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CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS : TOOLS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS ? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF AND PIF

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Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organisations? A comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF

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Introduction

'Conflict early warning and response' (EWR) was conceived as a means of preventing violent conflict in order to protect people's life. Broadly two types of mechanisms can be distinguished: quantitative and qualitative models. The most explicit response mechanism exists with regard to humanitarian emergencies at the UN level; however the EWR mechanism is far from being efficient since the UN is a bureaucratic organisation with a 'silo' mentality among the different agencies and departments, and the UN Security Council is a highly politicised body. At the same time, only in recent years have regional organisations been charged with responding to crises and only now are they beginning to establish instruments (organs of peace and security) with a capacity to respond.

EWR is being scrutinised today and questions are raised regarding the effectiveness of these tools. Two trends can be observed. Firstly, methodologies have improved. Most recently, for example, innovative proposals to combine both approaches have been put forward (Goldstone 2008). The models applied by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) meanwhile claim to have a predictive capacity of between 80 and 90 percent (Goldstone et al. 2005; Marshall 2008). At the same time, however, the usefulness of specific systems that were unable to adapt to user needs and find their niche has waned (Schmeidl 2008, Barton and von Hippel 2008), which can partly also be seen in the closing down of the Forum on Early Warning and Response (FEWER) and more recently *Frühanalyse von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung* (Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions, FAST). Secondly, several regional organisations, especially in Africa, have engaged in establishing EWR mechanisms, partly on the insistence and with the assistance of donor organisations, while others, especially in Asia, have abstained from such commitments.

However, a problem arises since all too often early warning systems do not result in early preventive action. Thus, it is time to evaluate to what extent empirical evidence confirms or questions the value of conflict EWR for effective practice.

The purpose of this research paper is to present a systematic overview of existing key EWR mechanisms and to analyse whether, to what extent, and under what conditions these mechanisms might be a useful peace and security promotion tool for regional organisations. Our research questions are the following:

1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the existing EWR mechanisms?

2. Have they been put to appropriate use in predicting and preventing violent conflict by regional organisations?

3. What is the experience of regional organisations in implementing EWR mechanisms?

4. Why did some regional organisations abstain from establishing such mechanisms?

5. Can regional organisations capitalise on the most recent progress in EWR research?

Our research questions are based on the following assumptions and preliminary conclusions:

1. The predictive capacities of conflict-EWR mechanisms have greatly improved over the last two decades. However, they still suffer from the fact that the underlying theory (or at least hypothesis) about causal chains towards violence and the role of small events are not always spelled out;

2. The link between warning and response remains weak. Response is often lacking, despite clear warning signals. But do decision makers receive the required information? Early warning often seems alarmist and sometimes offensive to governments. Not least, cognitive biases on the side of analysts and decision makers may hinder an appropriate reaction;

3. Regional organisations often fail to respond in time to prevent violent conflict not because of a lack of information on an emerging conflict but due to several barriers or weaknesses, namely the political differences and lack of common values within organisations, the hesitation to overrule the principle of non-interference in internal matters of the state, the lack of capacity to intervene, and the unclear and competitive mission and geographic reach of regional organisations;

4. Global and regional initiatives tend to inform policy makers at the top-level. Less attention is given to the strength and coping capacities at the local level; inappropriate inclusion of the local level leads to neglect of the dynamics of violence at the local-national-transborder interface and fails to strengthen local coping mechanisms against the outbreak of violence.

This report first takes stock of early warning research. It compares and categorises the most advanced early warning systems in their achievements and shortcomings and assesses what they have to offer to policy makers. In the following section, we will undertake a comparative case study of five regional/sub-regional organisations. Several regional and sub-regional organisations have established, or are building up, EWR mechanisms. In Africa, we will focus on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an intelligence-gathering and analysis centre of the African Union; the Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD); and the West Africa Early Warning Network (WARN) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As contrasting examples, we will analyse and discuss why such EWR mechanisms have not been established in Asia and Oceania by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its Regional Forum, and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF); and how far this had impacted on the organisations' ability to react to upcoming crises. The final section aims at finding answers to the question of whether an EWR mechanism can be considered a useful tool and spells out policy implications for how regional organisations could capitalise on this.

Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: How do they work?

'Early warning systems' for the prevention of violent conflict are 'latecomers' compared with their application in other fields (Bächler et al. 1998: 34). The origin of such systems dates back to the 1950s and lies in intelligence and military reconnaissance. In a second phase, early warning systems were established in the fields of natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies, gross human rights violations, the spread of diseases and economic crises. Since the 1980s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has undertaken efforts to foresee political-humanitarian crises. Within the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, several early warning projects led to the establishment of a 'Humanitarian Early Warning System' in the context of which ReliefWeb and the Integrated Regional Information Network were set up. 'Early response mechanisms' are much more recent efforts to close the gap between early warning and early action and have so far been elaborated most convincingly with regard to humanitarian emergencies.

Conceptualising Early Warning and Response

In the Berghof Handbook on Conflict Transformation, Alexander Austin (2004) defined an early warning system from an academic perspective as:

> 'any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both.' (Austin 2004: 2)

Within early warning, three components can be differentiated:

> '(1) estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging threats, (2) analyzing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and (3) communicating warning analyses to decision makers.' (Woocher 2008: 3)

Early response, accordingly, means:

> 'any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation. The term mechanism will refer to the individual units of an E[arly] W[arning] S[ystem] such as data collection, data formatting, data analysis with the understanding that there is a relationship and process between these unities for the system to operate.' (Austin 2004: 23)

A crucial, yet so far mainly under-reflected, issue is the question of *who* is going to be warned and *who* is supposed to act upon this warning. A well-established definition (Dorn 2004: 317) sees early warning as 'the act of alerting a recognized authority (such as the UN Security Council) to a new (or renewed) threat to peace at a sufficiently early stage' (Campbell and Meier 2007). But is the ideal of primarily addressing a 'recognised authority' a meaningful and sufficient criterion? As Casey Barrs (2006) rightly states, we 'typically 'wire' that warning toward ourselves so we can take action. But we have given much less thought to *also* warning those who are about to be attacked.' Thus, the underlying assumptions of most early warning systems is that international actors will take over responsibility as protectors as soon as adequate information is being processed along with rules and procedures for initiating appropriate action at the level of an international or regional organisation (Barrs 2006: 1, relying on Adelman 1999 and Darcy 2005). These assumptions, however, have so far not

been confirmed in practice. Accordingly, Barrs has proposed 'to focus more effort on a warning capacity *within* the killing grounds' (Barrs 2006: 4). Such an approach could facilitate the reduction or even overcoming of the gap between early warning and early response.

Efficient EWR systems can tackle various threats to human security, such as: a) wars and armed conflict; b) state failure; c) genocide and politicide; d) other gross human rights violations; and e) humanitarian emergencies caused by natural disasters. In the following we primarily focus on the related threats to the categories a) to c) for which we use, mainly in accordance with the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), the umbrella term 'political instability'.[2] These are also the types of conflict in which a prevention role is expected from regional organisations. Relying on the definitions used by the Human Security Center (2005; 2006), we can define 'wars' as forms of collective violence in which one of the parties involved is a government and which result in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. Armed conflicts include collective violence beyond the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths as well as 'non-state' forms of political violence between warlords, militias, guerrillas, and other organised groups. 'State failure' means that a state can hardly perform its core functions, such as maintaining a legitimate monopoly of force, guaranteeing the rule of law, opening channels for political participation, securing basic needs and implementing political decisions through administrative acts. Genocides and politicides, as defined by Barbara Harff,

> 'are the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents--or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities--that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group. In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups.' (Harff 2003: 58)

EWR mechanisms in this sense are a part of an overall crisis-prevention architecture, but this is not the same as conflict or crisis prevention. Howard Adelman (2008) argued:

> 'E[arly] W[arning] is intended to detect rising tensions headed towards violent conflict and, therefore, is complementary to conflict prevention when it focuses on tensions that are already rising but has little to do with preventing tensions from rising at all. (...) E[arly] W[arning] does include not only the gathering of data but the analysis of that data to develop strategic options for response but does not include the responses themselves which come under conflict prevention.'

In the more recent literature other classifications are used, differentiating between:

- *operational prevention* – short-term efforts using political or military means to prevent a conflict or forestall escalating violence;

- *structural prevention* – efforts through developmental or economic tools to address the root causes of conflict, aiming at risk reduction and to call for better regulatory frameworks;

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[2] Leiden University's Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) tried to build up a mapping of Gross Human Rights Violations (GHRV) with the potential for an early warning system in the 1990s, but this project has not been continued. New data related to GHRV are being provided by the Human Security Report, but do not claim to have predictive qualities.

- *systemic prevention* – tries to reduce conflict on a global basis and goes beyond mechanisms focused on any particular state (Rubin and Jones 2007).

Structural and systemic prevention both target underlying causes of conflict with a mid- to long-term perspective. However, they could be inadequate in an upcoming or even acute crisis that requires early action. Thus, we will primarily concentrate on response mechanisms within the category of operational prevention, 'which seeks to contain or reverse the escalation of violent conflict by using the tools of preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions and/or incentives, and/or military force' (Campbell and Meier 2007).

Categorising Early Warning and Response Systems

Despite growing scepticism in the policy and donor communities, papers and publications on early warning research and EWR have experienced an upsurge within the last two years (Marshall 2008; Goldstone 2008; Meier 2007; Barton and von Hippel 2008; Nyheim 2008; Campbell and Meier 2007; Schmeidl 2008). The review studies use different ways to categorise the broad spectrum of EWR models:

- In 'Early Warning: A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems', Barton and von Hippel (2008) cluster 30 models that try to predict conflict or instability according to the sectors from which they stem: a) national government models; b) international and regional organisation models; c) academic, NGO and think-tank models; and d) private models;

- David Nyheim (2008) undertook a 'Mapping of Early Warning and Response Systems' for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee. In his overview and critical appraisal he differentiated between quantitative and qualitative systems, as well as between early warning models and policy tools.

- Verstegen (1999) introduced four ideal type models: a) 'correlation models' focus on structural indicators and try to relate causal models from empirical research to future outbreaks of violence; b) 'sequential models' filter accelerators in order to understand when particular events lead to worsening a crisis situation; c) 'conjunctural models' look at escalation scenarios and inductively establish what factor combinations and thresholds lead to violence; and d) 'response models' try to identify windows of opportunity for early and effective intervention in crisis situations.

- Finally, Marshall (2008) classifies the 21 early warning models in his review according to three types: a) conditional and causal models deal with empirical evidence for causal interference between independent variables and violent conflict/political instability. They are of crucial importance for predictive models as they help to identify valid indicators (Marshall 2008: 9); b) predictive models try to forecast the outbreak of violence in a time span of one to five years. They focus on selected variables and in most cases not only include structural variables, but also process indicators or event-based information (Marshall 2008: 10); and c) general risk and capacity models are used 'to rank countries from weak to strong, building on the general association between weakness, social problems, political conflict, and poor state performance' (Marshall 2008: 10-11).

We find Marshall's differentiation most useful since it focuses on the aims of the models that make them more comparable. In our own compilation (see Appendix) we thus take up Marshall's categories, albeit with two specifications: 1) in order to keep the vast amount of

general risk and assessment models under control we divide them between those which aim at rankings or performance ratings and those which aim at targeted intervention (Verstegen's 'response model'); 2) we add in-depth investigative research and intelligence as an important additional category – a qualitative component that Marshall neglects, but which is regarded as highly valuable by practitioners as well as country and area specialists. In our review we list five major causal models: a) five predictive models (mainly run by the PITF); b) a dozen institutions that rank and rate states according to their risks and capacities; c) about twenty efforts to integrate risk and capacity assessments into early response models; d) several private companies, NGOs and government agencies that offer or use investigative case study research; and e) intelligence for early warning.

Selected EWR Models, Tools and Mechanisms

What are the assumptions underlying the different early warning projects? Which methodologies are used? Within these five categories we have singled out one prominent example of each in order to illustrate how these models, tools and mechanisms work, namely: a) the World Bank's greed model of rebellion; b) the PITF's global and sub-Saharan model; c) the Fragile States Index (FSI); d) the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) of Carleton University; and e) the International Crisis Group's (ICG) Crisis Watch – probably the most reputed and frequent alert system based on qualitative investigative research and 'NGO intelligence'.

Table 1: Early warning and response with regard to violent conflict and state fragility – selected models, tools and mechanisms
Source: Barton and von Hippel 2008; Marshall 2008; Nyheim 2008; own research and compilation. See full table in Appendix.

Institution / Lead Researchers Classification	a. **Name of the Model** b. **URL Link** c. **Major publications (e.g. Fearon/Laitin 2003)**
A. Conditional and Causal Factor Models (with predictive qualities/implications)	
(1) World Bank Development Research Group and Oxford University / Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler ACAD, IGO	a. Greed model of rebellion (opportunity structures) b. http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict c. Collier/Hoeffler 1998; Collier/Hoeffler 2004a; Collier/Hoeffler 2004b
B. Predictive Models	
(2) Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall ACAD	a. PITF global model PITF African Instability model b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm c. Goldstone et al. 2005
C. Risk and Capacity Assessments (Rankings and Performance Ratings)	
(3) The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy ACAD, NGO	a. Failed States Index, based on the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) b. http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option= com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 c. Fund for Peace 2008
D. Risk and Capacity Assessments with Early Response Component (event analysis)	
(4) Carleton University, Canadian Government / Gerald Cosette ACAD, GOV	a. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) b. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/ c. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 2008
E. Crisis Watch Lists based on Investigative Case Study Research or Intelligence	
(5) International Crisis Group, Belgium PRIV	a. Crisis Watch b. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1200 &l=1

ACAD = academic; GOV = governmental; IGO = international governmental organisation; INGO = international non-governmental organisation; NGO = non-governmental organisation; PRIV = private organisation

1. Causal Models: The greed model of rebellion

Different causal models are currently competing in explaining ethnic rebellion, civil war and state failure. Among the most prominent are Ted Robert Gurr's Minorities Risk Project (Adelmann 1998), the findings by the PITF (Esty et al. 1998; Goldstone et al. 2000), the Horizontal Inequalities Model (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and Collier and Hoeffler's (2001) greed/opportunity structure model. All of these models have substantially informed the choice of valid indicators for risk and capacity assessments and sometimes also the focus of attention within investigative research and intelligence. EWR systems that do not take the findings of advanced causal models into account have increasingly become difficult to maintain and justify. However, the problem remains that the findings of causal models are contested.

Collier and Hoeffler's greed model of rebellion – a model which has been soundly criticised (Marchal 2004; Nathan 2005; Suhrke et al. 2005) – may help to illustrate this argument. This model takes up the robust finding that civil war is strongly correlated with a low GDP per capita (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 15-16). At the same time, the model argues that 'grievance' is not a decisive factor for the outbreak of violence, but it is the opportunity of organising a military rebellion that matters. A low per-capita income, in this interpretation, may also mean that a state is not capable of maintaining effective control over its territory (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 81). Furthermore, the absence of viable economic alternatives and the absence of formal education make it easy to recruit young men (Collier and Hoeffler 2001: 16). Possible sources of rebel income are external assistance, plundering of natural resources like diamonds, coltan or copper and the control of raw material exports (Azam 2002: 12). As Mats Berdal and David Malone (2000: 5) have pointed out, within this economic model the 'traditional objective of war – to defeat the enemy military – is replaced by economically driven interests in continued fighting and the institutionalism of violence at what is clearly a profitable level of intensity'. As a consequence, the availability of resources as a means of 'fuelling war' (Le Billon 2005), measured by the extent of primary commodity exports (Collier and Hoeffler 2001: 26), became a major concern for crisis prevention – and also for early warning. Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 19) stressed the predictive implications of their model repeatedly; in particular, they argued that where primary commodity exports make up more than 30 percent of the GDP, a country is three times more violence-prone compared to a situation where primary commodity exports make up less than 10 percent of the GDP.

2. Predictive Models of the Political Instability Taskforce

The most advanced predictive models have been developed by the PITF (formerly known as the State Failure Task Force). They are based on the empirical findings of a data set that tries to explain events of political instability from 1955 onwards (Esty et al. 1998). Goldstone et al. (2005) claim that because of data availability and methodological richness their approach is superior to those put forward by Bates et al. (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2002), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Regan and Norton (2005). Though the self-assertiveness displayed by the PITF seems to be exaggerated, apparently it is the only project that tries to translate causal into predictive models. A major disclaimer, however, is that the conceptual and factual basis of the evaluation of their forecasting models is not fully disclosed and thus not reproducible for external observers – although most of the project's data are available on the internet.

PITF uses applied logistic regression, neural network analysis, Makov processes and event-history models in order to explain the occurrence of political instability episodes since 1955. Because of the high number of countries and years (more than 7,500 country-years), these episodes (about 150) make up only about 2 percent of the universe – a reason why the PITF to

a large extent has relied on the 'case-control method'. This tool stems from medical research, where it is used, for example, to single out specific risk factors for cancer patients in comparison to control groups with similar background conditions, but with a non-occurrence of the disease (conditional logitistic regression analysis). The PITF profiled cases of instability within a short-term time horizon, 'using data drawn from *two years prior* to the onset of instability' (Goldstone et al. 2005).

To its own surprise, the PITF team found that 'relatively simple models, involving just a handful of variables and no complex interactions, accurately classify 80% or more of the instability onsets and stable countries in the historical data' (Goldstone et al. 2005):

> 'The model essentially has only four independent variables: regime type, infant mortality …, a 'bad neighborhood' indicator flagging cases with four or more bordering states embroiled in armed civil or ethnic conflict, and the presence or absence of state-led discrimination.'

Using executive recruitment and the competitiveness of political participation for determining the regime type, the PITF found out that hybrid regimes were substantially more prone to violence than full autocracies or full democracies. Among hybrid regimes, partial democracies where political competition was shaped by particularistic ethnic, religious or regional agendas (factionalism) were particularly vulnerable (Goldstone et al. 2005).

Most of the causal factors identified in the global model were also applicable to regional contexts. In the model for sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the regime type continued to be the most important variable – with all partial democracies with factionalist political competition experiencing instability. At the same time, this regional model also showed some particularities: infant mortality no longer had a decisive impact, as the differences within the region were not significant. At the same time, the relevance of state-led discrimination increased. Furthermore, some variables achieved significant relevance, such as trade openness, colonial heritage, leader's years in office and the existence of a dominant religious majority (Goldstone et al. 2005).

It is obvious that the PITF model brings politics back in with regard to early warning models, putting regime type, state-led discrimination, factionalism and leader's years in office on the agenda. It is quite telling that these variables do not play a major role in most of the risk and capacity assessments used by international governmental and regional organisations, since they touch on sensitive issues of sovereignty and could have far-reaching political implications for 'early response'.

3. Risk and Capacity Assessments (Ranking and Performance): the Failed States Index

One of the most influential performance ratings was first published in 2005 by the *Foreign Policy Magazine* and the US 'Fund for Peace': the so-called 'Failed States Index' (FSI). This index ranks 177 countries world-wide according to their level of fragility. The FSI uses twelve indicators, which focus on changes that might lead to an escalation of the situation:

- Social indicators: mounting demographic pressures; massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarians emergencies; legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia; chronic and sustained human flight;

- Economic indicators: uneven economic development along group lines; sharp and/or severe economic decline;

- Political indicators: criminalisation and/or de-legitimisation of the state; progressive deterioration of public services; suspension of arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights; security apparatus operates as a 'state within state'; rise of factionalised elites; intervention of other states or external political actors.

In contrast to other projects, the FSI is not based on existing data sets but created out of an evaluation of media reports from more than 150 domestic and international sources. Monthly developments are then rated on a scale from 0 to 10 (Baker 2006: 20). The cumulative value leads to the ranking – with 120 points indicating extremely bad performance and 90 points being the threshold for the 'alert list'. The FSI does not claim to forecast state failure or violent conflict, but wants to assess a state's vulnerability.

In the meantime, a number of similar ratings have been developed, such as the Peace and Conflict Ledger (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008), the State Fragility Index (Marshall and Cole 2008), the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Rice and Patrick 2008), or the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace 2008). Marshall (2008) optimistically argues that the overall assessments of the different projects match or mostly match for 80 percent of the countries, leaving serious differences only for 20 percent. At the same time, 20 percent is quite a substantial number if one assumes that it is fairly easy to identify through common sense those countries that are regarded as very stable or very unstable. It would thus be helpful if the different projects spelled out more clearly the conditions, time horizons and criteria under which their validity could be put to the test.

4. Risk and Capacity Assessments with Early Response Component: Carleton University's Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)

Some prominent risk and capacity assessments with early response component have been jointly developed by research institutions and government agencies. Among them are the Stability Assessment Framework (Verstegen, Van de Goor and de Zeeuw 2005), which was developed by the Clingendael Institute for Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Spelten Model for Early Warning Indicators, used by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and developed and improved in collaboration with the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg (GIGA) and the Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg (INEF).

The two most advanced projects have been FAST (Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions) (SwissPeace 2006), developed in 1998 by SwissPeace (with Virtual Research Associates and VRA Knowledge Manager) for the Swiss Development Agency (DEZA), in collaboration with the Swiss government and other donors (Krummenacher et al. 2002: 5), and the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project (CIFP), which has its home base at the Norman Patterson School for International Affairs of Carleton University and serves to inform the Canadian government. FAST used quantitative event-data analysis, developed in collaboration with Virtual Research Associates, and the FAST tension barometer, as well as more qualitative analysis provided by fact-finding missions, local information networks and an international expert network. At the same time, it never managed to effectively integrate the data pool with thematic reports (Schmeidl 2008) and had to close down in 2008.

We thus focus on CIFP as currently being the most comprehensive policy-oriented project that assesses the capacities for good governance and democratic processes and the risk of

violent conflict and fragile statehood (CIFP 2007: 1).[3] It is based on a broad range of structural indicators that are clustered within six categories (rule of law, human rights, government transparency and accountability, government and market efficiency, democratic participation, political stability and violence). The focus of the project is on governance and democratic processes, complemented by indicators in the socio-economic and security dimension. Questions of identity/ethnicity as well as external factors, however, are mostly neglected. According to the project's assumption, violent conflict and state failure are most probable if a weak state apparatus is controlled by a repressive regime.

The structural data are evaluated with an 'index methodology' that attributes a weighting factor to each indicator and allows for a separate analysis of cluster indices. Within a nine-point-system for governance and democratic processes (nine meaning very poor performance), thresholds indicate the risk level of a state. Besides structural data, the CIFP also monitors and analyses events that could worsen the situation. Using the 'events monitoring methodology', each event is assessed in its intensity and its correlation with violent conflict and thus coded as impacting positively or negatively on the stability of its respective cluster of indicators: 'The purpose of CIFP event monitoring is to observe and report on events within a country to better understand the dynamic trends affecting democratic processes and governance in the country'. The final 'event analysis' is based on regression lines and tries to capture changes in the intensity and character of events. On this basis, the generation of negative, positive and most likely scenarios is feasible (CIFP 2008: 35-36).

These types of EWR models have clearly influenced the design of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of IGAD, the regional organisation in the Horn of Africa. A number of similar social, political and economic indicators (with a particular reference and relevance to conflicts in that region) as well as reports on events are used by IGAD to anticipate violent conflicts and respond in a timely and effective manner (see below and Appendix).

5. Investigative Research and Intelligence: the Crisis Watch List of the International Crisis Group (ICG)

Research on EWR mechanisms has so far not systematically evaluated the contribution made by investigative case-study research and intelligence. This is partly due to the fact that most of the intelligence reports provided by commercial or governmental agencies are not accessible to the public or are geared to business risks rather than to human security threats. At the same time, it may also be due to the fact that early warning analysis and intelligence have frequently been viewed as separate fields (Schmeidl 2002, Boshoff 2003). Instead, we follow Kristan J. Wheaton and Michael T. Beerbower (2006) who define intelligence as 'a process, focused externally and using information from all available sources, that is designed to reduce the level of uncertainty for a decision maker.' Intelligence can thus be used or misused for narrow self-interest, but may also serve the 'public good' of early warning. Besides intelligence by governmental agencies like the National Intelligence Council, there is a broad spectrum of commercial providers, such as Business Environment Risk Intelligence s.a., Control Risks Group, the Economist Intelligence Unit (which helped to establish the Global

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[3] Other risk and capacity assessments have been developed by a variety of research institutions, NGO networks, governmental and inter-governmental agencies, among them DFID, the European Commission, the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER, closed down), UNDP, USAID and regional organisations such as the African Union, CEEAC, ECOWAS and IGAD.

Peace Index), IHS Energy Group, International Risk Approach, PRS Group or STRATFOR.com.

In the field of EWR, the ICG, basing its work on investigative field research that is close to intelligence can be regarded as a success story. This international NGO, located at the interface of non-governmental actors and high-ranking decision makers, was established in 1995 by Mark Malloch Brown, then Vice-President of the World Bank, former US diplomat Morton Abramowitz and the late Fred Cuny. Crisis Watch works with reports, briefings, the Crisis Watch bulletin and 'crisis alerts'. Its target audience is policy makers, researchers and practitioners and its website is widely used by them. Since the focus is on peace negotiations, most of the information is accompanied by policy recommendations or scenario building (Schmeidl 2008: 7-8, table).

Funded mainly by governments and foundations, ICG meanwhile has 130 full-time staff members, from 49 nationalities with 52 languages. According to its website, ICG publishes around 90 reports and briefings annually on 65 conflict and potential conflict situations, plus Crisis Watch, which is a twelve-page monthly bulletin designed to provide busy readers in the policy community, media, business and interested general public with a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world (ICG 2009). The ICG website features a powerful, open-source Crisis Watch database, which makes crisis-related event analysis easily accessible. As Schmeidl (2008) convincingly argues, the involvement of high-ranking personalities (such as the current president Gareth Evans), the provision of otherwise unobtainable information from field research and the translation of results into recommendations and even lobbying strategies may be a reason why the ICG 'survived' the first ten years of its existence while FEWER and FAST – two other initiatives from the 1990s – did not.

In conclusion, the 1990s saw a 'boom' in conflict-assessment tools; and in the last few years state-failure rankings have blossomed. These instruments and ratings have helped to create awareness in the academia, the public and among decision makers. At the same time, it has been difficult to systematically link empirical research on the causes of war to conflict assessment tools and early warning models.

Regional Organisations

The Enhanced Role of Regional Organisations

Regional organisations have acquired new relevance during the past two decades, particularly regarding peace, security, development and the prevention or mitigation of conflict. According to the UN Charter, Chapter VIII:

> '[nothing] precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.' (Article 52.1)

These regional or sub-regional agencies have been given the task to 'make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council' (Article 52.2). Since the end of the Cold War the blockage within the UN has changed, and with the UN system increasingly overburdened, the newly discovered 'new regionalism' (Hettne 2008) seems to

rely more and more on regional and sub-regional organisations. The UN and regional arrangements are progressively more engaged in sharing responsibility for peacekeeping, especially in situations of state fragility and violence by non-state actors.

Regional organisations are supposed to have an immediate interest in promoting peace since inter-state and intra-state wars normally affect the region through spill-over and destabilisation, and groups of states in a certain region ought to have primary security concerns that link them together. Experience shows that this logic is not always applied. Regional organisations disagree and often quarrel about the best approach to prevent violent conflict.

Reform proposals to improve the conflict prevention effectiveness of the UN and regional bodies have been made (UN General Assembly 2001) and a number of regional and sub-regional organisations, especially in Africa and Europe have engaged in intensified activities for the promotion of peace. The potentially vital role of regional organisations in peace missions is one of the firm general expectations of such organisations. The experiences in Europe have inspired the prospects for a more active and expanded responsibility of regional organisations. However, this type of peace and conflict engagement has not taken place in all other regions, e.g. regional and sub-regional organisations play a much less pronounced role in the Middle East and in Asia.

The role of regional organisations contains a built-in tension. Regionalisation challenges the narrow concepts of national sovereignty since the organisation is meant to take over certain state functions – in some cases more, in others less. At the same time, the member states anxiously guard their sovereignty and continue to create more and more elaborate regional organisations and expand their responsibilities. Clements and Foley (2008: 857) conclude: 'To be successful each regional member requires a degree of de-territorialization and de-borderization and some ceding of hard notions of national sovereignty.'

Within the academic discourse critical views on the possible role of regional organisations were raised by the so-called realist school. They argue that, in reality, most regional organisations have no convincing record to justify the expectation of a conflict-mitigating role for regional organisations (Mearsheimer 1994/95). In contrast, mulitlateralists emphasise the potential of regional organisations. Given their present structure, regional and sub-regional organisations are not in a position to effectively apply the monopoly of force. However, in recent years several regional organisations have started to take over responsibilities for the promotion of peace. The EU, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the AU have all made security interventions in recent years. Early warning mechanisms are set up to enable regional organisations to monitor critical developments. The interesting question is: do regional or sub-regional organisations depend on established EWR mechanisms to effectively act either as peace promoter or conflict preventer?

At present it would be exaggerating to describe the regional organisations' peace and security functions as an effective regional conflict-management regime. Of course, the security dimensions, and thus the task for regional groupings, vary greatly in the different regions and security arrangements are not equally relevant for all regions. Theoretically, regional organisations can have two different functions for regional peace. Traditionally, neo-functional theory perceives regional integration as a peace promoter (the EU model). The motivation for forming regional bodies is simple: neighbours are better off if they are friendly and do not fight wars. Diplomacy, economic and cultural exchange, soft power rather than military means are the currency of interactions. The positive result of creating a zone of peace

and prosperity or 'a security community' (Deutsch et al. 1957) is obvious to all its members. The EU-integration process has acted as a stimulus for other regionalist endeavours.

The second and more recent perspective is the regionalisation of conflict as a reason for region building (the ECOWAS model). Regional bodies have an interest to prevent, contain or solve violent conflicts in their region because of the disastrous humanitarian and development effects and – not the least – because of the spill-over effects into the region. These two models are, according to Hettne (2008: 410), different but not contradictory; they belong to different stages of conflict.

The African Union: adoption of interventionist policies

1. Purpose, mandate and institutions

Protracted violent conflict and the development crisis in sub-Saharan Africa led to two important African economic and security initiatives: the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). Both institutions were launched to facilitate 'African solutions to African problems'. The OAU had been the stronghold for upholding state sovereignty. When it was launched by the African heads of state in 1999, the AU committed itself to promote peace, security and stability of the continent, to promote democracy and good governance, due process, the rule of law and human rights, as well to engage in effective intervention under grave circumstances. At the same time the vision of the AU upholds defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members.

In its charter, the AU claims far-reaching competencies. Article 4 opened up the possibility of military intervention under two circumstances: first, 'pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'; and second, upon request of a member state 'in order to restore peace and security' (African Union 2000).

On the basis of this charter the AU has engaged in several peace operations and has adopted an interventionist policy. It seems that a rudimentary African security architecture to address African security needs is emerging. At its top is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the political decision-making body, consisting of fifteen rotating members, as an organ 'for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts'. It is intended to be 'a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa' (African Union 2002). Under the PSC four pillars are being formed:

- An intelligence-gathering and analysis centre (CEWS), which relates to sub-regional EWR systems;

- The Military Staff Committee under whose guidance five brigades of the African Standby Force (ASF) are established: ECOBRIG (West Africa); SADCBRIG (Southern Africa); EASBRIG (East Africa); North African Brigade and Central African Brigade. The ASF consist of military, police and civil capabilities;

- The Panel of the Wise, an external mediation and advisory body of five members, one from each region of the ASF;

- The African Peace Facility Fund, a special financial fund jointly financed by the African Union and the EU. Within the EU Development Fund the EU has pledged support for the African Peace and Security Architecture and will provide €300 million for 2008-2010 (European Parliament 2008: 9).

The African Union's PSC assesses potential crisis situations and sends fact-finding missions to trouble spots (Murithi 2008). The PSC has the power to suggest an AU intervention in internal crisis situations. Two-thirds of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the AU can authorise such an intervention; peace enforcement interventions require a mandate of the UN Security Council (Krohn 2008).

2. Experiences and performance in conflict management

The AU's policy of intervention represents a paradigm shift from the OAU's concept of non-intervention. However, the AU is still hamstrung in its decision making by a number of barriers, not least the political divergences over the criteria of when and where not to intervene. A certain tension exists between Article 3 (sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states) and Article 4 (intervention under grave circumstances) of the Charter. The decision not to intervene is not primarily a question of the availability of information on potential or on urgent violent conflicts – the major purpose of EWR systems – but of disagreement about the application of these two articles of the Charter.

In addition, the AU's military capacities are still not very strong. The ASF is still in its early stages. The AU wants to have up to five regional brigades with a strength of at least 3,000 troops each, ready to operate as an African Rapid Reaction Force by June 2010 and capable of deployment anywhere on the continent. This will maintain a working relationship with the UN and other international organisations, notably ECOWAS, IGAD, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States and the Arab Maghreb Union. Most advanced is the planning of EASBRIG in East Africa and ECOBRIG in West Africa, without, however, the implementation of the planned civil component.

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is supposed to anticipate and thus prevent conflict from turning violent. Only a few specialists have been employed so far. Thus, the early warning system is far from functioning. The African Peace Facility Fund, mutually financed by the EU and AU, provides special support with its pledge of €300 million between 2008 and 2010 (Kinzel 2007).

A major influence on the AU has been the operations of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West African conflict situations. ECOMOG was the first African regional initiative on peacekeeping and was deployed in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. ECOMOG is seen as a model since, according to a study by the European Parliament (2008: 16):

> '[it] shows that a committed and robust regional force can bring an end to complicated conflicts. Indeed, the experience of ECOWAS in the field of peace and security offers much that the rest of Africa can learn from.'

During the few years that the AU has been operational it was, or is, engaged in four military peacekeeping or peace-building missions (Krohn 2008; Murithi 2008):

1. Burundi: The first practical test for the AU was the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The AU intervened in 2003 with more than 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique, primarily to monitor the peace process and to provide security. AMIB successfully pacified a potentially fragile situation so that the UN could take over in 2004.

2. Darfur: The second operation in Darfur between 2004 and 2006 proved to be complicated. The weak mandate to monitor the humanitarian crisis and to guarantee an armistice, the obstinacy of the Sudanese government and the limited financial capacity of the AU show the limitations of the AU to intervene in complex crises situations. This task in this vast territory was beyond the capacity of the 7,000 AU peacekeeping troops. In 2008 the UN Security Council passed a resolution for a combined AU/UN operation to replace the AU forces with 20,000 UN peacekeepers.

3. Somalia: After the Ethiopian, US-backed intervention into Somali, the UN mandated an 'IGAD and Member States of the African Union' (IGASOM), which was never deployed. Instead, the AU authorised the African Union Mission in Somalia at the beginning of 2007 to stabilise the situation, to further dialogue and reconciliation, to facilitate humanitarian assistance as well as reconstruction and development. However, in mid 2008, only 1,400 Ugandan soldiers of the 8,000 planned troops were deployed in Somalia. Other pledges have not been implemented in part due to a lack of funds.

4. Comoros: The most recent operation began in March 2008 to protect the government after a military coup. 1,500 AU troops from Libya, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania are deployed.

The first three operations made clear that the African Union has some potential for peacekeeping, but it is presently not able to carry out multidimensional stabilisation operations. It is too early to pass a definitive judgment on the AU's peacekeeping potential but it is obvious that it has its limitations. The AU initiatives have led to a run of donors to facilitate the funding of an African Peace and Security Architecture (Engel 2008: 5).

3. The use of EWR mechanism

The AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), initiated in 2002, is intended – according to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union – for 'early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts' (African Union 2002). It consists of two components: (1) an observation and monitoring centre ('The Situation Room') at the AU headquarters which is responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of appropriate early warning indicators; and (2) parallel observation and monitoring units at the sub-regional level, which are supposed to link up to the Situation Room. CEWS is an adaptation of the EU early warning system. The main instruments of the CEWS are reports, compiled on the basis of open source information that identifies potentially dangerous activity. These reports are the basis for the Peace and Security Council decisions, particularly for the possible deployment of the African Standby Forces. This setup of AU's early warning system places it into the type of risk assessment models with an early warning component (type D, see Table 1).

The CEWS is planned to deliver standardised and timely early warning reports as well as effective policy options as of 2009. An evaluation of the CEWS in 2006 (published in 2008) made clear how much is still to be done, particularly also to link up to the emerging regional EWR systems (African Union 2008). According to a study of the European Parliament (2008: 18) the CEWS is understaffed and underfunded and thus seriously constrained in its activity.

Considering that the sub-regional EWR mechanisms are still at their infant stage, the current early warning capacity of the AU is not very potent.

ECOWAS/ECOMOG: the model for others?

1. Purpose, mandate and institutions

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975. It is a regional group of fifteen member states, primarily tasked with the promotion of economic integration; but conflict management has become increasingly relevant in recent years. In 1993, a reform of the organisation was passed against the backdrop of an altered international environment and regime change in numerous member states. In this process, the goal of economic unity was adapted and the support of democracy in the member states became an official goal in the new ECOWAS treaty. Chapter II, Article 4, underlines the following fundamental principles (ECOWAS 1993): '…e) maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness; […]; h) accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development; […]; j) promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each Member State […]'. ECOWAS also has a Department of Defence and Security in its headquarters.

ECOWAS states have already ratified protocols regarding non-interference and mutual assistance in case of defence in 1976, 1978, and 1981. The 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was tied together with an elaborate conflict-solution mechanism. The organisation created a special body for crisis prevention and support of democracy and due process. The Mediation and Security Council, made up of nine members, is especially relevant. It has been operating since 2001 and was introduced at the urging of the Francophone states, which, against the backdrop of Nigeria's military intervention in Liberia (since 1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), wanted to curb the supposed instrumentalisation of ECOWAS by Nigeria as hegemonic power. Article 10 of the protocol authorises all forms of intervention; Article 25 permits the council to become active when violent conflict emerges, humanitarian threats evolve, the sub-region is destabilised and serious and massive human rights violations take place as well as in situations where a democratically elected government is overthrown or will be overthrown.

The possibility of intervening in the case of coups against a democratically elected government was also underlined in Article 45 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001), which already provides for a wide spectrum of incentives, but also sanctions in order to facilitate a return to constitutional order. Chapter IV of this Protocol is devoted to 'sub-regional peace and security observation systems' and 'early warning systems', leading to the establishment of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the ECOWAS Commission (Souaré 2007). ECOMOG) is the core of the newly formed West African brigade, intended to be able to deploy 5,000 soldiers and civilians within 90 days as well as 1,500 within 30 days (Pabst 2006: 10).

2. Experiences and performance in conflict management

Democratic principles have increased in significance over time for ECOWAS. The ambitious Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 explicitly formulated democratic requirements for the member states: division of power with autonomous legislative and judicative branches, free elections and participation, civil control of armed forces, freedom of press and assembly, protection against discrimination and 'zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means'. State fragility and stability mattered insofar as the

Protocol discussed both the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the member states. In the event of eroding political authority, ECOWAS promises to support the re-establishment of an elected government. Given this aim the type of EWR mechanisms described above under the heading of predictive models (e.g. the Political Instability Force as well as the Failed State Index) are of relevance for ECOWAS.

In the Gambia (1994), Niger (1999), and Togo (2005), ECOWAS tried with varying degrees of success to mediate after a coup or constitutional crisis. ECOMOG was the first African regional initiative on peacekeeping when ECOMOG troops intervened after the crisis and the failure of diplomatic negotiations in Liberia in 1990 to establish law and order. Further missions in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and again in Liberia have established ECOMOG as a serious regional player. Since 2002, ECOWAS has (if only unsuccessfully) been active in peacekeeping in the Ivory Coast; this mission later gave way to the UN mission for the Ivory Coast.

Despite its ambitious goals, ECOWAS has only limited operational resources at its disposal. Its budget mainly goes towards financing the fixed costs of the Secretary's office staff. There is a meagre 'regional fund' that finances projects in member states. However, since June 2006, ECOWAS has had a rapid response force at its command - the Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) consisting of up to 6,500 soldiers. Compared to other African regional organisations ECOWAS has evolved into a front runner for security and political integration. Even though the rationale of its interventions oscillates between collective security and partisan hegemony, the regional organisation has constituted itself as a capable actor that has built up its own sub-regional security regime.

3. The use of EWR mechanism

ECOWAS authorised in its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance the establishment of a sub-regional peace and security observation system with the intention of early warning. This mechanism also establishes an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the headquarters as well as four observation and monitoring zones with monitoring units within the sub-region (zonal bureaux).

The West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) has been engaged by ECOWAS to assist in data collection for the purpose of early warning. WANEP is a sub-regional civil society organisation based in Ghana. Since 2002, when a memorandum of understanding was signed, WANEP has been officially charged with facilitating the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). WANEP collects data on human security issues, most notably human rights and democracy, food shortages, unemployment, arms flows and civil-military relations and droughts and flooding (Souaré 2007). WANEP processes and analyses the data and prepares reports for the OMC at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja.

An evaluation of the EWR system carried out in August 2008 concluded 'that the system is on the right course' (ECOWARN 2008). The ECOWAS system is an innovative approach insofar as it combines data collection by civil society and government officials. On this basis it belongs to the type of EWR models described above as risk assessment and early warning as well as investigative research by civil society (types D and E, see Table 1). At the time of writing the WANEP-ECOWAS early warning reports are not publicly available.[4] Nevertheless, a component of the AU CEWS is in an emergent state in the ECOWAS region.

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[4] WANEP wrote in a communication with the authors on 22 October 2008: 'We are still finalizing the modalities and protocols (since ECOWAS is an inter-governmental organisation with restrictions on what is public and in

IGAD: conflict-prone, divided and weak

1. Purpose, mandate and institutions

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa superseded in 1996 the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, which was founded in 1986 primarily to react to the recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters in the Horn of Africa. IGAD's mission was extended to assist member states to achieve food security and environmental protection, promote and maintain peace, security and humanitarian affairs and facilitate economic cooperation and integration.

IGAD has no special organ that is responsible for the facilitation of peace and security. It has a Secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary, appointed by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. IGAD has formulated an extensive strategy for the implementation of the various programmes (IGAD 2003). Since the Horn of Africa is a region that is haunted by conflicts ranging from intra-state and inter-state to cross-border community conflicts, a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2000. The rational of CEWRAN is to systematically anticipate violent conflicts and respond in a timely and effective manner. This – it is argued in the mission statement – is more effective and would also prove much cheaper both in terms of human and material resources than dealing with full-blown crises.

CEWARN is funded from regular member states' contributions and supported by development donors such as the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and US Agency for International Development (USAID). It has initiated the Rapid Response Fund to help finance projects targeted at preventing, de-escalating or resolving pastoral and related conflicts in the region. The fund is intended to improve the flexibility and build up the required capacity to respond to early warning signals and address crises in a timely and appropriate manner. With the revitalisation of IGAD in 1996, the presence of the IGAD Partner Forum and the Friends of IGAD, a group of partners who work closely with the IGAD-Secretariat, steadily increased.

2. Experiences and performance in conflict management

IGAD, like several other regional institutions, should take the lead on conflict management, but it is severely hampered by wars and conflict among its members. Considering the fact that within IGAD we find Somalia as a collapsed state, Sudan with its wars and defying international conflict-moderating action, Ethiopia and Eritrea in a state of no-peace-no-war and Uganda with its northern conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army, the impossible conflict mediating task of the regional organisation becomes apparent (Rupiya and Nhema 2008). Obviously, IGAD is compromised by conflicts and has not been in a position to develop a framework capable of coping with these conflicts (Healy 2008). Problems are exacerbated by the fact that both Kenya and Ethiopia aspire to regional leadership, which, for example, led to the decision that the headquarters of the East African Brigade (EASBRIG) has been placed in Addis Ababa while the planning element is situated in Nairobi (European Parliament, 2008: 22-23). Given the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea it is not conceivable that their troops would presently serve together under an IGAD command.

The security architecture of IGAD is – with the exception of the EWR system CEWARN – not presently at an implementation stage. However, despite all these difficulties IGAD has

house) as to what would be published. By end of first quarter next year (2009), hopefully, the new look website with detail publications would be launched.'

established its EWR system, which concentrates on monitoring pastoral conflicts, thus avoiding becoming caught up in the major conflicts of the region.

3. The use of EWR mechanism

The seven member states of IGAD created CEWARN for the Horn of Africa region. The mandate of CEWARN is to 'receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region' (Von Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller 2006: 5). With the mandate to predict tensions and conflicts CEWARN combines elements of the predictive model and the risk assessment models (types B and D, see Table 1).

Because of a number of acute inter- and intra-state conflicts in the region CEWARN initially adopted an incremental approach by focusing exclusively on two pastoralist conflicts. Its ultimate aim is to report on all violent conflicts in a broadly defined human security area and not just on national or state security. Operationally, CEWARN established a network of field monitors, country coordinators, national research institutes and conflict-EWR units at the national level and began its work in two pilot areas on pastoral conflicts in the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya Uganda and Sudan as well as in the second cross-border areas of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia CEWARN uses a set of 52 socio-political indicators for two types of reports: (1) Violent Incident Reports with indicators on armed clashes, raids, protest demonstrations and other crimes; and (2) indicators for reports on the presence and status of communal relations, civil society activities, economic activities, governance and media, natural disasters, safety and security and social services (see Appendix 1).

According to IGAD's own assessment, CEWARN's achievements include:

- CEWARN has established itself as a sub-regional mechanism with the most developed data-based regional early warning system in Africa;

- It has developed an effective state-of-the-art field monitoring and data-analysis tool;

- It has brought to light hitherto unrecognised extent of violence in the pilot pastoralist areas;

- It has conducted capacity building for conflict prevention, management and response in the region through skill training of stakeholders at various levels;

- It has managed to build confidence and collaboration amongst various stakeholders including governments, civil society organisations, and comunity-based organisations.

CEWARN also recognises that there are several continuing operational gaps of implementation, including an inadequate information base and the lack of an effective response component. The capabilities and funding of CEWARN as well as those of IGAD are limited. The clearing house at the headquarters employs a small number of staff. It is intended to report on pastoral conflicts in all member states within the present planning period (2007-2011). IGAD still needs to decide if CEWARN operations will expand to cover other types of conflict as well.

ASEAN/ARF: Non-Interference

1. Purpose, mandate and institutions

ASEAN was founded in 1967 primarily as an organisation to promote the economic growth of its South East Asian members. At the same time it was intended to balance the excessive influence of great powers – first the USA and in later years also China. At the same time, ASEAN members agreed to a number of declarations and treaties addressing security issues, such as the ASEAN Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality declaration (1971) and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (1995).

ASEAN members and a number of other countries from the region, and from outside the region with an interest in Asia and the Pacific, formed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a multilateral dialogue forum and the only region-wide security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. Representatives of 27 states met for the first time in 1994 to foster a dialogue on security interests and to make efforts towards establishing confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. The mandate of the ARF has never been to engage in peacekeeping operations.

ASEAN members still uphold the concept of state sovereignty and non-interference. When, for example, Thailand and Malaysia suggested at the end of the 1990s to loosen the non-intervention norm, calling for 'constructive engagement' in other countries (e.g. influencing the Junta in Burma), other members of ASEAN regarded this as a hazardous move and refused to give up that rule. ASEAN is a mix of authoritarian and democratic regimes. Therefore, it is no surprise that the governments hold on to the concept of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other member states and oppose formal (or legalistic) approaches to conflict resolution and stress instead the cultural diversity in the region (Collins 2007: 212).

Peace and security issues as well as defence cooperation have increasingly been part of the debate within ASEAN. The founding members of ASEAN primarily aimed at economic cooperation without, however, ignoring the positive effects of cooperation for security. They intended to seek regional stability and overcome or avoid inter-member disputes and conflicts, like the Indonesian *Konfrontasi*, the Malaysian-Philippine conflict over Sabah, Thailand and Myanmar border skirmishes, bilateral territorial disputes between Singapore and Malaysia as well as internal ethnic secessionist aspirations and communist insurgencies (Poole 2007; Acharya 2007).

2. Experiences and performance in conflict management

Originally ASEAN was not a 'security-oriented structure', but it facilitated and protected regime security (Narine 2002: 15). Regional identity was not given, but the members hoped to pursue a gradual process towards making such an identity possible. The later admission of the new members Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam made ASEAN a geographically more inclusive organisation. At the same time it increased the divergences of political norms and the range of the security issues within the organisation. ASEAN's concept of regionalism has been very flexible and does not necessarily follow a common policy. The marginal influence of ASEAN on the governance behaviour of the Junta in Myanmar is but one example of the lack of common political values within the organisation.

Basic concepts such as non-alignment, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, peaceful settlements of disputes are, of course, not the inventions of ASEAN or ARF. They

had already been prominent during the Bandung Conference of 1955. As Severino, the former Secretary General of ASEAN, pointed out these norms 'dovetailed with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence formulated by China in the 1950s' (quoted in Stubbs. 2008: 462).

ASEAN has a mixed record of conflict management. Member states proudly point to their consensus on managing the Cambodia conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s with Vietnam's occupation of that country. In contrast, the Indonesian armed forces' involvement in East Timor after the referendum for independence in 1999 was barely criticised by ASEAN. Member states had contrasting views on participating in the INTERFET mission in East Timor. Only Thailand and the Philippines joined the Australian-led forces while Malaysia and Singapore joined belatedly and very reluctantly. The newer members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) refused to get engaged.

Sridharan (2008: 11) classifies the ASEAN approach as not

> 'a typical conflict-resolution mechanism, but it has evolved as a conflict-avoidance technique relying on softer elements like regional understanding and trust rather than on formalised, rules-based instrumentalities.'

The wider forum − ARF with ASEAN as the core plus other states from the region as well as outside powers (USA, EU and Canada) − has not made much progress in achieving its two primary goals of preventive diplomacy in crises and confidence building. The region has been plagued by a number of unresolved territorial disputes (in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait), other inter-state conflicts (North and South Korea) as well as intra-state conflicts, including ethnic, religious and separatist (Aceh, Cambodia, East Timor, Mindanao, Tibet etcetera), which could endanger the security of the region. In addition, many states in the region are investing strongly in the modernisation of their armed forces and in a military build-up.

Within ARF two groupings of countries can be found. A first group, among them China and most ASEAN countries, has been worried about the possibility that preventive diplomacy might encroach on their sovereignty and lead to intervention in their internal affairs. They fear that so-called humanitarian intervention and preventive diplomacy have the potential to undermine the principle of non-interference. A second more activist group, among them Australia, Canada, the EU, the USA and Japan, stresses the importance of the full kaleidoscope of the EWR mechanism and regional-dispute solutions, including fact-finding missions, good offices of special representatives and consideration of such security related issues as non-proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, marine safety etc. (Yuzuwa 2006).

Over several rounds of ministerial meetings only gradual advancement has been made on confidence-building measures (for example the simple fact that the ARF offers a forum to discuss the partition of Korea or that the ARF is a venue to submit voluntary background briefings on regional security issues). However, the ARF is not given an independent role in conflict management. Not even an enhanced role of the rotating ARF chair was acceptable to China. The ARF's operating rules of consensus decision-making and the diplomatic norm of maintaining a pace of negotiations and actions comfortable to all participants has led to a lack of progress in response to crises and security concerns. In none of the major acute recent crises in the region (Aceh, East Timor, Burma, Tibet) did the ARF play an important role.

The ARF, but also ASEAN, are criticised for their inadequate roles in conflict management. However, the judgement of observers varies: ASEAN's conflict-avoidance technique, de-escalation strategy and promotion of regional understanding (though not based on formal

rules) and its consensus techniques (by agreeing to accept disagreement on contentious issues) are recognised and honoured as the specific 'ASEAN or Asian way'. ASEAN 'has made probably the most successful attempt at regional cooperation in the non-Western world' (Poole 2007: 4). At the same time, ASEAN is criticised for remaining at an infant stage of regional security cooperation and as an organisation with a lack of norm compliance due to its members' fear of losing national control over security policy (Jones and Smith 2001). Its failure to address the East Timor crisis and to manage the conflict-resolution process has damaged the organisation's reputation. ASEAN is not seen as a 'security community' (with the 'we'-feeling of Karl W. Deutsch), but it could become, according to Emmerson (2005: 170) 'a pluralistic SC [security community]'. In conclusion, ASEAN and ARF are still far away from taking a pro-active role in conflict resolution and can certainly not be expected to function in the near- or medium-term future as a regional peacekeeping organisation as is being discussed within the UN.

3. Absence of an EWR mechanism

ASEAN has always emphasised its informal approach without binding legal obligations in dealing with tensions within member states and between members. Upholding the principle of non-interference results, of course, in the inability to implement an EWR system since EWR reports or data analysis would have to include criticism of conflict situations within and between states. As long as non-intervention is the hallmark of ASEAN as well as ARF it seems inconceivable that early warning of emerging conflicts of intra-state or intra-regional nature will take place.

Nevertheless, most observers agree that the 'incremental, consultative and consensus-based approach that ASEAN follows has created a more stable regional order' (Sridharan, 2008: 22). And '[d]espite considerable political and cultural diversity, the Association has provided a forum for dialogue between Southeast Asian states, and the opportunity for cooperation' Poole, 2007: 4). Since ASEAN and ARF have stressed the need for good governance there is a tension between the principle of non-interference and the emerging norms of governance. It remains to be seen how the regional organisations in Asia will be able to maintain these two partly contradictory norms with their consensus-oriented policies in the future.

In 2003, ASEAN published its Second Declaration of ASEAN Concord with its long-term intention to create an ASEAN Community by 2015 based on three pillars:

> 'namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region.' (ASEAN 2003)

The concept of a 'community' implies the notion of moving towards a more formal organisation even in the field of peace and security.

PIF: nascent security framework and rudimentary structures

1. Purpose, mandate and institutions

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), formerly the South Pacific Forum, was founded in August 1971. It comprises 16 independent and self-governing states in the Pacific. The Forum is the region's premier political and economic policy organisation. In its vision, it is stated that the Pacific region 'can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic

prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives' (Australian Government 2004). Besides programmes on economic growth, sustainable development and good governance the PIF has in recent years initiated its programme on security. In 2004 the leaders of the PIF established a security programme (for peace and security and a Pacific anti-money laundering project). This concept is mainly concerned with domestic security issues and transnational crime.

The political and security programme promotes forum interests and positions in the international arena and provides policy advice and technical assistance to members on international relations, law-enforcement cooperation, political, legal and security issues. The main focuses of the programme include:

- Legal sector cooperation and the implementation of the legislative priorities;

- Monitoring of regional political developments in member countries;

- Building capacity in conflict prevention and response;

- Conducting election observer missions to Forum Island Countries;

- Building the capacity of law-enforcement agencies to combat transnational crime.

The PIF leaders signed a security declaration in 2000 (Biketawa Declaration). It is a nascent security framework with commitments to upholding democratic processes and good governance and addressing crises in the region. The declaration includes a mechanism to advise and consult with the Forum's foreign ministers to undertake one, or a combination of, the following actions to assist in the resolution of crisis:

- A statement representing the view of members on the situation;

- The creation of a Ministerial Action Group;

- A fact-finding or similar mission;

- Convening an eminent persons group;

- Third party mediation;

- Support for appropriate institutions or mechanisms that would assist a resolution;

- The convening of a special high level meeting of the Forum Regional Security Committee or an ad hoc meeting of Forum Ministers.

In the Biketawa Declaration, forum leaders emphasised the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of another member state. The PIF has not established any specific organ or council for peace; instead it is a dialogue forum on such issues.

2. Experiences and performance in conflict management

The Biketawa Declaration has been invoked twice since its promulgation in 2000, with the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands and the Pacific Regional Assistance for Nauru. Three successful election observer missions in the region – Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Fiji – have also been undertaken under this framework.

3. The use of EWR mechanism

The PIF is nowhere near as large or as elaborate as other regional organisations such as the EU, the African Union and ASEAN, or even as sub-regional organisations as ECOWAS or SADC. But its aims and mandate are similar and facilitation of security is on the agenda of the PIF. The PIF is concerned with the broader issues of security and wants to develop 'a human security framework' (PIF 2008a). This is intended to provide a set of tools for preventing crises and conflicts. This is primarily a research programme with studies on conflict-prevention activities in the member states Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati and Micronesia. In cooperation with civil society organisations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the PIF will address three elements: causes of conflict, monitoring conflict escalation and strengthening conflict-resolution mechanisms. At present, the information sharing on law enforcement and transnational organised crime is being established. This research programme is far from a functioning EWR mechanism but it includes elements of the above mentioned causal EWR models (type A) and a strong connection to local groups (type E civil society-based models).

Clements and Foley (2008: 859) conclude that the majority of PIF members have governance systems at the national level that are not yet fully developed. These are states with hybrid political orders that combine elements of the introduced Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions (Boege et al., 2008). These authors stress that the maintenance of security and peace building in many island countries depends on the contribution of customary governance.

In the case of the PIF, the regional organisation largely depends on the cooperation of the local communities, which often is the real provider of security, and the modern Western-type nation-state institutions. Yet given the limited capabilities of PIF, the majority of the resources, both financially as well as in terms of military capacities for intervention, come from Australia and New Zealand.

PIF has been discussing the development of a crisis early warning system. The Secretary General of the forum expressed his hope that such a system would be strengthened through the collaboration with UNDP; he further emphasised that 'significant progress in developing a natural disaster Regional Early Warning Strategy' has been made (PIF 2008b). Natural disasters affect people's security much more than violent conflicts, although such conflicts are not unknown in the region, notably in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands where Australian-led PIF interventions took place.

Conclusion

This section offers our conclusions both on the effectiveness and usefulness of the most advanced EWR mechanisms as well as on their application and non-application in regional organisations. Furthermore we will provide some policy recommendation since we conclude that the potential of such EWR models has not been fully realised. This sub-optimal implementation leads not only to wasting of scarce resources but also to unsatisfactory results in conflict prevention.

Effectiveness and Usefulness of EWR Mechanisms

The richness of the various models of EWR is impressive. At the same time, looking at the large number of various data collections, conflict predictions and assessments, there is a considerable duplication and overlap of effort. The methodologies of data collection,

identification of relevant indicators and prediction of conflict have greatly improved. For example, the predictive models developed by the PITF seem to have had considerable success over the last few years (Marshall 2008: 10). According to members of the PITF, the predictive power of their quantitative models has improved substantially and now lies at about 85 percent. As Goldstone (2008: 7) argues, the overall accuracy of prediction can even be heightened if these models are combined with qualitative models based on structural analogies and patterns identified in case-study research. The future of predictive models thus seems to lie in a combination of indicator- and event-based quantitative analysis and qualitative/configurative analysis that relies on structural analogies and 'common patterns' among cases and might increase the precision of early warning up to 90 percent.

But what does this imply for practitioners? Barton and von Hippel 2008 (11-12) stressed that political decision makers still have their reservations regarding the usefulness of forecasting models. We have identified five shortcomings:

First, the difficult cases: Predictive models give precise forecasts regarding stable countries and fairly precise forecasts with regard to very unstable countries. But it is 'difficult to be accurate on moderately stable countries, where actual conflict will depend most on whether precipitating events of a certain magnitude occur, which is inherently unpredictable.' (Goldstone 2008: 3). Twenty percent of cases that are not predicted is quite a substantial number.

Related to that point, Barton and von Hippel (2008) rightly state that there is still little knowledge about the impact of small events, which in some cases trigger the outbreak of major violence and in others do not. In most models the establishment of threshold criteria and 'tipping points' is *ad hoc* and not based on sufficiently explained procedures.

Second, the causes of conflict: The correlation of selected indicators with violent conflict does not reveal causal chains and thus is of only limited relevance for intervention strategies. Let us assume that a country with high infant mortality, a hybrid regime and state discrimination is on the alert list. Would large-scale health programmes, political dialogue or a good governance programme and the threat of sanctions be conducive to early response?

Third, the structural variables: Most of the models focus on short-term correlations and might under-estimate the relevance of structural variables and the possibilities of structural prevention, as Barton and von Hippel (2008: 10) have argued:

> 'Poverty, human rights, demographics, displacement, education, and health are important factors for anticipating instability in a long-term time frame yet relatively few models rely on indicators in these categories. This observation suggests the models are geared towards near term crises rather than predicting long term trends.'

Fourth, the local space: Since most of the models, as well as the risk and capacity assessments, rely on quantitative data available over long time frames, questions of civil society development, participation or local governance and dispute resolution are not adequately incorporated and tested. If that led to a consolidated performance rating, it might easily replace less advanced assessments systems used by governmental and inter-governmental agencies.

Fifth, the possibility for replication: It needs to be emphasised that most of the models and mechanisms still do not clearly spell out under what conditions they can be regarded as

effective. The different projects should spell out more clearly the conditions, time horizons and criteria under which their validity could be put to test.

The rationale of most early warning systems is that international actors (the UN, regional organisations, coalitions of the willing, neighbouring states etcetera) will react when information about potential of violent conflict becomes available. However, is the assumption of the need for dissemination of information realistic? It has been pointed out in the literature that those likely to be affected by conflict have to be warned. We want to stress that early warning systems have to define clearly whom they are going to alert, based on which assumptions they expect early and effective response to be initiated and whom they are trying to address in a system of multi-level governance where the populations affected are located in local environments and deserve to be more than 'objects' of prevention, but rather 'partners' and 'subjects'.

Hesitations to Engage in Early Response: explaining the 'Warning-Response Gap'

There are several general reasons why a 'warning-response gap' is so apparent in many conflicts: shortcomings of the EWR models, structural disconnects between early warning advisors and early-response decision makers, political interests and inefficient use of scarce resources.

1. Institutional rigidity and cognitive biases

As we showed above, conflict-escalation processes and in particular the role of triggers and single events is still under-researched. While structural indicators fit into relatively simple models, the escalation of a tense situation into violence 'does not result from the linear summation of a neatly defined set of causes, but from interactions among multiple phenomena in a complex system with several levels of organization' (Meier 2007). Complexity science argues that organisations have to adapt to the structures of their environments, e.g. by introducing more flexible decision-making structures and feedback mechanisms that increase the resilience of the organisation and institutionalise learning processes. Against this background, Meier (2007) argues that most EWR mechanisms are still based on 'hierarchical structures' that cannot adequately cope with non-linear developments. In this view, the 'warning-response gap' could be reduced by establishing hybrid hierarchies and networked governance mechanisms within EWR mechanisms. This could denote that certain events may trigger the establishment of *ad hoc* task forces as well as consultation mechanisms that ensure that the information and possible conclusions do not get lost in predefined decision-making channels. It would also mean that at certain stages EWR mechanisms must address not only a vaguely defined 'international community', but find ways to inform different levels of potential actors all the way down to the local level.

Lawrence Woocher (2008) has added another dimension. According to his research, more accurate models and a change in communication and organisations' structures will not suffice – because they do not reflect the ways in which individuals and groups process information and make decisions in the shadow of risk and uncertainty. Most EWR models are still based on the prevalent 'rational actor' model. This model, however, does not take into account that individuals and groups are prone to 'mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies' (Heuer, 1999: 111, cited by Woocher 2008: 5). Among these cognitive biases, the following may in particular influence the response (Woocher 2008: 10-17):

- If people face risk, they will tend to refer to existing experiences and patterns ('availability heuristic') and try to relate situations to well-known reference points. This makes it difficult to adequately assess new unforeseen phenomena;

- If an alert is coupled with a lack of available options for early action, the resulting cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) may be mitigated by simply adjusting the alert level downwards;

- Human beings tend to assume that causes and effects stem from similar categories. They are thus not prepared to react appropriately towards accidental or unintentional effects;

- Human beings tend to neglect the extent of negative events because 'moral feelings' do not work with numbers. A mass catastrophe may even result in inactiveness (psychic numbing), because the sheer number will negatively influence the 'capacity to experience *affect*, the positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and actions' (Slovic 2007).

The arguments above suggest that the effectiveness of EWR systems is affected not only by the quality of alerts but also by institutional factors and 'cognitive biases'. This means institutional learning processes are required and 'de-biasing strategies' must be designed, such as a formulating 'attractive' policy options, e.g. framing them as investments with a high and immediate turnout or as tool to substantially reduce losses (Woocher 2008: 21).

2. The disconnect between early warning advisors and early action decision makers

Even if an early warning system is accurate and timely it does not automatically lead to timely action. Nathan (2007: 50) convincingly argues that

> '[a]bove all, it must be useful to the senior officials who are responsible for making decisions on early action. The system will have scant value if its outputs are not tailored precisely to meet their needs.'

The various decision makers who deal with governance and human rights abuses, reconstruction programmes, mediation in conflicts, deployment of peacekeepers, planning and implementation of humanitarian and military programmes or preventive diplomacy – all of whom are engaged in peace and security missions – need tailor-made information rather than general reports on the potential emergence of violent conflict. Specific information for each conflict is required. Nathan (2007) identifies four reasons for the disconnect between early warning advisors and early-response decision makers: (1) the different level of seniority (the early warning advisors are often middle-level officials or external academic advisors); (2) the decision makers often prefer to rely on their own sources of information; (3) the decision makers lack of time and their overload with contradictory information; and (4) the confidentiality of some information and their political sensitivity.

3. Political interests

Our summary of the key features of the five regional organisations described above illustrates how greatly the organisations' approach towards EWR varies. The most obvious difference, of course, is that the three African regional and sub-regional organisations that we analyse have strongly subscribed (at least on paper) to the implementation of EWR mechanisms while ASEAN and ARF have expressly abstained from establishing such an instrument. The PIF is in the beginning of a process that could lead to the establishment of an EWR system.

Table 2 takes a broader view and summarises the regional and sub-regional conflict management potential, including EWR mechanisms. The mandates, with certain reservations in ASEAN and ARF, of the regional organisations to act on behalf of the promotion of peace are quite clear and specific (AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, PIF). Organs or instruments have been established, military capacities are being build up in the case of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD. However, they are partly only on paper, particularly in the case of IGAD. There seems to be a glaring lack of adequate non-military capacities to intervene in order to prevent or end conflict.

Table 2: Summary of the regional and sub-regional conflict management potential

	AU	ECOWAS/ ECOMOG	IGAD	ASEAN/ARF	PIF
Mandate	Intervention under grave circumstances: (1) war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity; and (2) upon request of a member state to restore peace and security	Intervention: violent conflict, humanitarian threats, sub-regional destabilisation, serious/massive human rights violations, overthrow of democratically elected governments	Assist member states to maintain peace and security	Non-intervention, confidence building, preventive diplomacy	Non-interference; assistance to member states
Organs	Peace and Security Council	Mediation and Security Council	No peace organ	No peace organ	No peace organ; dialogue forum
Military capacities	Military Staff Committee; five regional brigades	Department of Defense, ECOMOG	Regional brigade	None	None
Non-military capacities	Preventive diplomacy: Panel of the Wise	Wide spectrum of incentives and sanctions	Field monitors, country coordinators, national research institutes, IGAD Partners Forum	Confidence-building measures forum and preventive diplomacy	Ministerial action groups; eminent persons group; third party mediation
Funding	Africa Peace Fund, jointly funded by AU and EU	Funding difficulties for the OMC	Rapid Response Fund, CERWARN is funded by member states, GTZ and USAID	Member states	Multilateral and bilateral donors
EWR	Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) Type D EWR model	Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC), WANEP and four observation and monitoring zones Type D and E EWR model	Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN); conflict-EWR units Type B and D EWR model	None	Research Programme on Conflicts; no functioning EWR

The three organisations that have engaged fully in establishing EWR systems, namely the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD, have chosen mixed models, which, however, strongly relate to already existing models with proven academic and practical background.

Two problems are obvious. First, given the vastness of the regions covered by the organisations and the enormous problems in the broadly defined area of peace and security, particularly human security, a large number of staff is needed at the local, national, sub-regional and regional level to adequately collect data and report on emerging conflicts. However, these staffs are not available in any of the existing systems (CEWS, WARN/WANEP and CEWARN). Capacities are still extremely limited. Secondly, Souaré (2007: 106) has pointed at ECOWAS member states' deficiencies in governance:

> '[…] it is not clear whether these zonal bureaux [of the ECOWAS EWR system] will be able to achieve their intended goals under the current regime of observation and monitoring systems. It is unlikely that civil servants loyal to an undemocratic regime will be able to effectively monitor and report human rights situations, press freedom and civil–military relations in their country or its allies.'

This quotation points to a fundamental problem that is not unique to West Africa. Usually, governments are quite aware of acute or emerging major conflicts. Often they themselves are the cause of this conflict. Sophisticated early warning indicators are not needed to warn about such conflicts. However, governments are usually not interested in the fact that their abuses of civil rights and the violation of human rights are documented or acted upon. Thus, despite mandating secretariats of regional organisations, this might only be lip service. In practice, certain governments make sure that the relevant regional bodies remain weak in early warning, thereby preventing early response.

We described above that regional organisations do have a strong interest in prevention and de-escalation of conflict in the region. But the methods used to achieve this vary. ASEAN and ARF have chosen a consultative and consensus-based approach that avoids bringing mutually exclusive positions on conflict-mediating mechanism among members into the public space. This has led to inactivity in solving regional conflicts but at the same time to a gradual development of regionalism.

IGAD, in contrast, although also a region compromised by conflicts, has chosen a different approach. Due to the political and security situation IGAD was not in a position to develop a functioning and effective region-wide EWR concept. As a compromise, IGAD presently restricts its fully developed indicator and report-based EWR to two pilot areas, both involving cross-border local level conflicts. This political compromise has both costs and benefits. Certainly, the declared intention of the EWR system of predicting violent conflict cannot be met. This would require a region-wide approach. Thus, numerous conflicts and tensions with a potential to turn into violent conflict remain unobserved and unreported by the official IGAD CEWARN system. However, the concentration on two local cross-border conflicts has the advantage of collecting the relevant information at the local level. Thus, the strong criticism against many EWR models, of largely ignoring the strength of the local space in mediating conflict, is of less relevance in the case of IGAD's two pilot projects.

4. Inefficient allocation and use of resources

Our analysis has shown that the field of EWR is characterised by a striking duplication and overlap of data collection in numerous different models. In particular, we have witnessed an 'inflation' of relatively closely related capacity and risk-assessment models within the last

few years – be it in the more academic context of ratings and performance rankings or among agencies with an interest in concrete risk analysis for their field work and/or early response. At the same time, there is a remarkable gap – not only between warning and response, but also between the high ambitions and far-reaching goals of EWR projects and the status of their actual implementation. This gap is not least mirrored in the relatively poorly developed early warning systems of the AU and ECOWAS that obviously need more than time to fully materialise. Besides political and bureaucratic hurdles, a major factor could be the pre-dominance of institutional logics of international organisations that prefer the establishment of their 'own' systems – even though that leads to the misallocation of human and financial resources and to the high transaction costs that result from complicated coordination procedures.

Instead, the focus could be on the consolidation of advanced models, the intensified sharing of data collections (despite academic competition and political barriers) and the public provision of relevant information. This would not only increase efficiency in the field, but would also broaden the scope of user groups of early warning systems and would enable advocates of early warning to inform in due course the people affected. Advanced predictive models, as currently developed by the PITF, should become accessible to the public or at least available to relevant organisations. Newly established or planned EWR systems could thus make use of existing systems instead of reinventing the wheel. This would enable the allocation of scarce resources to: a) the event-based and actor-oriented analysis of escalation processes and the development of scenarios and alternative response strategies that take into account possible cognitive biases; and b) monitoring the local space that has so far been mainly neglected by the larger research projects.

Taking this fact into account, research grants in the field of EWR should set a priority on the consolidation of existing models and findings with a focus on transparency, availability and connectivity towards regional and local EWRS. At the same time, development assistance to regional organisations should refrain from investing in the establishment of completely new systems and instead encourage their partners in crisis regions to capitalise on existing information pools, networking and cooperative learning. Thus the monitoring and assessment of local events and the policy-oriented formulation of scenarios and plausible as well as feasible response strategies could become the core task of regional EWR mechanisms.

Appendix 1 – Early Warning and Response with regard to Violent Conflict and State Fragility: An Overview on Models, Tools and Mechanisms

Sources: Nyheim 2008, Marshall 2008 (CPA), Barton and von Hippel 2008 (CSIS); own research and compilation

ACAD   Academic
GOV   Governmental
IGO   International Governmental Organisation
INGO   International Non-governmental Organisation
NGO   Non-governmental Organisation
PRIV   Private Organisation

Institution / Lead Researchers Classification (ACAD, GOV, IGO, INGO, NGO, PRIV)	a. Name of the Model b. URL Link c. Major publications (e.g. Fearon/Laitin 2003)
A. Conditional and Causal Factor Models (with predictive qualities/implications)	
Minorities at Risk Project, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) / Ted R. Gurr ACAD	a. Ethnic rebellion model b. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ c. Adelmann 1998; Ahmed and Kassinis 1998; Brecke 1998; Onishi 1998
Political Instability Task Force[5] (PITF), Center for Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall ACAD	a. Internal Wars and Failures of Governance 1955-2006 b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ c. Esty et al. 1998; Bates et al. 2003; Goldstone et al. 2000
Stanford University / James D. Fearon and David Laitin ACAD	a. Civil War Model Horizontal Inequalities b. http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/ c. Fearon and Laitin 2003
World Bank Development Research Group and Oxford University / Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler ACAD, IGO	a. Greed model of rebellion (opportunity structures) b. http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict c. Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004
Yale University / Nicholas Sambanis ACAD	a. Explanation of Ethnic Civil War b. http://pantheon.yale.edu/~ns237/ c. Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Sambanis 1999; Sambanis 2004
B. Predictive Models	
Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall ACAD	a. PITF global model PITF African Instability model b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm c. Goldstone et al. 2005
Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall ACAD	a. PITF Muslim countries model PITF ethnic war model b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm c. Gurr, Woodward and Marshall 2005
Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall ACAD	a. PITF autocratic and democratic transition models b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm c. Ulfelder and Lustig 2005
Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall ACAD	a. PITF genocide-politicide model b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide/ c. Harff 2003 d.

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[5] The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) was formerly known as State Failure Task Force.

United States Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA) Fort Belvoir Virginia / Sean O'Brien GOV	a. Analyzing complex threats for operations and readiness (ACTOR) b. http://www.dtic.mil/srch/doc?collection=t2&id=ADA399370 c. O'Brien 2001
C. Risk and Capacity Assessments (Rankings and Performance Ratings)	
Center for International Development and Conflict Managment/ Center for Systemic Peace, University of Maryland / Monty Marshall and Ted R. Gurr ACAD	a. Peace and Conflict Ledger b. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/chapter02/ c. Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008
Center for Systemic Peace, George Mason University, USA / Jack Goldstone and Monty Marshall ACAD	a. State Fragility Index Global Report b. http://www.systemicpeace.org/ c. Marshall and Cole 2008
Department for International Development (DFID), UK GOV	a. Conducting Conflict Assessments b. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf c. Goodhand, Vaux and Walker 2002
Department for International Development (DFID), UK GOV	a. Country Governance Analysis b. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/how-to-cga.pdf c. DFID 2008
European Union GOV, IGO	a. EC Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict b. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp.htm c. European Commission 2006
German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ), Germany / Eduard Westreicher GOV	a. Assessment of Governance Level and Trend in the Development Orientation of Governments Public: Development-Oriented Transformation in Conditions of Fragile Statehood and poor Government Performance b. http://www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/fach/konzepte/konzept153.pdf c. BMZ 2007
Sector Project Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) / Uwe Kievelitz, Katharina Hübner-Schmidt and Nina Scherg GOV	a. Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management b. http://www.gtz.de/en/themen/uebergreifende-themen/krisenpraevention/4091.htm c. Leonhardt 2001
The Brookings Institution / Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick ACAD, NGO	a. Index of State Weakness in the Developing World b. http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx c. Rice and Patrick 2008
The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy ACAD, NGO	d. Failed States Index, based on the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) e. http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 f. Fund for Peace 2008
United States Agency for International Development, Tulane University / Stanley Samarasinghe GOV, ACAD	a. Conflict Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Analysis b. http://www.certi.org/themes/conflict_RA_VA.htm c. Samarasinghe, Donaldson and McGinn 1999

Vision of Humanity / Steve Killelea ACAD, NGO	a. The Global Peace Index b. http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/home.php c. Institute for Economics & Peace 2008
World Bank / Shonali Sardesai and Per Wam IO	a. Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) b. http://go.worldbank.org/3QZPKY2XU0 c. World Bank 2002
D. Risk and Capacity Assessments with Early Response Component (event analysis)	
African Union (AU) IGO	a. Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) b. http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PSC/ c. African Union Commission 2008; Cilliers 2005
Carleton University, Canadian Government / Gerald Cosette ACAD, GOV	d. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) e. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/ f. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 2008
CEEAC (IGO)	a. Mechanisme d'Alerte Rapide pour l'Afrique Centrale (MARAC) b. http://www.delcaf.ec.europa.eu/fr/ue_et_afrique_centrale/documents/DSC_PIR_2003_2007.pdf
Clingendael Institute (Netherlands), Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Luc van de Goor ACAD, GOV	a. Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework The Stability Assessment Framework b. http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/ c. van de Goor and Verstegen 2000; Verstegen, van de Goor and de Zeeuw 2005
Department for International Development (DFID), UK GOV	a. Scenario and Contingency Planning for Fragile States b. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/departmental-report/2008/Chapter8.pdf
ECOWAS IGO	a. ECOWAS Early Warning and Early Response Network (ECOWARN) b. http://ecowarn.org/
European Commission / SWP / others IGO, ACAD	a. Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)
Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), UK INGO	a. Conflict Analysis and Response Definition b. http://www.fewer-international.org/index.html c. FEWER (1999); FEWER (2003)
FEWER-Africa (Kenya): Ituri Watch (Democratic Republic of Congo) INGO	a. Early Warning and Early Response b. http://www.fewer-international.org/pages/africa/projects_14.html c. FEWER (1999); FEWER (2003); Nobleza/Nyheim (2000)
FEWER-Eurasia (Russia): FEWER-Eurasia Network INGO	a. Early Warning and Early Response b. http://www.fewer-international.org/pages/eurasia/index.html c. FEWER (1999); FEWER (2003)
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg (GIGA) and Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg (INEF) / Angelika Spelten GOV, ACAD	a. Spelten Model An Indicator Model for Use as an Additional Instrument for Planning and Analysis in Development Co-operation (1998) b. http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/10596649641conflict-sensitivedevelop.pdf c. Gaigals and Leonhard 2001: 62
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) IGO	a. Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) b. http://www.cewarn.org/ c. IGAD 2002

SwissPeace, Virtual Research Associates, VRA Knowledge Manager NGO, ACAD	a. Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions (FAST) b. http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/ c. Swisspeace 2006
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery IGO	a. Conflict-Related Development Analysis (CDA) b. http://www.undp.org/cpr/ c. UNDP 2003
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) IGO	a. Regional Early Warning System for Southeastern Europe (REWS-SEE) b. http://earlywarning.undp.sk/ http://www.ks.undp.org/ c. UNDP SEE 2006
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) IGO	a. Country-level early warning systems in Ghana, Kenya, Ukraine (Crimea), Bolivia (PAPEP), Balkans, Kyrgyzstan
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) / Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance/Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) (GOV)	a. i. Conflict Assessment Framework (2004) ii. Conflict and Fragility Alert,. Consultation and Tracking System (C/FACTS) (2005) / Fragile States Indicators (2006) iii. b. i. USAID (2004) ii. ARD (2005) Nathan Associates Inc. (2006)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) / Military Affairs	a. Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (2006) b. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/ global_partnerships/ma/tcaf.html
West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP)	a. Early Warning and Response Network (WARN) b. http://www.wanep.org/aboutwanep.htm
E. Crisis Watch Lists based on Investigative Case Study Research or Intelligence	
Business Environment Risk Intelligence S.A. (BERI) / Bruno Hake PRIV	a. Historical Research Ratings Package (HRRP), b. http://www.beri.com/hrrp.asp c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; BERI 2006
Control Risks Group (CRG) PRIV	a. Ratings, Control Risks b. http://www.crg.com/Default.aspx?page=0 c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; Markwick 2001: 367
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) / John Bowler PRIV	a. Country Risk Service (CRS) b. http://www.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=ps_c ountry_risk_service&entry1=psNav c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; Howell 2001: 367
IHS Energy Group /Jerre L. Stead PRIV	a. Political Risk Ratings and Rankings Index b. http://energy.ihs.com/Products/Peps/ratingsandran kings.htm c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; Hallmark and Whited 2001
International Crisis Group, Belgium PRIV	a. Crisis Watch b. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=12 00&l=1
International Risk Approach PRIV	a. International Risk b. http://www.intlrisk.com/pdf/factsheets/pbras-eng.pdf
PRS Group PRIV	a. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) b. http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/riskdata.html c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; Howell 2001

STRATFOR.Com PRIV	a. Commercial geopolitical intelligence service, providing: * Situational Awareness * Analysis * Forecasts b. http://www.stratfor.com/
United States Government, National Intelligence Council (NIC) GOV	a. Instability Watch List National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) b. http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_specialproducts.html

Appendix 2 – Indicators of the CEWARN system of IGAD

Source: CEWARN Unit 2006: 40-41.

1. Description of CEWARN Indicators: Situation Reports

Alliance Formation
Inter-ethnic group alliance   Ethnic group – government alliance

Armed Intervention
Internal armed support   External armed support

Behavioural Aggravators

Interrupt other activities	Pastoral migration	Bullets as commodities
Development aid problems	Harmful migration policy	Protest
Media controls	Harmful livestock policy	Student attendance interrupted
Migrant labourers	Influx of IDPs	Separation of groups
New Markets	Security escorts	Livestock prices dropped
Negative media coverage	Small arms availability	Post-raid blessing
Livestock sales increase		

Environmental Pressure

Natural disaster	Land competition	More livestock in secure areas
Grazing areas abandoned	Livestock disease	

Exchange Behaviour

Celebration	Inter-group marriage	Gift offering
Inter-group sharing	Cross-border trade	

Mitigating Behaviour

Access to health care	Relief distributions	Law enforcement
Small arms disclosure	Markets remain open	Bride price stable
Access to education	Positive media coverage	Negotiations taking place

Peace Initiatives

Women peace messengers	Weapons reduction program	Local peace initiatives
Religious peace building	NGO peace initiatives	

Triggering Behaviour
All-male migration Pre-raid blessing Traditional forecasting

2. Description of CEWARN Indicators: Violent Incident Reports

Armed Clashes
• *Military Battle* (Armed hostilities or engagements between an official military unit of a government and an armed party. Includes both civil war and inter-state war battles.
• *Other Armed Clashes* (All other armed hostilities or engagements. Includes all communal and inter-communal battles.

Raids
• *Raids with Abductions* (Raids focused around abductions of people or the taking of hostages. May include injuries or death to humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property).
• *Organised Raids* (Other organised raids. May include injuries or deaths to humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property).
• *Livestock Theft* (Raids focused around the theft of livestock. May include injuries or death to humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property.

Protest Demonstrations
• *Peaceful Protests* (peaceful protest demonstrations or assemblies. May include isolated or low-level violence).
• *Violent Turmoil or Riots* (Assemblies or crowds that get out of control. Marked by violence, disorder, damage and/or destruction).

Other Crime
• *Assaults* (Physical attacks and abuse involving the actual use of physical force against individuals, and/or groups. Does not include abductions.
• *Banditry* (Commandeering of vehicles, highway robbery, and other similar criminal activities).

Acronyms

AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASF	African Standby Force
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CIFP	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project
EASBRIG	Brigade of East Africa
ECOBRIG	Brigade of ECOWAS
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Warning and Response Network
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EWR	Early Warning and Response
FAST	Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Response
FSI	Fragile States Index
GTZ	German Technical Assistance Corporation
ICG	International Crises Group
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OMC	Observation and Monitoring Centre
PIF	Pacific Island Forum
PITF	Political Instability Task Force
PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	Brigade of SADC
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WARN	West Africa Early Warning Network

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