

CFSP Watch 2005 – Sweden – by Stefan Borg and Gunilla Herolf¹

1) What are the priorities for Sweden in CFSP in 2005? What are the key issues for Sweden in 2005?

The Swedish government stresses the importance of the EU as an international actor, particularly in the areas of global development, the maintenance of international peace, the fight against poverty, and the promotion of democratisation and human rights. The Union should strive to work in close co-operation with the United Nations and other multilateral organisations. The EU should also maintain an on-going dialogue with other major actors, including the United States. Sweden emphasises the role of the Union in preventing conflicts and managing crises. The government believes that it is important that the EU's capacity to act in those areas is further strengthened, in both its civilian and military dimensions. The work for global disarmament should be carried forward and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) must be contained. The Swedish government also stresses that the EU should act to break down barriers to trade and work for global justice in the on-going WTO – round.²

In addition, the Swedish government believes that prioritised tasks for the Union as a global actor consist in increasing its development aid to the third world and make sure it is efficiently used; that it actively works for debt relief, and that it develops a strategy for protecting the climate. The Union should also be active in the struggle against diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria. The EU should support the UN Secretary General in his efforts to reform the UN.³

One of the key issues for Sweden was the initiative by the Swedish Foreign Minister to establish EU civilian rapid reaction units to complement its military rapid reaction capabilities and actively works for that the Union should have the same high ambitions when it comes to civilian capabilities as military ones. This initiative was presented in November 2004 and finally approved by the Council of Ministers in July 2005.⁴

The tsunami in January of 2005 made a big impact in Sweden, also due to the fact that more than 500 Swedes fell victim to it. In connection with this Foreign Minister Freivalds pointed to the need for EU rapid reaction forces to assist citizens in the event of crises and disasters abroad. The tsunami was also seen as a reminder of the need for a broad concept of security including natural disasters and environmental degradation, poverty and pandemics, terrorism and organized crime, failing states and regional conflicts, war and weapons of mass destruction – all these constituting a threat to every country.⁵

The negative referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands were deemed to be important set-backs for the Union. However, it is not yet clear whether and if so how the CFSP will be affected. The Swedish government has emphasised that the failure

¹ The Swedish Institute of International Affairs

² 'Arbetet i EU: EU – politiken 2004-2005' [The Work within the EU: The EU Politics 2004-2005] OBS KOLLA ENGELSKAN! <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/1477/a/19879>.

³ 'EU måste öka takten', Laila Freivalds and Carin Jämtin [EU must increase pace], *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, April 3, 2005.

⁴ 'EU inrättar civila snabbinsatsgrupper' [EU to establish civilian rapid reaction units], Press release, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, July 18, 2005; Utrikesdeklarationen [Foreign Policy Declaration], February 9, 2005.

⁵ Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Wednesday 9 February 2005.

to adopt the Constitutional Treaty must not have a negative impact on the coming rounds of accession.⁶

2) Does Sweden adopt a more pessimistic or optimistic stance regarding the ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty? How might the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands influence the ratification debate in Sweden and also have an impact on the outcome of the referendum?

In Sweden, only the Left and the Green parties have demanded a referendum on the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty. Referenda are rather unusual in Sweden and there is a solid majority among the political parties in favour of letting the Parliament decide (in which there is an overwhelming majority in favour of ratifying the Constitutional Treaty). The Prime Minister has stated that the main reason why he is against having a referendum, is that the Treaty does not change the fundamental relation between the EU and Sweden.⁷

Following the ratification crisis, the government called for an extension of the time limit for ratification of the Treaty. Individual member states should be allowed to proceed with the ratification process at a pace they deem fit. A new time limit for the national ratifications should not be fixed at this time. Rather, one should agree on a date at which the discussions about a new time limit for ratifications are to be resumed (a so called rendezvous clause). Finally, what should follow now is a time for an open and public discussion about the future direction of the Union.⁸

Given the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Treaty, no date for ratification in the Swedish Parliament has been fixed. The Prime Minister has stated that the Treaty will not be put before the Parliament during the present term of office (which ends in autumn 2006).⁹

3) National Perceptions and Positions with regard to CFSP/ESDP Issues in 2005?

Please describe key positions and perceptions in Sweden with regard to EU foreign policy, taking into account:

3.1 The perceived success and/or failure of CFSP/ESDP

For Sweden the UN has a crucial role in global security, but the UN cannot and should not do everything. The EU is a global actor with a responsibility to act all over the world. European cooperation needs to be strengthened further in order to meet threats emanating from drug trade, trade in women and children, terrorism and other threats. The EU has also had major successes: 'The pull of the EU has helped more than a dozen countries achieve impressive democratic, economic and social progress, and has led to the start of a fundamental transformation of Turkish society'.¹⁰

3.2 The role of the EU in crisis management e.g. in Congo, Georgia, Darfur

⁶ Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:36, June 14, 2005.

⁷ Sveriges Riksdag [Swedish Parliament], 2004/05: 7, November 3, 2004, Address 33.

⁸ Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:36, June 14, 2005.

⁹ Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:39, June 21, 2005.

¹⁰ 'Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate in Foreign Affairs', Wednesday 9 February 2005.

Sweden has participated in all EU missions to this date and is very supportive of the EU taking on a greater role in crisis management activities. In the Artemis operation in Congo in 2003, Sweden contributed with special forces for peace enforcement tasks. More specifically, the Swedish government has repeatedly stressed the importance that military and civilian means are well co-ordinated. Second, Sweden has pushed for a gender perspective in EUs international operations.¹¹

The situation in Darfur has received much attention in the Swedish media as well as in the Parliament. In August 2004, the Swedish Foreign Minister declared that the situation in Darfur should be dealt with as if a genocide was taking place.¹² Sweden is very positive to EU engagement in the region and has declared that the Union should be prepared to act in support of the African Union's (AU) efforts. However, in defence of domestic criticism of not doing enough in Darfur, the Swedish government has emphasised that EU contributions can only be made upon explicit request of the AU. The Conservative and the Liberal Parties have argued that the EU should take on a more active role in Darfur and have expressed doubts about the AUs capacity to effectively deal with the situation.¹³

Sweden supported the EU take-over from SFOR in Bosnia (operation ALTHEA) and has contributed more than 70 troops.¹⁴ Within the framework of the ESDP, EU is assisting the reform of the judicial system in Georgia (operation Themis). Sweden has been active from the beginning and has contributed to one expert out of the initial eight.¹⁵

3.3 The Perceived impact of EU enlargement on CFSP/ESDP

Sweden takes a supportive stance to future rounds of enlargement. There is a broad consensus among the Swedish political parties that Turkey should be offered full membership when the conditions have been met.¹⁶ The government has stressed that the important task of enlarging the Union must not be negatively affected by the failure to adopt the Constitutional treaty.¹⁷

3.4 The view of the European Security Strategy (ESS) as an instrument for enhancing coherence in the EUs security policy; how does Sweden view the ESS and which issues are of particular importance?

The Swedish government has taken a very positive view of the formulation of a European security strategy. It is held that the ESS contributes to the formation of a common European security culture. Sweden has in particular stressed the importance of a comprehensive approach to security, i.e. that the Union's various instruments such as foreign policy, trade policy, development policy and environmental policy, are utilised to strengthen its security

¹¹ Leni Björklund, Minister of Defence, Föredragning i Utrikes- och Försvarsutskottet den om den EU-ledda insatsen ALTHEA [Presentation before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence on the EU-led operation ALTHEA], October 13, 2004.

¹² 'Darfur ska hanteras som ett folkmord' [Darfur should be dealt with as genocide], Laila Freivalds and Carin Jämtin, *Dagens Nyheter*, August 5, 2004.

¹³ Riksdagens protokoll, Utrikespolitisk debatt [Parliamentary protocol, debate on foreign policy], 2004/05:72, February 9, 2005.

¹⁴ Leni Björklund, Föredragning i Utrikes- och Försvarsutskottet den 19 oktober om den EU-ledda insatsen ALTHEA [Presentation before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence on the EU-led operation ALTHEA], October 13, 2004. Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:30, May 20, 2005.

¹⁵ Skrivelse 2004/05:60, Berättelsen om verksamheten i Europeiska unionen under 2004 [Communication 2004/05:60, Annual Report on the activities of the European Union in 2004], March, 10 2005.

¹⁶ Pressmeddelande EU-nämnden i korthet [Press release, Committee on EU Affairs in brief], December 14, 2004.

¹⁷ Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:36, June, 14 2005.

objectives. Sweden has also stressed the importance that the EU acts for an international order based on multilateralism, co-operation with the UN, and respect for international law, which is perceived to pervade the current strategy.¹⁸

3.5 European Neighbourhood Policy and its implications

Sweden has actively supported the ENP from its inception. It has in particular worked for that the ENP is pervaded by a free trade perspective. The countries that adhere to the basic values of the Union should in the long run be given access to EUs common market.¹⁹

Similarly to other EU member states, Sweden tends to take a stronger interest in the part of the ENP that covers countries in its closest vicinity. Regarding EUs neighbours to the east, according to Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds, Sweden always belongs to those members that support increased EU activities.²⁰

The developments in Ukraine received a fair amount of attention in Sweden. The Swedish government supported the proposal drawn up by Javier Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner to strengthen the co-operation with Ukraine. Sweden has stressed that it is important to strengthen the co-operation between the EU and Ukraine. Now, however, it is up to Ukraine to implement the political and economic reforms which will bring it closer to the EU. The Swedish government has stated that it will actively work to ensure that Ukraine does not disappear from the agenda and that pressure to reform is sustained. Second, the government has emphasised the importance that the measures adopted by the EU become visible to the broader public, in particular to those in Eastern Ukraine where the majority of the population voted against Jusjtjenko.²¹ The Conservative Party has expressed its concern that it is important that the ENP drawn up for Ukraine and Moldavia should not distract from, nor delay, the issue of offering those countries the prospective of candidates for membership.²² It has been emphasized that the measures proposed by Solana and Ferrero-Waldner constitute a minimum – all the Swedish political parties see a Ukrainian membership of the EU as natural once Ukraina has fulfilled the criteria for this.²³

Concerning Belarus, the government is eager that the EU continues to pressure its government for reforms regarding democracy and human rights and has proposed that the EU assumes a 'shadow working plan' for Belarus. Sweden will also continue to pursue the issue that the EU establishes an office of representation in Minsk.²⁴

Sweden also takes a strong interest in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The Foreign Minister has emphasised the virtues of regional co-operation for narrowing the gap in prosperity as well as for the maintenance of peace and security.²⁵ For instance, Sweden has been actively involved in the so-called Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations. In 2002, Sweden co-initiated the Action Plan for this Dialogue, focusing on youth, education and media. The Swedish Institute in Alexandria inaugurated in 2000, aims at facilitating dialogues

¹⁸ Laila Freivalds, Tal Finlandsinstitutet [Speech at the Finnish Institute], Stockholm, April 15, 2004.

¹⁹ Laila Freivalds, svar på fråga 2004/05:517 om EU:s grannskapspolitik [Answer to question 2004/05:517 on EUs Neighbourhood Policy], December 8, 2004.

²⁰ Sveriges Riksdag [Swedish Parliament], 2004/05:06, November 1, 2004.

²¹ Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:22, April 8, 2005.

²² Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:22, February 18, 2005.

²³ Ibid. And Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:22, January 28, 2005.

²⁴ Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:27, February 18, 2005.

²⁵ Laila Freivalds, Tal vid Svenska Institutet [Speech at the Swedish Institute], Alexandria, May 3, 2004.

and contribute to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The EU's Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures is housed in this institute.

Finally, Sweden has a long tradition of active involvement in seeking to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict and strongly supports an active role for the EU in cooperation within the framework of the so-called Quartet. In connection with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip the Swedish view was that this should be seen as a step on the way to a renewed peace process and not a tighter Israeli grip on the West Bank.²⁶

3.6 The creation of battle group and their role for ESDP

Ever since the Anglo-French proposal of developing EU battle groups, Sweden has adopted a supportive stance. In particular, Sweden has been a strong advocate of multinational battle groups, involving as many member states as possible.²⁷

Sweden has assumed responsibility - i.e. it acts as a so-called framework nation - for the Nordic Battle Group, which is to consist of forces from Sweden, Finland, Norway and Estonia. In May 2005, the four countries' defence ministries signed a Memorandum of Understanding about the overarching goals and working forms for the battle group. The battle group is to be operational in mid- 2008.²⁸ The Swedish contribution is planned to amount to some 1200 soldiers out of a total of 1500.²⁹

As Sweden now starts to build up its own forces it perceives a need for the EU to come to conclusions as regards the threats that the forces should be capable to meet, which in their turn determine the balance between mobility, protection and fire capacity. Strategic air transport is another vital issue, which Sweden suggests should be discussed in the EDA with the aim of finding common solutions.³⁰

4. The Constitutional Treaty and its future – National perceptions concerning a 'plan B'?

Official positions on the Constitutional Treaty provisions on CFSP/ESDP and external relations?

Constitutional Treaty or some version of 'Nice Treaty Plus'?

Describe (briefly) Sweden's position on the following key issues and the possibility of their realisation without a Constitutional Treaty as a 'plan B', 'C' or 'D':

4.1 External Representation: What is the final position of Sweden on the European foreign minister and the President of the European Council? Will/should there be a

²⁶ Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs] 2004/05:22, June 10, 2005.

²⁷ 'Swedish defence policy in times of change', Speech by Ms Leni Björklund, Swedish Minister of Defence, Bern, 22 October 2004.

²⁸ 'Militär krishantering', EU-upplysningen, Sveriges Riksdag ['Military crisis management', the EU Information Centre, Swedish Parliament], http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/templates/EUU/standardRightMenuTemplate____2967.aspx.

²⁹ Riksdagens protokoll, 2004/05:72 [Parliamentary protocol, debate on foreign policy], 2004/05:72, February 9, 2005.

³⁰ Interpellation 13 september, Interpellation 2005/06:4 av Allan Widman (fp) to försvarsminister Leni Björklind (s) [Interpellation 13 September. Interpellation 2005/06 by Allan Widman (liberal) to Defence Minister Leni Björklund (soc. dem.)], <http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/index.aspx?nid=63&dtyp=i&rm=2005/06&nr=4>.

post resembling that of the Foreign Minister based on the Nice Treaty (something like an enhanced High Representative)? How could this be realised?

Sweden's final view on establishing a European foreign minister and a President of the European Council is positive. The proposal on institutions in its entirety is seen to strengthen and improve all institutions at the same time as the balance between them is maintained, which is positive.

The Prime Minister has stated that he does not think that the Treaty will be re-negotiated; either the present Treaty will be adopted or there will be no such Constitutional Treaty. He does not believe in taking out certain issues from the Constitution and then go for a 'Constitution light'. He supports the decision to use a rendez-vous clause and then meet some time during the first part of 2006 to consider the situation.³¹

4.2 Basic structures of the European External Action Service have already been developed. Now that the Constitutional Treaty might not enter into force, is the Swedish government in favour of developing such a body in order to support the High Representative?

No views have officially been expressed on this. See 4.1.

4.3 Decision-making: Does Sweden opt for an extension of QMV in the field of CFSP? Will the Nice provisions be sufficient for an efficient CFSP/ESDP decision-making within the enlarged EU?

In general, the Swedish government tends to favour the CFSP as an intergovernmental arrangement, entailing that decisions are taken by unanimity. The Left party and the Green parties are hostile to the extension of QMV in the second pillar, whereas the parties on the centre-right tend to worry less about such extension.³²

4.4 Crisis management: What is the official position on expanding the Petersberg tasks and making reference to tasks that involve military resources? Which regions does Sweden consider as particularly promising for EU crisis management?

The Swedish government is very positive to the expansion of the Petersberg tasks. It is seen as important that the EU has the ability to deal with the whole spectrum of tasks, stretching from conflict prevention, via conflict management in crisis situations including peace enforcement, to post-conflict management. It is therefore necessary for the EU to expand both its civilian and military capabilities.³³ Sweden has participated in all EU missions to this date.

Africa is often mentioned as an important area for EU crisis management. Historically, the legacy of colonialism is by the Swedish government thought to link Europe to many on-going conflicts in Africa. Moreover, wars fought in Africa are often financed with natural resources sold in Europe and arms used in conflicts often stem from Europe. Further, African involvement and support is considered crucial for ESDP activities on the continent.³⁴ To this

³¹ Sveriges Riksdag, EU-nämndens protokoll [Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs], 2004/05:39, June 21, 2005.

³² Sveriges Riksdag, regeringskonferensen och Europeiska rådets möte [Swedish parliament, the Intergovernmental Conference and the meeting of the European Council], 2003/04:37, June 16, 2003.

³³ Laila Freivalds, Tal Helsingfors [Speech in Helsinki], May 10, 2004.

³⁴ Sveriges Riksdag, Allmänna frågor och yttre förbindelser samt regeringskonferensen [Swedish Parliament, General issues and external relations], 2003/04:36, June 11, 2003.

can be added many other regions, (see 3.2 and 3.5): for example, the Middle East, and the Black Sea region. Continued involvement in the Balkans is considered necessary, as well as global tasks, for instance the civilian mission in the Aceh province.

4.5 Defence: What is Sweden's position towards the establishment of the civilian-military cell at the EUMS? Was your government in favour of creating a full-fledged operational EU headquarters?

The Swedish government is of the opinion that the EU should have its own structures of planning and command, since it must be able to act also when NATO does not wish to do so.³⁵ Therefore, the Swedish government supported the establishment of the civilian-military cell at the EUMS.³⁶ However, the enhanced cell should not take the form of a standing headquarter and there should be no unnecessary duplication of existing NATO structures.

4.6 Is Sweden in favour of realising provisions such as the permanent structured co-operation even without the Constitutional Treaty? What measures would be preferred?

The Swedish government has often emphasised the importance that structured co-operation should be open, i.e. so that all member states that wish to take part should be allowed to do so. Obviously not all countries are interested in all issues and are not willing to participate in all activities. The main thing is that those who wish to have the chance to participate in all EU activities.

4.7 Would Sweden support the creation of core groups inside or outside the EU in CFSP/ESDP if the Constitutional Treaty finally failed?

See 4.6. Sweden is not in favour of a core group of the EU when the establishment of such a group is equivalent to forming a *directoire* among the big countries, in which small countries are excluded. It is of course impossible to prevent big countries to cooperate informally with each other outside the EU, since all countries are free to cooperate with all they want to.

5. Mapping of Activities in CFSP-related Research

5.1 Please indicate major experts, universities and research institutions working in the CFSP field Sweden.

Universities

Uppsala University – Professor Walter Carlsnaes: walter.carlsnaes@statsvet.uu.se, Dr Fredrik Bynander: fredrik.bynander@statsvet.uu.se

Lund University – Professor Ole Elgström: ole.elgstrom@svet.lu.se, Dr Annika Björkdahl: annika.bjorkdahl@svet.lu.se, Dr Maria Strömvik: maria.stromvik@svet.lu.se, Professor Magnus Jerneck, magnus.jerneck@svet.lu.se

³⁵ Sveriges Riksdag, regeringskonferensen och Europeiska rådets möte [Swedish parliament, the Intergovernmental Conference and the meeting of the European Council], 2003/04:37, June 16, 2003.

³⁶ Sveriges Riksdag, Allmänna frågor och yttre förbindelser samt regeringskonferensen [Swedish Parliament, General issues and external relations], 2003/04:36, June 11, 2003.

Stockholm University – Dr Ulrika Mörth: ulrika.mörth@statsvet.su.se, Dr Kjell Engelbrekt: kjell.engelbrekt@statsvet.su.se

Göteborg University – Professor Rutger Lindahl: rutger.lindahl@pol.gu.se, Dr Hans E. Andersson: hans.andersson@pol.gu.se, Professor Ulf Bjereld: ulf.bjereld@pol.gu.se

Malmö University – Dr Magnus Ericson: magnus.ericson@imer.mah.se, Dr Rikard Bengtsson: rikard.bengtsson@imer.mah.se

Research institutes

Swedish Institute of International Affairs – Director Tomas Ries: ries@ui.se, Professor Olav F. Knudsen, knudsen@ui.se, Dr Gunilla Herolf: herolf@ui.se, Dr Jan Joel Andersson: andersson@ui.se, Dr Elisabeth Corell: ecorell@ui.se, Dr Jonas Tallberg: tallberg@ui.se.

Swedish National Defence College – Dr Magnus Ekengren: magnus.ekengren@fhs.mil.se, Professor Bo Huldt: bo.huldt@fhs.mil.se, Professor Jan Hallenberg: jan.hallenberg@fhs.mil.se

Swedish Defence Research Agency – Pär Eriksson: perik@foi.se, Dr Mike Winnerstig: mike.winnerstig@foi.se, Dr På Jonson: pal.jonson@foi.se, Dr Magnus Norell: magnus.norell@foi.se

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) – Director Alyson Bailes: bailes@sipri.org

Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), see <http://www.sieps.se>

5.2 Specific remarks on Sweden

Sweden's policy of military non-alignment is retained although the only thing which this policy is nowadays interpreted to exclude is mutual defence guarantees. The government repeatedly emphasises that there is no contradiction between active involvement in peace-enforcement tasks and military non-alignment. Sweden is a strong supporter of the UN and the importance of having a UN mandate for EU operations is stressed. However, in severe humanitarian crises, where the Security Council is paralysed, EU should be able to act without a UN Mandate.³⁷

Despite not being a member of NATO, Sweden strongly supports the transatlantic link. US presence in Europe is perceived as vital and Sweden is an active member of PfP.³⁸ The Swedish government believes that the EU should develop its capabilities in close co-operation and partnership with NATO. In its overarching view of the CFSP/ESDP and the transatlantic link, Sweden and the United Kingdom share many objectives.³⁹

³⁷ 'Inte nödvändigt med FN:s stöd vid ingripanden – rakt på sak med försvarsminister Leni Björklund' [Not necessary with UN endorsement at interventions – straight to the point with Minister of Defence Leni Björklund], *Dagens Nyheter*, November 26, 2004.

³⁸ 'Swedish defence policy in times of change', Speech by Ms Leni Björklund, Swedish Minister of Defence, Bern, 22 October 2004.

³⁹ 'EU:s försvarspolitik måste utvecklas', artikel av Storbritanniens and Sveriges utrikesministrar Jack Straw och Laila Freivalds, Utrikesdepartementet [EU's Defence policy must be further developed', article by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and Sweden Jack Straw and Laila Freivalds], April 18, 2004.