settling has been faster that that of older generations of migrants as they can now move more easily – physically and symbolically – between ethnic, national and transnational spaces. As they can become integrated faster and at the same time keep live and parallel links with their country of origin, they develop diasporic characteristics at a very early stage of their settlement. In this context, media and ICTs gain a significant communication and information role for sustaining links within the newly developed ethnic communities, as well as with the country of origin.
The fact that the word *diaspora* is originally Greek is not insignificant. For Greeks, the idea of spreading the seeds of their people – as the word *diaspora* implies – is very old and very significant for Greek culture. Originally it implied colonisation, but in recent history it has implied violent, forced and painful deterritorialisation. Though pain, nostalgia and longing characterise the dominant discourse around Greek *diasporisation*, at present there is also a sense of pride and celebration for ‘spreading the Greek seeds’ all over the world. The long experience of Greek emigration has led to the development of a large Greek diaspora around the globe. Though difficult to verify as an argument, some official and unofficial estimations argue that that Greek diaspora is at least 10 million – i.e. as large as the population of Greece – or even significantly larger than that. Because of the long and extensive Greek migration and settlement in places away from the original homeland, the social, historical and cultural experience of diasporisation is very familiar to Greeks. The vast majority of Greeks have close relatives or friends living outside Greece; within the country, old and more recent cultural narratives have been dominated by the experience of migration, exile and nostalgia, not less importantly, in modern Greek politics, the diaspora (usually referred to as *Greeks Abroad*) has been an overused reference for developing a nation-centric discourse of *global Hellenism*. With a historical baggage of long experience of migration and diasporisation that has deeply effected the social, cultural and political formations in Greece, Greeks have seen recently experienced a direct historical and cultural change: Greece has transformed into a country of immigration rather than of emigration.

I. The Context: A Brief Discussion about Minorities in Greece

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2 That includes estimations of the Greek Foreign Office, organizations of the Greek Diaspora and the relevant literature.
3 The music genre of *Rembetico* is the most characteristic. This genre, originally developed in the early 20th century, is saturated by the experience of migration and longing. This genre is now rediscovered and broadly consumed.
Greece, like most southern European countries transformed in the last 20 years, from a country of emigration to a country of immigration. This shift is partly due to the need for more labour and due to the enforcement of strict migration controls in the countries of the north. For Greece though, there are also some specific particularities that played their part in this change. The difficulty to control its long borders, the mass exodus of people from the neighbouring Balkan countries and Greek politics of attracting populations of Greek ancestry from the former socialist Eastern European countries had their role as well. For many of the migrants, Greece was imagined as a transit country; though difficulties to migrate to the countries of the north and their absorption by the local economy – especially as illegal unskilled labour – led to the settling of most there. Southern countries are for the first time receivers of large numbers of migrants and for the first time they have to deal with issues of integration (ibid.).

The Greek case is unique in the way it has attracted large numbers of legal and illegal migrants, but also about 2 million ethnic Greeks (Pontians, Greeks from Albania), by successive waves through the late 20th century (Tsoukala, 1999).

The long and adventurous 20th century history of migration in Greece can be drawn by period:
1922-23: 1.25 million ethnic Greek refugees from Asia Minor
1950’s- ’70s: 200,000 Greeks from Turkey, Zaire, Lebanon, Egypt
1974+: 150,000 Greek Cypriot refugees
1949 – present: return of 33,500 Greek political refugees, especially from Eastern Europe
1960’s with large boom after 1989: 70,000 Pontic Greeks – 15,000 arrivals a year
1990’s: The vast majority of the 200,000 ethnic Greeks from Albania

Greek polity in the 20th century encouraged the migration of ethnic Greeks and of members of the large Greek diaspora; while government attitudes have been very negative and restrictive in the case of the non-Greek migrants. This is expressed in the restrictive legislation for residence, work and naturalisation of migrants (Tsoukala, ibid.); legislation has also been based on ius sanguinis –
which means that Greek is considered anybody who has *Greek blood*. This makes the naturalization of foreigners very difficult. Only about 4,000 were naturalised in 1994 – more than 15% of them being EU nationals; 23% of Eastern Europe, 49% from Middle East, Africa and Asia. ‘All these provisions show that Greek government is highly reluctant to accept the potential transformation of Greek society into a multiethnic society’ (ibid.: 117).

Within less than 20 years, migrants have become almost the 6 –7% (Amitsis and Lazaridou, 2001) of the population of the country. Yet, only about 230,000 of them have obtained legal status (ibid.). The Greek history of emigration and the present experience of immigration have formed a very contradictory and tense condition in the Greek society. The state has been inexperienced, unprepared, and as often argued (Christopoulos, 2001; Hletsos, 2001; Giannopoulos, op. cit.), unwilling to deal with the large numbers of immigrants and their integration. At the same time, the mainstream political discourse has been extensively saturated by discourses of cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Furthermore, the majority of Greeks have had no experience of living among people of different background, language and religion. As a result, migrants faced extensive xenophobia upon their arrival – in many cases xenophobia become racism – and political, legal and social resistance to their integration and participation in the society. In 1991, more than 42% of Greeks wanted all illegal immigrants to return to their countries. And 49% did not think that foreign legal migrants should be naturalised (Tsoukala, op. cit.). In 1991, 29% thought that there were too many foreigners in Greece, a percentage that rose to 59% in 1993 (Eurobarometer Trends). More recent European research has

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4 Different sources estimate migrants in Greece to be about one million (interview R.Goro, 3.4.02; interview N.Giannopoulos, 9.4.02). The official statistics are not representative as more than half of those migrants are not unrecorded. According to official statistics quoted in Naxakis (2001), there are about 800,000 migrants in Greece. 65% are Albanians, 6.53% are Bulgarians, 4.5% are Rumanians, 3.17% are Pakistani, 2.64% are Ukrainian and 2.64% are Polish (more data later in this report).

5 Racism against immigrants has taken different forms. It starts with the verbal abuse in public services – which I have repeatedly witnessed myself – the refusal of Greek landlords to rent houses to immigrants – which I again know of many anecdotal incidents – and reaching the extremes of immigrants being refused entry in public transport and being forced into curfew in some villages (such incidents were reported in the Greek press occasionally, especially between the early to the mid-1990’s.)
confirmed that Greeks demand the restriction of the rights of migrants (EUROSTAT research quoted in Georgoulas, 2001).

Migrants still face many conditions of extreme exclusion that set boundaries to their integration, though in the last few years some important changes have taken place. At present, about half of the migrants have some kind of legal status (Giannopoulos, 9.4.02); there are some provisions for bilingual education and a very contradictory experience of participation in the media; a portion of the civil society institutions has become sensitive to issues that relate to migrants’ legalisation, participation and quality of life. Though there is relevant progress towards migrant integration, the vast majority still struggles to obtain residenceship, working permits and reach basic standards of living. At the same time, because of the widespread xenophobia, many migrants – at least those coming from the Balkans, who are the vast majority – take on board the project of assimilation. They often prefer to speak in Greek among themselves – especially in public – they Hellenise their names, they convert into Christian Orthodoxy and baptise their children in the Greek Church. These choices are not original and unique in the Greek case; rather they have characterised the experience of many migrants who struggled for their acceptance in the society of their settlement through adapting culturally homogenising projects throughout the 20th century. These cultural choices however have to be seen in their complexity. Drawing from de Certeau (1984), I would argue that, though partly disempowering, this behaviour could become tactic of resistance in everyday life. Many migrants are cynical and playful about their name and religion change (Sirigou-Rigou, 2000); they know such tactics will help them to be accepted.

I would thus argue that this form of adoption might have two different consequences for identity: on one hand, the identity of the migrant might become more prominent over the particular ethnic identity because of the extreme experience of Otherness in the Greek society; on the other, and while thinking beyond the primordiality of ethnicity, it could be argued that ethnic identity’s

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6 See special section on minority media later in this report.
7 It was typical among the Greeks migrants to the US to Americanize their names; many Greek Cypriot
particularity is not threatened by the change of name and religion; migrants’ public performance of Greekness is rather part of their multiple identities that are in no case static and unchanged. Both of these arguments cannot be but hypotheses, because of the early experience of migration and because of the limited research that has been conducted for this report. However, if one turns to the experience of minorities in countries with long history of migration, it becomes apparent that the project of homogenisation has been challenged by the experience of minorities through time. Furthermore, the limited research done in Greece so far supports such hypotheses for the Greek case.

An Albanian worker’s words (quoted in Psimenos, 1995) reflect the cynicism and the irony of his performed identity:

People used to call me Giorgos. My previous boss gave me this name. Now, the new boss decided to baptise me with his son’s name: Nicos. He was at the church when I was baptised. He believes I should go to church every week and change my manners. The priest says that the route to Christianity is difficult and that I should pray regularly for forgiveness, because my previous life was sinful. I don’t believe in God, but if it’s going to keep me out of trouble while I live here, I have no problem with getting a new name (ibid.: 185-186; my translation).

With this hypothesis as a starting point, the particularity of the minority cultural production and participation – and especially as this relates to communication – becomes more than relevant. What is the role of media in processes of shaping minority identities? How do media participate in the project of minority inclusion and participation? Have new technologies changed the minority communication field in empowering ways? These are starting points which will be addressed in the second half of this report. First, I discuss the socio-historical context of the experience of ethnic and diasporic minorities in Greece.

The Demography of Minorities in Greece

It is very difficult to find any kind of accurate statistical data about the presence of minorities in Greece for many reasons. The main reason is that the migrants to the UK forced their children to speak only in English (Georgiou, 2001).
majority of the ‘new’ ethnic groups has no legal status. Thus, it is only estimations that can be presented. As already mentioned, according to the most accurate estimations, migrants in Greece reach one million at present. The statistics about the old ethnic and religious groups are also subject to political decisions about the recognition of these groups. Muslims (Turks, Pomaks, Roma) are estimated at 110,000 – 120,000 (Madianou, 2002), while, according to the Minority Rights Group International (2000) Roma/Gypsies (which includes Muslim, Christian and other subgroups) are estimated at 160,000 – 200,000. Other recent data of the Council of Europe (2000) show that the 21 largest numbers of people with foreign citizenship are: Albanians, Bulgarians, Rumanian, Polish, people from the Russian Federation, Ukraine, people from Former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan, the Democratic republic of Congo, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Syria. Greece has also been a country with a long tradition of accepting refugees and asylum seekers. Even before the 1980’s there were 30,000 asylum seekers and refugees from countries such as Poland, Iran and Iraq, Turkey, Sudan and Ethiopia (Fakiolas and King, 1996). Smaller groups of diasporic communities, such as Jews (estimated 5,000) and Armenians also live in Greece.

Even though migrant minorities and old ethnic/national/diasporic minorities often experience similar forms of exclusion and marginalisation, there is an apparent division between the old and the new minorities. On one hand, the old ethnic/diasporic minorities remain highly segregated from the mainstream and their everyday life evolves around within their own community (e.g. Turks, Roma). On the other hand, the experience of migration and xenophobia – which

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8 We do not include here the ‘privileged’ migrants – e.g. people with citizenship from one of the developed countries in the world, such as the USA, Canada and Australia.
9 There is a difficulty in defining some of the old ethnic groups that live in Greece. These include primarily Turks, Pomacs and other Muslim groups, people of Slavic background and Roma. It is very difficult to clearly define these groups for many reasons that surpass the scope of the present report. Some of the most important is the diversity in the historical journey of different subgroups and the politicization of these groups’ identities by the Greek and other neighbouring states. For the purpose of this report, we will only highlight certain characteristics of the groups and their experience of marginalisation and exclusion, as this relates to the combination of issues around ethnicity, migration, diasporisation.
brought together very diverse groups of the new ethnic minorities – is alien to the older ethnic groups that fail to see the commonalities between their experience of exclusion and marginalisation and that of the migrant communities.

II. Immigration and Minority-related Policies

As already argued, the Greek polity has been unprepared and often unwilling to form integration policies about the older and new ethnic groups. In 1991 and as a first reaction to the extensive immigration of the late 1980’s – early 1990’s, the Greek government introduced a new law (1975/91) which criminalized migration (Koutrovic, 2001). The following years, migrants were on the go; the deportations reached a record level: from 1991 until early 1999 1,820 people were deported; 1,700,000 Albanians and 120,000 of other nationalities (ibid.). In 1997 another law introduces the so-called White and Green cards of residency in Greece. Though this law has allowed migrants to apply for residenceship, its main aim has not been integration of the new minorities; rather it has aimed at tackling illegal immigration (Kourtovic, ibid.; Petrakou, 2001). The legal framework is still dominated by a policing and controlling approach to immigration, while the provisions for the cultural integration of minorities and for tackling exclusion are still very limited. Some of the very few provisions include the establishment of the so-called multicultural schools, which though have became in very little time mechanisms for the continuing marginalisation and segregation of the children of ethnic minorities (Giannopoulos, op. cit.). These schools became mono-cultural (ibid.) with only the children of migrants joining them, while Greek parents and children refused to accept the multiethnic co-existence. In research among school children in the area of Athens, 63 % did not want Roma children in their classroom and 56 % wanted no Albanian children in their classroom (cited in Georgoulas, 2001). Some projects for adult education – especially for learning the Greek language have also been in place but their contribution is still very limited because of their small scale and because of the low availability of such courses for the majority of migrants.
The state has engaged the police as the primary representative of the government in dealing with migration and migrants. In that way migration has, since its early days, been dealt with from a criminality perspective (Psimenos, 1998; Alexias, 2001; Giannopoulos, op. cit.; Petrakou, 2001). This political choice has had consequences for the way the majority population, the state and the mainstream media have been conceiving the migrant minorities and the ways migrants themselves have been imagining themselves in the Greek society. The domination of a criminality discourse in the policy and public debates around migration has reproduced xenophobic stereotypes, has excluded migrants from housing and has set difficult boundaries to surpass in their relations with the majority population. The role of the police in particular has had multiple consequences for the life of the migrants, especially since they have extensive power for arresting and deporting migrants with illegal status – or even those who have applied for legalisation and wait for official reply (Giannopoulos, op. cit.).

Empirical research has shown that migrants are very aware of their disempowered position against the state and the police. As Petrakou (op. cit.) notes, migrants are well aware that their existence depends on the documents they carry; they are aware that they are the Others who can only manage to exist if they are invisible, if they do not make their presence visible to neighbours, to the society, to the police. It is for these reasons that many Eastern European (especially Albanians) convert to Greek Orthodoxy; this is a passport to invisibility (followed by the change of their name to a Greek Christian one). A study of Alexias (op. cit.) among 669 police officers and 1,797 immigrants is revealing about the perceptions of each side for the other. 72 % of the police officers say that they would not like to have a migrant as a friend and 73 % say that they have no personal relations with immigrants, revealing an extreme level of xenophobia. At the same time, they see immigration as a national issue and from a very nationalistic perspective. On the contrary, the migrants asked adapted a much broader, global perspective, realising that their migration and employment relates to transnational and global financial developments and global conditions of population mobility (ibid.).
Exclusion: The Extremity of the Greek Case

Exclusion from safe and long term employment, social security, health and housing is still so extreme in the case of the migrants living in Greece that explains why questions of identity, culture and, even less that of minority media production, are still secondary and undermined issues. It is estimated that migrants' wages can be as much as 60% lower than those of the Greek labour (Naxakis, 2001). Statistics also show that there is a downward professional mobility among the migrants, especially those coming from Eastern European countries (Psimenos, 2001). Yet, because of the flexibility of the migrant labourers and their young age, their contribution to the economic development of the country is substantial. According to strict estimations (ibid.), the migrants participate with at least 0.5% in the GDP; according to other estimations this contribution reaches 10 – 15% (Demousi cited in Georgoulas, 2001). Needless to say, they also participate in the economic growth as consumers (ibid.). The contribution of the migrant workforce is very much undermined in the dominant discourse and the media that reproduced ideologies of migration as a problem (Psimenos, 1998; Naxakis, op.cit.).

Furthermore, and with consequences for their quality of life, the development of distinct cultures and communities, some groups are characterised by huge inequalities in the numbers of their male and female members. According to statistics used by Kavounidis (2001) for example, Russians and many African groups are male-dominated, while groups such as the Bulgarians and the Filipino are in their majority female populations. In this way, some groups' exclusion is reproduced as they tend to live in cheap accommodation as male or female groups. Gender inequality also reproduces the sense of temporality within specific communities. Though this sense is often illusionary, it keeps their quality of life levels low as they do not invest in housing and rather send large percentages of their income to family in the country of origin.
III. The Complexities of Ethnic Relations and Identity

Concerns around identity and community are not foreign to minorities; they are concerned and struggle with issues of identity repeatedly, as the limited empirical research indicates (e.g. Veikou, 2001; Psimenos, 1998, 2001). However, their identities are either shaped from a defensive position or through the performative and contradictory engagement in assimilation and resistance to assimilation tactics. An Albanian interviewee (Veikou, op. cit.: 316) defends his choice of migration, while adapting a global perspective, which is at the same time mediated: ‘I know that your homeland is where you’re born, but do you have to die there too?!…The world is big…now I know it. I hear it on radio, I see it on TV…’ A defensive, passive and disempowering expression of self-identity is expressed in the words of another female interviewee in Veikou’s research (ibid.): ‘When I dress like a Greek, when I don’t wear my work cloths, I look Greek. When I walk in the street without being scared and without staring at my feet…in other words when I mind my own business, nobody can tell that I come from that place [Albania]. In a while, we’ll even forget it ourselves’. Veikou highlights that the experience of the migrants through their interaction with the Greeks pushes them towards performativity of cultural assimilation. At the same time, their miming of Greek attitudes does not imply their acceptance of the assimilation project. Rather, she argues, it is a playful act of performance; minorities still aim at achieving the acceptance of their ethnic, collective identities and cultures.

Processes of inclusion and participation in the locale, in the national space and in ethnic and multiethnic communities are usually diverse and contradicting. These contradictions and inconsistencies reflect the conflict between the dominant ideologies and legal and economic (formal) mechanisms on one hand and the realities of everyday life, the political economy of everyday life and the informal economic relations on the other. In understanding identity, forms of
exclusion and participation beyond a narrow legal and economic perspective, one has to examine the particular cultural context and everyday life.

In the Greek context for example, where it is estimated that up to 40% of the GDP comes out of informal, untaxed and parallel to the mainstream, economic activities, the illegal employment of the majority of migrants does not come as a surprise. As Petrakou (op. cit.) notes, in the Greek context this can be a form of social integration. In the areas of the unstructured and small-scale economic activity where migrants are employed, it is recognised that they contribute to the increase of wealth. At the same time, in these environments the extensive xenophobia is confronted by the actual lived experience. As often noted (Giannopoulos, op. cit.; Goro, op. cit.), most of the Greeks very easily reproduce racist degrading stereotypes; at the same time they are usually very positive when they talk about the specific migrants they work with, or live close by.

In the Urban Space

Athens, as the major and overpopulated urban centre of Greece, has attracted the majority of the new ethnic groups. According to official statistics, 44.3% of the migrants who applied for the White Card in 1998 live in the broader Athens area (Psimenos, 2001). In the early days of mass immigration to Greece (1990 – 1995), the centre of Athens became primarily a centre of social exclusion for the immigrants (Psimenos, 1998). Athens’ inner city became a pole of attraction for the poorest immigrants of illegal status who were offering cheap and temporary labour. Some of the city’s main squares even became slam neighbourhoods for years. These squares, hosting some hundreds migrants for more than two years, became symbols of the migrant degrading and exclusion.

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10 Athens has been overpopulated before the arrival of the estimated 500,000 immigrants who now inhabit the city. The extreme concentration of most of the economic and administration activity of the country in Athens has been attracting the majority of the working population – including the immigrants. Half of the country’s population lives in Athens.
11 The case of Koumoundourou Sq. in the center of Athens is the most characteristic. More than 200 Kurdish refugees inhabited the square in the mid-1990s. Their poverty and exclusion turned their temporary
(Psimenos, 2001). In these areas of extreme social exclusion were thousands of immigrants lived (and some continue to live) in fear, poverty and marginalization, the first strong ethnic community networks developed (Psimenos, ibid.; see preceded footnote). In the cheap hotels of Vathis Square, ethnic networks of support were the ones that enabled newly arriving migrants to find their first jobs and housing. These cheap overcrowded hotels became spaces of collective ethnic co-habitation and turned into community spaces desperately needed among people with no legal status, no knowledge of Greek or no money. At the same time, Psimenos (ibid.) argues, the extreme conditions of social exclusion that ghettoised ethnic groups in the poor areas of the inner city led to the segregation of the city into ethnic enclaves. This segregation partly sustained stereotypes of the majority population to accept the Others; over-concentration and poverty reproduced exclusion.

The shared experience of exclusion, as well as their co-existence in certain locales and professional spaces, has given rise to different forms of solidarity between diverse migrant groups; solidarity and interethnic relations developed around issues that have to do with common concerns around employment and legal status, but are also expressed in politics of everyday life. These novel interethnic relations lead to the emergence of new cultural meetings and gave birth to interethnic communities and became empowering as informal and alternative forms of socialising in everyday life.

One of the most interesting forms of these newly developed social relations is that of intermarriage between certain ethnic groups. Intermarriage is very common among certain communities of migrants – especially those dominated by males (e.g. Nigerian) and those dominated by females (e.g. Filipinos). Some of those communities co-exist in local spaces of the urban centres; some locales of Athens are much more interethnic than mono-ethnic and hybrid cultures emerge in the meeting of different ethnic cultures. The urban context filters the cultural meeting of different minority communities; the sharing

neighbourhood into a community for refugees, migrants and a support movement. In this square – and until its inhabitants were violently uprooted by the police – demonstrations and gatherings for the rights of the
of the urban everyday experience, similar working conditions, negative experiences of xenophobia and the limited choices for entertainment and consumption are experiences that bring different groups closer together. The locales are transformed as the demography of their population does. Some of the local economies have been revived after the arrival of the new migrant residents; migrants reinforced the old form of the local shop as space of social gathering, especially as hybrid grocery shops – telephone centres – Internet cafes continuously appear in areas with high migrant concentration.

Highlighting the development of multietnic communities, especially in the large cities, does not imply that ethnic communities are on the decline; on the contrary, ethnic groups are increasingly formed into communities and start developing their own institutions, networks of support and socialising. Filipinos, forming one of the oldest groups of migrants in Greece have a well functioning community; they have established a Philippinese school in Athens, they publish at least one monthly news bulletin \((Hearts:\) Philippinese Catholic Bulletin) and have a visible political presence in both the national and the transnational European space. Interestingly, their main community organisation KASAPI is not only active as a migrant lobby in Greece and the EU but has close links with Greek unions and other non-ethnic institutes. The close links between the Filipinos of Greece also relate to a cultural background of tight networks (Canete, 2001). Filipinos are one of the most visible ethnic groups in Greece, both in terms of appearance and also in terms of the very public presence in the urban spaces, especially at the weekends. Church and other social gatherings in the weekends compensate for their isolation during the week – as the vast majority is employed as domestic workers.

Participation in ethnic communities’ formal and informal activities – which, in the words of many members of minorities are their main pleasures – meets the resistance of employers and other hostile attitudes. Anderson and Phizacklea (cited in Psimenos, 2001: 119) quote a Filipino domestic worker who says:

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migrants and for other political issues repeatedly took place.
Once I asked [my boss] if I could have Saturday and Sunday off instead of Friday and Saturday so that I can go to church and meet with the other Filipinos who have social gatherings, play basketball, eat Philippine food and have such a lovely time. That's all I ask: a Saturday and a Sunday once a month so that I can join the gathering. I'm very-very lonely because I live far away from the city and I want to have Sunday off…and my boss always says “we'll see”. Because they go away at the weekend with their yacht and they want me to be there so that the home is not alone and a burglar gets in. And it's so quiet and I sit there and I think: “oh, now, they are all at the gathering…and I have to switch on the television or the radio because it's so quiet, I feel I'm going to get mad (my translation).

One of the obvious changes indicating that ethnic migrant minorities are increasingly part of the Greek society – even if their position is still marginalized and implies multiple exclusions – is the development of ethnic social spaces in public. For the Filipinos, certain parks, churches, but also community centres become – at least partly – their own; they also give them the opportunity for positive participation and visibility. Formal and informal community centres appear all the time, especially in the large urban centres. Coffee shops, food stores, telephone centres, ethnic video stores are the most vibrant ethnic and interethnic hangouts, next to community centres and interethnic migrant centres.

Migrants have also brought with them new, for the Greek space, food cultures. Greek food cultures have since become more diverse. Migrant food stores and restaurants appear in the areas of high minority concentration. The new ethnic cuisine culture is becoming one of those informal forms of celebrating minorities’ presence in Greece. Ethnic restaurants are becoming some of the visible expressions of the growing multiethnicity in Greece; and it is usually welcome by the majority population. Ethnic restaurants are also becoming some of the few leisure spaces shared by minorities and members of the majority population.

…and ICTs

The diversity and revival of interethnic neighbourhoods reflects one kind of the migrant experience in the urban space. Another one is that of the degraded inner city ghettoisation. Migrants’ entry and settlement in the city and the locale reflects their economic position and their social and cultural integration; not all migrants’ experience is the same. For example, Nigerians – who are some of the
very few non-white people in Greece – are highly marginalized and usually live in
poor quality inner-city accommodation. This community very much depends on
informal economy and in pirate CD and video tape commerce. Interestingly, and
as described to me by an informant, who spends most of his working time among
migrant communities, for the very marginalized Nigerian community, ICTs are
central as everyday reference. A large number of Nigerians are ICT-literate as
this is a necessary tool in the reproduction and commerce of pirate audio-visual
products. According to my informant, many of the formal and informal community
spaces that attract members of the Nigerian group are extensively equipped with
ICTs.

The boundaries between the professional and the personal use of ICTs
are constantly blurred. ICTs are used for their own personal communication and
information needs – especially email and surfing on (Nigerian) web sites – but
also for sustaining a very particular, ethnic and informal economy: for producing
pirate CDs, DVDs and video tapes. Some of the spaces that work as both social
and ‘professional’ centres for the informal Nigerian pirate economy are equipped
with CD-writers, VCRs and PCs. It is interesting to note how ICTs (i.) sustain
economically the majority of this ethnic community (most of its members are
excluded from the mainstream economy, as they have no work permit) and (ii.)
how ICTs have allowed the emergence of a very particular ethnic form of
economy that, though informal and illegal, has become an integrated part of the
urban Greek everyday culture12.

New technologies – and often telephone technologies – have become
central in the construction of local social and communicational centres in the
urban space. They also have a functional role as bridges to the home country
and ethnic/diasporic communities around the world. Telephone and Internet
centres and ethnic video clubs constantly make their appearance and get
established in areas with high concentration of migrants. These communication
and media centres both reproduce and sustain mediated minority communication, as well as direct and face-to-face communication. Their customers also become their habitués as such shops do not only offer specific commercial services, but they also become social spaces for local interaction.

**Mapping Minorities in Greece**

According to data of the Greek Institute of Employment (quoted in Kavounidis, 2001), 371,641 immigrants applied for the White Card and about 225,000 for the Green Card (Hletsos, 2001) in 1997[^13]. The process of obtaining the White or the Green Card is very long and the required documents can be obtain by a portion of the migrants only. This is one of the reasons explaining why a large number of migrants are excluded from the official economy and labour market (Goro, op. cit.; Naxakis, 2001). The highly restrictive legal framework has caused long and on-going protests among the migrants and other groups of the civil society (Giannopoulos, op. cit.).

From the migrants applying for a White Card, 65% were Albanian, 6.8% Bulgarian, 4.6% Rumanian, 2.9% Pakistani, 2.6% Ukrainian, 2.3% Polish, 2.0% Georgian, 1.7% Indian, 1.7% Egyptian and 1.4% Filipino. Nationalities that follow with lower percentages include Syrian, Russian, Bangladeshi, Iraqi, Armenian, Yugoslavs and people from different African countries. These numbers more or less reflect the proportions of different migrant communities in the whole of the population.

Migrants are not one homogenous group; people have different backgrounds, have come to Greece for different reasons and their social and cultural experiences in the Greek context vary. For highlighting some of this diversity, we briefly describe some of these communities.

[^12]: The Nigerian CD ‘mobile street trader’ has become a common image of the urban everyday life. It is almost impossible not to see at least a couple of Nigerian street traders on any day in Athens. Especially the pirate CD trade seems to be exclusively a Nigerian migrants’ trade.

[^13]: According to a 1996 law the migrants can obtain legal status in two stages. The first one is that of obtaining the ‘White Card’ which gives them a temporary resident status and the second is that of obtaining a ‘Green Card’ which gives them the right to stay in the country for longer periods (Hletsos, 2001).
Albanians and Albanian Greeks

As already described, this is the largest migrant community in Greece. Large numbers of migrants from Albania have started coming to Greece since 1989, when the neighbouring country opened its borders. There are two reasons for this large emigration from Albania to Greece: (i.) the vast majority of the young Albanian population wanted to leave the country when its boundaries opened; the reasons are complexly economic and cultural; (ii.) the Greek government in 1989 invited the Greek minority of Albania back to the Homeland; most of its members benefited from the opportunity, migrated and settled in Greece since.

Apart from those Albanian citizens who could prove their Greek ancestry, the others have been coming to Greece as illegal immigrants. For many of them, deportation to Albania and return to Greece has become a routine. Albanian migrants were the first economic migrants to come to Greece en masse and they have contributed extensively to the Greek economy during the last 20 years (Georgoulas, op. cit.; Iosifides, 2001). The visibility of their Otherness – poor cloths, their language and numerical visibility – is partly responsible for the xenophobia that rocketed since their mass migration to Greece. Xenophobia has also been sustained in the dominant politics and policies, as well as in the mainstream media discourse. In everyday life Albanian became a degrading mocking word, a synonym to poor, badly-dressed and a person with criminal tendencies.

Albanian migrants have faced different and various forms of exclusion and racism; the extremes of the first half of the 1990’s are fading now, though they are still and often subject to formal and informal forms of hostility. Apart from that on-going resistance of the polity and of large percentage of the population to the presence of Albanians in the Greek society, they have established their presence all over the country. The children of the migrants have been educated in Greek
schools and there is a slow though continuous social integration and upwards mobility among them (Goro, op. cit.).

**Pontic Greeks**

This is a very interesting case of one of the new minorities – one of the oldest ones with children born in Greece who are becoming adults at present. Pontic Greeks are estimated at 170,000 (Kiliari, op. cit.). The Pontic Greeks are people of Greek ancestry, most of whom lived for at least three generations in the Former USSR. Benefiting from special arrangements for the Greek diaspora, large numbers of these populations started moving to Greece in the late 1980's. Though the official Greek discourse and the dominant discourse within this community is that these people have returned to Greece – the *Homeland* – the real experience of most of them is much more complex and contradictory than a natural return discourse implies.

The contradictions characterising these people’s life since moving to Greece are partly relevant to their being a *diaspora of a diaspora*. They were considered and considering themselves to be Greeks in the USSR but what that meant is not necessarily of any relevance within the national Greek context. Many of them had no or limited knowledge of Greek language and a faded knowledge of Greek culture before moving to Greece. Thus, their cultural identities relate much more to their experience and their 20th century historical memory in the USSR and to the lived experience among a different kind of multiethnic society – the Soviet one. Many of the older people cannot adjust to the Greek realities, while huge problems are found among the young Pontic Greeks (they have the highest levels of suicide in Greece – Giannopoulos, op. cit.). Their settlement and difficulty in integrating in the Greek society and economy[1], which partly reproduces experiences of exclusion and Otherness, puts Pontic Greeks in a place between the ethnic Greeks and the ethnic
minorities. The words of a Pontic woman, interviewed by Kiliari (1997), reflect this in-betweeness and contradictory experience of belonging. When asked if she migrated to Greece because she considers it to be the Homeland, she said:

…If Italy was the homeland, or Portugal, or Africa, I would go there. There’s nothing special about Greece. I have no special love for Greece because my real Homeland is Ukraine. Greece is, yeah, the historical homeland; that’s where my grandma and my granddad were living….For that, I love Greece. There’s nobody who doesn’t love Greece. I love Greece and since I had the Greek nationality, believe me, I’d go there (ibid.: 89, my translation).

The case of the Pontic Greeks is worth noting in the context of the present research because (i.) it is a vivid example of the conflict between the ideology of the natural belonging and the uninterrupted link of the diaspora to the Homeland and (ii.) it is a case where processes of exclusion, Otherness and ideologies of national homogeneity have brought a diasporic community in the position of the Other and of the migrant in the imagining of the majority national – Greek in this case – population.

Roma or Gypries

This is one of the oldest ethnic/cultural minorities in Greece. Roma are estimated at 130,000 – 150,000 (Exarchos, 1998) and they are formed of many different ethnic and linguistic groups; their major commonality is that they are all ascribed the identity of ‘Gypsies’ by the majority population and the authorities (ibid.). Though some of the Roma people in Greece speak Indian-rooted languages, it is difficult to argue that they have a shared and significant sense of diasporic identity and consciousness. At the same time, it is worth noting that the Roma in Greece have connections, and often share common languages, with other Roma populations around Europe. In this way, there is definitely a dimension of transnationalism, which though is difficult to theorise in the context of the present research. However, and for the purpose of this study, we should

14 The Greek government’s initiatives for the integration of Pontic Greeks have been very controversial and it has been argued that they often serve other government interests and not that of the specific community (Lavrentiadou, 2002).
highlight how Roma migrants coming to Greece from the Balkans found hospitality, support and a receiving community between the Greek Roma (ibid.). This is an apparent example of the connections, networks, linguistic and cultural expressions that signify the transnational character of the Roma communities.

If the Roma people are included in this section is because they are one of the minority groups that face extreme expressions of economic and cultural exclusion. Their oral and musical cultures are the strongest and more consistent forms of self-expression and cultural empowerment. Because of their nomadism, poverty and very low education level, it is this kind of popular culture that is the most dominant connecting cultural form; the media are almost non-existent among them, apart from some newsletters that Roma organisations publish.

Muslim Minority/ies

This is a diverse minority, which is actually formed from different ethnic groups, of diverse backgrounds and historical journeys and estimated between 110,000 – 120,000 (Madianou, op. cit.). The concept of ‘Muslim Minority’ is a political, more than anthropological, concept adapted by the Greek polity and used in many international agreements. Though no updated and objective data exists, according to the most accurate estimations, 49.1 % of the Muslim minority are Turkish (this is a borderline, national minority, as already discussed briefly), 32.5 % Pomaks and 18.3 % Roma (ibid.). These populations have lived in Greece for hundreds, and some for thousands of years. Apart from the Turkish minority, which keeps links with neighbouring Turkey, the other Muslim groups do not have a sense of belonging to any distant Homeland.

Jewish

In the early 20th century an estimated number of 100,000 Jews were living in Greece – a quite substantial percentage of 1.5 – 2 % of the total population of the country. The Jewish cultural and economic presence was visible and
substantial, especially in Thessalonica, the major city of the northern Greece. Jews have had equal to the rest of the population civil rights since the formation of Greece’s first constitution in 1844 [www.jewishmuseum.gr/gr_jews.htm](http://www.jewishmuseum.gr/gr_jews.htm). Jews’ presence in Greece goes back thousands of years, but it became more substantial when Sephardic Jews migrated from Spain and Portugal to Greece around the 15th – 16th centuries. The significant and long presence of the Jewish diaspora in Greece was violently interrupted during WWII. Concentration camps and executions reduced the Greek Jewish population by 78 %, one of the highest percentages of loss in Europe (ibid.). After WWII about 10,000 Jews lived in Greece and many of them moved since to Israel and the USA. Today, approximately 5,000 Jews live in Greece organised into eight communities (ibid.). Though the links within those communities remain strong, the community’s ethnic and cultural visibility is now very limited.

**Suggested Categories for Mapping**

I. Temporal Mapping of Migration in Greece

**Pre-Capitalist (until mid-19th cent.)**

Ottoman (including Turks, Armenians, Slavs)

Jewish

**Pre-WWII (19th – early 20th cent.)**

Turks

Armenians

Slavs

**Post-WWII (1945 – 1950)**
Period of Greek Emigration; Immigration almost non-existent

Post-colonial (1950 – 1965)

Period of Greek Emigration; Immigration almost non-existent

Post-communist (1989 – present)

Albanian (Greek Albanians)
Rumanian
Bulgarian
Macedonian
Serbian
Polish
Russian
Georgian
Ukrainian
Pontic Greeks (also included in ex-USSR migration)

Other Categories

Other Economic – Labour Migration (1985 - …)

Egyptian
Syrian
Ethiopian
Bangladeshi
Sri Lankan
Indian
Pakistani
Filipino
Political Migration

Kurdish
Iraqi Kurdish
Turkish
Serbian
Palestinian
Iraqi

Refugees (Violence – Hunger Fleeing Migration)

Palestinian
Iraqi
Lebanese
Sierra Leone
Ethiopian
Eritrean
Rwandan
Vietnam
Greek Cypriots

II. Diasporic Mapping (based on Cohen’s suggested categories (1997))

Victim Diasporas

Jewish
Armenian
Palestinian
Kurdish
Iranian (exiles)
African (early)
Rwandan
Vietnam
Cypriot (post-'74 refugees)

Labour Diasporas

Albanian
Russian
Georgian
Ukrainian
Polish
Bulgarian
Rumanian
Serbs
Macedonians
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Filipino
Egyptian
Ghanaian
Sudanese
Libyan

Cultural Diasporas

Iranian
Educational – Intellectual Migration

Arabs (Syrian, Jordanian)
Iranian

Political Diasporas

Eritrean
Berber
Ethiopian
Sierra Leonean
Nigerian
Serbs
Iraqi
Turkish
Lebanese

Minority and Migrant Media in Context

As it becomes already apparent, ethnic and diasporic minorities in Greece face various problems of exclusion and discrimination, many of which directly challenge their meeting of basis needs, such as employment, housing and social security. This condition has two apparent and immediate implications as far as minority media production is concerned. On one hand, minority media – apart from the particular and unique case of the Muslim/Turkish communities – started developing very recently. The developing minority media cultures take place in an unfriendly political and policy environment, while minority production has to deal with immense financial limitations. On the other hand, because of the extremity of problems that minorities face, minority media are saturated by a

15 Not included in Cohen’s suggested framework. We believe it is useful as surpassing the limitations of the ‘victim diaspora’
Because of these particularities of the minority condition in Greece, the specific historical, cultural and geographical context, mediascapes take specific forms and shapes:

- Minority media production in Greece is very new and rather limited. Primarily, it evolves around the ethnic press, which is almost exclusively produced in the ethnic languages; there is no established bilingual culture in the press.
- Because of the lack of resources, those minority media projects developed within mainstream media – either public or commercial media – have been very welcome by the migrants (Giannopoulos, op. cit.; Goro, op. cit.). However, the apparent lack of political commitment regarding these projects and the marginal economic benefit that they can offer (discussion follows) to commercial media puts this kind of minority media production in a very fragile position.
- The limitations in the local and national minority media production enforce the presence of the media of the country of origin. Very often, and after migrants manage to settle down in relatively permanent housing, they invest in satellite dishes (Goro, ibid.). It is often said that Albanians introduced the satellite dish in Greece (ibid.).
- On-line communication is very marginal in terms of production and participation, with a few exceptions. The low economic status of the majority of the economic migrants, the high levels of computer illiteracy among them and the lack of access points means that they do not take advantage of them extensively. Exceptions among minorities include groups such as the Jews and the Kurds who have well-developed transnational networks and their participation in transnational ethnic communities very much depends on their participation on on-line fora and communities.
This is a period of transition regarding the media. On one hand, the polity is in a stage of taking important decisions regarding minority media and minority representation in mainstream media. On the other hand, the growing production of minority media in the Greek space challenges the predomination of the media originating in the country of origin (see discussion on the Gazeta e Athines that follows).

**Greek Media Policy**

There is no particular policy strategy for minority or any form of alternative and community media in Greece. The policy is rather characterised by tolerance and a laissez-faire ideology rather than by strategies of drawing agendas and priorities. Since the shift of the audio-visual legislation in the early 1980's, that set an end to the audio-visual state/public broadcasting monopoly, the airwaves and the television production has been rather loosely controlled. Though restrictions apply in receiving broadcasting licenses, these restrictions primarily relate to the commercialisation of audio-visual production. The consequence of this free market ideology is that any alternative media initiatives have been marginalized and excluded; the airwaves are increasingly dominated my commercial, larger media projects. The survival of alternative and community media is only sustainable as small-scale projects and these projects are usually limited in local production and transmission. Radio stations run by the local authorities, and which have flourished in the early days of radio pluralism, have been on the retreat. The local authority-run radio stations have had a significant role in the Greek mediascapes as they were some of the few projects that functioned as community media. Now very few are still viable and part of the broadcasting scene. It is no coincidence that a number of the few such radios that still exist offer a space for expression and production for the ethnic minorities. In local authorities-run radio stations, there are some weekly slots for minorities. These programmes usually are in the major minority languages (e.g. Albanian and Russian). The limited time of these programmes does not allow its producers to
go beyond the major issues that concern the migrants (legalisation, social security, education).

The domination of the liberal ideology in the Greek audio-visual policy does not make the life of these projects very easily sustainable. On one hand, such small projects cannot survive in a very competitive and commercialised audio-visual setting and on the other, they do not receive any kind of financial support from the authorities. For these reasons, the minority media that are sustainable are the newspapers – usually weekly. The cost of their production is much smaller and it can be covered through sales and advertising. Again, the only exceptions of successful minority radio production are some Turkish ones. These projects are viable as they are based and broadcast locally in areas of Trace in North-eastern Greece, where large Turkish/Muslim populations are concentrated.

Finally, the liberal ideology that saturates media policy in Greece has a positive effect for minorities: there is no control in the reception of satellite channels and no restrictions in the installation of satellite dishes. In that way, access to television and radio production of the country of origin is easy and usually free.\footnote{This of course excludes the cost of the dish installation. Also, a new provider of satellite television packages (Nova) charges for subscription. However, the ethnic channels are also available for free and there is no need to subscribe to Nova to receive them.}

**Minority Media in Greece: A Mapping**

As noted already, a series of difficulties in developing independent minority media projects makes interethnic initiatives and those integrated in mainstream media very important. At present there are only two programmes on television that are especially produced for the migrant communities: these are two 20-minute long slots on the Sunday afternoon programme of ET-3, the third and least popular public television channel. These two programmes – one in Albanian and the second in Russian; the Russian programme mostly addresses the Pontic Greeks – present news and information about politics, culture and
entertainment; these programmes are very popular among the two communities they address (Goro, op. cit.).

The radio presence of minorities again depends on mainstream projects – apart from the Turkish radio stations in North-eastern Greece. The short history of minority radio presence and production is very contradictory and, unfortunately, not very promising. Traditionally – and since the late 1960’s, the public broadcaster ERT has been producing various programmes in many different languages; these programmes have been produced for the Greek diaspora around the globe. This is an interesting case indicating how both governments and media were aware and eager to preserve transnational connections on the airwaves long before the Information Age.

The Φωνή της Ελλάδος (Voice of Greece) has seen a shift in its audience during the last two decades from the Greek diaspora to the migrant minorities living in Greece. Originally these programmes aimed at attracting the second and third generation of diasporic Greeks who did not have a good knowledge of the Greek language but were still interested in news and cultural production from Greece. With the arrival and settlement of large migrant populations in Greece these programmes gained new audience. There are two interesting dimensions in this shift: on one hand, the programmes have turned from the transnational back to the national context. On the other hand, there is still resistance on the production side to accept that these new audiences have different interests. Thus, issues that relate to migration, legalisation, work and social security – which are on the top of the migrant communities’ concerns – are still marginal in the Voice of Greece programmes. Rather, the majority of the information programmes reflects the agenda of the ERT programmes addressing the majority population.

It is nevertheless very important that the Voice of Greece broadcasts in 10 languages that cover the most broadly spoken languages among the migrant communities: English; French; German; Spanish; Arabic; Bulgarian; Rumanian; Albanian; Serbo-Croatian; Russian and Turkish. Programmes broadcasted in Greek medium and long wave still have a special focus on the audiences of the
Greek diaspora. There is one half an hour programme in each different language. Programmes include news and information for social and public services, cultural programmes and music from the original culture/language, while there are connections with the BBC World Service language sections – the output is a mixture of national and transnational production. Interestingly there are no minority producers in the Voice of Greece; neither there is on-line broadcasting (or planning for it).

Changes in audiences, media technologies and communication geographies have not led to the range of changes that would be expected; but this seems to reflect a general undermining of minority broadcasting on public radio. For example, the programmes of the Voice of Greece broadcasted on FM were recently interrupted; now broadcasts are only found in the less popular long and medium wave.

Filia – Friendship…It Finally Appears on AM

The inconsistency of pubic broadcasting policy as far as minority programming is concerned became apparent in the odyssey that the project of the Filia (Friendship) new multicultural public radio has been through. The management of ERT announced the launch of a multicultural radio in October 2001, but within a month this decision was frozen (Giannopoulos, op. cit.), only to come back as surprisingly as it disappeared in April 2002. This station which is now broadcasting in the 12 mostly spoken migrant/foreign languages (Arabic, Russian, Rumanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Turkish, Polish, English, French, German and Spanish) is a rather ambitious project. According to its planning, Filia would broadcast news, entertainment, anti-discrimination programmes and programmes with medical and legal information concerning migrants. This being a rather significant political decision, it remains to be seen how it will be accepted and appropriated by the migrant populations. Concerns that have been raised by organisations working with migrants (Giannopoulos, ibid.) regarding this project relate to the limited presence of the migrant
communities and the NGOs working with migrants in setting the agenda and putting together the programmes of the new radio.

Beyond the difficulties that the multicultural public radio has been facing before it was even born, this still remains a rather radical and positive step towards integration, especially when it is compared to the almost inexistent projects that address minority audiences in mainstream commercial media. A promising project for a two-page supplement for migrant readers in one of the major national dailies was abandoned after marketing research showed no expected economic benefit from it, as Giannopoulos who was directly involves explains (ibid.).

At present, there are only a few weekly slots in Albanian and Russian in the Communist party’s radio stations (90,2 Left on FM); similar slots are broadcasted on a commercial Athenian radio (Klik FM), on Athens’ ATHINA 9,84 FM (run by the local authorities) and on a few other local authority run radios around the country.

The adventurous situation regarding minority production in mainstream and broadcasting media, means that, at least so far, ethnic press has had the major position for minorities’ own representation and shaping of media agendas. The ethnic press has been growing rapidly in the last three years and now there are weekly newspapers that address most of the larger new ethnic minorities. The ethnic press has established itself partly because Greek entrepreneurs committed in investing in such projects; for those entrepreneurs it has become apparent that this is a new, promising market. One of the enterprises that developed minority media presence in Greece is the *International Media Network*, publishing now 5 newspapers in ethnic languages: Albanian, Bulgarian, Russian, French and Polish. These newspapers gain profit from advertising and their sales. Like many ethnic newspapers around Europe, these newspapers depend for a substantial part of their advertising income upon a large transnational money transfer company. As a substantial part of this company’s profit comes from migrants’ money transfers to their home countries, it uses the ethnic press as a major advertising space for reaching these customers. At the
same time, many newspapers manage to survive as they secure continuous income from this major company.

The ethnic press is almost exclusively monolingual – in the ethnic language – reflecting the early stages of its readers’ settlement in the new country. Even for those migrant communities with Greek ethnic background – e.g. the Pontic Greeks – ethnic press in the language of their emigration country is more widely read (e.g. Russian-language press). The agenda of minority newspapers reflects the major concerns among these communities, as already discussed: legalisations, social security, labour legislation and education dominate in the agenda and the front pages. At the same time though, the inside pages reflect the diversity in these communities’ interests, the multiple dimensions of their everyday life and their dual attachment to both the country of origin and Greece. Thus, news from the home country and Greece both take prominent place in these newspapers; cultural pages informing readers about events, publications, new music production in both countries are also extensive, while the letters’ pages and advertising also reveal the transnationalism of these communities. In one of the Bulgarian newspapers we have seen, an ad of the Bulgarian government invites migrants to register as Bulgarians abroad – the national project and that of the diasporisation that involves both migrants and their state is in process. Also, many of these newspapers take on board a community role: at least one Bulgarian newspaper and the Albanian weekly translated and explained the whole of the new migration law to their readers with the publication of a special supplement.

The small-scale of these projects as well as the identity of their producers make it difficult to draw a line between the readership – ethnic community and the ethnic press.

Gazeta e Athines

Taking the numerical predomination of the Albanian group among the migrant communities, it comes as a surprise that Albanian press has developed
only recently. The Gazeta e Athines is the only Albanian newspaper published in Greece and its regular publication and circulation is only two years old. Before that, and during the last five years, some initiatives for establishing Albanian newspapers and magazines have failed or have had huge difficulties with keeping up their regular publication. The Gazeta e Athines is one of those projects that was taken over by a Greek entrepreneur (its life goes beyond the two years of its regular publication, but in the past its publication was not consistent). The resources, access to advertising and the distribution mechanisms that the publishing house had established were missing from previous initiatives produced and published solely by Albanians. The production and distribution demands make it difficult for minorities to develop their own projects and achieve production and economic autonomy beyond the mainstream media. This is one of the reasons explaining the lack of any consistent media presence until 1999. At the same time, the Albanian group, like every ethnic community, has its own particularities that make it distinct, not only vis-à-vis the majority population, but also vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. These particularities are reflected in media cultures.

The history of Albania and half a century of the country’s isolation have had important consequences for Albanian identity and culture. Television has been very successful among Albanians, both in their country of origin and in their countries of settlement (Mai, 2002). Television – western and commercial television especially, including channels received on satellite – has signified a reference of liberation among Albanians. Greek commercial television is very popular among Albanians, partly for this reason. For this rather poor and excluded community, commercial Greek television is also one of the few entertainment options they have access to; it is also a mediator of contemporary Greece and in some ways a Greek language and culture teacher. Television is also the everyday companion that unites them with the Greek majority; media consumption in this way becomes inclusive. So Greek television is predominant as a consumption, cultural, entertainment and participation choice. Yet, the exclusion, which is experienced in various social and economic dimensions, is no
less part of Albanian everyday life in Greece. The interest in information about their life and work as migrants, about politics in Albania and Greece, and, arguably, the need to have access to media of their own language and of positive Albanian representations are behind the success of the Gazeta (Goro, op. cit.).

The weekly edition of Gazeta sells between 4,000 – 4,500, it is distributed in the whole country and even in Albania. According to Robert Goro, its editor-in-chief, the Gazeta is increasingly replacing the newspapers imported from Albania as readers’ choice. ‘The newspapers from Albania now sell half of what the Gazeta sells. Their sales have declined rapidly….Why? Well, on one hand our paper is cheaper, but also we offer a perspective of the Albanians in Greece. The Gazeta is a newspaper for Albanians in Greece. We have local news and news from Albania. We write about events that take place here. We inform our readers about the legalisation process and other such issues that really concern them. We know what the priorities and the concerns of our readers are’ (ibid.).

The Gazeta does indeed adopt a community role. It has published a special bulletin with the whole migration law and relevant comments in the Albanian language; there are weekly updates on migration, employment and social security related legislation and events; it organises an annual literature competition which becomes one of the few community cultural events of large scale; it is now launching a new campaign with questionnaires, inviting readers to give their feedback to the newspaper. The Gazeta seems to increasingly achieve a powerful position and a point-of-reference position within the Albanian community. Its growing presence brings on the foreground plans for daily publication and co-production of such a daily with a major Albanian newspaper. On one hand, the Gazeta’s success promises a long-term and empowering project in the new country; on the other hand, this is planned as a transnational project and in co-dependence of the country of origin.
Mapping Diasporic Media – SUGGESTED CATEGORIES

(1) By Ethnic Group and/or Language and Kind of Medium

Newspapers and Periodicals

ALBANIAN

Gazeta e Athines
Albanian weekly
Mr Robert Goro
3A Polytechniou Str.
Athens 10433
Tel. +105202326
Fax +105244149
omonoia@compulink.gr

Albania
Albanian daily, imported

Balkan
Albanian daily, imported

E Panjohura
Albanian daily, imported

Enigma
Albanian daily, imported

Gazeta Shqiptare
Albanian daily, imported
Koha Jone
Albanian daily, imported

Korrier
Albanian daily, imported

Republika
Albanian daily, imported

Rilindja Demokratike Shpk
Albanian daily, imported

Shekulli
Albanian daily, imported

Sport Express
Albanian daily, imported

Sport Plus
Albanian daily, imported

Sporth
Albanian daily, imported

Zeri I Popullit
Albanian daily, imported

Futbolli Shqiptar
Albanian weekly, imported
Intemexo
Albanian weekly, imported

Ngjallja
Albanian monthly, imported

**BULGARIAN**

Βουλγαρία Σήμερα
Bi-weekly Bulgarian newspaper circulated in Greece and Cyprus, mainly in Bulgarian
Ms Nikolina Cantiiska
33, Marnis Str.
Athens 10432
Tel. +105234152
Fax +105234152

Βουλγαρική Φωνή
Weekly Bulgarian newspaper circulated in Greece and Cyprus, mainly in Bulgarian
Ms D. Bayraktarova
11, Anaxagora Str.
Athens 181 20
Tel. +104976412
[diiliana@hotmail.com](mailto:diiliana@hotmail.com)

ΚΟΝΤΑΚΤΗ/ΕΠΑΦΕΣ
Bulgarian bi-monthly
Mr Kalin Ionov
4, Ag. Costantinou Str.
Athens 10431
Tel./Fax +105228319
kontakti@abv.bg
www.geocities.com/Kontakti2000

BECTH
Bulgarian weekly
Ms Nelli Karayiosova
3A Polytechniou Str.
Athens 10433
Tel. +105202792
Fax +105244149
omonoia@compulink.gr

24 Hours
Bulgarian daily, imported

7 Dni Sport
Bulgarian daily, imported

Monitor
Bulgarian daily, imported

Novinar
Bulgarian daily, imported

Pari
Bulgarian daily, imported

Sega
Bulgarian daily, imported
Trud
Bulgarian daily, imported

168 Chasa
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Jalt Trud
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Kapital
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Vestnik Zenata
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Vits Para
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Bulgarski Novini
Bulgarian fortnightly, imported

RUSSIAN

Athenian Courier
Russian Weekly; in co-operation with the Moscow-based MOCKOBCKNN KOMCOMOLEY
Mr Svevolont Snigger
46B Nikis Str.
Athens 10558
Tel. +109848499
Fax +109848399
amk@stargate.gr

Athenian Sun
Russian Weekly
26, Menadrou Str., 3rd Fl.
Athens 10552
Tel. +105228350
Fax +105221737
patriot@otenet.gr

OMONOIA
Russian Weekly
Inga Abgarova
3A Polytechniou Str.
Athens 10433
Tel. +105202791
Fax +105244149
iabgarova@hotmail.com

ATHENS-PLUS/ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΠΛΟΥΣ
Russian weekly newspaper
Tel. +105228350
Fax. +105221737
26, Menandrou Str.
Athens

Argumenty I Facyt
Russian weekly, imported

Kosmomolskaja Pravda
Russian weekly, imported
Literatournaja Gazeta
Russian weekly, imported

Moskovskij Komsomoletz
Russian weekly, imported

Paratiritis
Turkish and Russian language weekly
Mr Damonas Damianos
Komotini
Tel. +932 963293

RUMANIAN

Ελληνορουμανική Φιλία
Rumanian; Used to be weekly, now monthly magazine
Mainly economic news, not so focused on Rumanian labour immigrant issues

TURKISH

Aksam
Turkish daily, imported

Bulvar
Turkish daily, imported

Cumhuriyet
Turkish daily, imported

Fanatik
Turkish daily, imported

Gunes
Turkish daily, imported

Milliyet
Turkish daily, imported

Ozgur Politika
Turkish daily, imported

Posta
Turkish daily, imported

Turkiye
Turkish daily, imported

Yeni Safak
Turkish daily, imported

Haftasonu
Turkish weekly, imported

ARABIC LANGUAGE

Panorama
Bi-monthly Arabic language newspaper
Mr. Abdul Zagapi
Tel. +108232446/108235944
2A, Keffalinias Str.
Kypseli, Athens
Athens Weekly Report
Arabic language weekly political news bulletin
Mr. Mansour Sassati
Tel. +108235944
Fax. +108232446
2A, Keffalinias Str.
Kypseli, Athens

AAWAZ Athens
Weekly Pakistani Newspaper

Al Ahram
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Akhbar
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Arabi
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Gomhouria
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Hayat
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Messa
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Watan
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Watan Saudi
Egyptian daily, imported

Maydane El Ryada
Egyptian daily, imported

Okaz
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Liwa
Lebanese daily imported

Al Nahar
Lebanese daily, imported

**IRANIAN**

Ettela’ At
Daily, imported

**FILIPINO**

Hearts
Filipino Monthly Catholic News Bulletin

**POLISH**

Kurier Atenski
Polish weekly
Mr Andrzej Jenczelewski
42 Menagia
Athens 115 24
Tel. +105202325
Fax +105244149
kurier@hol.gr

Gazeta Wyborcza
Polish daily, imported

Rzeczpospolita
Polish daily, imported

CZECH

Blesk
Czech daily, imported

Hospodarske Noviny
Czech daily, imported

Lidove Noviny
Czech daily, imported

Mlada Fronta Dnes
Czech daily, imported

SLOVAK

Sme-Slovac
Slovak daily, imported
**Radio**

Voice of Greece  
Multilingual Public Radio Programmes  
ERT  
Agia Paraskeyi  
Athens

**Turkish Minority Media**

**Newspapers and Periodicals**

TRIAKYANIN SESI  
Mr Dede Abdulhalim  
Weekly Newspaper since 1981  
5, Othonos Str.  
69100 Komotini  
Tel. + 5310 20660  
Fax + 5310 37759  
dede@otenet.gr  
www.TRIAKYANINSESIN.com

DIALOG  
Mr. Aidin Omeroglou  
Occasional Newspaper  
Tel. +5310 27803  
Komotini

OZGUR BALKAN  
Mr Nazmi Arif
Occasional Newspaper
Tel. +5310 32572
Komotini

ILERI
Mr Salih Halil
BI-monthly Newspaper
Tel. +5310 36805
Komotini

GUNDEM
Ms. Hulya Emin
Weekly Newspaper
Tel. +5310 70929
Komotini

Radio

ISIK FM, 91,8 FM
Turkish Bi-lingual Radio, since 1994
Mr. Dedes
5, Othonos Str.
69100 Komotini
Tel. + 5310 20660
Fax + 5310 37759
dede@otenet.gr
(Satellite connections with Istanbul station and with Turkish service of Deutsche Welle)

CITY FM
Turkish Music Radio
Komotini

JOY FM
Turkish Music Radio
Komotini

KRAL FM
Turkish Music Radio
Xanthi

KING FM
Turkish Music Radio
Xanthi

TELE RADIO
Turkish Music Radio
Xanthi

**Television**

Satellite channels to be presented on European satellite television mapping.

(2) By Technology and Language

**Print**

Gazeta e Athines
Albanian language weekly

Βουλγαρία Ξήμερα
Bulgarian bi-weekly

Βουλγάρικη Φωνή
Albanian weekly
КОНТАКТΗ/ΕΠΑΦΕΣ
Bulgarian bi-monthly

ВЕСТΗ
Bulgarian weekly

Athenian Courier
Russian Weekly; in co-operation with the Moscow-based МОСКОВСКИЙ

Athenian Sun
Russian Weekly

Kurier Atenski
Polish weekly

OMONOIA
Russian Weekly

ATHENS-PLUS/ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΠΛΟΥΣ
Russian weekly newspaper

Paratiritis
Turkish and Russian language weekly

Ελληνορουμανική Φιλία
Rumanian; Used to be weekly, now monthly magazine

Panorama
Bi-monthly Arabic language newspaper

Athens Weekly Report
Arabic language weekly political news bulletin
AAWAZ Athens
Weekly Pakistani Newspaper

Hearts
Filipino Monthly Catholic News Bulletin

24 Hours
Bulgarian daily, imported

7 Dni Sport
Bulgarian daily, imported

Monitor
Bulgarian daily, imported

Novinar
Bulgarian daily, imported

Pari
Bulgarian daily, imported

Sega
Bulgarian daily, imported

Trud
Bulgarian daily, imported

168 Chasa
Bulgarian weekly, imported
Jalt Trud
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Kapital
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Vestnik Zenata
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Vits Para
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Bulgarski Novini
Bulgarian fortnightly, imported

Argumenty I Facty
Russian weekly, imported

Kosmomolskaja Pravda
Russian weekly, imported

Literatournaja Gazeta
Russian weekly, imported

Moskovskij Komsomoletz
Russian weekly, imported

Aksam
Turkish daily, imported

Bulvar
Turkish daily, imported

Cumhuriyet
Turkish daily, imported

Fanatik
Turkish daily, imported

Gunes
Turkish daily, imported

Milliyet
Turkish daily, imported

Ozgur Politika
Turkish daily, imported

Posta
Turkish daily, imported

Turkiye
Turkish daily, imported

Yeni Safak
Turkish daily, imported

Haftasonu
Turkish weekly, imported

Al Ahram
Egyptian daily, imported
Al Akhbar
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Arabi
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Gomhouria
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Hayat
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Messa
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Watan
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Watan Saudi
Egyptian daily, imported

Maydane El Ryada
Egyptian daily, imported

Okaz
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Liwa
Lebanese daily imported
Al Nahar
Lebanese daily, imported

Ettela’ At
Iranian daily, imported

Gazeta Wyborcza
Polish daily, imported

Rzeczpospolita
Polish daily, imported

Blesk
Czech daily, imported

Hospodarske Noviny
Czech daily, imported

Lidove Noviny
Czech daily, imported

Mlada Fronta Dnes
Czech daily, imported

Sme-Slovac
Slovak daily, imported

Radio

Voice of Greece
Multilingual Public Radio Programmes
Turkish Minority Media

Print

TRIAKYANIN SESI

DIALOG

OZGUR BALKAN

ILERI
Bi-monthly Newspaper

GUNDEM
Weekly Newspaper

Radio

ISIK FM, 91,8 FM
Turkish Bi-lingual Radio

CITY FM
Turkish Music Radio

JOY FM
Turkish Music Radio

KRAL FM
Turkish Music Radio
Television

Satellite channels to be presented on European satellite television mapping.

On-line

Refer to the separate database of web sites and discussion groups from different EU countries. As the on-line diasporic presence is immense, the database will present examples of the different kinds of this presence.

(3) In Relation to Space

Transnational

Voice of Greece
Multilingual Public Radio Programmes

24 Hours
Bulgarian daily, imported

7 Dni Sport
Bulgarian daily, imported

Monitor
Bulgarian daily, imported
Novinar
Bulgarian daily, imported

Pari
Bulgarian daily, imported

Sega
Bulgarian daily, imported

Trud
Bulgarian daily, imported

168 Chasa
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Jalt Trud
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Kapital
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Vestnik Zenata
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Vits Para
Bulgarian weekly, imported

Bulgarski Novini
Bulgarian fortnightly, imported
Argumenty i Farty
Russian weekly, imported

Kosmomolskaja Pravda
Russian weekly, imported

Literatournaja Gazeta
Russian weekly, imported

Moskovskij Komsomoletz
Russian weekly, imported

Aksam
Turkish daily, imported

Bulvar
Turkish daily, imported

Cumhuriyet
Turkish daily, imported

Fanatik
Turkish daily, imported

Gunes
Turkish daily, imported

Milliyet
Turkish daily, imported

Ozgur Politika
Turkish daily, imported

Posta
Turkish daily, imported

Turkiye
Turkish daily, imported

Yeni Safak
Turkish daily, imported

Haftasonu
Turkish weekly, imported

Al Ahram
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Akhbar
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Arabi
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Gomhouria
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Hayat
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Messa
Egyptian daily, imported
Al Watan
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Watan Saudi
Egyptian daily, imported

Maydane El Ryada
Egyptian daily, imported

Okaz
Egyptian daily, imported

Al Liwa
Lebanese daily imported

Al Nahar
Lebanese daily, imported

Ettela’ At
Iranian daily, imported

Gazeta Wyborcza
Polish daily, imported

Rzeczpospolita
Polish daily, imported

Blesk
Czech daily, imported
Hospodarske Noviny
Czech daily, imported

Lidove Noviny
Czech daily, imported

Mlada Fronta Dnes
Czech daily, imported

Sme-Slovac
Slovak daily, imported

Satellite channels to be presented on European satellite television mapping. Also refer to separate mapping database for on-line media.

National

Gazeta e Athines
Albanian language weekly

Βουλγαρία Σήμερα
Bulgarian bi-weekly

Βουλγάρικη Φωνή
Albanian weekly

ΚΟΝΤΑΚΤΗ/ΕΠΑΦΕΣ
Bulgarian bi-monthly

ВЕСТΗ
Bulgarian weekly
Athenian Courier
Russian Weekly; in co-operation with the Moscow-based MOCKOBCKNN

Athenian Sun
Russian Weekly

Kurier Atenski
Polish weekly

OMONOIA
Russian Weekly

ATHENS-PLUS/ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΠΛΟΥΣ
Russian weekly newspaper

Paratiritis
Turkish and Russian language weekly

Ελληνορουμανική Φιλία
Rumanian; Used to be weekly, now monthly magazine

Panorama
Bi-monthly Arabic language newspaper

Athens Weekly Report
Arabic language weekly political news bulletin

AAWAZ Athens
Weekly Pakistani Newspaper

Hearts
Local

All Turkish Media based at North-eastern Greece

TRIAKYANIN SESI

DIALOG

OZGUR BALKAN

ILERI
Bi-monthly Newspaper

GUNDEM
Weekly Newspaper

ISIK FM, 91,8 FM
Turkish Bi-lingual Radio

CITY FM
Turkish Music Radio

JOY FM
Turkish Music Radio

KRAL FM
Turkish Music Radio

KING FM
Conclusions – What’s to learn from the Greek experience?

The domination of the concept of the migrant in Greece – rather than that of minority, which is never used about the migrant groups – reflects a resistance of the Greek polity and society to accept that these communities are there to stay (Christopoulos, 2001). The concept of the migrant – especially as it often assumes an illegal or semi-illegal status – reproduces the dominant ideology of Greek cultural homogeneity and of the temporality of the Greek contemporary multi-ethnic condition. This example alone reflects the level of problems that migrant/new ethnic minorities have to deal with. When their survival and everyday life is subject to all different, basic and apparent forms of legal and economic exclusion, it becomes rather difficult to discuss cultural inclusion and participation; even less so to discuss the shaping of a multicultural model of diversity.

From a similar perspective, Marvakis, Parsanoglou and Pavlou (op. cit.) highlight some problematic starting points that saturate most of the political, policy and academic debates about migration and Otherness in Greece. These reproduce relations of exclusion and subordination of the Others and make the project of their integration and empowerment very difficult. Some of the problematic dimensions highlighted (ibid.) include the perception of migration as a problem; the objectification of migrants when thought through the lens of use and benefit for the economy; the lack of public debates and substantial dialogue around migration. At the same time, these authors highlight the problems with minorities' absence from the public sphere or the reproduction of discourses by minority leadership that undermine the autonomous and diverse expressions of experience and identity.
This is a very central point to emphasise in the context of the present research. On one hand, the marginilization and the exclusion of the minorities from the mainstream public sphere, the mainstream media and culture polarise the communication (or the lack of communication) between different parts of the society. Minorities are forced to deal with basic issues of employment, housing and standards of living and as a result issues of identity, multiculturalism and cultural participation are undermined in their narrative and action. On the other hand, because of their disempowerment and because of their everyday struggles for achieving basic standards of living, minority organisations are often non-representative of the groups’ diverse cultures and politics. This means that a certain understanding of minority politics predominates, reproducing a chain reproduction of exclusion: the majority of the groups’ members stay away from their institutions and the communities reproduce their own exclusion and marginalisation because they fail to shape a strong, representative public discourse.

Minority media are deeply involved in these processes in complex ways:

- Minority media usually reflect the agenda that predominates in the communities they address. This happens for two reasons: the obvious marketing strategies is the one and the second is that minority media are usually small projects from within that have the reflexivity coming out of the everyday experience of their producers in/with the group. This reflexivity is immediately apparent in the minority press. Most of the minority newspapers for example, offer large sections in information and explanation about labour law, legalisation processes, social security for migrations, etc.

- Limited minority media availability – especially as far as audio-visual presence is concerned – means that the legalisation and labour conditions’ agenda, as well as issues of racism and xenophobia predominate. Thus, most media have not become spaces of diverse
expression of cultural, social and political concerns that will enable minorities’ cultural empowerment

- Newspapers are the exception to that. Because of their form as media, newspapers are characterised by diversity in their agenda and content. Thus, distinct and often substantial sections of minority press are dedicated to culture and cultural production, community events, gossip and sports. These newspaper sections are new and growing spaces of cultural participation and offer positive visibility of minorities.

- The contribution of ICTs to the development of minority communication and community building is very diverse. On one hand, satellite television has opened up possibilities for immediate and simultaneous reception of television and radio from the countries of origin. On the other hand, and as most of the migrant communities are still very poor, computer technologies and the Internet still have a very marginal presence. Though this is less and less the case with the younger generations – especially computer literate children – the Internet has not become a broadly used platform of expression, information and communication. In this case, the digital divide is very visible in the low computer literacy and lack of access to computers by migrants (Greece has one of the lowest levels of availability of public access points in the EU).

**Do minority media matter?**

Relevant research on the new ethnic minorities (e.g. Jordanova, op. cit.) and the experience within migrant communities (Goro, op. cit.; Giannopoulos, op. cit.) indicates that ICTs and the media have been of central importance in developing mediated networks and in sustaining community links within the ethnic groups in local, national and transnational scale, as well as links with their country of origin. These links develop from the early days of migration (Jordanova, op. cit.); in that way, migrants’ settlement and integration is rather faster compared to migrants in earlier historical times. In the Greek space, where
the polity’s resistance in promoting long-term minority integration and the population’s xenophobia have a counter-effect on projects of inclusion, participation and community building, minority media have a particularly interesting role of resistance to subordination.

All this is particularly important in a country where minority representations in mainstream media are extremely negative. The mainstream media have played a very central role in the development of xenophobia and stereotypes against minorities – especially against some migrant groups – during the last 15 years (Marvakis, Parsanoglou and Pavlou, 2001; Pavlou, op. cit.). Populism characterising Greek reporting, especially in television crime reports that involve migrants, has literally led to public reactions of moral panic. In the first half of the 1990’s especially, the word **Albanian** became a synonym to criminal in the Greek commercial television and in a large fraction of the – conservative especially – press.

The construction of alternative representations and even more of self-representations by the minorities for themselves can have multiple consequences: (i.) for minorities’ identities, as people can consume multidimensional and diverse representations of their community; (ii.) for minorities’ symbolic participation and inclusion, as cultural production can make the community as a whole feel more empowered; (iii.) for minority’s active inclusion and participation as ethnic media can mediate information that concern them and become a bridge between the mainstream and the minority culture in its different expressions, and (iv.) for the majority population that can be reminded of the positive presence of minorities in the society through such media projects.

But more than anything, media cultures, as integrated in everyday life, relate to informal acts and tactics of resistance and empowerment. The minority press is the primary communication space where ethnic visibility is celebrated; where it is positive rather than negative and defensive. The representation of Albanians in the ethnic press as hard working, as literary people and as a community proposes a self-identity that is denied by the majority of the
population and the Greek polity. The existence of the ethnic press alone is an act of resistance to both the ideologies of minority exclusion, as well as to the myth of temporality in the migrant communities’ presence in the Greek society. The ethnic press reminds both sides that the migrants are *here to stay* – the process of their diasporisation is now in progress.
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Kiliari, A. (1997) Ξένος στην Ελλάδα. Στάσεις της Ελληνικής Κοινωνίας απέναντι στον Μετανάστη. Θεσσαλονίκη: Παρατηρίτης


Mai, Nicola (2002)


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