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Buying off the Revolution: Democratization, Social Movements and Redistribution

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Buying off the Revolution:
Democratization, Social Movements and Redistribution [*]

María del Pilar López-Uribe [†]

Abstract

This paper shows that franchise extension is not enough for commitment to redistribution and that in the absence of *de facto* empowerment, the threat of revolution is intact. In particular, the paper studies the relationship between a democratic reform that extends the political rights of a threatening group and redistribution during periods of revolutionary threat. Far from causing an increase in broad redistribution (e.g. social spending), I show that democratic reform -the state organization of a social movement that extends political rights- can be used to identify rebel leaders and provide private goods to them, in return for preventing social unrest and demobilizing their supporters. I study the context of the organization by the state of the most important social movement in Colombian history -the National Peasant Movement (ANUC)- over almost three decades (1957-1985), in which the threat of a Communist Revolution was perennial and throughout which the government gave ANUC direct political participation at the local level in the executive branch and economic support. Using three newly digitized data sets of Colombian municipalities, I find that rather than leading to broad redistribution to the benefit of the peasantry, the reform instead led to an increase in targeted redistribution in terms of public jobs and lands. In particular, by matching the names of the peasant leaders to the beneficiaries of the land reform, evidence suggests that peasant leaders disproportionately benefited from land reform, especially in municipalities where the communist threat was higher. Finally, I find suggestive evidence that buying off the rebel leaders was an effective counter-revolutionary strategy as it led to fewer revolutionary activities after the support of ANUC was terminated (1972-1985).

Keywords: Threat of Revolution, Democratic Reform, Redistribution, Social Movements, Political Empowerment, Conflict.

JEL Classification: D70, H76, H41, N46

1 Introduction

Governments often face threats to the status quo from groups in society that are politically and economically excluded. One response to these threats is the implementation of democratic reforms that increase the political participation of the threatening group. Most prominently, scholars have studied reforms such as the extension of the franchise (Aidt and Leon, 2015), and the introduction of elections (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006; Przerworski 2009; Aidt and Jensen 2014; Aidt and Frank 2015; Weyland, 2010), as commitment devices for redistribution to reduce revolutionary threats, and have concentrated on their effect on broad redistribution, assuming that once these reforms take place, the original status quo will be permanently secured. However, even after implementing reforms that extend *de jure* decision power, governments may still face a threat from uprisings. Contrary to what the literature has suggested, elections -the ultimate democratic reform- are not enough for commitment[1]. In this scenario, elites need to provide *de facto* power by giving the excluded group a direct voice in the policymaking process.

If democratisation is defined as a process that extends the political participation of underrepresented groups, one of its forms that have received little attention in the literature is a state-sponsored participatory reform, namely the organization of a social movement by the state[2]. This democratic reform empowers the threatening group by giving them direct political participation in the executive branch of government. It is a mechanism that gives *de facto* power after the franchise is extended. The state support for the social movement that secured direct political participation in the policy decision process is the commitment device the excluded group uses to pressure more broad redistribution while decreasing grievances and reducing attempts to revolt.

This paper proposes that governments use the (voluntary) organization of the social movement to identify the leaders, the people elites should be worried about and buy them off. Large-scale social movements have a vertical structure that allows their members to select the representatives that participate in the policy-making process. In exchange for receiving private goods, leaders are expected to use their influence and demobilize their followers. Hence, this democratic reform to avoid revolution focuses on targeted

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[1]Some examples of threats to the status quo of excluded groups after elections have taken place are Sri Lanka, India and Colombia

[2]In this paper, a social movement is defined as a process of mobilization that stretch across space and time, linking persons, and groups identified with particular claims and values (Escobar 1995).

redistribution[3].

This paper studies the effect of this democratic reform on broad and targeted redistribution and its effectiveness in averting social unrest. I find that elites use this form of democratization not as a device to increase broad redistribution -which is expected when elites do not know who is the threat- but as a mechanism to identify leaders of the dissatisfied group and buy them off, in return for preventing social unrest and demobilizing their supporters.

Specifically, this paper draws on the experience of the organization of the Colombian National Peasant Movement -ANUC- within the context of the threat of a Communist revolution in Latin America during 1957-1985. As a Colombian liberal politician recognized: with the foundation of the ANUC *"the goal of the state was not to organize a peasant revolution but to avoid one"* (Perez, 2010). The Colombian government organized this movement in 1967, when peasants could already vote and run for public office. Through a direct alliance between the peasantry and the national state that lasted until 1972, the central government gave the peasants direct political participation in the local executive branch (a seat in local committees) and economic support (resources to organize and train peasants leaders). ANUC had a vertical organization where the peasant members elected their permanent leaders, who would represent them in the local and regional authorities.

In this context, democratic reform is the extension of the political representation of a group dissatisfied with the status quo -peasantry- and it is measured as a municipal peasant association affiliated to ANUC obtaining legal entitlement during the years that the government supported the movement (1967-1972). Obtaining legal entitlement is a *de facto* devolution of power from landlords to peasants, which allows the peasantry to participate directly in the local policymaking process: ANUC peasant leaders have meetings with local authorities regularly to discuss investment projects, revise budgets and activities of their agencies and to coordinate future activities.

Crucially for my empirical strategy, obtaining legal entitlement is a two-stage process and includes an element of voluntary organization. First, an association has to obtain legal status (recognition), for which its members have to organize themselves and convene a local assembly. After that, it obtains legal entitlement (empowerment) by

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[3]Targeted redistribution is easier to implement than broad redistribution. Large-scale reforms that lead to broad redistribution are politically and economically costly, require important economic resources and have the potential to harm elite interests.

sending documents to the Ministry of Agriculture in Bogota, which grants the new legal recognition in a process that takes, on average, between 9 to 11 months.

I use a difference-in-difference strategy that takes advantage of the variation in the timing of democratization, and solves the potential self-selection problem in the voluntary organization of the association by comparing municipalities that obtained legal entitlement with the compliers; those that only managed to obtain legal status due to the end of the alliance in 1972. To test the main theoretical predictions of the link between the threat of revolution, democratization, and redistribution, I use a newly digitized and hand-coded municipal dataset which includes detailed information about local public expenditure and revenues, ANUC, and public land allocations from 1957 to 1975.

My empirical analysis yields four key findings. First, the democratic reform that empowered the excluded group -peasants- did not lead to higher redistribution from the landowners toward the peasantry. Results suggest deterioration in the broad redistributive policies, such as social expenditure (primary education and basic health) and land tax revenues, due to heightened tax evasion.

Second, the empowerment of the peasants led to higher targeted redistribution. In places where democratic reform took place, there was an increase in bureaucratic expenditure and the number of public lands given to peasants. I provide evidence showing that the change in bureaucratic expenditure was driven by an increase in the number of employees in the department of public administration, in line with previous qualitative findings (Bagley 1989, Escobar 1988, Archer 1990). By matching the names of approximately 2,500 peasant leaders and over 10,000 peasants that received public lands during 1967-1972, the analysis also reveals that peasant leaders benefited disproportionately from the land reform.[4] These private goods -public jobs and lands- represent more than just a temporary change in income. They were political (contacts) and economic (collateral) assets that could be used in the future (Lehman, 1971).

Third, targeted redistribution and peasant leader co-optation occurred more intensively in municipalities which experienced more violence in the previous years or where communist support was stronger. In contrast, wealth, collective action capacity, and inequality do not affect the results. This finding supports the hypothesis that the

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[4]Albertus (2013, 2015) suggests similar findings in the case of Velasco dictatorship in Peru during 1968-1980, where the land was redistributed to "middle-class" peasants instead of landless peasants because they had the greatest potential to organize against the regime.

mechanism behind the increase in targeted redistribution was the potential threat of a revolution, a communist revolution.

Assuming that a targeted redistribution is an informal contract between peasant leaders and the state in exchange for demobilizing their followers (Lehman 1971), I test whether municipalities, where peasant leaders were co-opted through public land allocations, experienced less violence following the end of the alliance. I merge all data about public disorder activities in Colombia between 1972 and 1995, which includes the number of land invasions, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -FARC- guerrilla rebel activities, and peasant protests at the municipal level. Fourth, I find a negative correlation between the co-optation of the peasant leaders and public disorder, which is consistent with the idea that, in the short run, the strategy was successful at buying off the revolution. However, open questions remain in the long-run impacts as it is possible that this targeted strategy, instead of a more large-scale rural reform, partially explains the substantial increase of violence that Colombia experienced decades later.

The study of mechanisms that increase participation (elections and franchise extension) rapidly expands as they are seen as key drivers of redistribution and development. This paper contributes to this existing literature by studying the effect of another democratic reform, namely the organization of a social movement by the state, and how this type of representation can affect redistribution. This type of democratic reform differs from the one studied in the existing literature as it gives *de facto* decision power to peasants and goes beyond the traditional *de jure* decision power, universal suffrage. This paper also adds to the growing literature on democratization and redistribution occurring alongside a threat of revolution, as it shows that the organization of a social movement by the state is a mechanism which allows local associations to select their leaders and, at the same time allows governments to identify the potential rebel leaders and buy them off. The paper exploits a unique dataset that allows for the simultaneous identification of the leaders of the threatening group and the beneficiaries of the land reform. The results also complement the literature as they quantify the effect of democratization on both types of redistribution, broad and targeted. Finally, the threat of a Communist revolution and the end of the alliance between government and peasants provides a unique context to study the effectiveness of this strategy as a mechanism to avoid revolution.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review. Section 3 describes the institutional framework of Colombia and the National peasant

movement during the period of study 1957-1985. Section 4 presents the conceptual framework. Section 5 discusses the econometric specifications of the relationship between democratization and redistribution during periods of a threat of revolution. Section 6 presents the mechanisms. Section 7 presents the econometric specifications and results of the relationship between democratization, co-optation and the threat of revolution. Section 8 concludes.

2   Government Strategies to avoid Revolution

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on democratization and redistribution during periods of a threat of revolution. A prolific body of work has explored the different strategies that governments can implement when there is a threat to the status quo from a group that is politically and economically excluded. One strategy to deal with the threat is to rely on repression for survival, becoming dependent on the police force or military and using a large share of resources to maintain this control. In addition to the notorious consequences of displacement and mortality, using repression as a long-term strategy could result in this politically excluded force turning against the government. Moreover, this strategy may undermine the government's ability, which is populated by repressed members, to function (Haber, 2006).

Another commonly studied response by the elite is the implementation of democratic reforms, with the introduction of elections and then franchise extension as the most commonly used and studied type of reforms (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006; Tilly, 1995; Weyland, 2010; Przeworski, 2009; Chaney 2013; Aidt and Jensen, 2014; Aidt and Franck, 2015; Aidt and Leon, 2015). These works have suggested that these forms of democratization will lead to an increase in broad redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981) and public good provision (Musgrave 1969; Lindert 1994; Peltzman 1980) and have assumed that once they take place, the original status quo will be permanently secured.

However, franchise extension is only one step forward in the democratisation process. In many democracies, real power is rarely vested in formal political institutions. Even when peasants, workers, women and urban poor enjoy political rights such as voting, they lack access to effective and informal channels of influence (Eckstein 2001).

There is another democratic mechanism governments can use to restrain threats to the status quo that has received little attention in the literature: the organization of a social

movement by the state. Social movements are a democratizing mechanism because, through collective action, they generate new channels of influence and people that have traditionally been excluded are given a united voice that allows them to participate directly in the policymaking process (Meyer, 1994; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly 1978; Roberts 1996; Jelin and Hershberg 1996; Campbell et al, 2010; Eckstein 2001; Escobar 1998). In Latin American history, social movements have served as vehicles for achieving greater political and economic rights (Roberts 1996; Jelin and Hershberg, 1996).

Although the literature regarding social movements and their empowerment role is extensive, this work is the first to study the organization of a social movement by the state in the context of a threat of revolution. Moreover, the idea proposed in this paper about the organization of social movements as a mechanism to identify leaders of the dissatisfied group and buy them off in return for preventing social unrest and demobilizing their supporters has not been previously explored in the quantitative political economy literature.

This paper is also related to the empirical literature that studies the effect of democratization on redistribution, regardless of the revolutionary threats. A prolific body of work suggests that introduction of elections and franchise extension increase broad redistribution and public good provision (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Lindert 1994; Peltzman, 1980; Husted and Kenny 1997; Vernby 2013; Martinez-Bravo et al 2014; Kroth et al 2016). For example, in Britain, France, and Germany, democratic reforms during the 19th and 20th centuries coincided with important educational reforms and the progressivity of the tax system (Musgrave 1969; Lindert 1994; Flora 1983). In a similar spirit, Corvalan et al (2017) have shown that the right to run has a greater effect on redistribution than the right to vote.

The role of democratic reforms as mechanisms to identify the leaders in authoritarian regimes and co-opt them has been discussed extensively. Elections have often been used as a mechanism to identify opposition leaders in authoritarian regimes whereas parliament provide them with some policy influence (Boix and Svolik, 2007; Gandhi 2008; Malesky and Schiler 2010). Once the opposition leaders[5] are identified, they are co-opted. The status quo is secured, as was the case in Russia (Reuter and Robertson 2014), Argentina during the dictatorships in the 1970s-1980s (Rock, 1987), and Mexico

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[5]Opposition leaders can be politicians as in the Russian case or senior entrepreneurs as in Argentina and Mexico.

during the Porfiriato (Haber, Razo and Maurer, 2003).[6]

Finally, the type of democratic reform studied is closest to quotas and reservation seats for underrepresented groups. Pande (2003) provides evidence that reservations for minority groups in India -underrepresented castes and tribes- can enhance groups' influence in the policymaking process and that legislators belonging to these groups have used this influence to increase targeted redistribution. Similarly, in the case of gender quotas in India, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that reserving a council seat for women led to more investment in infrastructure directly relevant to women's needs. Despite the importance of this issue, very little is known about the causal effect of quotas or reserved seats on redistribution in the context of a threat of revolution.

3   Theoretical Framework

Threats arise in response to grievances or unfulfilled needs that groups experience in a shared way (McAdam, 1982) and materialize when they develop a shared consciousness and collective identity (Taylor and Whittier, 1992; Johnson 1999) or with the presence of political opportunities (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).

The triumph of peasant revolutions in neighbouring countries can exert a great stimulus on peasant aspirations, provide new political opportunities and exacerbate peasant grievances over poverty and landholding inequality, transforming the peasantry into a threat. Revolutionary events abroad also represent exogenous shocks to the information set of the elites and may be a trigger for reforms to reduce grievances (Aidt and Jensen, 2014).

Grievance accounts of peasant support for revolutionary ideas -such as the communist ideology- and guerrilla movements suggest that fulfilling their demands should reduce peasants' support for rebels. Hence, the state can address peasant grievances by implementing reforms that meet peasant's demands and can potentially "buy" peasants away from supporting revolutionary ideas and turning them into a force that supports the status quo (Huntington 1968; Paige 1975).

One response to address the grievances is to implement democratic reforms that

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[6]More recently, Nicolas Maduro's government in Venezuela has identified the military as a potentially threatening group and has promoted more than 2000 military to general positions -US has more than double military force and only 900 generals- and has allowed them to run the oil-state enterprise or to be in charge of different Ministries as a strategy to avoid an uprising of the military forces.

give *de facto* power to underrepresented groups. Elections and franchise extension are only the first steps moving forward in the democratisation process. These reforms are intended to improve the welfare of the excluded group and, in turn, prevent social unrest when employed as commitments to future broad redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006). However, revolutionary threats may still occur after franchise extension. In democracies, where regular elections are already taking place and all citizens have been enfranchised, the representation of some groups remains limited. When there is a threat to the status quo in this context, governments have to repress, implement other democratic reforms to empower the dissatisfied group or carry out redistributive policies directly.[7]

One reform aimed at preventing revolution is the organization of social movements by the state, which is a state-sponsored participatory reform that generates new channels of influence by giving underrepresented groups political participation in the executive branch of the government.

The participation of the threatening group in the policy-making process is also a way to control it, as was the case of the Latin American labour movements during the 1920s (Collier and Collier, 2012). Participation channels the threat toward administrative functions and gives the impression that its demands are being addressed. As a result, the threat no longer needs to be at the forefront of its activities (Murphree et al 1996).

What are the possible consequences of the organization of a social movement (e.g. peasant movement) by the state? One possibility is that increased participation by the traditionally excluded group -the peasantry- leads to greater broad redistribution in the form of progressive taxes, -land tax revenues- and/or greater public goods provision. In particular, when the excluded group is the peasantry, its discontent is primarily distributive, not ideational (Finkel et al, 2015), so its empowerment will lead to demands for more redistribution from the elite (landlords) to the excluded group (peasants). This broad redistribution will decrease grievances and the perceptions of inequality by taking resources from the landowners and investing them in improving the living conditions of the rural population (land and other public goods). Redistribution to the benefit of the threatening group enables the appeasement of grievances, thereby reducing attempts to revolt by the peasantry.

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[7]For example, during Velasco dictatorship in Peru between 1968-1980, the regime targeted the largest and most influential landowners directly for expropriation, redistributing to peasant workers (Albertus, 2013, 2015).

However, larger-scale reforms that lead to greater broad redistribution are politically and economically costly. They require important economic resources and have the potential to harm elite interests.[8] Because they are politically difficult to implement[9], the effectiveness of the government's broad redistributive policies intending to undercut revolutionary threats and guerrilla expansion is limited, as it was the Colombian case during the 1980s and 1990s (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012). Large-scale reforms are also a strategy that governments tend to use when they are uncertain about the precise individuals leading threatening groups or indeed who makes up the membership of these groups in place. For this reason, looking only at the effect of participatory reform on broad redistribution as a way to avoid revolution is incomplete.

Governments have another, potentially effective, strategy: use the next step of a democratic reform, such as the organization of a social (peasant) movement, as an instrument of political control and then identify the leaders of the group. Social movements are a device to identify the leaders since they have a vertical structure, and through an internal process, they select their representatives. Once identified, the leaders can be bought off with particularistic benefits such as patronage jobs or private goods (e.g public lands) in exchange for demobilizing their followers.[10]

Regardless of whether the demobilization occurs as a result of an implicit contract between leaders and elites or because leaders have now a vested interest in the status quo due to an increase in "ownership" and "identification", similar outcomes are achieved[11]. Demobilization and the appeasement of a threat to the status quo occur when the state co-opts leaders with significant power over their followers. Elites have incentives to use the organization of the social movement as a tool of political control. The co-optation

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[8]This is not the case in nondemocratic regimes where the interest is to destroy the power of economic elites and diminish their influence, as was the case in Peru during the 1970s.

[9]In Colombia, powerful landowners blocked extensive land reforms and successfully lobbied for INCORA to focus its efforts on projects least disturbing to the existing land tenure (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012).

[10]This strategic policy is similar to the political economy theory proposed by Biais and Perotti (2002) in which a government implements Machiavellian privatization, which allocates significant share ownership to a targeted section of the population, leading to a shift in political preferences, ensuring reelection. Similarly, the selectorate theory proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012) also suggests that elites use private goods to buy off the "essentials"; those whose support guarantees the permanence of the status quo.

[11]This increase in identification can occur even when these policies do not imply substantial changes or outcomes that are not very satisfactory to the group goals.

of leaders strengthens the state's control over the threatening group while reducing the bargaining power of the rest of the movement's members. When leaders become part of the status quo, members face higher costs to organize against the government and overcoming the collective action problem is harder due to the loss of trust.[12] Leaders can exploit their power over members to encourage demobilization and any attempt to revolt. Hence, the co-optation of leaders will be negatively correlated with violent activities against the status quo.[13]

Regarding the role of leaders, they serve as a link between the state and the movement's members, and it is costly to replace them. Followers are grateful to their leaders for speaking and acting on their behalf, even though leaders can potentially become part of the political elites.[14] Followers willingly cede agency to their leaders, for example, due to their apathy or lack of political competence in comparison to their skilled leaders (Michels 1962)[15].

If this is the case, the empowerment of peasants through the social movement will redistribute private goods, which are political and economic assets for the peasant leaders[16]. Receiving private goods will also help the leaders to keep the vertical structure of the movement by consolidating their economic and/or political power and help them to differentiate from the rest of the members. For the status quo, the advantages of this strategy are its political and economic costs as it requires lower economic expenditure (near zero in terms of the public budget), and it protects the elite interests.

By extending the political rights of the threatening group, governments also need to manage the balancing act of increasing the representation of this group without threatening the stability of the status quo. When governments decide to empower these groups, they cannot risk their power. In the case of social movements organized by the

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[12]For example, Mattingly (2016) shows how the inclusion of lineage leaders in village political institutions in China weakens villagers' land rights and is used by the elite to elicit compliance from villagers for land expropriation policies.

[13]Future work might study whether co-opting the leaders is an effective long-term strategy.

[14]Michels's (1962) theory of political leadership suggests that in large-scale movements, leaders inevitably become oligarchical as they are motivated to preserve their power and positions and are more concerned with organizational maintenance than the original goals of the movement.

[15]Marx and Engels (1968) and Lenin (1975) also shared the view that only intellectuals should be the leaders of revolutionary movements because they can understand the meaning of revolutionary struggle.

[16]Public jobs are seen as political assets that facilitate building contacts, political capital, and networks that give political gains. In particular, public jobs in administrative sections allow employees to become familiar with both the legal and administrative complexities of the state (Lehman, 1971).

state, governments control their economic resources, and their participation gives them a voice, but a partial vote over policy decisions, limiting their direct access to the state budget.

This framework relies on two assumptions. First, it assumes that leaders of social movements have control over their followers, which is sufficient to deter attempts at revolution from their followers if they decide to do so. The power of social movement leaders is particularly strong in large-scale social movements as they need to have a considerable influence on their followers to keep the movement cohesive (Hobsbawm 1993; McCarthy and Zald 1977).[17] Second, it assumes that leaders value private goods more than public goods.

I apply this framework to the Colombian case during the 1960s when there was a threat of a Communist revolution. The threatening group -the peasantry- was empowered by the state to avoid exploiting peasant grievances by communists and rebel groups to revolt against the status quo. Empowerment occurred through the voluntary organization of a peasant association that gave the peasants direct participation in the policy-making process. Their representatives in local state organizations were peasant leaders, who each municipal association elected. The strategy of the government to avoid potential unrest was to support them in organizing and identifying their leaders, then give the peasant leaders economic -lands- and/or political -public jobs- assets. In exchange, these leaders helped to demobilize their followers and avoid potential revolts.[18]

4   The Communist Threat and the Colombian National Peasant Movement, 1957-1985.

The beginning of a revolutionary socialist state in Cuba in 1959 exerted a great stimulus on the aspirations of peasants in Latin America, and it was perceived by the governments in the region, including the United States, as a threat to the status quo (U.S Senate 1966, 1967; Archila 2001, Hobsbwam 2001; Hirschman 1963; Reyes 1987; Gilhodes 1988; Bagley and Botero 1994).

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[17]As Morris and Staggenborg (2012) suggest, leaders, help to create or undermine political and economic realities that influence the trajectories and outcomes of social movements.

[18]In this article, I only consider the benefits of being a leader. However, there are also costs associated with this position. For example, in terms of time spent or life threats as a result of the visibility of the job.

In particular, Colombia was seen as one of the countries with a *castroite insurgency problem* in the region (C.I.A 1961, 1967)[19] due to the spontaneous mobilization of peasants during the "La Violencia" civil war between 1948 and 1958[20]. In terms of its political structure, Colombia was under the "National Front" coalition (1958-1974), in which the two main political parties, the Liberal and the Conservative parties, agreed to alternate power for four presidential terms. However, other parties, such as the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL), National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), and the Communist Party, actively participated in local and regional elections.

To respond to the threat, Latin American governments, pressured by the US government and the Alliance for Progress, focused on implementing important agrarian reforms and rural development programs. One of the responses of the political urban elite was the implementation of democratic reforms that expanded the political opportunities for peasants. Table 1 indicates that during the 1960s, this policy was implemented in other countries in the region, such as Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. This empowerment was manifested in the organization and support of social movements in the name of general national goals that transcended political party interests (Perez, 2010).

In Colombia, President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, supported by the urban elite[21], founded the Colombian National Peasant Movement -ANUC- in May 1967 (Ministry of Agriculture, 1968)[22], considered the most important movement in the country's history (Gilhodes, 1988)[23]. ANUC had some features that distinguished it from any other rural movement in the country[24]. First, it had a national scope. Two years after its creation, it had branches in almost 50% of municipalities and had approximately one million

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[19]Other countries that were considered to have a prospect of the insurgency were Guatemala, Nicaragua and Bolivia.

[20]According to Hobsbwam (1963) this mobilization was greater than anywhere else in the Latin American history, with the exception of Mexico.

[21]At this time, the political national elite that controlled the central government had started to separate from the local/regional rural elite due to differences in their economic interests.

[22]To found ANUC, the president skipped the traditional process through the congress and signed directly the decree of foundation (Ocampo, 2014).

[23]Its national protests achieved important press coverage and gathered more than 500.000 people in 155 cities ("El Tiempo", June 3 1968).

[24]The other important rural association at the time was the National Federation of Coffee growers (FEDECAFE). However, this organization did not compete directly with ANUC. Its goals and demands from the government were different. FEDECAFE's main demands were subsidies, reduction of export tariffs, improvement of commercialisation mechanisms and access to credit.

members. Second, it claimed to be politically independent, and its members came from different political ideologies (Zamosc, 2006; Escobar 1982). Third, its members were heterogeneous and diverse. Small landowners, tenants, sharecroppers, settlers and agricultural workers were part of it (Zamosc, 2006; Bagley and Botero, 1994). The goals of the movement were the improvement of the living and labour conditions of the peasantry and the implementation of a structural agrarian reform that redistributed land to peasants (Zamosc, 2006). The government stipulated that only members of the movement would be potential beneficiaries of the agrarian policies. It made it compulsory to show a membership card when a service was requested or a benefit was received[25].

ANUC had a vertical organization. It had a national committee that participated in meetings with the central government, regional associations in the different state assemblies, and municipal associations that elected five representatives to participate in the local committees. Each municipality was in charge of organizing its association and acquiring its legal recognition. The legal process had two stages: first, the association had to obtain legal status and only then could the legal entitlement be granted. To acquire legal status, members had to convene a local assembly with a 10% minimum quorum of the registered members and agree on the association's statutes. This assembly also required the presence of a delegate of the Ministry of Agriculture who had to sign the act of foundation. His presence relied on the budget that the ministry had to organize the movement[26]. In total, 75 delegates had to travel around the country to attend these assemblies (Ministry of Agriculture, 1968). After an association got legal status, it had to send some documents (constitutive act of the assembly, electoral results of the board of directors of the associations and a copy of the statutes) directly to the Ministry of Agriculture in Bogota, which was in charge of granting the legal entitlement. The time to get legal entitlement once an association had obtained legal status varied between nine and eleven months, independently on the region where the municipality is.

Once an association obtained legal entitlement, its leaders were able to participate directly in the policy-making processes in their municipalities. Officials of the local entities met with peasant representatives to revise budgets, organize the activities of their agencies, and coordinate future activities. This representation ensured that local officials fulfilled their tasks taking into account the needs of the peasants and ensured

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[25]To become a member, a peasant has to show evidence of being a rural worker: labourer, sharecropper, settler or small landowner.

[26]The financial support comes mainly from the Alliance for Progress and international organizations such as the Interamerican Development Dank (IDB).

that local entities studied the how, when, and where to provide public goods (Ministry of Agriculture, 1968)[27].

The alliance between the state and the ANUC lasted until 1972 when the government signed a new pact, an agrarian counter-reform known as the Chicoral agreement, which protected large properties and landowners. The end of the alliance also brought about the end of the state's political and economic support of the ANUC municipal associations. Many lost their legal entitlement, and the repression of peasants restarted in earnest[28].

As a result of internal divisions and a lack of means to gain access to new economic resources, the ANUC movement split into two in October 1972. The first group -"linea Sincelejo"- had a radical position, declared itself independent of the government, and maintained a revolutionary ideology of transforming the economic structure of the countryside by abolishing all types of the capitalist structure. Some ANUC members also joined the rural guerrilla group - FARC- that emerged in 1964 after "La Violencia" civil war, while others founded the indigenous peasant group known as Quintin Lame (CQL) in 1974[29]. A second group -"linea Armenia"- supported the reforms proposed by the government and insisted upon peaceful and legal solutions through dialogue with the authorities (Rudqvist, 1983). These two groups persisted over time, and although ANUC is active today, it has lost its strength and influence in national affairs (Zamosc, 2006).

ANUC was seen as a democratic reform that empowered the peasants -a historically excluded group- and was thought of as a mechanism to substitute repression during the years of the Communist threat. Several factors can explain why the Colombian government preferred not to employ a violent strategy (repression). First, it was costly compared to the other alternative -the organization of the peasant movement-. Bagley and Botero (1994) estimate that the cost of organizing ANUC was less than a dollar

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[27]Other benefits that the associations received once they obtained legal entitlement were training of their leaders and access to credit quotas, revolving funds and marketing and technical assistance.

[28]In the region, military governments took power in Uruguay and Chile in 1973, and Argentina in 1976. In these countries, militaries removed presidents they saw as moving dangerously to the left and to countered guerrilla movements that threatened to topple the governments. In these three cases, the immediate threat to national security was translated as "communism or fidelismo" (Wright, 1991).

[29]The Quintin Lame group received military training from the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party and was formed after the killing of indigenous leaders in the state of Cauca by the repressive forces of the state and landowners (Penaranda, 2015).

per member. Second, between 1948 and 1958, the country experienced the longest and deadliest bipartisan civil war in Colombian history, "La Violencia", which left around 200.000 dead. When the war ended, the state had a large budgetary deficit and lost part of the monopoly over violence in the rural areas. Third, international organizations encouraged governments to control rural areas using peaceful means and conditioned their credit and economic resources to its achievement.

5 Democratization and Redistribution

The objective of the empirical exercise is to estimate the effect of peasant empowerment during the period 1967-1972 on two types of redistribution, broad and targeted. I employ a difference in difference regression with municipality and year-fixed effects and state-specific-time trends in a panel data of 1088 Colombian municipalities between 1957 and 1975. I use obtaining legal entitlement as a proxy for peasant empowerment and exploit the variation in the timing of obtaining it.

During the period in which the peasant movement had the support of the state, 552 municipalities obtained empowerment (legal entitlement and legal status), while 92 only acquired recognition (legal status). 444 municipalities did not receive any legal recognition. Table 2 shows the number of municipalities that obtained legal entitlement and legal status annually, and Figure 2 presents the spatial distribution of the municipalities that obtained full empowerment (legal status and legal entitlement) and partial empowerment (legal status only), without consideration of temporal variation.

To test the effect of the participation of peasants in the policy-making process on broad redistribution, I use the information on land tax revenues, central transfers, and social expenditure. Land tax revenues are a good proxy of broad redistribution since they relate to three actors: landowners who pay the taxes, local governments who collect them, and peasants who are the potential beneficiaries[30] Land tax revenues were the main component of a municipality's revenues, paid only by the rural elite, but the enforcement of their collection was very low. Local social expenditure includes the spending on projects in primary public schools and health centres reported by a municipality. Central transfers are additional revenues for specific projects related to health, education, and

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[30]Lant taxes may potentially be used to provide benefits for peasants, but there are other ways government could spend that revenue -including on public good that benefit the elites who pay the taxes instead such as infrastructure.

infrastructure that municipalities receive from the central government.

To test the effect on targeted redistribution, I collected data on bureaucratic expenditure, the number of public employees, and the number of hectares of public lands given to peasants. This type of expenditure redistributes resources to selected people by giving them private goods such as jobs and lands. Bureaucratic expenditure includes all spending in the general direction of a given municipality. This refers to the spending in general administration and executive power, such as mayors, local assemblies, and local administrative directions. This spending is a good proxy of targeted redistribution because it includes the budget spent on public jobs that are potential political assets and job positions that facilitate building contacts and clientelistic relations.

The second proxy of targeted redistribution is the number of hectares of public lands allocated to peasants. Land was considered the most valuable asset for a peasant. Although agrarian reforms were aimed at benefiting most of the rural population, the policy was selective and usually ended up assisting only a small fraction of the peasants[31]. Theoretically, all the agricultural workers could have been potential beneficiaries of the agrarian reform. In practice, less than 5% of the peasants received public lands during these years[32]. Because of selectivity in targeted redistribution, some members disproportionately benefited from this type of redistribution.

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the different variables used in the specifications.[33] The treatment group are the 552 municipalities that obtained legal entitlement (full empowerment). In the case of the full sample, the control group is all the municipalities that did not get this legal recognition and in the case of the restricted sample, the control group is the 92 municipalities that obtained legal status but did not obtain legal entitlement.

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[31]Law 135 of 1961 provides two different mechanisms to peasants to receive public lands. First, through the regular process of public land allocations in which, the peasants have to demonstrate that they have worked on at least 2/3 parts of the land they are claiming. Second, through colonization in which, public lands are allocated free of charge to "poor rural workers or low-income families". The decision relies on the Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCORA), a public national institution with administrative autonomy.

[32]The rural population during these decades was around 14 million and overall the agrarian reform implemented since 1961 gave out around 300.000 plots of lands to peasants

[33]Table B.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for both treatment and control groups during the pre-treatment years (1957-1966).

5.1 Identification Strategy

My main specification uses a restricted sample of 644 municipalities to solve a potential self-selection problem in the voluntary organization of the association. In this sample, I compare only municipalities that obtained both legal entitlement and legal status (treatment) with municipalities that only got legal status (control) during the years that the government supported the organization of the peasant movement (1967-1972). Given that the average time to acquire legal entitlement after obtaining legal status was between 9 and 11 months, the control group includes municipalities whose applications to obtain legal entitlement were pending when the alliance between government and peasants ended in October 1972 and hence only obtained legal status. The self-selection problem is solved in the restricted sample because all the municipalities in it follow the requirement of voluntary organization, and they only differ in the legal entitlement requirement, which was a process that depends on the Ministry of Agriculture.

I also include other controls in the main specification. First, I control for potential income shocks that municipalities may experience every year. This captures changes in the annual income of municipalities depending on their suitability to produce some crops. This variable is the average land suitability of the main four crops (coffee, sugar, tobacco and banana) weighted by the national average price of each crop in 1957 COP. Second, I include other variables that might affect the timing of obtaining legal entitlement. These variables are the population in 1964, and the number of tractors in 1960 (as proxy of physical capital) interacted with a linear time trend t to allow their impact to vary over time.

The following difference in difference model is estimated:

$$y_{i,j,t} = \alpha_i + \delta_j t + \beta_1 D(peas\_asso)_{i,j,t} + \beta_2 x_{i,j,t} + \beta_3 (X_{i,j1960/4} * t) + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

where $y_{i,j,t}$ is measured as the log of both broad -land tax revenues, central transfers, and social expenditure- and targeted -bureaucratic expenditure and public lands granted to peasants- redistributive variables in municipality i, state j in year t; $x_{i,j,t}$ is the income shock; $X_{d1960/4}$ is a vector of baseline demographic and economic variables (population and tractors) obtained in 1964 and 1960, t is a linear trend and $\alpha_i, \delta_j t$ and λ_t are municipality, state specific-time trend, and year fixed effects respectively. The inclusion of municipality fixed effects in the main specification controls for any selection into treatment that is due to municipality time-invariant factors. Year-fixed effects capture the influence of aggregate shocks and state-specific-time trend control for the economic

and institutional differences across states in Colombia from 1957 to 1975. The variable $D(peas\_asso)_{i,j,t}$ takes value 1 from the year t that a municipality i in state j receives legal entitlement until 1972 and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at municipality level to allow for within-municipality correlations.

The coefficient β_1 is the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of legal entitlement of the municipal peasant association on the outcome variables during the years that the government supported the peasant movement (1967-1972). Interpreting β_1 as the causal effect of obtaining legal entitlement does not require the assumption that the legal entitlement timing within municipalities was random. Instead, it requires the weaker assumption that conditional on the baseline controls, obtaining legal entitlement is not correlated with time-varying municipality characteristics that affect broad and targeted redistributive variables through channels other than the peasant movement. The second assumption that the identification strategy relies on is the standard parallel trends in the absence of the shock to peasant organizations.

5.2   Results

I test the hypothesis that averages of both broad and targeted redistributive variables in municipalities that obtained full empowerment were different from those that received just legal status (partial empowerment) during the years that the government supported the peasant movement (1967-1972). Table 4 presents the effects of legal entitlement on broad redistribution, and Table 6 presents the estimations on targeted redistribution. All estimations include municipality and year-fixed effects. Columns 1, 4, and 7 in both tables include a state-specific-time trend, columns 2, 5, and 8 include a state-fixed effect and a municipality-specific-time trend. As a comparison, columns 3, 6, and 9 present results for the full sample.

5.2.1   Broad Redistribution

Columns 1-3 in Table 4 report the results of obtaining legal entitlement on land tax revenues, columns 4-6 on central transfers, and columns 7-9 on social expenditure.

Results indicate that obtaining legal entitlement did not lead to higher broad redistribution towards the peasantry. This implies a change in policy variables when a peasant association only obtained recognition compared to when it acquired full empow-

erment[34]. The magnitude for the coefficient on land tax revenues is about 0.114 relative to the sample mean 12.0, which implies a 12%[35] decrease in land tax revenues once an association obtained legal entitlement. The decrease in land tax revenues seems to be offset by an increase in transfers from the central government of around 10%, but this coefficient is not significant [36]. The magnitude of the coefficient of social expenditure is 0.19 relative to the sample mean of 10.4, which implies a decrease of 21% in municipalities that obtained legal entitlement compared to those that only obtained legal status and is significant at 5%.

The negative and significant estimates for the legal entitlement dummy are robust when I use the alternative specification -municipality time-trend-, although the coefficient on central transfers remains insignificant. The magnitude of the coefficients is larger when I use the full sample and include as a control group not only municipalities that just got legal status, but also municipalities that did not get any type of recognition. Moreover, the coefficient on central transfers becomes considerably larger and statistically significant.

To have a better understanding of the results, I explore different explanations behind the reduction in land tax revenues. The main payers of land taxes, given the exemptions to small plots of land, were the landowners. There are four plausible explanations for the reduction in land tax revenues: i) cadastral updates, ii) changes in the tax rate, iii) changes in the statutory tax base, or iv) changes in the effective tax base (tax evasion).

There was not a cadastral update[37] or evidence of a tax rate change during this period.[38] To study changes in the statutory tax base, I collect cadastral information

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[34]The size of the coefficients is larger when the full sample is used.

[35]Because the dependent variable is in log, this result is obtained from exp(0.114) -1=0.12.

[36]Although the results are not significant, Table B.8 in Appendix B also indicates that indirect tax revenues, such as local taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, increased during the same period and could have helped to offset the reduction in land tax revenues.

[37]The official newspaper *Diario Oficial* indicates that the only cadastral update that took place during the period 1957-1975 was during the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla in 1957-1958 (Decree 2317 and 2615, 1953).

[38]Since the government of Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938) land was subject to taxation through two different and fixed taxes: the main municipality revenue, the real estate land (land tax) of 4 x 1000 and a state tax, a patrimony (net worth) tax of 1.35 x 1000 to 15 x 1000 in taxable property over one million. Exemptions in both cases were applied to subsistence properties and communal lands (Pecaut 2006, Gonzalez and Calderon, 2002 and Hirschman, 1963). During the second government of President Lleras Camargo (1958-1962), a new tax bill that proposed a "territorial tax" and increased the cultivation

between 1957 and 1972 at the municipal level -the number and value of taxable rural properties-. Table 5 tests whether obtaining legal entitlement between 1967-1972 affects the number of rural taxable plots and their land values. Results suggest that in municipalities where peasants were empowered, the number of taxable plots and their cadastral value increased with coefficients significant at 1%. Consequently, the decrease in tax revenues can only be due to a decrease in the effective tax base, which is related to higher tax evasion by the main taxpayers, the landlords.

Theoretically, this result is also consistent with the idea that social movements also create, expand and amplify the political or economic opportunities for their opponents, which in this context were the rural elites (Tarrow, 1994). Landowners could have benefited from the organization of the peasant movement through lower enforcement in land tax collection in exchange for not interfering in the campaign to organize the movement and for recognising the participation of the peasants in the policy-making process.

5.2.2 Targeted Redistribution

Table 6 tests the effect of obtaining legal entitlement on the targeted redistributive variables: bureaucratic expenditure and public lands allocated to peasants. These variables redistribute resources to the peasantry, but instead of benefiting the group, they aim to favour a selected group within the peasantry.

Column 1 indicates that obtaining legal entitlement will increase bureaucratic expenditure by 0.26 relative to the mean. This expenditure is around 30% higher for municipalities that acquired legal entitlement than those that only obtained legal status. This expenditure includes all the spending in the general administration of a municipality. While the relevance of bureaucratic jobs is the potential access to political networks, peasant leaders could also get jobs in other sectors such as education, health, or judicial systems, giving them fewer political gains. If public jobs are seen as political assets that facilitate building contacts and clientelistic relations, general direction job positions in the municipality executive power are the closest to achieving this objective.

To link the increase in bureaucratic expenditure with public jobs, I collected information about the number of municipal employees in the different administrative sections. This data is only aggregated at the state level for the period 1957-1972, so in this case, I regress the percentage of municipalities in the state that obtained legal entitlement out

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requirements and the penalties for non-compliance was not approved by Congress (Hirschman, 1963).

of the total that obtained either entitlement or legal status on the number of municipal public employees.

Results in Table 7 show that the total number of municipal public employees increased in those states that have a higher share of the municipalities that obtained legal entitlement. This increase is due to a substantial expansion in the number of jobs in the general administration section. An increase of 1 percentage point in this share is associated with an increase of 59% in the number of employees in general administration. Other sections, such as education, health, judicial system, or tax collection, did not experience a significant increase in the number of employees.

The second channel of targeted redistribution, public lands granted to peasants, is measured as the total number of hectares (in thousands and log) allocated to peasants at the municipal level.[39] Column 4 in Table 6 indicates that obtaining legal entitlement increases the number of hectares allocated to the peasants by 0.014 relative to the mean 0.02. This represents an increase of 1.5%. This change is small compared to the coefficients found in the other policy variables, indicating that the empowerment of peasants had a limited effect on the implementation of the agrarian reform.

To establish who received public lands in the municipalities with legal entitlement during the years the government supported the movement, I match the list of names of the five municipal peasant leaders that attended the second national assembly of ANUC in 1971[40] in Bogota to the names of approximately 10.000 peasants that were listed as beneficiaries of public lands and were daily reported in the newspaper *Diario Oficial* between 1967 and 1972.

This exercise identifies whether the peasant leaders were the main beneficiaries of the agrarian reform. Table 8 shows the number of municipalities that allocated lands to peasants, that obtained legal entitlement, and that had peasant leaders that received public lands. Out of 1088 municipalities, 462 implemented an agrarian reform (=42%) in

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[39]I use the average measure of a Family Agriculture Unit (UAF) as the threshold. A UAF is defined as the number of hectares a family of four needs to subsist for a month. This number varies depending on the soil conditions and crop type, but Tobon (1972) calculated that plots of land that are 20 hectares or larger can give a family an annual income of 8800 COP. I used this number to define the lands given to the peasantry and aggregated all allocations below this number to calculate the total number of hectares given to peasants yearly.

[40]Although I only observe the name of the five peasant leaders once (1971), I had access to the list of peasant leaders in two states -Huila and Meta- in the following year. Only two leaders in the municipalities of Tarqui and Gigante were dropped off of the lists and were replaced by a new leader.

1967-1972. Of these 462 municipalities, 63% (295) of them had a peasant association that obtained legal entitlement. Finally, 210 of the 295 had at least one peasant leader that received land during the years 1967-1972. This represents 71% of the total municipalities that obtained agrarian reform and peasant association. Overall, 20% of the peasant leaders received land in this period. Based on the Ministry of Agriculture estimates of the number of members of ANUC (approximately one million members) and INCORA reports on the number of public lands allocations (10,000 plots of lands in the empowered municipalities), only 1% of the members were beneficiaries of the state policy during the years that the peasants participated in the policy-making process.

Moreover, I compare the average size of a plot of land with the average size of the land given to the peasant leaders and find that the land given to the leaders is twice as large than the average size of the land granted to peasants: 10.82 against 5.33 has respectively. In terms of the distribution, Figure 5 shows that more than 50% of the public lands given to peasants were smaller than 5 has, regardless of the characteristics of the peasant association.

The timing of co-optation is also consistent with the hypothesis that the government organized the peasant movement to identify the leaders and buy them off. Only 22% of the leaders received land before their association was organized, whereas 78% received it only after the movement was organized, their leaders were elected, and the association obtained legal status.[41] Overall, these results suggest that municipalities with legal entitlement experienced, on average higher targeted redistribution, with peasant leaders disproportionately benefiting from it.

Results are still robust to different specifications. First, when I allow heterogeneity in the trends of the outcome variables across municipalities by including municipality-specific-time trends (results presented in Tables 4 and 6). Second, when I use the full sample, the magnitude of the coefficients on both variables is smaller but still statistically significant at 1%.

I also report additional robustness checks to address other potential concerns about the estimates for both types of redistribution.[42] Table B.11 uses just the sample of

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[41]12% of the peasant leaders received land in the months between obtaining legal status and legal entitlement, and 66% obtained land after the legal entitlement was granted.

[42]I also run a seemingly unrelated regression where I allow errors associated with the dependent variables to be correlated across different equations. Results are still robust for three of the dependent variables (land tax revenues, central transfers, and bureaucratic expenditure) and are presented in Appendix B, Table B.13. A jointly significant test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients on legal

municipalities that obtained legal status in 1971 (95), using those that obtained legal entitlement either in 1971 or 1972 (33 municipalities) as a treatment group and municipalities that only managed to get legal status in 1971 due to end of the alliance between the movement and the government (62 municipalities) as a control. Although results are not significant due to the low power of the sample, all the signs are consistent with the results presented in Tables 4 and 6.

Table B.12 includes indicator variables for 1 and 2 years before and after acquiring legal entitlement. The coefficients on the legal entitlement leads are close to zero, showing little evidence of an anticipatory response within a municipality about obtaining legal entitlement. In the year that an association receives legal entitlement, the change in land tax revenues, social expenditure, and bureaucratic expenditure is around 25%, after which the change is much smaller. Although for this specification, the estimates of the public land allocations are not significant, the size of the coefficients substantially increases the year that an association received legal entitlement compared to the previous and following years.

Finally, I also report in Appendix B additional robustness checks of the main estimates to heterogeneous treatment effects to test whether heterogeneity across time and municipalities is likely to bias the main difference-in-difference estimator. Figures B.1 to B.5 present alternative estimators to estimate the average treatment effects adopted in a staggered fashion across groups. For each dependent variable (broad and targeted redistribution), I report a) Event study, b) Borusyak et al, (2022); c) Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2020); d) Callaway and SantAnna (2021) and e) Sun and Abraham (2021). Results illustrate that my estimates are robust to heterogeneous treatment effects.

5.3 Validation of assumptions

One of the main assumptions in a difference-in-difference framework is the parallel path: the trends for treated and non-treated municipalities would be the same in the absence of treatment (Lechner, 2010). To validate this assumption, I run three exercises.

I run the main specification for the pre-treatment period (1957-1966) and regress the outcome variables against an indicator of whether the municipality received treatment or

entitlement are jointly zero in the four simultaneous equations.

not.[43] Results are presented in Table B.2 for the restricted and full sample and suggest that neither the broad nor the targeted redistributive variables in municipalities that received the treatment differ from those that did not receive it.[44] These results are also shown in Figure 3, which presents the pre-trends of the five outcome variables for the two groups (legal status only and legal entitlement)[45].

I run an event study for the full period (1957-1975) to observe whether there existed differences between municipalities with legal entitlement and those with only legal status at different time points before and after the treatment. Event study designs are helpful when treatment does not happen at a single time-point, as in this case. Results are reported in Figure 6 for each dependent variable. The estimated coefficients of the leads are small and, in most cases, statistically indistinguishable from zero. The first year in effect (year "-1" on the horizontal axis), obtaining legal entitlement is associated with higher central transfers, bureaucratic expenditure and public land allocations and with lower social expenditure and land tax revenues.

I also estimate a placebo experiment only using the pre-treatment period (1957-1966) of the data and by moving the legal entitlement years from 1969-1972 to 1960-1963; and results are reported in Table B.3. The coefficients for the restricted sample are all close to zero, and none of them is significant, indicating that outcomes variables in municipalities that later obtained legal entitlement were not already on a similar trend before 1967.[46]

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[43]These regressions include year-fixed effect, state-fixed effect, and geographical and economic controls. This shows whether there is any difference in broad and targeted redistribution between municipalities that obtained legal entitlement and those that only obtained legal status before the foundation of the peasant movement.

[44]When the specification includes region instead of state fixed effect, the effect on transfers is significant and positive, indicating that differences on the central transfers between municipalities that obtained legal entitlement and the control group in pre-treatment years are mainly driven by state characteristics.

[45]The figures indicate an important reduction in revenues and expenditure in 1963. The significant reduction in the dependent variables in this year is the result of an increase in inflation of around 400% between 1962 and 1963 (6.3% in 1962, 33.6% in 1963 and 8.8% in 1964). The large change in inflation was the result of two different policies: a decree that increased the minimum wage issue at the beginning of 1963 and a drastic devaluation of the Colombian peso implemented by the Central Bank due to a currency shortage because of low coffee prices, the main export.

[46]In the case of the full sample, the coefficients of land tax revenues and public land allocations are significant, but in the case of the land tax revenues, the coefficients are the opposite of the ones observed once the municipalities received the treatment.

The second assumption is that the timing of obtaining legal entitlement in Colombian municipalities depends on pre-determined variables that are accounted for in the main specification. I estimate the following specification to check this assumption:

$$D(peas\_asso)_{i,j} = \beta_1 X_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

where $D(peas\_asso)_i$ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if an association obtained legal entitlement in the period 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise and $X_{i,t}$ is a vector of different time variant and invariant variables.[47]

Table B.4 presents the results of an OLS and probit estimation for both full and restricted samples. As expected, more variables are correlated with legal entitlement in the full than in the restricted sample. In both samples, the difference between obtaining legal entitlement or obtaining partial or impartial treatment depends mainly on geographical variables, which is expected given that one requirement to obtain full legal recognition was to send paperwork to Bogota for approval. Experience in organizing (the historical peasant leagues) and the support of communist parties are also correlated with obtaining legal entitlement, but only in the full sample.

As an additional validation, Table B.5 shows the results of an ordered response model[48] to explain differences in the timing of obtaining legal entitlement. Results indicate that municipality characteristics such as temperature and experience in organizing are correlated with the timing of obtaining legal entitlement. The marginal effects indicate that having one more peasant league during the 1920s -a proxy of collective action capacity-, relative to the mean 0.76, increases the probability of obtaining legal entitlement during the first year (1970) by 0.08 percentage points. In addition, places less urbanized but with higher average wages correlate with a higher probability of obtaining legal entitlement earlier.

These variables are controlled in the main specification by the municipality-fixed effect. Other time-varying economic and political variables such as literacy rate, political

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[47]This vector includes variables such as rainfall, altitude, temperature, area, distance to the capital, population, peasant leagues (1945), "La Violencia", land reform (1930-1960), and for the year 1960, data on roads, railroads, irrigated lands (has), coffee lands (plots), banana lands (plots), literacy (%), tenants (%), number of tractors, number of workers, the share of votes of radical left-wing parties in presidential elections in 1946, and the share of votes of the winner in presidential elections in 1966.

[48]In this model the dependent variable takes value 3 if a municipality gets legal entitlement during the first year (1970), 2 if it is in 1971, 1 if it is in 1972 and 0 otherwise (full sample) or if it gets just legal status (restricted sample).

competition, land tenure distribution, infrastructure, and lands for coffee or banana production are not correlated with receiving the treatment.

6 Heterogenous Effects

Results in Tables 4- 8 suggest that the empowerment of the peasants, measured by a peasant association obtaining legal entitlement, led to a decrease in broad redistribution, but an increase in targeted redistribution. In this section, I try to deepen potential mechanisms through which empowerment can affect broad and targeted redistribution. While it is infeasible to study all possible channels, existing literature provides some guidance on the especially important mechanisms.

6.1 Threat of a Communist Revolution

I start by providing some empirical evidence supporting the plausibility of historical radical left-wing parties (communist, socialist, Maoist and radical liberal) support as a central channel through which democratization affects redistribution.[49]

Before the Cuban revolution, communist ideology was dormant in Colombia and did not have a real chance to translate into serious and credible rhetoric that could obtain power. The events in Cuba inspired the peasants to try to break the cycles of landlessness, political exclusion, and low public good provision, threatening the political elite with the loss of their traditional political power due to their exclusion (Wright, 1991).[50]

The influence of the Cuban revolution was greater in places characterized by a historical "revolutionary spirit" where leftist and revolutionary ideas were deeply embedded in society (Hobswam, 1973). Municipalities with stronger support for the communist party and its ideologies were more sensitive to the Cuban situation and hence more willing to protest and rebel to achieve a potential change to the status quo.

I use the political support of radical left-wing parties (communist, socialist, Maoist and radical liberal) as a first proxy for the threat of revolution. To avoid potential

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[49]I interviewed three ANUC leaders in the 1970s, and all of them suggested that the government support their organization because they thought the peasants would join the communists shortly.

[50]In Colombia, the influence of Cuba was manifested in the radicalization of left-wing parties such as the communist party and the liberal revolutionary movement (MRL), which started to pursue a change *"a la cubana"* (Romero and Castro, 1978) and were fed on the legacy of the past civil wars.

reverse causality with the outcome variables, I exploit the persistence in communist support over time and its variation across municipalities by using the share of votes that the radical, left-wing parties obtained during the presidential elections in 1946, when all radical lefty parties jointly supported one candidate.[51] The second proxy of a threat of revolution is the exposure to the "La Violencia" civil war during the years 1948-1958. During the war, conservative guerrillas started to go after the liberal and communist peasants, who also had access to weapons and military armaments. The civil war took place in municipalities where peasants were highly influenced by either the radical wing of the liberal party or the communists, which were also the target of the Conservative army (Trejos, 2011).[52]

These proxies are transformed into binary variables to facilitate the interpretation of results and are included in the main specification as an interacted variable with the legal entitlement dummy.[53]Panel A in Table 9 presents the results for the first proxy of threat -communist support- and Panel B in the same table for the second proxy -exposure to civil war. I test whether broad and targeted redistributions are affected by variations in the threat of revolution. In panel A of Table 9, columns 1 and 3 indicate that broad redistribution is smaller in places where the peasants are empowered, and the threat of an uprising is stronger. However, only the coefficient of the interaction variable in the case of land tax revenues is statistically significant. Column 4 also indicates that targeted redistribution, measured as bureaucratic expenditure, increases significantly in empowered municipalities and in those with greater support for the communist party compared to the national average.

Similarly, panel B in Table 9 suggests that broad redistribution in municipalities where the peasants are empowered falls significantly if they have been exposed to the civil war in the previous decade (1948-1958). The interaction term in panel B in columns

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[51]Table B.14 suggests a strong correlation between the share of votes of the communist party in departmental assembly elections in 1966 -one year before the movement was founded- and previous elections. The correlation is around 0.4 with the previous presidential election in 1962 and is smaller but still statistically significant at 1% when I compare it with the elections in 1966.

[52]To respond to this persecution, the communist party organized "self-defense" groups in areas of their influence that later were known as "independent republics", due to the lack of state presence (Medina, 1980). The "self-defense" communist peasants groups founded the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia -the FARC- in 1964.

[53]The communist support in 1946 takes value 1 if the percentage that the communist parties obtained in the presidential elections in 1946 is above the median and 0 otherwise. The exposure to civil war takes value 1 if a municipality experienced any violent event during "La Violencia" and 0 otherwise.

1 and 3 implies a decrease of around 25% in land tax revenues and social expenditure in municipalities that get legal entitlement and also are exposed to La Violencia. The positive and statistically significant coefficients in columns 4 and 5 capture the intensification of the effect of democratic reform on targeted redistribution in municipalities that participated in the civil war during the 1950s.

In addition, I run a standard OLS regression using two measures of peasant leaders' co-optation (number and land share) as dependent variables on different geographical, economic, social, historical, and political variables. Table 10 suggests that the co-optation of the peasant leaders is significantly and positively correlated with previous exposure to violence and revolutionary threats. Graphically, Figure 7 shows a positive correlation between the share of land given to peasant leaders and communist support. Other geographical, economic, and social variables are not correlated with leaders' co-optation.

An interesting result in Table 10 is that leaders' co-optation is not correlated with political competition, measured as the share of votes of the winning candidate in the presidential elections in 1966. This result suggests that land allocations to peasant leaders are not rewards in exchange for mobilizing political support and votes.

6.2   Alternative mechanisms

While I have argued that historical radical left-wing parties support (communist, socialist, Maoist and radical liberal) is an important mechanism linking democratization to broad and targeted redistribution, an alternative hypothesis is that experience at organizing facilitates the process of voluntary democratization, and due to higher levels of collective action capacity, governments will have more incentives to co-opt the leaders and capture these groups[54].

[54]Seabright (2000) has explained how cooperation may be self-reinforcing or habit-forming in South India. Bardhan (2000) studies 48 irrigation communities in South India and shows more cooperative behaviour in communities where the water-users organization has existed for more than 20 years. Shin (1994) demonstrates how prior collective actions contributed to the Korean peasant uprisings of 1946 by developing a political and national consciousness. In a recent paper, Finkel, Gehlbach and Kofanov (2017) show that the persistence in repertoires of collective action are a potential determinant of the peasant organization and disturbances that Russia experienced between March and October in 1917. On the same lines, Golden (1988), Hammond (2009), Jenkins and Perrow (1977) and Gurr (1968) show how previous social movements or past struggles facilitate the development of a consciousness that results in subsequent collective actions.

I define collective action capacity as the ability of organizations to independently recruit and mobilize members, and I use two proxies to measure it.[55] The first one is the number of peasant leagues that obtained legal entitlement between 1918 and 1947[56]. The second one is a measure of colonial collective organizations: the presence of slaved palenques or indigenous resguardos between 1500 and 1851[57]. These measures reflect previous experience and history at organizing since they require high levels of coordination, networking, and strong ties among their members and within communities.

Table 11 explores this hypothesis, and columns 4 and 5 examine the effect of democratization and collective action capacity on targeted redistribution. None of the coefficients of the interaction variable is statistically significant. However, the coefficients on *legal entitlement* are positive and statistically significant for both measures. Their size is very similar to the baseline coefficients.[58] These results suggest that targeted redistribution was not higher in places where the collective action capacity was stronger. On the contrary, results indicate that municipalities with no history of organizing were easier to co-opt.

The relative wealth or agricultural development of a municipality can be an alternative mechanism that affects the intensity of the effect of democratization on broad and targeted redistribution. Poor municipalities have lower living conditions and hence higher economic grievances, which give them more incentives to organize and rebel. If this is the case, the threat would be higher in poorer municipalities, and the government would try to co-opt the leaders in those places. Table 12 explores this hypothesis using the daily wage in 1968 and the number of tractors in 1960 as a measure of wealth and agricultural development.[59] None of the interaction variable coefficients in Panel A in

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[55]They are measured before 1948 when "La Violencia" civil war started.

[56]Although the law that allowed workers and peasants to organize was issued in 1931 (Law 83), the first peasant organizations were founded at the end of the 1920s in areas of agricultural exports such as Santa Marta (United Fruit Company), Viota (coffee plantations), Puerto Berrio (league of settlers from Antioquia), and in some indigenous areas of Cauca (Sanchez, 1977).

[57]Slaved palenques were free-black agricultural communities and defensive centers that sought self-sufficiency and were founded by escaped slaves. Indigenous resguardos were territorial units that comprised communal lands administrated by native authorities. They are measured as dummy variables that take value 1 if there was either a palenque or an indigenous resguardo in the municipality between 1500 and 1851, the year in which slavery was abolished and indigenous resguardos were dissolved.

[58]This result is also suggested in Table 10 where the history of organizing (peasant leagues 1918-1945) is negatively correlated with the number of peasant leaders co-opted.

[59]For the sake of comparison, a dummy variable is used that takes value 1 if the log of the daily wage in 1968 or the number of tractors in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. For the specification

Table 12 are statistically significant. In the case of tractors in Panel B, the interaction term in column 4 is not significant, and the coefficient of legal entitlement is larger than the baseline coefficient. The coefficient estimate -0.019 on the (*legal_entitlement* x *tractors*) interaction in column 5 captures the elimination of the effect of legal entitlement on public land allocations in municipalities with higher agricultural development. Table 12 suggests that neither wealth nor agricultural development was the mechanism driving the effect of democratization on broad and targeted redistribution.

Table 13 presents results of heterogeneous effects using variation in inequality in rural areas. I measure inequality as the share of non-landowners (settlers, sharecroppers, tenants, agricultural workers) working in rural areas in terms of the number of properties and area cultivated.[60] In the case of broad redistribution, none of the coefficients is significant for both types of measures (Panel A -number of properties, or Panel B-area). In the case of targeted redistribution, the coefficients estimates of 0.362 and 0.019 on legal entitlement in columns 4 and 5 of Panel A imply that the effect of legal entitlement on targeted redistribution is 35% higher in municipalities with a lower percentage of non-landowners relative to the baseline results. However, the coefficient estimates on (*legal_entitlement* x *%_no_owners*) of -0.128 and -0.017 reduce the bias when municipalities with a higher percentage of non-landowners are taken into account. These results indicate that inequality in land tenure is not a factor that explains the differences in the effect of legal entitlement on redistribution.

7   Democratization, Co-optation and Threat of Revolution

I thus explore whether the results on targeted redistribution reported in Tables 6-8 are consistent with a government strategy to avoid violent activities by using a data set that contains economic, social, and political information about 1088 municipalities from 1972 to 1995. I test whether the government's strategy -once the leaders were identified and co-opted- was effective at reducing violent activities after 1972 when the alliance between the government and the peasant movement ended.

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that uses the interaction with the number of tractors as one of the explanatory variables, I drop the variable interacting tractors with a time trend in the original specification.

[60]I transform these two variables as binary indicators equal to 1 if they are above the median and 0 otherwise.

With this cross-sectional data set, I study the relationship between legal entitlement, co-optation of peasant leaders, and revolutionary activities. I work with a restricted sample of 520 municipalities that includes only municipalities that obtained legal entitlement to ascertain in which municipalities were leaders co-opted or otherwise.[61]

After matching the names of peasant leaders with the names of peasants that received land, I calculate three measures of co-optation. First, a dummy variable that indicates whether the municipality experienced co-optation of their leaders or not. Second, the number of municipal peasant leaders -of the five delegates per municipality that attended the second ANUC national assembly in 1971- that received public land between 1967 and 1972. Finally, the share of land that peasant leaders received in the same period relative to the total land granted to the municipality.

I use three different proxies for revolutionary activities. First, the number of land invasions after the alliance between the government and the ANUC ended (1972-1978). When the relationship between the government and the peasants officially ended in 1972, a section of the ANUC announced direct opposition to the government, and a wave of land invasions started across the country.[62]

Second, the number of FARC rebel actions in the years 1974-1985, which include the number of threats to civilians, attacks, assaults, and extortions. When the alliance ended in 1972, a faction of the ANUC decided to continue the fight and joined the newborn rural guerrilla group the FARC, whose aspirations were aligned with ANUC goals: improvement of the living conditions of the peasants and the implementation of an agrarian reform that transforms the economic structure of the rural areas (Molano, 2015).[63]

Finally, I use the number of peasant protests over the period 1974-1995. These protests reflect more spontaneous associations either organized by the ANUC or by other sectors of the peasantry and aim at bringing government attention to rural areas[64].

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[61]Results when using the full sample and the restricted sample that include only municipalities that obtained legal entitlement or just legal status are presented in the Appendix B, Table B.17 and Table B.18.

[62]Figure 8 shows the number of land invasions during the 1970s: while there were not more than 30 in 1971, this number exceeded 600 in 1972. These invasions were initiated and supported by the ANUC and resulted from unfulfilled government promises (Escobar, 1972).

[63]The FARC was considered the military wing of the communist party, and its influence is reflected by the fact that Manuel Marulanda Velez, the main leader of the guerrilla group, was a leader of this party before the foundation of the FARC.

[64]The main causes of rural protest during these years were access to land and public good provision.

I run a standard OLS and a negative binomial estimation[65] to test whether co-opting the peasant leaders during the period that the government supported the movement (1967-1972) is correlated with the increase in revolutionary activities that are observed after the alliance between the government and the ANUC ended (1972-1995) in the municipalities that obtained legal entitlement. The following equation is estimated:

$$\text{threat}_{i,j} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 cooptation_{i,j} + X'_{i,j}\beta + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

where $threat_{i,j}$ is any of the three measures of public disorder -number of land invasions (1972-1978), number of FARC rebel actions (1974-1985) or number of rural protests (1975-1995)- in municipality i in state j and the variable $cooptation_{i,j}$ is any of the three measures of co-optation stated previously. $X'_{i,j}$ contains a vector of time-invariant geographic characteristics and other controls[66].

Table 14 shows the results of the ordinary least squares estimates[67]. The dependent variables are specified in the headers of the columns. Columns 1-3 look at the number of land invasions between 1972 and 1978, columns 4-6 look at the number of FARC rebel activities between 1974 and 1985 and columns 7-9 look at the number of peasant protests over the period 1974-1995.

Overall, this table shows a strong negative correlation between the co-optation of peasant leaders through public land allocations and the posterior violent activities that the country experienced (1972-1995). As is expected, results are stronger in the case of land invasions since they were greatly linked to the peasant movement and its members. Most of the land invasions took place under the ANUC banner name, and the movement publicly supported them (Escobar, 1982).

Since the 1990s, the human rights motive was also part of the protests.

[65]Due to the characteristics of the dependent variables (nonnegative count values reflecting the number of occurrences of an event in a fixed period) OLS models are not the best method because they usually violate two of their main assumptions: conditional normality and homoscedasticity. Both of these problems are solved with the negative binomial model, which is flexible in its error structure and assumes a Poisson distribution of errors.

[66]This vector includes variables such as land tenancy (1960), population (1964), left-wing parties' support (1946), dummy of "La Violencia", historical peasant leagues (1931-1947), land reform (1967-1972) and land conflicts (1878-1964), and α_j is a state fixed effect.

[67]I also run the equation

$$\text{threat}_{i,j} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 D(peas\_asso)_{i,j} + \gamma_2 cooptation_{i,j} + X'_{i,j}\beta + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_{i,j}$$

to test whether obtaining legal entitlement or otherwise is also correlated with violent activities. In this case, I use the sample of municipalities that obtained either legal entitlement or just legal status.

The results in the second row of the table indicate that a co-opted peasant leader reduces the number of rebel activities, on average, by one event. All of these results are statistically significant at the 1% level. The third row shows that an increase in the number of peasant leaders that received private benefits leads to, on average, a 0.3 decrease in the number of rebel activities. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level for land invasions and peasant protests and the 5% level for FARC rebel activities. The fourth row indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of land that peasants' leaders received is correlated with a 2.5 to 3 decrease in the number of rebel activities. This coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level for land invasions and FARC rebel activities, but it is not significant in the case of peasant protests.

Tables 15 and 16 show the estimates of the negative binomial model and its incidence rate ratios, respectively. Municipalities where the peasant leaders were co-opted, are expected to have a rate 0.6 times lower for land invasions and FARC rebel activities. The coefficient when the explanatory variable is the number of peasant leaders co-opted indicates that if a municipality were to increase its number of peasant leaders co-opted by one, its rate for land invasions and FARC activities would be expected to decrease by a factor 0.7 and 0.8, respectively. These coefficients have the expected sign in the case of peasant protests but are not statistically significant. Similarly, if a municipality increases the share of land given to its leaders by 1%, its rate for land invasions would be expected to decrease by 0.03, while holding all other variables in the model constant. The results of both the standard OLS estimation and negative binomial indicate a negative correlation between co-optation of peasant leaders and revolutionary activities, suggesting that the co-optation strategy was, to some extent, effective.

Results in Table B.15 in Appendix B show the relative importance of the extensive margin over the intense margin: the largest and most significant difference is when three or four peasant leaders are co-opted. This is consistent with the idea that members in a large-scale movement do not follow a single charismatic leader but rather a cohesive group of leaders. When the majority of the leaders are co-opted and use their influence to demobilize their followers, it is harder for their members to oppose and replace them.

In addition, I also found a positive correlation between municipalities that obtained legal entitlement but had neither co-opted leaders nor land invasions. Although the sign of this correlation holds for the negative binomial estimation, this result is not significant. This result suggests that municipalities that were organized and empowered

but did not benefit from targeted redistribution are correlated with higher public disorder afterwards.

This empirical result must be interpreted cautiously, as elites strategically selected where to co-opt the peasant leaders. However, if elites co-opted them when the threat of a revolution was higher, then the estimates may be likely to be downward biased (in absolute values).

8   Concluding remarks

Extensive literature shows that when governments face threats to the status quo, they respond by implementing democratic reforms (elections or franchise extension) as commitment devices for redistribution. However, this is not the only strategy. In this paper, I suggest a novel hypothesis: use democratization to identify and buy off the leaders instead of redistribution.

In this paper, I estimate the effect of a different democratic reform -the organization and political participation of a peasant movement- on broad and targeted redistribution in Colombian municipalities during the years of a potential threat of a Communist revolution (1957-1985).

In the Colombian case during the 1960s, when there was a threat of a Communist revolution, the threatening group -the peasantry- was empowered by the state to avoid it being captured by Communists and rebels to strengthen action against the status quo. This empowerment occurred through the voluntary organization of a peasant association that gave peasants direct participation in the policy-making process. Their representatives in state organizations were peasant leaders, who each municipal association locally elected. The strategy of the government to avoid the Communist revolution was to provide the peasant leaders with economic -lands- or political -public jobs- assets.

I show that in municipalities where the peasants were empowered -an association obtaining legal entitlement- broad redistributive variables decreased when the government supported the peasant movement, while targeted redistribution increased. I provide evidence of the increase in targeted redistribution: more public jobs in empowered municipalities and more public lands for the peasant leaders. I also provide suggestive evidence of the negative correlation between the co-optation of the peasant leaders and the public disorder events that Colombia experienced during the 1970s and 1980s.

This paper studies the effect of democratization on a particular type of redistribu-

tion -targeted-transcending the idea that democratization is only correlated with broad redistribution. These results also confirm previous findings in the autocracy case regarding the government's strategies to co-opt potential opposing groups, such as the provision of rent-seeking positions in the legislatures. But the evidence goes further, providing direct evidence of the private goods received -lands- and how this is linked to revolutionary activities. Finally, this paper explores a particular democratic mechanism that extends political rights in democracies beyond the *de jure* decision power, such as universal suffrage.

The findings of this paper, insofar as they provide evidence on the effects of democratic reforms on targeted redistribution, and the effectiveness of this strategy during times of a threat of revolution, have important implications for theories of conflict, democratization and redistribution. If governments recognize that to avoid public disorder, targeted redistribution to well-connected social movement leaders can be more successful than reforms aimed at increasing broad redistribution, particularistic benefits to the leaders become more likely despite increases in inequality within the threatening group. This strategy -targeted instead of broad- might have important implications in the long run. For example, it could potentially explain the intense violence that countries such as Colombia experienced in the 1980s and 1990s in their rural areas. The targeted redistribution is an effective strategy to avoid revolution in the short run, but could lead to more violence in the long run.

It also has important implications for Colombia recent peace process with the FARC. After the signing of the agreement in 2016, rebels demobilized following the orders of their FARC leaders. While the leaders received direct protection and benefits[68] from the government, former rebels stayed unprotected. They continued to be exposed to violence and poverty. The weak implementation of the peace process has been effective in reducing conflict in the short run but might turn ineffective in the long run.

Future research must explore the effect of other types of democratic reforms, such as quotas in the legislative branch, as a mechanism to prevent unrest. In the case of Colombia, more research needs to be done on the effectiveness of increasing public good provision in terms of the different repertoires -land invasions or new political parties- that were used once the peasant movement lost state support. Moreover, there is a research gap in the study of the new clientelistic relationships that arise with the emergence of peasant leaders as political actors and their different implications on public good

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[68]Leaders received a monthly salary, bodyguards and legal protection.

provision and state capacity in the medium and long term.

Table 1: Franchise extension, Peasant movements, Land reforms and Guerrilla movements.

	Communist Party foundation	Franchise extension	Land reform I	Peasant Movement foundation	Land reform II	Guerrilla movements
Argentina	1918	1916				1970(ERP)
Ecuador	1925	1924		1968	1965-1975	
Peru	1928	1931		1960	1964-1968	1964(APRA)
Brazil	1922	1932		1960	1962-1964	
Chile	1922	1934		1967	1962-1973	
Colombia	1930	1936	1936	1967	1961-1971	1964 (FARC/ELN)
Venezuela	1931	1945	1945-1948	1959	1958-1968	1963(FALN)
Costa Rica	1931	1949		1969	1961	
Bolivia	1950	1952	1953	1952	1953	
Uruguay	1920	1927				
Mexico	1919	1947	1934			
Panama	1930	1941		1961	1962	
El Salvador	1930	1950		1961		
Nicaragua	1967	1955			1979	1961(FSLN)
Guatemala	1922	1946		1950	1952-1954	1962(FAR)
Dominican Republic	1939	1942		1962	1962	
Cuba	1925	1940				

Chile: Confederacion Triunfo.

Colombia: Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (ANUC).

Venezuela: National Peasant Federation.

Costa Rica: Federacion Nacional Unitaria de trabajadores agricolas y de campesinos.

Panama: 1 Liga campesina en Carrizal (congreso campesino).

Guatemala: National confederation of Guatemala.

Ecuador: Federacion Nacional de Organizacion Campesina (FENAC).

Peru: Rural workers federation of Peru (FENCAP).

Brazil: Parana peasant league and National Confederation of Agricultural workers.

El Salvador: Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN).

Table 2: Legal Status and Legal Entitlement

	Municipal Peasant Associations	
Year	Legal Status	Legal Entitlement
1961	0	0
1962	0	0
1963	0	0
1964	0	0
1965	0	0
1966	0	0
1967	0	0
1968	48	0
1969	225	1
1970	246	408
1971	95	123
1972	30	20
1973	0	0
1974	0	0
1975	0	0
Total	644	552

Notes: The full sample includes 1088 municipalities and the data includes the years 1957-1975.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev
A. Public Finance (in real terms and logs)			
Total Revenue	16994	13.5	1.61
Land Tax revenue	16870	12.2	1.59
Sales Tax revenue	16868	10.7	1.93
Capital revenue	13428	11.0	2.24
Central Transfers	16486	11.2	1.88
Total Expenditure	16774	12.8	1.57
Social Expenditure	15697	10.3	2.01
Tax Collection Expenditure	16302	10.4	1.92
Bureaucratic Expenditure	16493	11.7	1.69
Economic Promotion Expenditure	10334	11.2	1.92
Debt	2582	11.2	2.19
B. Peasant Municipal Associations			
Legal Status (dummy)	1088	0.62	0.49
Legal Entitlement (dummy)	1088	0.54	0.42
C. Public Land allocated to Peasants			
Public Lands (Plots)	20596	5.16	25.34
Public Lands Has (in thousands and logs)	20596	0.02	0.14
D. Co-optation Variables			
Peasant Leaders (dummy)	1094	0.20	0.40
Peasant Leaders	1094	0.55	1.27
Land Share- Peasant Leaders	1094	0.02	0.07
E. Other Variables			
Income Shocks	20520	9.16	9.02
Vote Share Leftist Parties (1946)	1085	0.30	0.30
Peasant Campaign Budget (in thousands, real terms)	19	30342	44365
Peasant Leagues (1914-1947)	1090	0.76	6.25
Union Members (1914-1947)	1090	152.4	1449.2
Peasant Union Members (1914-1947)	1090	13.75	78.5
Slaves Palenques (1650-1851, dummy)	1097	0.03	0.21
Indigenous Resguardos (1531-1851, dummy)	1097	0.18	0.38
Daily Wage (1968, log)	877	2.71	0.30
Tractors (1960)	871	18.33	93.88
No land owners (%, number, 1960)	808	0.27	0.17
No land owners (%, area, 1960)	807	0.15	0.14
F. Threat of Revolution			
La Violencia (dummy)	1047	0.18	0.38
Land Invasions (1971-1978)	1095	0.99	3.22
Rebel Activity (1974-1985)	1046	1.28	12.36
Peasant Protests (1974-1995)	1094	2.75	3.97

Table 4: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Broad redistribution 1957-1975 (in log).

	Land Tax Revenues			Central transfers			Social expenditure		
	Restricted Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Dependent Variable Mean	12.0	12.0	12.4	11.1	11.1	11.2	10.4	10.4	10.3
Legal Entitlement.	-0.136***	-0.233***	-0.241***	0.083	0.008	0.203*	-0.151**	-0.198*	-0.196***
	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.093)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.097)	(0.116)	(0.059)
Income Shock	-0.004	0.002	0.026***	-0.018**	-0.015*	-0.009	-0.002	-0.014*	-0.014
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Observations	11.368	11.368	17.866	11.074	11.074	16.467	10.738	10.738	15.598
Clusters	625	625	1080	621	621	924	616	616	909
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
Municip-time trend		✓			✓			✓	
Controls	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓

Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had State support (1967-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period in the restricted sample. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 5: Legal Entitlement and land tax base, 1957-1972

	Rural		Rural and Urban	
	Number Taxable Plots	Cadastral Value	Number Taxable Plots	Cadastral Value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Legal Entitlement	0.172***	0.143***	0.103***	0.133***
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.024)	(0.048)
Income shock	0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Observations	6676	6676	6669	6669
Clusters	595	595	593	593
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for year, municipality and region-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Dependent Variables: log of the number of taxable plots in both rural and urban areas and log of total payable tax in 1957 COP millions.***$p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, *$p<0.1$.

Table 6: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Targeted redistribution 1957-1975 (in log).

	Bureaucratic Expenditure			Public Land Allocations		
	Restricted Sample (1)	Restricted Sample (2)	Full Sample (3)	Restricted Sample (4)	Restricted Sample (5)	Full Sample (6)
Dependent Variable Mean	11.4	11.4	11.7	0.04	0.04	0.02
Legal Entitlement	0.252***	0.376***	0.173***	0.013***	0.009*	0.013***
	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.037)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Income shock	-0.000	-0.004	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	11.242	11.242	16.493	12.216	12.216	20.520
Clusters	620	620	918	644	644	1080
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓		✓	✓		✓
Municip-time trend		✓			✓	
Controls	✓		✓	✓		✓

Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had State support (1968-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 7: Legal Entitlement and the number of municipal employees, 1957-1972

	General Direction	Judicial System	Tax Collection	Education and Health	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Municipalities	0.084*	-0.041*	-0.052**	-0.000	-0.018
Legal entitlement (%)	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.072)	(0.032)
Observations	380	380	364	380	364
Clusters	32	32	32	32	32
State Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Dependent variable: number of employees in each section of the municipality (in logs). Explanatory variable: percentage of municipalities that have legal entitlement in a state relative to the municipalities with legal status. All regressions control for year and state fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a state-level panel of 32 states for the years 1957-1972.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 8: Matching names of peasant leaders and peasant beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, 1957-1972 (1088 municipalities)

Allocated land to peasants	Association Legal Entitlement	Peasant leader beneficiaries	Number of Municipalities
x			462 (=42%)
x	x		295 (=63%)
x	x	x	210 (=71%)

Table 9: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution (restricted sample).

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline)	-0.114**	0.096	-0.195**	0.255***	0.014***
	(0.052)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.056)	(0.005)
A: Communist Support (dummy around the median)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.073	-0.006	-0.130	0.135***	0.017***
	(0.060)	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.067)	(0.006)
Legal Entitlement * Communist	-0.075*	0.123	-0.103	0.191**	0.005
	(0.045)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.054)	(0.006)
Income shock	0.004	-0.020*	-0.015*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Observations	11.387	11.074	10.738	11.242	12.216
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
B: "La Violencia" (dummy)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.068	0.285***	-0.185***	0.240***	0.008*
	(0.050)	(0.087)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.005)
Legal Entitlement * "La Violencia"	-0.137***	-0.022	-0.271***	0.098*	0.023**
	(0.052)	(0.101)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.010)
Income shock	0.005	-0.017*	-0.020**	-0.010	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Observations	11.348	11.019	10.718	11.242	12.102
Clusters	622	616	613	620	637
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and the interaction of this variable with Communist support in 1946 or the exposure to the civil war "La Violencia". ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 10: Leaders co-opted

	OLS	
	Leaders Co-opted (1967-1972)	
	Number	Land Share
	(1)	(2)
A. Geographical Variables		
Rainfall (log)	-0.065	0.010
	(0.169)	(0.012)
Altitude (log)	0.031	0.003
	(0.083)	(0.006)
Temperature	0.026	0.000
	(0.021)	(0.001)
Area(log)	0.351	-0.011*
	(0.076)	(0.006)
Distance to Capital	0.141*	-0.000
	(0.084)	(0.006)
B. Economic and Social Variables		
Population (1970) (in log)	-0.120	0.005
	(0.116)	(0.008)
No owners Land (%,1960)	0.504	-0.001
	(0.364)	(0.026)
Tractors (1960)	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Railroads (1960)	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Irrigated lands (1960)	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Daily Wage (log, 1968)	0.626***	0.001
	(0.229)	(0.001)
C. Historical and Political Variables		
Peasant Leagues (1945)	-0.099*	0.002
	(0.060)	(0.004)
"La Violencia" (dummy)	0.791***	0.019*
	(0.164)	(0.011)
Left-wing support (%, elections 1946)	0.547***	0.036**
	(0.214)	(0.015)
Land Conflicts (1878-1964)	0.099**	0.003
	(0.041)	(0.003)
Share votes winner elections (1966)	-0.312	-0.000
	(0.320)	(0.023)
Observations	716	716
R-squared	0.221	0.056

Notes: The dependent variable is either the number of peasant leaders co-opted or the share of land these leaders received during 1967-1972. The variables are in levels unless otherwise stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960)" measures the number of plots given to peasants during these years. The variable "No owners Land" is the share of farmers that work on a land that is not owned by themselves out of the total number of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers, settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Peasant leagues" measures the number of legal peasant leagues between 1918-1945. The variable "Tractors" is the number of machines and agricultural workers in a municipality. The variable d_"La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was affected by this civil war and 0 otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes that the left-wing candidate obtained during the presidential elections in 1946 and the variable "Share votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner obtained in the presidential elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 11: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution.

	Broad Redistribution(in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline)	-0.114**	0.096	-0.195**	0.255***	0.014***
	(0.052)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.056)	(0.005)
A: Peasant Leagues (Number of peasant leagues legally recognized, 1918-1947)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.111*	0.109	-0.186*	0.238***	0.013***
	(0.059)	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.061)	(0.005)
Legal Entitlement * Peasant Leagues	-0.043	-0.139**	-0.162**	0.062	0.002
	(0.038)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.044)	(0.007)
Income shock	0.004	-0.021**	-0.015	0.009	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Observations	11.387	11.074	10.738	11.242	12.216
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
B: Colonial Collective Organizations (Slave palenques and Indigenous Resguardos, 1550-1851)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.124*	0.076	-0.237***	0.260***	0.011***
	(0.058)	(0.102)	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.005)
Legal Entitlement * Colonial Collective Organization	-0.011	-0.062	-0.037	0.008	0.005
	(0.048)	(0.097)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.007)
Income shock	0.004	-0.021**	-0.014*	0.009	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Observations	11.387	11.074	10.738	11.242	12.216
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975.The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972). The variable *peasantleagues* is the number of peasant leagues that were legally recognized between 1918-1947. The variable *ColonialCollectiveOrganization* takes value 1 if the municipality had a slave palenque or an indigenous resguardo between 1550-1851 and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 12: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution.

	Broad Redistribution(in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline)	-0.114**	0.096	-0.195**	0.255***	0.014***
	(0.052)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.056)	(0.005)
A: Wages (dummy around the median, log, 1968)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.099*	-0.024	-0.269***	0.222***	0.015***
	(0.059)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.064)	(0.006)
Legal Entitlement *wages (1968)	-0.022	0.167*	0.085	0.075	0.002
	(0.044)	(0.095)	(0.086)	(0.054)	(0.008)
Income shock	-0.003	-0.017*	-0.000	-0.003	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.000)
Observations	11.110	10.834	10.452	10.880	11.361
Clusters	598	595	591	593	598
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
B: Tractors (dummy around the median, 1960)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.096	0.073	-0.163	0.278***	0.030***
	(0.080)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.061)	(0.004)
Legal Entitlement *Tractors	-0.014	0.020	0.011	0.013	-0.019**
	(0.069)	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.076)	(0.008)
Income shock	0.006	-0.023**	-0.014	0.009	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Observations	10.976	10.695	10.504	10.905	11.285
Clusters	593	590	591	593	594
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. Panel B only includes as a control Population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972). The dummy variable *wages* takes value 1 if the log daily wage in 1968 is above the median and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable *tractors* takes value 1 if the number of tractors in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 13: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution.

	Broad Redistribution(in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement (Baseline)	-0.114**	0.096	-0.195**	0.255***	0.014***
	(0.052)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.056)	(0.005)
A: No owners (dummy number of properties around median, 1960)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.040	0.000	-0.160	0.362***	0.019***
	(0.058)	(0.099)	(0.114)	(0.063)	(0.006)
Legal Entitlement * % no owners	-0.063	0.085	-0.017	-0.128***	-0.017**
	(0.040)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.052)	(0.009)
Income shock	0.002	-0.014	-0.002	0.005	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.000)
Observations	10.390	10.165	10.041	10.355	10.449
Clusters	550	549	550	550	550
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
B: No owners (dummy area around median, 1960)					
Legal Entitlement	-0.076	0.050	-0.174	0.299***	0.007
	(0.055)	(0.101)	(0.111)	(0.061)	(0.005)
Legal Entitlement * % no owners	0.005	-0.011	0.009	-0.007	0.006
	(0.040)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.051)	(0.007)
Income shock	-0.002	-0.015*	-0.002	-0.004	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.000)
Observations	10.390	10.165	10.041	10.335	10.449
Clusters	550	549	550	550	550
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state-time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel for the years 1957-1975.The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972). In panel A, the dummy variable *noowner* takes value 1 if the share of the total number of properties that are worked by no land owners in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. In panel B, the dummy variable *noowner* takes value 1 if the share of the total area of properties that are worked by no land owners in 1960 is above the median and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 14: OLS-Restricted sample (only municipalities with legal entitlement): Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-2.824***			-1.910***			-0.367		
	(0.758)			(0.673)			(0.610)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-1.050***			-0.329*			-0.099	
		(0.192)			(0.175)			(0.194)	
Share land peasant leaders			-2.959***			-3.845***			-2.399**
			(0.935)			(1.214)			(1.224)
Peasant Leagues (1931-1947)	-0.123	-0.169**	-0.130*	0.334*	0.316	0.329	0.236***	-0.240**	-0.236***
	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.200)	(0.204)	(0.207)	(0.088)	(0.099)	(0.087)
Land Reform (log, 1967-1972)	0.395***	0.491***		-0.018	-0.134		-0.059	-0.064	
	(0.136)	(0.131)		(0.139)	(0.164)		(0.122)	(0.128)	
Left-wing parties support (1946)	-0.026	0.076	-0.069	0.009	-0.014	-0.032	0.371	0.375	0.411
	(0.430)	(0.427)	(0.436)	(0.624)	(0.472)	(0.477)	(0.616)	(0.620)	(0.622)
Observations	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978, FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985 and Peasant Protests as the number of protests organized by peasants between 1974-1995. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 15: Negative Binomial-Restricted sample (only municipalities with legal entitlement): Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-1.056***			-1.252***			-0.013		
	(0.296)			(0.345)			(0.148)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-0.630***			-0.233**			-0.004	
		(0.110)			(0.109)			(0.041)	
Share land peasant leaders			-8.316***			-3.925			-0.618
			(2.667)			(2.648)			(0.504)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	0.057*	0.081***	0.046	0.075	0.035	0.067	0.058***	0.058***	0.056***
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Land Reform (log, 1967-1972)	0.174***	0.251***		0.020	-0.046		-0.031	-0.031	
	(0.051)	(0.056)		(0.056)	(0.059)		(0.027)	(0.027)	
Left-wing parties support (1946)	-0.379	-0.157	-0.288	0.195	0.126	0.025	0.134	0.134	0.156
	(0.324)	(0.330)	(0.319)	(0.345)	(0.358)	(0.372)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.199)
Observations	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978, FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985 and Peasant Protests as the number of protests organized by peasants between 1974-1995. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 16: Negative Binomial-IRR -Restricted sample (only municipalities with legal entitlement): Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	0.347***			0.285***			0.986		
	(-3.57)			(-3.63)			(-0.09)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		0.532***			0.791**			0.995	
		(-5.68)			(-2.14)			(-0.12)	
Share land peasant leaders			0.000***			0.266			0.019
			(-3.12)			(-0.91)			(-1.48)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	0.944*	0.921***	0.954	1.078	1.036	1.069	1.073**	0.942***	0.945***
	(-1.76)	(-2.72)	(-1.43)	(1.42)	(0.73)	(1.17)	(2.19)	(-2.94)	(-2.72)
Land Reform (log, 1967-1972)	1.190***	1.285***		1.020	0.954		0.969	0.969	
	(3.42)	(4.47)		(0.35)	(-0.79)		(-1.14)	(-1.14)	
Left-wing parties support (1946)	0.684	0.854	0.749	1.215	1.134	1.025	0.143	1.143	1.169
	(-1.17)	(-0.48)	(-0.90)	(0.56)	(0.35)	(0.07)	(0.70)	(0.69)	(0.78)
Observations	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Z-statistics in parenthesis.All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978, FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985 and Peasant Protests as the number of protests organized by peasants between 1974-1995. The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Figure 1: Months between Legal Status and Legal Entitlement

Figure 2: Municipalities with legal entitlement and legal status (only), 1967-1972

(a) Legal Entitlement

(b) Legal Status (only)

55

Figure 3: Pre-trends of broad and targeted redistribution, 1957-1966

(a) Land Tax Revenues

(b) Central Transfers

(c) Social Expenditure

(d) Bureaucratic Expenditure

(e) Public Land Allocations

Figure 4: Evolution of broad and targeted redistribution, 1963-1973

(a) Land Tax Revenues

(b) Central Transfers

(c) Social Expenditure

(d) Bureaucratic Expenditure

(e) Public Land Allocations

Figure 5: Distribution of Individual Public land allocations by area, 1967-1972

(a) Municipalities with Legal Entitlement

(b) Municipalities with Legal Status

(c) Municipalities without Legal Entitlement
or Status

Figure 6: Event Study: Effect of Legal Entitlement on Broad and Targeted Redistribution, 1957-1975.

The plots show the effect of legal entitlement on broad (land tax revenues, central transfers and social expenditure) and targeted (bureaucratic expenditure and public land allocations) redistribution before and after peasant empowerment, based on the difference and difference equation. Coefficients on the left side of the plots indicate leads, and coefficients on the right side indicate lags. Controls of the main specification are included. The dots represent the point estimates, and the vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 7: Land share of peasant leaders and Communist support (1946)

Figure 8: Land Invasions 1971-1978

A   Appendix A: Data

The analysis builds two new data sets from different primary and secondary sources. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables.

**Local Government Expenditure and Revenues**:This is the first dataset about local government expenditure and revenues built in Colombia that covers the years 1957-1975. Data was collected from official yearbooks at the Colombian National Archive and National Library for the entire period of study. The balance sheets have disaggregated information of all sources of revenue (by type of tax), transfers and expenditures. All nominal values of revenues and expenditures are transformed in real terms in 1957 Colombian pesos using the Consumer Price Index estimates of the Colombian Central Bank. Municipalities are the lowest level of administration in Colombia and are in charge of collecting particular taxes and revenues established by national laws (e.g. land and income tax) and of providing basic public goods (e.g. primary level education, tertiary roads and local health centers). Municipalities also receive transfers from the national government as an additional source of revenue but those revenues are attached to particular investment projects. Tax revenues count for around 60% of total municipal revenues and within this type of revenue, land tax revenues are around 70% of total tax revenues.

Legal Status and Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations: Data on the exact dates that the municipal peasant associations got legal status and legal entitlement comes from two sources: the archive of the Ministry of Agriculture and the archive of ANUC. I construct two different variables with this data. The variable *legal status* takes the value 1 the year that the peasant association gets legal status until 1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable *legal entitlement* takes the value 1 the year that the peasant association gets legal entitlement until 1972 and 0 otherwise. Associations can only get legal entitlement once they have obtained legal status, so there is no case that an association gets first legal entitlement and then legal status does not exist.

Public Lands allocated to Peasants: The data on public lands allocations come from the Colombian Institute for rural development -INCODER-. The dataset contains every plot of land that has been allocated at municipal level and its size during 1901-2013. During the years of interest (1957-1985), the dataset has more than 185.000 allocations. I collapsed this data by municipality and year and dropped all the allocations of size greater than 20 has (the used size to measure the agricultural unit for a family -UAF-).

I construct two variables with this dataset: the number of peasants that receive public lands (*public_land_num*) and the total number of hectares (in thousands) that peasants received of public lands (*public_lands_has*) by year and by municipality.

Peasant Leaders names: Data on peasant leaders was collected from the ANUC archive. The list of the delegates at municipal level that attended the II National Congress of ANUC in 1971 is collected from *Manual de la campana nacional de organizacion campesina* published in 1972.

Names of peasants that were granted lands: The list of the names of peasants that received public lands comes from the daily information published in *Diario Oficial* during 1967-1972. This dataset contains more than 10.000 names.

Cadastral values and Public Employees: Information on cadastral values is only reported from 1957 to 1972. Yearly data was collected from the yearbooks of public finance at the Colombian National Archive and the National Library. The yearly data contain information on the number of properties and the cadastral value for both urban and rural areas of each municipality. The official newspaper that reports all the national laws and decrees *Diario Oficial* was also revised during the period of study to verify any law change regarding tax rate, tax base or exemptions.

The number of public employees at the municipal level is disaggregated by each sector (general direction, judicial system, tax collection, education, health, among others). This information is only available at the state level for the years 1957-1972 and was obtained from the library at the Ministry of Finance "Jose Maria Castillo y Rada".

Income shocks: I use as a control the variable *income_shock*. This variable is the average of the land suitability of the main four crops (coffee, sugar, tobacco, banana) weighted by the national average price of each crop (in 1957 Colombian pesos). Data on land suitability was collected from the Food and Agriculture Organization -FAO- and on national average price comes from the annual bulletins published by Colombian National Statistical Agency -DANE-.

Communist Support: The communist support is measured as the vote share of all left wing parties during the presidential election in 1946. I collect information for the presidential elections in 1946 and 1966 and the departmental assemblies elections in 1962 and 1966. I test persistence in communist support with the significance of the correlation of the vote share of the leftist parties in elections over time. This information comes from the National Electoral Agency and yearbooks published by Colombian Statistical

Agency (DANE).

Historical Peasant leagues: Information on the history of Collective Action Activities comes from the first national census of unions in1947. The census contains detailed information about the number of unions and rural unions and their members between 1918 and 1947. I collapsed this information at municipal level. I complement that information with the data provided about legal peasant organizations in the annual report of the Ministry of Labor in 1945.

I also constructed a variable of peasant associations supported by the Communist Party but not legally recognized by the government from 1914 to 1939. The variable is a dummy that has value 1 if in that municipality there was a peasant association with these characteristics and 0 otherwise. The data about these associations comes from the Communist newspaper *Claridad: Semanario de la tarde* from 1936 to 1939.

Slave Palenques and Indigenous resguardos: I construct a dummy variable that indicates the presence of either a Slave Palenque or an Indigenous Resguardo in the municipality until 1851. That year, the government issued two laws: slavery abolition and Indigenous resguardo dissolution. Since 1851, all the slaves were declared free and the communal and protected communal indigenous lands were divided into their members. Once the law took place, some Palenques and resguardos continued to exist, but the idea of community and independent organizations changed. I collected the data about Palenques and resguardos from different sources. Data on palenques came mainly from Friedemann (1993) and on Indigenous Resguardos from Gonzalez (1970), Friede (1976) and Herrera (1998).

Campaign to organize the National Peasant Movement: Data on the annual budget received by the Ministry of Agriculture to organize the national peasant movement is reported in the yearbooks of the national balance sheets published by *Contraloria General de la Nacion -CGN-*. The campaign was financed mainly by international organizations that transferred the money to the Ministry of Agriculture. All the campaign organization was centralized at the national level and an independent section within the Ministry was created just to work on the organization of the national peasant movement.

Land Invasions: Information about the number of land invasions in each municipality between 1971-1978 is reported weekly in the peasant newspaper "La Via Campesina". In this newspaper, they report all land invasions across the country independently of the size. I contrasted these numbers with the reports of land invasions in one of the main

newspapers of the country "El Tiempo" during the same period. "El Tiempo" underreported a considerable number of land invasions which means that taking the data from "La Via Campesina" is more reasonable.

FARC Rebel Activity: Information about rebel activity is collected from the data set of IEPRI-CEDE, and includes the number of violent events by FARC between 1974-1985. It includes the number of threats to civilians, attacks, assaults and extortions. I add up the number of events and give the same weight to each of these events.

Peasant Protests: Information about peasant protests is collected from the CINEP data set, which includes by event all the protests where peasants were involved between 1974 and 1995. I collapsed events at municipal-year level and give equal weight to all the protests.

B Appendix B: Empirical Appendix

Figure B.1: Land Tax Revenues: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Note: Subfigure A is the event study estimator, subfigure B is Borusyak et al (2022) estimator, subfigure C is Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2022) estimator, subfigure D is Callaway and Santanna (2020) estimator and Subfigure E is Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator. The plots show the effect of legal entitlement on Land Tax Revenues before and after peasant empowerment, based on the difference and difference equation. Coefficients on the left side of the plots indicate leads, and coefficients on the right side indicate lags. Controls of the main specification are not included. The dots represent the point estimates, and the vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure B.2: Central Transfers: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Note: Subfigure A is the event study estimator, subfigure B is Borusyak et al (2022) estimator, subfigure C is Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2022) estimator, subfigure D is Callaway and Santanna (2020) estimator and Subfigure E is Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator. The plots show the effect of legal entitlement on Central Transfers before and after peasant empowerment, based on the difference and difference equation. Coefficients on the left side of the plots indicate leads, and coefficients on the right side indicate lags. Controls of the main specification are not included. The dots represent the point estimates, and the vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure B.3: Social Expenditure: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Note: Subfigure A is the event study estimator, subfigure B is Borusyak et al (2022) estimator, subfigure C is Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2022) estimator, subfigure D is Callaway and Santanna (2020) estimator and Subfigure E is Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator. The plots show the effect of legal entitlement on Social Expenditure before and after peasant empowerment, based on the difference and difference equation. Coefficients on the left side of the plots indicate leads, and coefficients on the right side indicate lags. Controls of the main specification are not included. The dots represent the point estimates, and the vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure B.4: Bureaucratic Expenditure: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Note: Subfigure A is the event study estimator, subfigure B is Borusyak et al (2022) estimator, subfigure C is Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2022) estimator, subfigure D is Callaway and Santanna (2020) estimator and Subfigure E is Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator. The plots show the effect of legal entitlement on Bureaucratic Expenditure before and after peasant empowerment, based on the difference and difference equation. Coefficients on the left side of the plots indicate leads, and coefficients on the right side indicate lags. Controls of the main specification are not included. The dots represent the point estimates, and the vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.

## Figure B.5: Public Land Allocations: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Note: Subfigure A is the event study estimator, subfigure B is Borusyak et al (2022) estimator, subfigure C is Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2022) estimator, subfigure D is Callaway and Santanna (2020) estimator and Subfigure E is Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator. The plots show the effect of legal entitlement on Public Land Allocations before and after peasant empowerment, based on the difference and difference equation. Coefficients on the left side of the plots indicate leads, and coefficients on the right side indicate lags. Controls of the main specification are not included. The dots represent the point estimates, and the vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics for treatment (legal entitlement) and control groups before treatment (1957-1966).

	Treatment 532 municipalities		Control-Full sample 556 municipalities		Control-Restricted sample 92 municipalities	
	Mean	Std.Dev	Mean	Std.Dev	Mean	Std.Dev
Land Tax revenues (logs)	12.4	1.31	12.0	1.59	12.1	1.46
Central Transfers (logs)	11.2	0.69	11.0	1.98	11.1	1.66
Social Expenditure (logs)	10.3	1.6	10.5	1.92	10.4	1.56
Bureaucratic Expenditure (logs)	11.7	1.31	11.6	1.69	11.3	1.36
Public Lands Has (in thousands and logs)	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.08

Notes: All revenues and expenditure are in log. Variable on Public Land allocations are expressed in thousands of has and logs.

Table B.2: Pre-treatment: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Redistribution 1957-1966

	Broad Redistribution (in log)						Targeted Redistribution (in log)			
	Land Tax Revenues		Central Transfers		Social Expenditure		Bureaucratic Expenditure		Public Land Allocations	
	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dummy Legal Entitlement	-0.017	0.115	0.157	0.198	0.013	0.044	0.015	0.029	0.003	0.317
	(0.146)	(0.109)	(0.165)	(0.092)	(0.166)	(0.049)	(0.167)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.194)
Income shock	-0.000	0.026***	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	0.006	0.003	-0.000	-0.000	0.005
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.009)
Observations	5.347	8.151	5.293	8.643	5.122	7.994	5.280	8.185	5.560	10.800
Clusters	545	859	541	886	533	858	538	864	556	1080
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: All regressions control for year fixed effect and state specific-time trend. Regressions include geographical, economic and social variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The full sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities and the restricted sample is a municipality-level of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1966. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and 0 if only got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.3: Placebo test: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Redistribution 1957-1966

	Broad Redistribution (in log)						Targeted Redistribution (in log)			
	Land Tax Revenues		Central Transfers		Social Expenditure		Bureaucratic Expenditure		Public Land Allocations	
	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dummy Legal Entitlement	0.020	0.094***	0.052	0.065	-0.007	0.001	0.025	0.028	-0.000	0.008***
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.190)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Income shock	0.004	-0.003	-0.017**	-0.014**	-0.009	-0.006	0.003	0.002	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	5.854	8.658	5.811	8.643	5.507	8.006	5.707	8.322	6.430	10.800
Clusters	603	891	596	886	582	858	591	873	643	1.080
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effect and state specific-time trend. Regressions include geographical, economic and social variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The legal entitlement years are shifted from 1969-1972 to 1960-1963. The full sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities and the restricted sample is a municipality-level of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1966. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.4: Legal Entitlement (1967-1972)

	OLS		Probit	
	Full Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample	Restricted Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Geographical Variables				
Rainfall (log)	-0.084*	0.007	-0.268*	0.057
	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.164)	(0.216)
Altitude (log)	-0.069***	-0.005	-0.297***	-0.029
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.099)	(0.096)
Temperature	-0.007	-0.004	-0.049**	-0.034
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.024)	(0.033)
Area(log)	0.005	0.011	-0.003	0.070
	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.074)	(0.093)
Distance to Capital	-0.000**	-0.007	-0.086	-0.036
	(0.000)	(0.017)	(0.083)	(0.110)
B. Economic and Social Variables				
Population (log, 1964)	0.135***	0.034	0.431***	0.207
	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.126)	(0.163)
Land reform (1930-1960) (plots)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
No owners Land (%,1960)	-0.071	0.026	-0.284	0.135
	(0.104)	(0.092)	(0.348)	(0.506)
Tenants (%,1960)	0.059	0.065	0.262	0.352
	(0.103)	(0.084)	(0.382)	(0.432)
Tractors (log, 1960)	0.034***	0.006	0.097***	0.048
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.039)	(0.051)
Workers (log, 1960)	0.002	-0.004	-0.005	-0.031
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.067)	(0.078)
Daily Wage (1968)	0.006	0.005	0.017	0.028
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Coffee Lands (1960)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Banana Lands (1960)	0.000	-0.000	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Railroads (log, 1960)	0.000	0.000	0.026	-0.007
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Roads (log, 1960)	0.007	0.002	0.022	0.016
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Housing (log, 1960)	-0.028***	-0.007	-0.130***	-0.077
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.038)	(0.055)
Irrigated lands (1960)	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Literacy rate(1964)	0.003	0.014	0.002	0.010
	(0.022)	(0.088)	(0.016)	(0.078)
C. Historical and Political Variables				
Peasant Leagues (1945)	0.022	0.011	0.073	0.012
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.067)	(0.090)
d_"La Violencia"	0.050	0.068**	0.182	0.478*
	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.141)	(0.262)
Left-wing support (%, elections 1946)	0.219***	-0.061	0.701***	-0.321
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.182)	(0.277)
Share votes winner elections (1966)	0.123	-0.013	0.340	-0.015
	(0.092)	(0.075)	(0.283)	(0.421)
Observations	745	507	745	507
R-squared	0.172	0.037	0.165	0.062

Note: In the full sample the dependent variable takes value 1 if the municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. In the restricted sample the dependent variable takes value 1 if the municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 if only got legal status. The variables are in levels unless otherwise stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960)" measures the number of plots given to peasants during these years. The variable "No owners Land" is the share of farmers that work on a land that is not owned by themselves out of the total number of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers, settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Tenants" is the share of tenants out of the total number of farmers. The variables "Tractors" and "workers" are the log of number of machines and agricultural workers in a municipality. The variables "Coffee Lands" and "Banana Lands" are the number of plots that cultivated these crops. The variable "Housing" measures the number of houses in a municipality. The variable d_"La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was affected by this civil war and 0 otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes that the left-wing candidate obtained during the presidential elections in 1946 and the variable "Share votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner obtained in the presidential elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.5: Legal Entitlement Timing (1967-1972)

	Ordered Response Model	
	Full Sample	Restricted Sample
	(1)	(2)
A. Geographical Variables		
Rainfall (log)	-0.249*	-0.060
	(0.149)	(0.176)
Altitude (log)	-0.203***	-0.106
	(0.086)	(0.099)
Temperature	-0.052***	-0.051*
	(0.022)	(0.027)
Area(log)	0.092	0.058
	(0.062)	(0.072)
Distance to Capital	-0.061	-0.054
	(0.070)	(0.087)
B. Economic and Social Variables		
Population (log, 1964)	0.322***	0.114
	(0.097)	(0.126)
Land reform (1930-1960) (plots)	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
No owners Land (%,1960)	0.017	0.0156
	(0.298)	(0.373)
Tenants (%,1960)	0.454	0.407
	(0.295)	(0.351)
Tractors (log, 1960)	0.074**	0.019
	(0.031)	(0.035)
Workers (log, 1960)	0.054	0.044
	(0.058)	(0.070)
Daily Wage (log, 1968)	0.330*	0.610**
	(0.195)	(0.247)
Coffee Lands (log,1960)	-0.004	-0.017
	(0.048)	(0.058)
Banana Lands (log, 1960)	0.012	0.030
	(0.051)	(0.057)
Railroads (log, 1960)	0.022	0.020
	(0.013)	(0.016)
Roads (log, 1960)	0.012	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.018)
Housing (log, 1960)	-0.135***	-0.110***
	(0.028)	(0.033)
Irrigated lands (1960)	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Literacy rate(1964)	0.002	0.010
	(0.022)	(0.088)
C. Historical and Political Variables		
Peasant Leagues (1945)	0.325***	0.262*
	(0.126)	(0.142)
"La Violencia" (dummy)	0.129	0.206
	(0.125)	(0.158)
Left-wing support (%, elections 1946)	0.571***	0.265
	(0.163)	(0.206)
Share votes winner elections (1966)	0.150	0.256
	(0.092)	(0.322)
Observations	745	498
R-squared	0.105	0.049

Note: In the full sample the dependent variable takes value 3 if the municipality got legal entitle-ment in 1970, 2 if it got it in 1971, 1 if it got it in 1972 and 0 otherwise. In the restricted sample the dependent variable takes value 3 if the municipality got legal entitlement in 1970, 2 if it got it in 1971, 1 if it got it in 1972 and 0 if only got legal status. The variables are in levels unless otherwise stated. The variable "Land Reform (1930-1960) measures the number of plots given to peasants during these years. The variable "No owners Land" is the share of farmers that work on a land that is not owned by themselves out of the total number of farmers (tenants, sharecroppers, settlers, agricultural workers). The variable "Tenants" is the share of tenants out of the total number of farmers. The variables "Tractors" and "workers" are the log of number of machines and agricultural workers in a municipality. The variables "Coffee Lands" and "Banana Lands" are the number of plots that cultivated these crops. The variable "Housing" measures the number of houses in a municipality. The variable d_"La Violencia" takes value 1 if that municipality was affected by this civil war and 0 otherwise. The variable "Left-wing support" is the share of votes that the left-wing candidate obtained during the presidential elections in 1946 and the variable "Share votes winner elections" is the share of votes that the winner obtained in the presidential elections in 1966". Robust standard errors in brackets.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.6: Restricted Sample-Without Controls: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dummy Legal Entitlement	-0.115*	0.086	-0.270***	0.259***	0.011**
	(0.059)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.064)	(0.005)
Observations	11.368	11.074	10.738	11.242	12.235
Clusters	625	620	616	620	644
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗

Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and 0 otherwise. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.7: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution (Control group: Municipalities that got just legal status).

	Total Revenues (in log)	Total Expenditure (in log)
	(1)	(2)
Legal Entitlement	0.019	-0.078
	(0.031)	(0.065)
Income shock	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	11.445	10.995
Clusters	625	620
Municipality Fixed Effect	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓
Municip-time trend	✓	✓

All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effect and state-time trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.8: The Effect of Legal Entitlement on Indirect Tax Revenues 1957-1975 (in log).

	Indirect Taxes Revenues		
	Restricted Sample	Restricted Sample	Full Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Legal Entitlement.	0.069	0.025	0.234***
	(0.075)	(0.092)	(0.047)
Income Shock	0.032***	0.025***	0.027***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Observations	11.374	11.387	17.917
Clusters	625	625	1080
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓		✓
Municip-time trend		✓	

Notes: All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The restricted sample is a municipality-level panel of 644 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The explanatory variable is the treatment effect of a municipal association receiving legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had State support (1967-1972) and control group is just receiving legal status during the same period in the restricted sample. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.9: Full Sample: Legal entitlement and the land tax base, 1957-1972

	Rural		Rural and Urban	
	Number Taxable Plots	Cadastral Value	Number Taxable Plots	Cadastral Value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Legal Status	144.35	0.209***	-1105.8	0.162***
	(151.981)	(0.060)	(976.92)	(0.056)
Legal Entitlement	35.76	0.149***	-1174.7	0.098**
	(122.94)	(0.053)	(790.6)	(0.050)
Observations	13792	13792	13792	13792
Clusters	862	862	862	862
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for year, municipality and region-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Dependent Variables: number of taxable plots in rural and both rural and urban areas and Total payable tax in 1957 COP millions. The sample is a municipal-level panel of 862 municipalities for the years 1957-1973. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.10: Full Sample: Legal entitlement and the number of municipal employees, 1957-1972

	General Direction	Judicial System	Tax Collection	Education and Health	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Municipalities	0.463**	-0.047	-0.025	-0.322	0.038
Legal entitlement (%)	(0.221)	(0.150)	(0.125)	(0.277)	(0.104)
Observations	364	364	364	364	364
Clusters	31	31	31	31	31
State Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Dependent variable: log of the number of employees in each section of the municipality. Explanatory variable: percentage of municipalities that have legal entitlement in a state relative to the total number of municipalities. All regressions control for year and state fixed effects.

Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a state-level panel of 31 states for the years 1957-1972.***$p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, *$p<0.1$.

Table B.11: 1971 Municipalities: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975 (Restricted Sample)

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Institutional Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dummy Legal Entitlement	-0.001	0.338	-0.280	0.142	0.007
	(0.120)	(0.220)	(0.198)	(0.161)	(0.014)
Income shock	-0.000	0.032	-0.007	0.010	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.001)
Observations	1617	1595	1520	1621	1783
Clusters	92	91	91	90	96
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects and state fixed effects-time trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 95 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during 1971 and 1972 and 0 if only got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.12: Leads and Lags: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975 (Restricted Sample)

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)	
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Institutional Expenditure	Public Land allocations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legal Entitlement leads and lags					
Legal Entitlement$_{t-2}$	0.048	0.130**	-0.088	0.030	-0.002
	(0.035)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.006)
Legal Entitlement$_{t-1}$	0.061**	0.055	-0.070*	0.030	0.000
	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.005)
Legal Entitlement$_{t0}$	-0.239***	0.031	-0.220***	0.311***	0.009
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.006)
Legal Entitlement$_{t1}$	0.038**	0.027	-0.007	-0.038	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.071)	(0.031)	(0.006)
Legal Entitlement$_{t+2}$	0.055**	0.018	0.239	-0.172**	0.003
	(0.027)	(0.060)	(0.176)	(0.076)	(0.006)
Income shock	-0.003	-0.022**	-0.002	0.000	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Observations	10.132	9.956	9.575	10.006	10.930
Clusters	625	620	616	620	643
Municip. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects and state fixed effects-time trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Controls include number of tractors (1960) and population (1964) interacted with a time trend. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 1088 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The number of observations vary because of missing values in the dependent variable. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during 1967 and 1972 and 0 if only got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.13: Restricted Sample-Seemingly Unrelated Regression: The Effect of Legal Entitlement of Municipal Peasant Associations on Redistribution 1957-1975

	Broad Redistribution (in log)			Targeted Redistribution (in log)
	Land Tax Revenues	Central Transfers	Social Expenditure	Bureaucratic Expenditure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Legal Entitlement	-0.088*	0.193***	-0.051	0.226***
	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.047)
Observations	10.376	10.376	10.376	10.376
Municipality Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Seemingly unrelated regressions allow error terms in the equations separately to be correlated. The regression perform the join test that the coefficients on the legal entitlement for the four regressions are equal to zero. Results indicate that, for the same municipalities, the hypothesis that the correlation of the residuals in the four redistributive variables is zero is rejected. All regressions control for year and municipality fixed effects and state specific time trends. Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The sample is a municipality-level panel of 1080 municipalities for the years 1957-1975. The dummy explanatory variable takes value 1 if the municipal association received legal entitlement during the years that the peasant movement had state support (1967-1972) and 0 if just got legal status. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.14: Correlation across municipalities of the share of votes of Communist 1946,1962,1966.

	Share of votes left-wing parties
	Departmental assembly elections 1966
Departmental assembly elections 1962	0.405***
Presidential elections 1946	0.236***

Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.15: OLS-Extensive Margin- Restricted sample (only municipalities with legal entitlement): Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions	FARC Rebel activity	Peasant Protests
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1 peasant leader co-opted	-1.969***	-1.649**	-0.401
	(0.729)	(0.738)	(0.666)
2 peasant leaders co-opted	-3.114***	-2.446***	-0.285
	(0.883)	(0.789)	(0.862)
3 peasant leaders co-opted	-4.996***	-2.156**	0.052
	(0.968)	(0.843)	(1.184)
4 peasant leaders co-opted	-4.745***	-2.023**	-0.523
	(0.937)	(0.878)	(0.852)
5 peasant leaders co-opted	-5.136***	-2.322**	-0.711
	(1.123)	(1.069)	(1.034)
Peasant Leagues (1931-1947)	-0.164**	0.325	-0.236**
	(0.074)	(0.210)	(0.101)
Land Reform (log, 1967-1972)	0.592***	0.006	-0.048
	(0.156)	(0.168)	(0.140)
Left-wing parties support (1946)	0.079	-0.010	0.394
	(0.428)	(0.471)	(0.623)
Observations	520	520	520
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The base group of the variable *peasant_leaders_coopted* is 0. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.16: OLS-Extensive Margin: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions	FARC Rebel activity	Peasant Protests
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Legal Entitlement	0.439	-0.721	0.761**
	(0.438)	(0.458)	(0.392)
1 peasant leader co-opted	-0.129	-1.011*	-1.041*
	(0.543)	(0.567)	(0.580)
2 peasant leaders co-opted	-0.509	-1.928***	-0.878
	(0.679)	(0.707)	(0.724)
3 peasant leaders co-opted	-2.041**	-2.140**	-0.793
	(0.995)	(1.037)	(1.062)
4 peasant leaders co-opted	-1.732***	-1.777***	-1.153**
	(0.472)	(0.494)	(0.504)
5 peasant leaders co-opted	-1.432	-2.096**	-1.373
	(1.043)	(1.086)	(1.112)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	-0.094	0.668***	-0.172
	(0.094)	(0.169)	(0.173)
Observations	591	590	591
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The base group of the variable *peasant_leaders_coopted* is 0. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.17: OLS-Sample of municipalities with legal entitlement and legal status: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legal Entitlement	0.767*	0.810**	0.761**	0.387	0.694	0.608	0.141	0.069	-0.081
	(0.045)	(0.392)	(0.392)	(0.438)	(0.494)	(0.350)	(0.464)	(0.471)	(0.466)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-1.066***			-1.625***			-1.062***		
	(0.359)			(0.372)			(0.381)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-0.291***			-0.418**			-0.272***	
		(0.074)			(0.137)			(0.114)	
Share land peasant leaders			-2.868***			-3.726***			-2.384
			(0.859)			(1.979)			(1.648)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	-0.081	-0.100	-0.051	0.688***	0.676***	0.731***	-0.172	-0.228	-0.200
	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Observations	591	591	591	590	590	590	591	591	591
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.18: OLS-Full Sample: The Effect of Peasant Empowerment and Co-optation between 1967-1972 on the potential threat of revolution between 1972-1985.

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legal Entitlement	0.952***	1.317***	1.078***	1.215***	1.126***	0.964***	0.800***	0.653***	0.554**
	(0.225)	(0.217)	(0.208)	(0.238)	(0.360)	(0.350)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.254)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-0.931***			-1.42***			-0.768***		
	(0.274)			(0.288)			(0.316)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-0.377***			-0.346**			-0.203**	
		(0.081)			(0.137)			(0.096)	
Share land peasant leaders			-3.523***			-3.295*			-2.455*
			(1.177)			(1.979)			(1.445)
Observations	1.040	1.040	1.040	1.002	1.002	1.002	987	961	961
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964).The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1971 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.19: Negative Binomial: Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legal Entitlement	0.227	0.327	0.120	0.018	0.025	0.066	0.197*	0.182*	0.163
	(0.300)	(0.285)	(0.299)	(0.289)	(0.290)	(0.290)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.127)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	-0.534***			-0.640***			-0.136		
	(0.218)			(0.261)			(0.107)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		-0.385***			-0.145**			-0.028	
		(0.076)			(0.077)			(0.031)	
Share land peasant leaders			-3.295***			-1.323			-0.305
			(1.754)			(1.461)			(0.505)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	0.075	0.057	0.086	0.423***	0.427***	0.431***	0.095**	0.096**	0.099***
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Observations	591	591	591	590	590	590	591	591	591
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table B.20: Negative Binomial-IRR : Peasant Empowerment, co-optation (1967-1972) and Revolutionary activities (1972-1985).

	Land invasions			FARC Rebel activity			Peasant Protests		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Legal Entitlement	1.256	1.387	1.159	0.981	0.974	0.935	1.236*	1.200*	1.177
	(0.76)	(1.15)	(0.50)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.23)	(1.66)	(1.75)	(1.28)
Peasant leaders co-opted (dummy)	0.586***			0.526***			0.845		
	(-2.48)			(-2.45)			(-1.58)		
Peasant leaders co-opted (number)		0.683***			0.864**			0.9718	
		(-4.99)			(-1.86)			(-0.91)	
Share land peasant leaders			0.035***			0.266			0.736
			(-2.02)			(-0.91)			(-0.60)
Peasant Leagues (1947)	1.078	1.058	1.090	1.527***	1.533***	1.539***	1.073**	1.101**	1.104***
	(0.085)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.125)	(2.19)	(2.28)	(2.36)
Observations	591	591	591	590	590	590	591	591	591
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Z-statistics in parenthesis. All regressions control for state fixed effects, geographical variables (area, distance to capital, altitude, precipitation), population (1964), Communist Support (1946), peasant leagues (1931-1947) and land conflicts (1878-1964). The variable land invasions is measured as the number of land invasions between 1972-1978 and FARC rebel actions is measured as the number of rebel actions executed between 1974-1985.The variable legal entitlement is a dummy that takes value 1 if municipality got legal entitlement between 1967-1972 and 0 otherwise. The variable peasant leaders co-opted takes value between 0 and 5. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Figure B.6: Sample of list of peasant leaders and beneficiaries of land reform

C   Appendix C: A short history of a previous Threat of Revolution in Latin America - 1920s-1930s

Latin American history provides a suggestive example consistent with the hypothesis that governments respond to threats of uprising by implementing democratic reforms. During the 1920s and 1930s, when the ideas of the Mexican and Russian revolutions began to spread in the region, 12 countries experienced the foundation of their Communist party (see Table 1). In 1929, the first regional conference of the Communist Party was held in Buenos Aires and included delegates from all countries in the region but Chile, whose Party was suffering repression under Ibanez government. During these years regional and local peasant associations were founded, numerous peasant protests took place, and there was an intensification of land conflicts between landowners and settlers or sharecroppers in the region (Gilhodes, 1988; Sanchez, 1977; Vega 2004; Tovar 1975, Gaitan 1969).

Due to all these events, Latin American governments perceived a clear threat to their status quo, especially from the rural areas. The main containment mechanism used by the governments at that time was the extension of suffrage (either universal male suffrage or female suffrage). As a result, this democratic reform was implemented in the following years after the foundation of the Communist party in eight countries in the region as Table 1 suggests[69].

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[69]Some of these countries also implemented extensive agrarian reforms to suppress the threat. This is consistent with Hirschman (1963), who suggests that the triumph of the rebels in the Mexican revolution explains why important land reforms were implemented in the following years.

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