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'Gaining control with the power of the gun and maintaining control with the power of the pen': A Content Analysis of Framing the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) in the *People's Daily*

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MSc in Media and Communications (Research)

Dissertation submitted to the Department of Media and Communications, London School of Economics and Political Science, August 2014, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc in Media, Communication and Development. Supervised by Professor Terhi Rantanen

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how the mainstream Chinese media in the 1960s framed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in order to promote and legitimise the movement. Theoretically grounded in framing theory, this dissertation is a test application of the theory in a non-democratic Anglophone context. Methodologically, content analysis was applied to map the patterns of the sample news articles. By building the coding frame on the Soviet Propaganda model and the previous qualitative research on the discursive strategies of the Cultural Revolution, 301 pieces of news covering a period of 1966 to 1969 from the *People's Daily* were coded and analysed in the context of relevant literature. The result of the dissertation suggests the framing of the Cultural Revolution has the following characteristics: (1) The 'personality cult of leaders' – a Soviet legacy - is at the centre of the framing of the Cultural Revolution. (2) The other Soviet Propaganda legacy - 'internationalism' - is rendered salient and persistent in order to legitimise the revolution. (3) Beyond the impact of the Soviet Union, the news sample also suggests that participation was class-oriented, which might serve to emphasize the binary opposition of Mao and the 'Enemies of the revolution'. (4) Monitoring these changes shows that both Maoism and class struggle are long-lasting themes of the Cultural Revolution, and that its rhetoric and slogans are not salient or persistent enough to form frames. (5) Although the overall intensity of the framing starts to decline in 1969, what the pattern of the second half of the Revolution is still needs examination. The results suggest that the media system is one key source of influence of framing building in China whereas the role of individual journalists still requires further investigation.

INTRODUCTION

> Revolution is not like inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery... A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows the power of another.

> Mao Zedong, February 1927

On 12th January 2014, Song Binbin, a prominent ex-Red Guard and daughter of a senior admiral in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), offered a public apology for the death of her high school headmistress Bian Zhongyun who had been beaten to death by her Red Guard students in the summer of 1966. This apology touches some people's memory and triggers others' imagination of the turbulent decade nearly fifty years ago. Although the official attitude of the CCP towards the Cultural Revolution is negative, the topic is still very sensitive in China. No official commemoration is allowed. Justice was only brought to the high-profiled figures when their reputation was restored. But millions of other ordinary teachers, intellectuals, doctors and workers perished without even leaving their names. (Wang, 2004). Song's apology thus caused a very negative reaction. Even worse, Song was no an ordinary Red Guard - she was one of the few Red Guard representatives who had been accepted by Mao on the Tiananmen Square Rostrum. The picture of her putting on a Red Guard armband for Mao was all over the newspaper. Later the story that she has changed her name to demonstrate her loyalty to Mao[1] was spread by the media again.

However, Song has insisted that she never wrote the article. Whatever the truth is, this suggests the active role that Chinese media played during the Cultural Revolution. The Party's 'May Sixteen Notification 1966' (Party History, no date) declares that news media, amongst other cultural sectors, should actively seize the power from the counter-revolutionists to ensure the dictatorship of the Proletariat. Therefore the mainstream media in China should have assisted the CCP's promotion and legitimation of it so that more people would be motivated to take part in this 'Great Movement'.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, also known as the Cultural Revolution, is a political social movement, aiming to 'settle the question of "who will win" in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie' and 'to establish the ascendancy of Mao Zedong's Thought' (White, 1979: 48). However, the Revolution caused a huge catastrophe which is described as the 'loss of culture, and of spiritual values; loss of hope and ideals; loss of time, truth, and of life; loss, in short, of nearly everything that gives meaning to life.'

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[1] News claims that she changed her name from 'Binbin' to 'Yaowu' after Mao joking on her name. Binbin in Chinese literally means 'demand violence'. (See Appendix 6)

(1984-85: 605-6). It surely damaged the cause of media as well. The media was reduced to a mere conduit of the CCP and actuality was lost in political correctness (de Burgh, 2003). The Cultural Revolution was 'the dark age of Chinese journalism' (Zhao, 1998: 22). So how did the media in the 1960s justify the movement? What issues would the media focus on? These questions guide this dissertation to ground the research in framing theory, a theory that deals with the issues of how media construct events and shape public opinion (de Vreese, 2005).

This dissertation will investigate the way the Cultural Revolution was framed by the mainstream Chinese media in the 1960s. One potential contribution of this dissertation is to test the application of framing theory in an alternative to an Anglophone democratic context. Another contribution could be to better understand the media's role in the Cultural Revolution. Almost fifty years has passed since the Revolution but the issues that the Revolution represents are still very relevant to make sense of what is going on in some countries today, where ideological inspiration has been passed on to new leaders from their predecessors.

This dissertation is organised into three parts. The next chapter will provide the theoretical base of this dissertation by reviewing literature on framing theory and the empirical application of it before proposing the research question. Then the justification of using content analysis and detailed sampling strategy for this research will be stated. The result will be reported and analysed in the Discussion Chapter before the conclusion of this dissertation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will set the theoretical ground for the dissertation. It starts with reviewing literature on framing theory and its limited critique. Special attention is paid to its various definitions and different emphasis, and the call for its empirical application to be employed across a wider temporal and geographic range than it has been previously. It moves on to examine the Chinese media system and its relationship with the Soviet Union during the 1950s and 60s as a key frame-building factor. Then the core strategies of the Soviet Propaganda Model and the previous study on discursive strategy used in mass mobilisation are summarised as the base to investigate how the Cultural Revolution was framed by the media in the 1960s. A conceptual framework of this dissertation will be outlined and will conclude this chapter.

Framing theory

Framing theory has been widely studied by many scholars from various academic fields, including Sociology, Political Science and Media and Communication (Reese, 2001). In 1974 Erving Goffman was the first scholar to view framing as a way of communication. He describes 'framing' as a 'schemata of interpretation' such that every individual can 'locate, perceive, identify and label' (1974: 21). Since then Dorina and Miron (2004) have found that framing theory is the most used theory in top ranking communication journals. It can be used to unravel framing strategies in the media-related discursive opportunity structures of social movements (Cammaerts, 2012). It can also play a key role in creating an initial model for covering certain events that will often set the example for future reports of similar events (Hall, 1982).

Its growing popularity, to some extent, lies in the fact that with the development of media technology people are increasingly relying on the media for information (Carter, 2013). People build up their knowledge of this world from the information they receive from media technology. The ability of media to shape people's view of the world has been under close scrutiny, from Berger and Luckmann's 1966 book *The Social Construction of Reality,* Tuckman's *Making news*: *a study in the construction of reality* in 1980, to Herman and Chomsky's *Manufacturing Consent* in 2002. This ability of the media to construct reality forms the basis of framing theory.

Framing Theory: Definitions and Variations

Scholars such as Entman, Kinder, Sanders and Scheufele contend that frames work in both news presentation and news comprehension, though they use different terminologies. Entman identifies two levels of frames – 'Mentally stored principles for information processing' and 'characteristics of the news text' (1991: 7). This echoes the claim from Kinder and Sanders (1990) that frames are both 'internal structures of the mind' and 'devices embedded in political discourse' (25), which are named by Scheufele (1999) as 'individual frames' and 'media frame' respectively later on. Due to spatial limitations, however, this research only focuses on the examination of the external mainstream media frame of the Cultural Revolution; concepts and literature on audience frames are excluded from discussion.

Entman articulates that framing theory is 'a scattered conceptualization' (1993: 51). Scheufele also admits that 'research on framing is characterized by theoretical and empirical vagueness' (103).

From an analytical perspective, framing theory has been given various definitions with different emphasis by many researchers. Entman's definition underlines *salience* and *selection* as the main characteristics of framing theory:

> To frame is to *select* some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more *salient* in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (1993: 52; emphasis added).

Salience here means rendering some information more noticeable than others. Entman further argues that the key to salience is sizing (ibid). Keywords, quotations, metaphors, symbols and images etc. are often where news frames are embedded (Entman, 1993; Gamsom and Modigliani, 1989; Shah et al., 2002). Consequently, salience and selection can be achieved by repeating particular words or images containing 'thematically consonant meanings across media and time' (Entman, 1993: 7).

Gitlin (1980), by emphasizing that patterns which can appear in any news regardless of the topic, defines framing theory as 'persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse...' (7). He outlines the dominant characteristics of frames as persistence and re-utilisation, suggesting that the nature of frames is well entrenched. This is echoed by Stephen Reese, who claims that 'frames are *organizing principles* that are socially *shared* and *persistent* over time, that work *symbolically* to meaningfully *structure* the social world ' (2010: p5; emphasis in original). But his definition suggests that frames are abstract organising principles. Frames can be found, according to Entman (1993), in communicatory text. But sometimes it is not enough to map the overall frame if only the obvious media discourse is studied due to that frames' inclusion or exclusion. In other words, it is possible that some frames never make it to a media text.[2] Similarly, issues that manage to set the agenda do not necessarily mean it is critical. In the study of Mao's rhetorical strategy of mobilisation, Huang suggests a means called 'deliberate ignoring' – 'While in Western culture silence usually means tacit approval, in Chinese culture, silence suggests tacit disapproval. If Chinese official media deliberately ignore an event, that event is rhetorically disapproved by the authority' (2001: 216). That is why Gitlin (1980) believes that frames are only one part of a larger social ideology that can differ from culture to culture.

However, Reese (2010) asserts that research must go beyond the face value of exclusion and inclusion. The issue of exclusion and inclusion also hints at the assumption of how the

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[2] Reese illustrates it by borrowing Lukes (1974) articulation of power, asserting that 'the most effective power prevents conflicts (and perhaps manifested frames) from arising in the first place.' (2001: 9)

audience makes sense of the world. There are certain things and words that are taken for granted by the news and which indicate their expectation of an audience's ability to understand. This can be examined in conjunction with the historical and social background.

From a methodological perspective, there is also an imbalance in using qualitative and quantitative methods. Framing research using qualitative methods hugely outnumbers the ones using quantitative tools (König, n.d.). Examples that can be looked up are very few. Thomas and van de Steegs (2003) applied quantitative Factor Analysis in *'An Emerging European Public Sphere? Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Clarifications.'* Despite the flaws[3], it offers a new way to map latent frames from texts. Even when quantitative methods are used, they are often given little credit in the final articles. For example, Reese claims to use an inductive qualitative analysis of the 'War on Terror' frame (2010). But from a methodological perspective, he over-emphasises the qualitative discourse examination, without the recognition of the foundation that the quantitative content analysis established. In the section of 'Inductively Finding the "What" of Frames', he describes how a content analysis of whether headlines contain 'war on terror' in detail. It might still be justifiable for him to argue that the majority of the analysis is still qualitative, but at least his application of a quantitative method to build his hypothesis for further qualitative analysis does raise a point – although, as many researchers argue, patterns that can be counted by quantitative methods do not necessarily mean they are important frames; it would be too hasty to reject the information quantitative methods can offer. Framing is not merely about ideology or metaphors embedded in text, it is also characterised by persistence and reutilisation (Gitlin, 1980). Therefore quantitative methods are a really useful tool while identifying repeating patterns over time. (Chong and Druckman, 2007)

Not enough critique towards framing theory has been done so far. Benford makes an effort to criticise the application of framing theory in social movements as it lacks 'empirical studies, descriptive bias, static tendencies, reification, reductionism, elite bias and monolithic tendencies' (1997: 399). He calls for a methodological development and a clarification of concepts. Although the suggestion is not entirely new, its calling for expanding the focus of framing studies, in both time and space, could be very beneficial to framing theory, as the involvement of more framing examination on events over time and across nations will enable researchers to have an overall grasp of the change of framing strategies one day.

Frame building/finding:

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[3] I have no access to the data and the analysis details of the study, but Thomas König points out the 'violation of the scale level assumptions of factor analysis' (n.d, para. 11) in the study.

Benford attributes some of the shortcomings of framing theory to insufficient methodological development. There has not been enough effort in investigating the less case-specific empirical steps or the systematic factors which determine the framing of news (de Vreese, 2005; Camaj, 2010). But it is an important issue since the questions of what should be made salient and persistent and how to do it do not have one single answer.

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) identify four journalists-related rules: journalists' ideology, professional routine, influences from the news organisation and external interests groups. Based on the four rules and the work from Gans (1979), Scheufele then summarises three major sources of influence in framing building – 'journalist-centred influences', 'political orientation of the medium' and 'external sources' [4] (1999: 115). To sum up, he believes that the determinants of frame building lie in the ideology and professional norms of individual journalists and the structure of the media system.

Framing theory has been developed and applied in western media systems for decades and dozens of frames have been observed and identified by researchers over the years (Game Frame; War on Terror Frame; Cold War Frame, to name just a few). These frames have also been applied in the analysis of news coverage of events today (Camaj, 2010; Reese, 2007; Guo et al., 2012). Even Scheufele's summaries of sources of framing building is also largely based on observation of western media systems. Therefore his emphasis on individual journalist and media systems is worth testing whether it is still applicable in a different media environment.

Chinese media system during the Cultural Revolution

> 'Your [journalists'] job is to educate the people, to *let them know their interests*, their own tasks and the Party's general and specific policies.' Mao Zedong, 'A Talk to the Editorial Staff of Jinshui Daily' (in Selections, 1972: 72).

The quote from Mao describes a top-down mode of communication in China and the ultimate power that is to tell people what they desire (Lukes, 1974). The core notion highlighting Chinese media's absolute subordination to the CCP is the 'Party principles' (*dangxing yuanze)* and the name of the system is called 'Party journalism' (Zhao, 1999: 19). Under the

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[4] Three sources of influences are summarised (Scheufele, 1999):
Journalists: ideology, attitudes and professional norms
Political orientation of the medium: media political preference and organisational routines
External sources: political actors, authorities, interest groups, elites

Party principles, journalists do not have much say about what or how to report. Unlike journalism in western democracy which champions truth and functions as a watchdog for the people, their Chinese counterparts have been taught that: ' ... the news media must accept the Party's guiding ideology as its own; that they must propagate the Party's leadership and stick to the Party's organizational principles and press policies.... ' (ibid). The Party directs the media by Party announcement, internal bulletins, and speeches from leading party members. Certain topics can enjoy intense media coverage during a period of time whereas some receive no attention at all. Consequently, the voice from the top and of political correctness outweighs the diversity of the voices below. The topics and timeliness of the news were compromised as a result. Facts could be twisted in order to serve the purpose of 'political education'. As Howard describes:

> We [Chinese journalists] have no interest in 'hot' news or so called actuality...We show a consolidated view of events...We give the end result the positive resolution of contradictions: and so we show the way forward (1971: 992).

The whole media and all journalists are in control of the party. That is to say, the major source of influence in news framing in China in the 1960s is the Communist Party; the role of individual journalists, however, has been neglected by a great deal of the literature; this is something that needs investigating.

Framing the Cultural Revolution

Since the Chinese media system is rather different from those operating in western democracies, the framing of the Cultural Revolution cannot be easily identified as any of the frames formed in western media systems. However, seldom is a frame built from scratch as it is more likely to rise from existing cultural codes (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; McAdam, 1994; Snow & Benford, 1988). As a matter of fact, the notion of Party principle is inherited and developed from Lenin, who branded the Party newspapers as the 'collective propagandist, agitator, and organiser' of the Party (Zhao, 1999; Zhao, 2011, p19; Meng &Rantanen, forthcoming). Moreover, as in the 1950s the media in China applied the Soviet press system as a model to guide itself (Rantanen, 2007).

The Soviet Union used to be dearly called the 'old brother' by the Chinese and for a period of time their experience was valued unquestionably. Slogans such as 'The Soviet Union of today is our tomorrow' illustrates the expectation (Bernstein, 2009: 6). According to Anderson, 'Chinese Revolution grew directly out of the Russian Revolution, and remained connected with it, as inspiration or admonition, down to their common moment of truth at the end of

the eighties' (2010: 60). Many policies were adopted in China without modification, as Mao declared in 1953:

> In front of us lie very difficult tasks and we do not have enough experience. Therefore, we must seriously study the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union. Whether within or without the Communist Party, whether old or new cadres, technicians, intellectuals, worker or peasant masses, all must learn sincerely from the Soviet Union. We must... study... the advanced science and technology of the Soviet Union. In order to build up our great country, we must launch a nationwide upsurge of studying the Soviet Union (Xinhua Monthly, 1953: 13).

The experience from the Communist old brother had an enormous impact on China. One example is that the economic reform of collectivization known as the 'Great Turn' in the Soviet Union reincarnated itself as the 'Great Leap Forward' in China. Considering all these, it should be reasonable to argue that the strategies learnt from the Soviet Propaganda could still have been in use in the Cultural Revolution, even if by then the relationship between the two had already grown sour. Therefore this dissertation will use the findings of the previous work on Soviet Propaganda and rhetoric as the base for the framing building/finding of the Cultural Revolution.

Soviet Propaganda Model

This dissertation is not an exhaustive specification of how Soviet Propaganda was put into practice. Rather, it only looks for the very core traits of Soviet Propaganda that can transcend those differences engendered by the linguistic, political and cultural differences between the two countries, despite all the similarities they share.

1. The awareness of class struggle:

   At the core of Soviet propaganda is ideology. In the Soviet context, it is defined as 'the interpretation' of Marxism-Leninism 'serving the political purpose of explanation, rationalisation, communication and legitimation', in which class struggle is the central notion (Valdez, 1993: 14).

2. Personality cult and anti-personality cult:

   Personality cult is an integral part of Soviet ideological propaganda (Leese, 2011). For example, Stalin's biography was used as a mass mobilisation tool (Brandenberger, 2011). Social scientists have observed that personality

cults or charismatic leadership is a very common option to create legitimacy and popularity for the ruling class or figures in developing countries.

3. Internationalism:

In spite of the changing definitions of internationalism in history, class-based 'internationalism' had always been the premise of the Soviet Union's foreign policy up until the 1980s (Valdez, 1993: 27). Lenin described internationalism as 'a communist's attitude to the world revolution and a willingness to sacrifice national interests to the broader interests of the world communist movement' (1967: 93). Stalin's subsequent identification of the Soviet Union in 1927 as the 'base' of the world communist movement thus redefined the true measure of internationalism in a revolutionary's attitude toward the Soviet Union.

The bullet points identified from the literature on Soviet Propaganda will contribute to the variables in the codebook that will be used to search for dominant themes.

Previous Qualitative Research

Despite the media system similarities between China and the Soviet Union, I am aware that it would be hasty to claim that the media in both countries are the same. From *The Four Theories of the Press* (1956) to *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (2004), scholars have always been aware of the various characters of the media worldwide and keen on sorting different countries' media into different categories. But more efforts are needed to summarise various media systems in the world without ignoring the different characters of different nations at the same time. As Zhao wrote when criticising *The Four Theories of the Press*: '*Four Theories* only traced the 'Soviet model' 'from its roots in Marx through its mutations in the gardens of Lenin and Stalin in the USSR' (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm, 1963: 106) and paid no attention to its mutations in the gardens of Mao in China' (Zhao, 2011: 148, in Hallin & Manchini). Meng and Rantanen echo this by raising the long-ignored issue that '… Soviet and Chinese media have been analysed with reference to a single concept of Communism' (forthcoming :4). There are obvious cultural and historic differences between the two, such as the impact of Confucius' thought in China. Apart from the deep-rooted culture-related reasons, the break of the diplomatic relations in 1960 followed by the withdrawal of all Soviet advisers from China further diverts the directions the two countries headed towards on their Communist roads (Ferdinand, 1991;

Meng & Rantanen, forthcoming). Therefore, while fitting a Chinese Cultural Revolution frame model, I am not only aware of the similarities but their divergence as well.

Many qualitative studies have been done on the discursive strategies deployed in the mass mobilisation of the Cultural Revolution. For example, Lu (2004) does a series of rhetorical analyses of political slogans, wall posters, revolutionary songs, the so-called model opera and political rituals produced in the Revolution. He contends that political slogans are instrumental in shaping people's minds in various social movements. He identifies two aims of the Cultural Revolution that repeatedly appeared in official media – 'to prevent capitalism' and 'to consolidate the socialist system for the ultimate realization of a communist society'. (5). Therefore, all discursive strategies were oriented towards these two aims. After examining in detail the origins, the transformations, the applications and the effects in theory of these slogans, he argues that the high frequency and widespread use of the political slogans actively shaped the public mind with regard to class consciousness and cultural attitudes. He goes on to analyse six rhetorical slogans of high intensity – 'Never forget class struggle', 'To rebel is justified', 'Sweeping away all the monsters and demons', 'Destroy the four olds and establish the four news' and rhetoric eulogizing Mao such as 'Long live Chairman Mao' - which I will use in the coding frame.

In the study of Mao's rhetorical strategies in the Revolution, Huang (2001) identifies the fundamental structure of the Cultural Revolution as the dichotomous relationship between leader (Mao) and the led (the people). Her argument is based on attributing Mao's success in shifting mass opinion in several critical moments from 1966 to 1969 to his symbolic rhetorical strategies. By dividing the Cultural Revolution into three phases she shows how Mao's manipulative rhetorical strategy successfully shifted the movements of the Red Guards, from advocacy for rebellion to being gradually relocated and silenced. Her interpretive findings offer an insight into the application of the rhetoric. Hence it provides this research with a source of key words to identify in mapping out news patterns.

Conceptual Framework Summary

With the theoretical backup from framing theory, this research aims to find what aspects were rendered salient, persistent, included and excluded by Chinese mainstream media in the 1960s. More specifically, the research will begin by searching for the possible strategies China had learnt from the Soviet Union propaganda model. Meanwhile it will also make use of the qualitative results from previous studies on Cultural Revolution which will provide this dissertation with a schema of key words, popular rhetoric and themes. This dissertation will then put this interpretative work to the test -whether they are rendered salient and persistent to be the means that the Cultural Revolution was framed.

The objective of this research is to examine the mainstream media frame of the Cultural Revolution. Schoenhals (1996) remarks the Cultural Revolution research seems to have been in limbo. He claims that political researchers have left the task of studying the Cultural Revolution to historians who are equally uninterested due to the lack of available archives. But the issues that the Revolution represents are still very relevant today. For example in North Korea, a rigid mutation of 'communism' passed directly on from Stalin and Mao is still in power (Zhao, 2011, in Hallin & Manchini). This clear 'line of inheritance from Stalin, to Mao, to Ho, to Kim Il Sung, to Pol Pot' (Coutier, 1999: xiv) points out the value in studying the Cultural Revolution and other significant events in which ideological inspiration has been passed on to new leaders from their predecessors.

After reviewing relevant literature and researches on the Cultural Revolution, one research question was developed, with three sub-questions assisting the evaluation:

RQ: How did the framing of Chinese mainstream media from 1966 to 1969 promote and legitimise the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution?

> SQ1: To what extent, if any, can the Soviet Communist Propaganda model assist to identify possible frames of the Chinese Cultural Revolution framing?
>
> SQ2: What patterns of framing can be identified from the news articles on the *People's Daily* from 1966 to 1969?
>
> SQ3: To what extent, if any, did the news framing patterns change over the period of 1966 to 1969?

In the next chapter, the methodology that will be used to answer these questions will be justified. Specific sampling strategies will be specified and the data collecting process summarised.

METHODOLOGY

Research Strategy

Content analysis is chosen as the main method for this research. Content analysis is a quantitative research method that 'identif[ies] and count[s] the occurrence of specified characteristics or dimensions of text, and through this, to be able to say something about the messages, images, representations of such texts and their wider social significance' (Hansel et al, 1998: 95).

As a frequently used research tool, it has two main advantages. Firstly, it is a very objective research method. It searches for the manifest and comprehensive content based on a systematic coding frame, which is less likely to be subjective or selective (Zito, 1975; Hansen, et al, 1998). Consequently, content analysis can provide an 'objective, systematic, and quantitative' description of the research materials (Berelson, 1952: 152) and effectively reduce subjective influence from researchers themselves. Objectivity is a particularly important factor in this research due to the sensitivity of the research topic. The research on the Cultural Revolution is a prime example that one's value and belief are more likely to impact which evidence to use and how to interpret it. On the one hand, Gao (2008) points out that 'the dominant hegemony of neoliberalism (Wang, 2004) and the worldwide conversion to capitalism' led to the *total* denigration of the Maoist legacy. On the other hand, Gao summarises that 'the way we conceptualise ourselves in the present frames our perception of the past' (2008: 4). Some Cultural Revolution researchers are victims or their families are victims of this chaos: the lack of research materials and more clear and open official attitude leave them no choice but to consult more limited and personal memories. I have no doubt in the research ethics of responsible scholars, nevertheless I believe a comparatively objective research method could help researchers to reduce the human influence when the human factors in research is relatively large.

The second advantage of content analysis is its ability to process a large amount of data. One aim of this research is to map the changes in news framing of the Cultural Revolution over four years, and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, many studies have shown that 'framing is best conceptualized as a process that evolves over time' (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 108). The number of pieces of news included is over a thousand; even after sampling the number is still over a hundred. So content analysis enables me to select a comparatively large sample of data and analyse it efficiently with computer software.

Nevertheless, no research method is perfect and content analysis has three main disadvantages. Hansen et al. (1998) points out that content analysis can only identify the most obvious meaning. As to analogies and suggestion, content analysis is unable to detect. Reese (2001) also argues that some frames cannot be identified by sheer counting. Vice versa, patterns that can be counted are not necessarily all valuable to the study. Burgelin criticises content analysis 'for its fragmentation of textual wholes, for its positive notion of objectivity, for its lack of a theory of meaning.' (1972: 11). The coding frame may also contain subjective categories whose answers are open to various interpretations. Moreover, without theoretical support, content analysis alone cannot interpret the statistical patterns. Therefore it is essential to support content analysis with a theoretical framework that can justify the significance and meaning of counting (Hansen, 1998: 96). Otherwise recognising themes

does not necessarily mean identifying frames (van Dijk, 1991), because themes can be mapped out by quantitative content analysis whereas the construction of frames needs a detailed qualitative examination.

During the research preparation period, discourse analysis was also considered as the data of this research is the content collected from various newspapers. However, it was rejected for three reasons. First of all, discourse analysis cannot handle a large amount of news content; therefore it is unable to answer the research question of monitoring the changes of framing. Also discourse analysis is a subjective method, relying too much on personal interpretation. More importantly, in the research on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, a large number of studies have been done in a qualitative manner to examine the discursive strategies deployed in mass mobilisation or the effects on people, such as discourse analysis of posters and memoirs and in-depth interviews of victims, which could offer quite contradictory or polarised perceptions (Gao, 2008). But what is problematic is the fact that very few studies take a quantitative route.

Selection of Data

Media

The *People's Daily* was chosen as the sample media for two reasons. Firstly, since its inception in 1946, the *People's Daily* has been occupying a crucial role in Chinese media, especially after all the commercial newspapers died out in China in the 1950s. By the time the Cultural Revolution began, most other party-controlled newspapers had also ceased publication. Only the three most influential national publications, known as 'Two Newspapers and One Magazine', survived. The *People's Daily* is one of them. These three publications contained the most important editorials, which would be transmitted again on local radio broadcasts or other local newspapers (Zhao, 1998: 18). The second reason is more practical - due to access reasons, the only available online archive among the three is the *People's Daily*, which was obtained from the online archive search engine of Fudan University and Renmin University and ethical approval was obtained beforehand.

Time

Although it is widely agreed that the Cultural Revolution lasted for a decade, starting from June of 1966 (Zhao, 1998), the sample only covers the period of June 1966 to December 1969. This is because the research is more interested in the *promotion* and *legitimation* of the revolution and it should be reasonable to infer that the task of *promoting* and *legitimising*

should have been conducted at the early phase of the movement so that the masses could be mobilised to actively participate in the revolution. What is more, the period before 1970 is widely acknowledged as the most chaotic time of the Revolution (Mark, 2012; Thurston, 1987). Therefore in theory the patterns of media assisting the promotion of the Revolution should be most detectable during this period.

Sampling

By inputting 'the Cultural Revolution' into the database within that three-and-a-half-year period, 185 pages of results were generated. Since there is no other criteria regarding to news selection5 and the sample size is large, random sampling (1997, UN) is adopted to narrow down choices. One in every four days was selected, starting from page one, 1st June 1966. In the end the overall sample is 301.

Coding frames

The coding frame of content analysis contains 16 mutually excluded codes and some include further options. Variables include objective description, such as article title, reporter name and word counts of source, the themes, the sources and tone towards the Cultural Revolution. Many variables are based on keyword detection, as keywords are often used as indicators of frames (Entman, 1993; Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998; Miller & Riechert, 2001). Expressions, such as 'Maoism', 'Chinese Khrushchev' and political slogans were selected based upon the previous qualitative research results.

Among the 301 articles, 30 were selected for a pilot study and Intercoder Reliability Test (ICR). ICR examines how well a content analysis could be duplicated by other people, which is a basic but significant characteristic of content analysis. A content analysis with a low or missing ICR result could be deemed as invalid (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). Formula [r=agreed/(agreed+disagreed)] was used to calculate the ICR. The overall score is 0.91 and apart from the variable 'motivational/prognostic frame' and 'Develop Marxism-Leninism', all other variables achieve over 80% agreement. This variable was removed before carrying out the rest of the coding to ensure the validity and duplicability of the result.

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5 Articles from all kinds of categories should be included because the ideological propaganda was all-round (Lu, 2004), hence the framing should exist in every piece of news, be it the most important front-page editorial or the theoretically least important 6th-page revolutionary lyrics.

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

This section explains the results of the content analysis. Key phrases, figures and quotes from all 301 pieces of news were used for pattern-testing. Statistical tests were carried out using SPSS and the relevant results are reported in the following three sections.

Themes and Topics

Themes are important factors in framing theory (Callaghan, 2005: 6). 71.9% of the major news themes can be identified as relating to the Cultural Revolution. Among them, the most frequently appearing theme is 'Maoism and the Study of Maoism' (32.6%), following by 'Class Struggle' (30.2%) and 'Cultural Revolution Struggle Session or Criticism' (19.1%). The topics of all the sample news are mostly limited in politics (37.9%), production (26.6%), culture and sports (14.6%) and the military (8.0%). Topics such as 'Medicare', 'Economy' and 'Science' only started to emerge after 1967.

For international news, the most frequently used themes were 'Admiring for Mao and the Cultural Revolution' (34%), followed by 'Attack on Chinese people or embassy' (17%). The foreign countries that most frequently appear individually in international news are: Albania, Vietnam and Japan, and the Soviet Union.

Participants of Sources

Although foreign leaders are a major source of international news, overall together with the other party cadres it is quoted very little, with quotes being roughly 8% of the news. Apart from them, three major sources of quotation can be identified:

Mao

71.8% of the news quotes Mao's words (216/301). Two-thirds of the news apply admiring words or phrases in front of Mao straightaway, such as great leader, great supervisor, genius, leader of the world, etc. 99% of the sample articles mention Mao or Maoism (298/301) and the change over time is statistically insignificant (x^2=4.052, P-value=0.399>0.1). This is calculated via Kruskal-Wallis Test as the distribution of the number of mentioning Mao and Maoism is a nonparametric skew to the left . (Appendix 5.2)

Chi-Squared Test of Independence (Appendix 5.1) was employed for the possible association between Mao's image as a world leader and whether it is a piece of international news. The result shows that there is strong evidence that the variable of Mao's image as the leader of the

world and the variable of international news are associated, as x^2= 32.362, *P-value*<0.001, for Chi-squared distribution with df=1.

The enemies and the people

As much as 90% of the sample news includes 'The enemies' but less than half of the news specifically names who the enemies are. The single 'biggest' enemy according to news attribution is Liu Shaoqi – Mao's biggest rival during the Cultural Revolution, with 13.3% of the news criticising him as the main enemy. The rest of the individuals such as Peng Dehuai[6], Zhou Yang[7], Luo Ruiqing[8], Deng Tuo[9] etc. are only mentioned 5 times or less respectively. Only 39.2% of the news clearly identify 'the people' referring to students, workers, peasants or soldiers.

Interactions among sources

Chi-Squared Test of Independence was used to detect whether any associations between quoted sources exist. The results can be summarised into three major findings:

1. Mao and Lin Biao: x^2=12.638 and P-value<0.001
   The null hypothesis that the variable of whether Mao is quoted and whether Lin is quoted are independent of each other is rejected. There is an association between whether the appearance of the people is associated with the appearance of that from Mao.

2. Mao and the enemies x^2=16.394 and P-value<0.001
   The null hypothesis that the variable of whether Mao is quoted and whether the enemies are quoted are independent of each other is rejected. There is an association between whether the appearance of source from the enemies is associated with the appearance of that from Mao.

3. Mao and the people: x^2=1.933 and P-value=0.158>0.1
   The variables of whether Mao and the people appear are independent of each other. So there is no association between whether the people are quoted and whether Mao is quoted.

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[6] Peng Dehuai: prominent military leader, Minister of Defense (1954-1959)
[7] Zhou Yang: Chinese literary theorist
[8] Luo Ruiqing: Chief of PLA General Staff (1959 – 1965), opposing the Cultural Revolution from the start.
[9] Deng Tuo: Chief editor of the *People's Daily* (1948-1958)

Changes over time

The overall trend of the variables measuring promotion and legitimation such as themes, slogans and rhetoric are in decline with few exceptions. But the overall trend means different things for different variables, which could distinguish the potential candidates for framing from the rest. As to participants, only the number of words quoted from Mao has a statistically significant change.

'Maoism and Study of Maoism' and 'Class Struggle' were not only the main themes but also dominated throughout the four years. ' Maoism and Study of Maoism' was the most common theme (stable between 25%-30% of news) before plummeting to 17.9% in 1968. Then it showed a sign of small recovery to 21.4%. 'Class Struggle', starting from 12.9%, quickly progressed to its peak of 32.1% in 1968, before dropping with other variables. The theme of 'Cultural Revolution Struggle Session and Criticism' was stable at around 14% to 18% before the 1969 decline. 'Individual Heroes' was the only theme that had an opposite trend – rising back to 7.1% after a three-year decline from 10.2%. The 'Red Guards movements', 'anti-fraction campaigning' and 'Intellectual Urban Youth Move to Area' did not last throughout the four years. Figure 1 provides a visualisation of the change.

As to slogans and rhetoric (see Figure 2), 'Long live' style rhetoric appeared most throughout the four years and peaked (48%) in 1967. Most other slogans experienced gradual decline throughout the four years. 'Never forget class struggle' decreased sharply from 1966 to 1967 but increased more sharply from 1967 to 1968. 'To rebel is justified' peaked in 1967 at 6% and the rest of the time was generally stable at around 2%.

(for figures see next page)

**Figure 1 Changes of theme from 1966 to 1969**

Figure 2 Changes of CR rhetoric and slogan

As to change of participants (Mao, Lin Biao, the enemies, the people, other cadres and foreign leaders), the Kruskal-Wallis Test shows that only the median[10] number of words quoted from Mao has a statistically significant change between 1966 and 1969 (x^2=20.483, P-value<0.001, df=3).

'Chairman Mao' shows how the increase in the median word counts of Mao over the four years[11] is statistically significant, at 5% significance level from 1966 to 1967 (Z=-2.810, p=0.005<0.05) and from 1967 to 1986. (Z=-2.297, p=0.022<0.05).

DISCUSSION

This section will discuss the major findings of the content analysis associated with research questions and relevant literature. Pertinent news extracts are provided to assist illustration and discussion. At the end of this section, the implications of the results and the possible future studies will be outlined as well. This part will be organised as the order of the sub-questions.

The first two findings correspond to **sub-question**: To what extent, if any, can the Soviet Communist Propaganda model assist to identify possible frames of the Chinese Cultural Revolution framing?

The long-lasting personality cult of Mao Zedong

Mao was the leading figure that received the most attention from the newspaper. According to the content analysis, the frequency of Mao Zedong and Maoism's appearance in the news articles and the number of words quoted from him is the highest among all individuals that could be attributed by specific names. Other top-rank cadres such as Premier Zhou Enlai (appearing in 8 out of 301 news pieces) and Mao's successor at that time Lin Biao (before he fled in 1971) were no match for him. Even lower level cadres were barely mentioned. As for the main theme of the news, the number of 'Admiring Mao and the Cultural Revolution' even supersedes the putatively most popular and Soviet legacy theme of the Cultural Revolution – class struggle (Walder, 1996). For example, the extract below is from a piece of news on the broadcasting of a colour documentary about Chairman Mao. One anonymous audience member was quoted:

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[10] The numbers of words from all sources are nonparametric, see Appendix 4(4)
[11] Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Rank Test was conducted to test the two median of nonparametric groups, equivalent to a two-sample t-test for parametric data groups, see Appendix 4(5)

Extract1

Chairman Mao! *Chairman Mao*! Under your leadership, we overthrew the Three Big Mountains which had been crushing Chinese people and we workers and poor and lower-middle peasants[12] were liberated. You are now leading Chinese people to fight in the Revolution and build Socialism. Great victories come one after another. *Maoism* lights the path forward for Chinese people and all revolutionary mass worldwide. *Chairman Mao*! *Chairman Mao*! You are the most outstanding leader and the greatest genius in contemporary society; you are reddest sun in the hearts of Chinese people and people worldwide. *Chairman Mao*! *Chairman Mao*! We hail to you non-stop... *Chairman Mao* trusts and relies on the mass most, leading us to seize victories. We will forever read *Chairman's* books, follow *Chairman Mao*'s order and fight in the revolution under *Chairman Mao's* leadership (Xinhua News Agency, 1967; emphasis added).

This example shows how the personality cult was rendered most noticeable of all. Chairman Mao was repeated 11 times. The heavy emphasis on Mao alone is one obvious point of this quote, regardless of when, where and who watched the documentary or the actual detailed stories about Mao were presented on the screen. This makes all the abstract victories and praises attributing to him alone and the repeating mentioning of Mao more noticeable and memorable than anything else. The fact that a colour documentary was made about the leader in 1967 is early evidence of the personality cult developing.

According to Entman (1993), frames can render certain rhetorical aspects salient, and Mao's cult is one of the aspects that are made most noticeable. As scholars since Max Weber (1968) have posited, if coordinated effectively, charismatic leadership can promote consensus even in societies that are poorly integrated or lack a greater sense of patriotism, community, and rule of law. The personality cult of Mao is a persistent phenomenon as well. As the Kruskal-Wallis Test shows that Mao is the only source whose number of words quoted in the news has statistically significant increase between 1966 and 1968, indicating his cult was lasting.

This finding echoes the Soviet Legacy of the personality cult of leaders. In the Soviet media systems, Stalin was once the cult figure, whose biography was also used as a propaganda tool. In the Chinese media system, Mao is Stalin's equivalent, known as the starter of the Cultural Revolution. His Little Red Book - *Quotations from Chairman Mao* - was widely distributed in news and other means as a propaganda tool. Therefore the high frequency of his

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[12] Poor and lower-middle peasants is a term coined during the Revolution to refer to poor middle and lower class peasants.

appearance and quotes creates the one-sided positive image that was designed to serve first and foremost as a framing mechanism for political mobilization.

Becoming the fort of the revolutionary world

There are two patterns of the international news[13] that have been framed most obviously. Firstly, the statistics show that when framing international news, the most salient theme is 'Admiration for Mao and the Cultural Revolution' from abroad, framing China in a leading global position. On the theme of admiring Mao and the Cultural Revolution, an effort was made to create Mao as the saviour of the world. According to the Chi-Squared Test of Independence on Mao's image and whether it represents international news, $P<0.00$ indicates that there is strong evidence that mentioning Mao or China as leader of the world is associated with being international news or not, which could suggest the image of Mao and China on the international stage that the media tried to shape.

Secondly, in conjunction with frequently stressing the worldwide admiration for Mao and the Cultural Revolution, Mao and China are also framed as the supporter for poor Asian, African and Latin American countries and the revolutionary mass in capitalist countries. This similar strategy was used by Soviet Propaganda beforehand. Originating from Lenin, internationalism was, as Lenin defined it: 'a communist attitude to the world revolution and a willingness to sacrifice national interests to the broader interests of the world communist movement' (1967: 93). Stalin later refined it as establishing the nation as the 'base' of communism, as he thought of it more as a one-way obligation by claiming:' ...USSR is the *base* of the world revolutionary movement, and this revolutionary movement cannot be defended unless the USSR is defended' (Valdez, 1993: 27-28).

With the alliance between China and the USSR gradually collapsing during the late 50s and early 60s, China no longer recognised the dominant position of the Soviet Union in the communist world. By the time of 1966, 'China's Communists...looked down on the Soviet traitors against world revolution' (Lüthi, 2010: 27). The Soviet Union was therefore frequently associated with the US, both targeted as enemies to all international revolutionary masses. And the 'base' has been replaced.

Extract 2:

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[13] The 'international news' here is defined as 'events or situation outside the home country, or events in the home country in which foreign nationals take part or which are presented as having substantive relevance for foreign situations.' (Elliot and Golding, 1979, cited in UN report, 1985) There are a few cases that are still hard to tell as home and abroad elements tangle together. If so, decision has to be made on personal interpretation of which side of the story is more focused on.

> The editorial [from abroad] says: Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, socialist China has seized the victory of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It is the greatest *base* in the revolutionary world and the great fort of all revolutionary mass striving for liberation (1969, Xinhua News Agency: 5; emphasis added).

Content analysis reveals 13 of 19 foreign nations appearing as the main subjects of the foreign news are poor colonised countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This observation supports Mark's (2012) argument that without the Soviets' support 'Mao attached great importance to the revolutionary struggles in the Afro-Asian-Latin American "intermediate zone", centred on China' (Mark, 2012: 60).

This framing is a reflection of the foreign relationships China had during the Revolution, when the biggest enemy, America, was 'the imperialist' and its lackey the Soviet Union was 'the revisionist' and when Albania - the most frequently appearing foreign nation – was China's best friend and the theme was always friendship and mutual support (Thurston, 1987). But just as Reese (2001) contends, framing is not all about what is included, and what is excluded can be crucial too. Content analysis reveals that the framing of the international news in the Cultural Revolution constructs a world that is very China-centric and black-and-white, either condemning revisionists and imperialists or celebrating the Revolution with several friends. Framing as such could highlight the necessity and legitimation of the Cultural Revolution.

Therefore, in short, the first two findings provide the answer to the first sub-question. The personality cult and internationalism or setting oneself or one country as the leader of the world, as Stalin redefined, are both legacies of the Soviet Propaganda that were applied without too much modification.

The third and fourth findings will provide the answers to the second and third sub-questions: What patterns of framing can be identified from the news articles on the *People's Daily* from 1966 to 1969? And, to what extent, if any, did the news framing patterns change over the period of 1966 to 1969?

Mao-centric dichotomous structures

Quotes in news can display individuals' views on the same issue and reduce the chance of misreporting. (Ingram et al., no date) It contributes to the overall construction of dynamics among various participants in stories. In coding, the participants were grouped according to

their political identities, which had been considered to be the most important labels for everyone during the Cultural Revolution (Gao, 2008). When examining the participants, I am going to examine those who were quoted in the news, which is an indication of whose voices are heard and whose voices often appear together.

Individual wise, it is not surprising to find that Mao was quoted most frequently (71.8%), due to Mao's cult. His words carry the symbolic power of legitimation and charming ethos (Huang, 2000, in Heisay: 208). Around half of the articles also quoted from the source 'the people' which acquired specific meaning during the Cultural Revolution, although it does not mean everyone. It could refer to the revolutionary masses, including workers, peasants (poor and low-middle peasants), but in general it is rather vague as content analysis shows that 52.5% of the news does not specify who 'the people' are - not even their political label, let alone their names. A similar pattern also applies to 'the enemies'. As much as 89.4% of the news mentions 'the enemies' but 54.5% of it mentions no specific names. Common are claims such as 'hidden enemies and traitors within Chinese intellectual circles and within the Party-right up to its highest reaches' or enemies 'have conspired to overthrow Communism and restore capitalism' (Walder,1996: 177). The answer to who exactly the enemies are is vague over half of the time. The only exceptions are a few top-rank cadres. At the beginning of the revolution, Deng Tuo and Zhou Yang were the target of public criticism in 1966 and 1967. As the Revolution progressed, expressions such as 'Chinese Khrushchev' and 'biggest capitalist road of the Party' started being the biggest enemies until Liu Shaoqi became the top enemy in 1969.

A more interesting aspect is the interaction and dynamic amongst these voices as it suggests the structure, relationship and interaction among sources. Group wise, three findings of the Chi-Squared tests of the relationship among sources cast a light on possible groups of interaction that the newspaper strived to construct.

The first finding is that there is an association between whether the appearance of Lin Biao as a source is associated with the appearance of that from Mao which suggests a special status of Lin[14] among all the rest of the top cadres. As the mouthpiece of the CCP, the *People's Daily* was supposed to legitimise and popularise the Party's movement; details such as who is quoted, who appears or disappear in the newspaper could be indicative to what was happening in the CCP (Zhao, 1998).

The second finding is that there is no association between whether the appearance of 'the people' as a source is associated with the appearance of that from Mao. According to the rhetorical studies on Mao and the mass line strategy, Huang (2000, in Heisay) contends that

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[14] Lin was officially listed as the successor of Mao in 1969.

'the fundamental structure of the CRM [Cultural Revolution Movement] was thus represented by the dichotomy of leader and followers and the interactions between leader and the led' (2000, in Heisay: 208). But the finding seems to suggest that such a structure is not statistically obvious from 1966 to 1969. The different findings could be the result of different methodological approaches. This dissertation applies quantitative content analysis that allows for generalisation over a period of time but can only detect the frequency of the direct dialogues between the two. Huang's choice of a qualitative approach enables her to read a number of news articles closely and examine all details in the article, not only direct quotations but also the indirect interaction such as participants' gestures or thoughts. But how representative these indirect interactions and their generalizability are is questionable.

The last result shows there is an association between the appearance of the enemies and that of Mao. About two thirds of news that is themed as 'Cultural Revolution Struggle Session or Criticism' involves quotations from the enemies and it also ranks top for the average number of words quoted in the news. Many framing analysis conducted within the context of western democratic countries may find one side of the voice left unheard or one group of people under-presented in news (de Hugo, 2003). But it does not seem to be the case for the Cultural Revolution.

The enemies' claims were given either in summaries or disproportionately cited in a single article (see extract 3). The former is often used over a period of time and in different themes and topics as a summary of vicious enemies' claims, whereas the latter appears in a type of news which is a hallmark of the Cultural Revolution – struggle session and criticism.

> Extract 3:
>
> By raving 'class difference has already been eliminated so there is no need to emphasize class struggle,' the other biggest capitalist roader in the party is trying to fool the proletarian and revolutionary mass, have the class struggle against bourgeoisies died out and cover the bourgeoisies' attack to the proletarians. This behaviour itself is class struggle. The character of revisionism is helping the bourgeoisie attack the proletarians and changing the proletarian dictatorship to bourgeois dictatorship, which all happens under the name of denying class and class struggle. We have to firmly remember Chairman Mao's teaching: 'Never forget class struggle' (The Artillery Revolutionary Fraction, 1968).

However, I am not equalising giving the enemies a voice to giving enemies an equal chance to speak. The enemies surely were not given any chance to refute claims in newspaper[15], which is a different silence.

In a western liberal democratic media system, media is expected to be the public sphere where various voices can be heard (Lee, 2001). Therefore the diversity in voices is a key factor to study news frames. But in the case of 1960s Chinese propaganda media system, it is not proper to assume the same standard. The diversity of voices is not as important as the source of the voices. The statistical result suggests an interaction between Mao and the enemies, which could support the claim that Mao's words were widely used to frame conduct (Leese, 2011) and refute what the enemies claimed, such as the lively study session of Maoism and fierce debate amongst the Red Guards by throwing quotes (usually out of their contexts) at each other (Lu, 2004).

Considering test results two and three, the findings are not claiming Huang's conclusion on a dichotomous relationship is wrong, but suggesting from a quantitative framing theory perspective another possible structure of the Cultural Revolution.

An overall declining of most variables measuring the promotion and legitimation of the Cultural Revolution.

This finding echoes the overall trend many qualitative studies have proposed. Previous qualitative studies (Leese, 2011; Huang; 2000) came to the conclusion that the following represents the different stages that the Cultural Revolution is roughly divided into:

1. The period of disorder advocacy/ the Red Terror:
   the summer of 1966 to January 1967
2. The anarchy period:
   February 1967-1968, including 'two height of the upheaval height of the upheaval, in the spring and summer of the 1967, and in the spring of the 1968. ' (Thurston, 1987: xvii).
3. Peace restoration: 1969

As Entman regards sizing as the most essential aspect of framing, he argues that 'the first and in some ways most critical sizing choice involves the over salience of the event in the flow of the news' (1991: 9). The flow of news reflects the importance of the events or themes,

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[15] But the fact that some of their claims which makes perfect sense to readers now were blatantly quoted and criticised in the 1960s reflects how twisted the basic judgment were.

including not only the specific words used, but also how much information regarding it was available in the media. Therefore, Entman's sizing will be applied to examine the changes overtime in this section.

Themes

Compared with other themes, both 'Maoism and Study of Maoism' and 'Class Struggle' are rendered by the news most salient and persistent of the four years, regardless of the up and down of the situation in reality. Hence they qualify the frame of the Cultural Revolution themes. Regardless the topics of the news, they are likely to be linked with either Maoism or class struggle. What's more, by the time of 1968, the theme of 'Maoism and Study of Maoism' seems to be rising again. It is important to note that this dissertation only explores the period before 1970, which is only half of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore it could be suggested that 'Maoism and Study of Maoism' is a more salient and lasting theme than 'Class Struggle', which needs further study to answer.

The Red Guard movement is one of the dominant issues in many memoirs on Cultural Revolution (Wang, 2004; Lu, 2004; Chiou, 1974) due to the violence and damage they caused. 6.3% of the news featuring the Red Guards movement from the second half of 1966 drops to 3.6% in 1967 when the chaotic situation turned worse. This example shows what Huang (2001: 216) called 'deliberate ignoring', meaning disapproval from the CCP. A similar strategy can also be observed in the anti-fraction campaign in 1968 to 1969. This observation echoes the point that framing is also about exclusion (Reese, 2007; Entman, 1993).

The Cultural Revolution rhetoric and slogans

Slogans and rhetoric have been widely used to create identities, provoke actions, evoke responses and provide morale and hope (Denton, 1980; Steward et al., 1995; Lu, 2004). Therefore, they function as the primary source of justification for all the violence, criticism, class awareness and elevation of the personality cult of Mao (Lu, 2004). The percentage of the appearances of 'Long live Chairman Mao' almost doubled from 16.3% in 1966 to 28.6% in 1967 and stayed at the top for the next three years, which echoes the long-lasting cult of Mao.[16] The declining trend for the use of doggerels, 'Cow Ghost Snake and Spirit' and 'Destroy Four Olds and Establish Four News' and the peaking of the frequency of 'To Rebel is Justified' and 'Long live Chairman Mao' in 1967 both echo the advocacy for chaos and upheaval. In contrast, the use of 'Never Forget Class struggle' decreases when the two rise

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[16] Long live XXX: Composed around Zhou Dynasty (1027-7700 B.E.C.), it was the most popular way to hail feudal society emperors throughout Chinese history. (Lu, 2004)

and it peaks in 1968 when the other two themes decrease. Class struggle is the core theme inherited from the Soviet Union, but it is outnumbered by the personality cult of Mao.

However, the result also suggests that all slogans were in use but at a relatively low frequency (less than 15%). Moreover, 'Cow Ghost Snake and Spirit' and 'Destroy Four Olds and Establish Four News' gradually disappeared in 1969. Therefore, it might not be appropriate to declare that these slogans are the frame of the Cultural Revolution in the newspaper. There is no doubt of, as Lu's (2004) analyses suggests, the role the slogans occupy in the discursive strategy of the promotion and legitimation of the Cultural Revolution. However, as suggested in the methodology chapter, the lack of the researchers' own background inevitably affect the choice of the materials they use. Lu's rhetorical analysis is mainly based on 'Red Guards discourse and published recollections' (Leese, 2011: 16), therefore the result on political slogans is helpful in studying remembrance instead of framing.

Voices

As to the participants, the Kruskal-Wallis Test shows that only the median number of the words quoted from Mao has a statistically significant change between 1966 and 1969. A close look at the word counts of Mao over the four years and a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test shows the increase in the median of Mao's words quoted is statistically significant from 1966 to 1967 and from 1967 to 1986. From a qualitative perspective, the Revolution started to lose momentum. But from a quantitative perspective, despite the decrease of the number of articles which quote Mao's words, Mao's personality cult still kept at a rather high level as the word count does not drop at a statistically significant level.

In short, to answer the third sub-question according to Finding Three and Four, apart from the frames about Mao's cult and internationalism summarised in Finding One and Two, the patterns of the framing of the Cultural Revolution also include:

1. Regardless of the topic of the news, the dominant themes are 'Mao and Study of Maoism' and 'Class Struggle.' And in general the former outnumbers the latter.
2. The vague identities of the people and the enemies, except for big names such as Liu Shaoqi.
3. Through a quantitative approach, a possible dynamics between Mao & Lin and Mao & the enemies are discovered, which suggests another direction for researching the fundamental structure of the Cultural Revolution.
4. The Cultural Revolution slogans and rhetoric examined here were used in news but with limited proportion.

5. 'Deliberate ignoring' was used to *exclude* certain information that the CCP tried to discourage.

The last sub-question is about the change of the patterns over the period of 1966 to 1969, and the discussion shows an overall pattern of declining intensity of cultural revolution-related themes and provocative poetical slogans and rhetoric, as order was gradually restored by 1969. However, the personality cult of Mao, reflected in the quotes from Mao and on Maoism and relevant themes were still in a comparatively high level and even had the trend of growing again.

Implications

The results of the discussion show that the media system did influence the framing process. 'Deliberate ignoring' on subjects like the cause of conflicts and the anarchy state during the Red Guard upheaval all indicate that the framing of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s was rigidly following the CCP's strategic plan, serving different, and to some degree opposite purposes compared with the media systems from which Scheufele derives his observation. This result tests positive to Scheufele's claim that media systems are one source of influence of framing. As to his other factor, 'individual journalists', in theory Chinese journalists had little choice in the 1960s, because they were taught to follow the CCP's lead (de Burgh, 2003). In practice, it is unclear judging from the data collected in this dissertation. In the sample, 7.3% of the articles are not attributed to any individuals or organisations. Only around 15.0% of news clearly states its individual authors, among which fake names can be identified. (Ding, no date)[17]. Consequently, even though various ideologies and professional norms of individual journalists did exist, content analysis is unable to capture them in this case. In-depth interviews of former journalists should reveal the influence journalists had in framing news in 1960s China, though it could be a very challenging task to find suitable candidates.

Further Research

Despite the overall low frequency of the use of slogans and rhetoric in news and the decline of all Cultural Revolution-related themes, rhetoric could suggest that the framing of the first four years of the Cultural Revolution is going to change, or at least shift the focus, when heading towards the less chaotic 1970s. Therefore, similar research will benefit from materials from a wider time scale, as the Cultural Revolution was a ten-year movement.

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[17] Some of them are not normal name and merely same pronunciation with different characters but some might be CCP using fake names to publish articles, which is a tradition formed in 1960s. (Information in Chinese could be found: http://www.xys.org/xys/ebooks/others/history/contemporary/culture_revolution/xiezuozu.txt) But more research is needed.

Moreover, the years before and after the Revolution are also worth examining if one wants to investigate the overall degree of framing change the Cultural Revolution caused. Since framing is not limited to words, future research can also look for the relationship between framing and news types, pictures, or even attributed authors, which this dissertation has no space for.

Also did the framing work as the Party had expected? In the case of the Soviet Union, David Brandenberger questions the effectiveness of the work of the Soviet Communist propagandists. As he describes that all the calling for 'class consciousness, worker-peasant solidarity and loyal to the party as the vanguard of the revolution had fallen upon deaf ears' (2011: 23). Is this the case in China? Only more research on historical media distribution and audience frame study could provide an answer.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the goal of this dissertation is to map how the mainstream media framed the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and monitor the changes from a quantitative perspective as the movement unfolded. Content analysis was used to track the key themes, rhetoric and prominent figures in the Revolution, which are identified by the Soviet Propaganda model and previous qualitative studies. The results and discussion suggest that the Soviet legacy of the personality cult of leaders is at the centre of the framing of the Cultural Revolution. Themes and slogans on Mao, Maoism and the admiration of him were rendered most salient and persistent during the four years, showing China's independence from the USSR and Marxism, Leninism and class struggle. Even in international news, the base of internationalism inherited from the Soviet Union is relocated to China. The framing also suggests a possible structure of the Revolution featuring the interaction between Mao and the enemies. Although the overall intensity of the framing starts to decline in 1969, what the pattern of the second half of the Revolution is still needs examination. This application of framing theory in the Cultural Revolution indicates that media systems are one source of influence of framing. However, this quantitative study cannot offer insights in the possible influence from individual journalists. Like other questions left unanswered that were mentioned in the Discussion section, it suggests more research is needed.

In the speech given during the meeting on 11 August 2014, current Chinese President Xi Jinping said that 'the lesson of 'ten-year Cultural Revolution' must be learnt.' (Beijing News,

2014). Hopefully more research materials, efforts and freedom will be given to the Cultural Revolution studies, which is the only way to truly learn the lesson from it.

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APPENDIX 1: SPSS Output Examples

Without specification, charts and graphs are all made by the researcher.

1. Frequency table for the themes

What is the main theme of this article? (out of all the Revolution related articles)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Class Struggle	65	30.2	30.2	30.2
	Maoism and the Study of Maoism	70	32.6	32.6	62.8
	Cultural Revolution Struggle Session or Criticism	41	19.1	19.1	81.9
	Red Guard Movement	7	3.3	3.3	85.1
	Individual Heroes	19	8.8	8.8	94.0
	Anti-factionalism	7	3.3	3.3	97.2
	Intellectual Youth going to country	6	2.8	2.8	100.0
	Total	215	100.0	100.0	

2. Frequency table for the topics

What is the topic of this article, regardless of the propaganda?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None of these	7	2.3	2.3	2.3
	Politics	114	37.9	37.9	40.2
	Production	80	26.6	26.6	66.8
	Military	27	9.0	9.0	75.7
	Culture and Sports	44	14.6	14.6	90.4
	Science	3	1.0	1.0	91.4
	Conflicts or Protests	14	4.7	4.7	96.0
	Education	4	1.3	1.3	97.3
	Economy	4	1.3	1.3	98.7
	Medical care	4	1.3	1.3	100.0
	Total	301	100.0	100.0	

3. International News

What is it about?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	N/A	1	1.1	1.1	1.1
	Violence abroad	8	8.5	8.5	9.6
	Peaceful protest abroad	10	10.6	10.6	20.2
	Chinese leaders diplomatic visit abroad or foreign leaders visit to China	14	14.9	14.9	35.1
	Attack on Chinese people or embassy	15	16.0	16.0	51.1
	Other	10	10.6	10.6	61.7
	Celebration friendship/victory	8	8.5	8.5	70.2
	Admiration for Mao/China/CR	28	29.8	29.8	100.0
	Total	94	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX 2: News Extract

People's Daily 21st August 1966, Author: Song Yaowu

I Put on a Red Arm Band for Chairman Mao

On 18th, I met with our most beloved leader Chairman Mao on the Tiananmen Rostrum and I was very excited. I asked the comrade holding the event for permission to put on an red arm band for Chairman Mao, which represents our Red Guards boundless belief and love for Chairman Mao. The comrade directed me to Chairman Mao and with great excitement I put the arm band for our great leader.

Chairman is tall and strong, with a healthy glow of red on cheek. He was wearing a green military suit and a green military hat. Hence the red band was even more obvious, shining to everyone's heart. I was filled with joy after see Chairman is healthy and strong, eager to hail: Long live Chairman Mao! Chairman Mao then asked me for my name and I replied: 'Song Binbin. 'Chairman asked:'Binbin? Meaning politeness and elegance? "Yes.' I answered. Chairman kindly commented: 'Yaowu (Demanding violence) is better.'

I have been think about Chairman's comment since I went home. His words touched me and enlightened me that I am still far away from Chairman's expectation. That is why he pointed out for me where I should go. I haven't achieved much since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution but I was lucky enough to be given a chance to

meet with Chairman Mao, even putting on an arm band for him. I am very happy but guilty at the same time. But now I have more revolutionary motivation to meet Chairman Mao's expectation, to demand violence, to bread through limitations and to carry out the Revolution until the end.

In the past, our revolutionary senior followed the leadership of Chairman Mao, holding guns to seizing the world. New China was born out of revolutionary violence. This is so-called 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun '. 'Demand violence' is a truth that existed in the past. It is still existing today and will keep existing in the future. This truth applies to Chinese people and it applies to other oppressed mass worldwide as well.

We are now experiencing a new phase of socialist revolution. In the Cultural Revolution, we need to learn from our revolutionary seniors and demand violence. It was a military suit that Chairman Mao was wearing whiling receiving millions of mass, which represents demanding violence. Chairman Mao teaches us: *'Revolution is not like inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery… A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows the power of another*.' This is calling us to rebel. In the past, the revisionist education system restrained out revolutionary spirit and made us polite and elegant wonks. However, today in the Cultural Revolution Chairman Mao points out the direction for us and we will rebel! We will demand violence. Choosing violence over politeness and elegance represents a major shift of our thought and shows our growth, which is the fruit of the Cultural Revolution with enormous significance.

〈日期〉=1966.08.21

〈版次〉=2

〈□□〉=我□毛主席戴上了□袖章

〈作者〉=宋要武

　　　　十八日，在天安□城楼上，我看□了我□最最敬□的□袖毛主席，我心里激□极了。当□，我向主持大会的一位同志要求献□毛主席一个□袖章，以表达全体'□□兵'□士□毛主席的无限信仰，无限□□。他把我□到了主席跟前。我□□激情，把'□□兵'的袖章戴在了我□□大□袖的臂上。

　　　　毛主席高大魁梧，□光□面，身穿一套□□装，戴着一□□□帽，□□的□□章□到了人的心坎上。看□主席□么健壮，我心中感到有□不出的幸福，真想高喊：祝毛主席万寿无疆！毛主席□我叫什么名字，我□：'叫宋彬彬。'主席又□：'是不是文□彬彬的彬？'我□：'是。'主席□切地□：'要武嘛。'

回来后，我心中一直平静不下来，耳□□回响着毛主席的声音：'要武嘛。'□句□深深地触□了我，使我看到了自己离主席的要求差得太□了，□我指出了前□的方向。文化大革命以来，我干的并不好，却□了毛主席。我能□手□他老人家戴上了□袖章，我感到无比的幸福，也感到十分□愧，但我干革命的决心也因此更足更足了。我一定不辜□毛主席的期望，要武，要□，誓把无□□□文化大革命□行到底。

解放前，我□的革命老前□就是跟着毛主席，□握□杆子，□江山，打天下，用革命的暴力打出了一个新中国。□就是□杆子里出政□。'要武嘛'，□个真理□去存在，□在存在，将来也存在。□个真理□中国适用，□世界上一切被□迫民族、被□迫人民也都适用。

今天，在社会主□革命的新□段，在无□□□文化大革命中，我□要向革命前□学□，也要武。毛主席身穿□□装接□百万群众，□也就是要武的精神。毛主席向来教□我□：'革命不是□客吃□，不是做文章，不是□画□花，……革命是暴□，是一个□□推翻一个□□的暴烈的行□。'毛主席□教□我□，要'舍得一身□，敢把皇帝拉下□'。□就是要我□□□敢□、敢干的革命造反精神。□去，修正主□的教育制度□□地束□着我□，想把我□革命的棱角都磨光磨□，把我□磨成不敢造反的文□彬彬的□呆子。今天，在无□□□文化大革命中，毛主席□我□指明了方向，我□起来造反了，我□要武了！从'彬'到'武'，□反映了人□思想的一个大□□，反映了革命的小将在成□，□是无□□□文化大革命的□物，是一个具有□史意□的事情。

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