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Madhya Pradesh, India, 1993-2010: An  
Introduction**

Could the poor demand and control their own  
schools?

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**PRO-POOR GOVERNANCE REFORM INITIATIVES IN  
MADHYA PRADESH, INDIA, 1993-2010: AN INTRODUCTION**

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This working paper is one among a set of five companion working papers which arise from research on the dynamics of the pro-poor governance reforms that were undertaken in Madhya Pradesh (MP), India, during the years 1993-2003, under the leadership of the then Chief Minister, Shri Digvijay Singh.

A number of significant initiatives were undertaken in Madhya Pradesh (MP) under Digvijay Singh's leadership. Collectively, they sought to secure empowerment, participation and improved well-being for common citizens, especially for poor and relatively powerless men and women living in rural areas. These initiatives included: decentralization through the establishing of *Panchayati Raj Institutions* (PRIs), and the devolution of considerable powers and resources to these institutions to manage important rural developmental programmes; universal access to primary and elementary education through the Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS); a Participatory Watershed Development Programme; a District Poverty Initiative Programme (DPIP); *Rogi Kalyan Samiti* and *Jan Swasthya Rakshak* - participatory governance systems for

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improving hospital services and health delivery system; Participatory (Joint) Forest Management (JFM); a Right to Information Act; and Citizens Charters. Through these policies and programmes, multiple institutional spaces were created in Madhya Pradesh with the stated purpose of channeling action by and on behalf of designated (mainly rural) communities. The overall aim was to bring a 'quiet revolution' to MP whereby successful development work would expand popular participation and (thus) greatly more responsive government.

What did this simple mantra of *popular and responsive government* give rise to? Nothing less than a revolution in participatory governance if one accepts the key claims made by the Government of Madhya Pradesh: about 3.44 lakh [one lakh = 100,000] elected representatives of *panchayats*, of whom 1.16 lakh were women, most of whom took charge of village governance and development (1999-2004 *panchayat* elections); 50,000 members of watershed committees; 1.5 million members of *Tendupatta* (tobacco leaf) plucker societies and more than 4.8 million members of joint forest management committees have been managing their natural resources; about 32,000 *Gurujis* (para teachers) selected by the community are teaching in community schools under the Education Guarantee Scheme. The Government has further asserted that participatory governance has not only deepened democracy in MP, but has paid huge dividends by ensuring improved outcomes. For instance, about 26,600 EGS Schools were established from 1997-2002, when it took MP 50 years to establish about 56,000 primary government schools, and the greater accountability of *Gurujis* to local people (since they appointed and controlled them) supposedly led to a significant increase in literacy levels in MP during the decade of 1991-2001: it rose to 64.11% (national average 65.38%). Female literacy growth of 20.94% during that decade was the best in India. The EGS innovation earned MP a "Commonwealth Innovation" award.

Similarly, the participatory watershed development programme (Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission) started in 1994 with a target of treating 1.2 million hectares, but quickly expanded to cover 3.43 million hectares by 2001 to become India's largest such programme. Different water harvesting and soil conservation activities were completed across about 1.4 million hectares by 2001 with an expenditure of about Rs. 6.9 billion. They covered about 8,000 villages with the apparently active involvement of more than

5,000 watershed committees, about 44,000 user committees, 14,000 self-help-groups and some 8,000 women thrift and credit groups. This resulted, it has been suggested, in an increase in Kharif area cultivation of 21% and of productivity by 37%. It also led to an increase in the area under irrigation by 59%, a decrease in wastelands by 34%, and improvement in ground water table levels in more than 3,000 villages.

Impressive as these initiatives and their outcomes apparently were, they were quite extraordinary as well in terms of supposed motivation. Outcome improvements were said to be based on a vision of and strategy for pro-poor governance reform: empowering the common and poor people to take charge of development programmes for their own benefit. The MP model became widely lauded within and outside India. To many academics, however, the supposed success of MP in the 1990s and early 2000s seemed unlikely, not to say counter-intuitive. This is so because, first, the state of MP hardly inspired confidence in its developmental potential. It was widely regarded when Digvijay Singh came to power as one of India's BIMARU (poorest, under-performing, even failing) States. It was characterised by low economic growth, abject poverty, low levels of human development and high levels of gender disparity. Second, politics in MP had long been marked by elite (forward caste) control of the State's main socio-political institutions. This pattern of control essentially reflected a feudal power structure and the local prevalence of vertically organised systems of clientelistic politics. The formation of MP in 1956 from 72 erstwhile Princely States deeply reinforced this elite-dominated scenario. In such an institutional context, pro-poor reforms which are potentially threatening to the elites who colonize and control state power are (or should be) highly unlikely to be undertaken by the state itself. And, thirdly, large-scale organized movements and protests by the downtrodden for educational reforms or economic betterment were noticeable in MP prior to 1993 mainly by their absence. The other backward Castes (OBCs) in MP-- unlike their counterparts in UP and Bihar, where they had gradually emerged politically to challenge the traditional order in the 1970s and 1980s - are demographically too fragmented, and politically too easily co-opted, to emerge as a robust channel for articulating the aspirations of locally depressed (or oppressed) people.

We know, however, that a wide array of ‘pro-poor’ initiatives was mainstreamed across MP by Digvijay Singh and some of his colleagues. More so, indeed, than in either Uttar Pradesh or Bihar. Here then are our central puzzles. This research has attempted to explore: (i) how and why the State of MP acquired its initial capacity to envision and further a pro-poor governance reform agenda (henceforth ‘agenda’) in the teeth of evident political risks; (ii) under what institutional premises and logics different policies and programmes were structured for realising the agenda on the ground. How effectively (or not) did such strategies work? If they proved effective, did that result from the successful unfolding of those premises and logics, or were other unanticipated factors responsible? And if so, why? If the strategies failed or performed poorly did the premises and logic prove inadequate or faulty, or did they turn ineffective in face of countervailing forces of ground realities?; and (iii) How if at all can the answers to these questions be causally inter-connect to understand the outcomes of reforms on the ground? What fresh insights do the MP reform experiments and experiences offer to both the academic and the policy worlds for advancing the debates on and practices of pro-poor governance?

To answer these questions we studied the four most important elements of MP’s agenda for pro-poor reforms: (i) decentralization through PRIs and the implementation of a major anti-poverty programme, the *Jawahar Rojgar Yozna (JRY)*; (ii) decentralization from the district to the village level with reference to the first national level ‘rights-based’ Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS); (iii) community driven development (CDD), as exemplified by the Education Guarantee (EGS); and (iv) state-society partnership, or co-production, with reference mainly to the watershed development programme.

Three districts were selected for study, with each one representing important socio-political regions in MP: Rewa in the Vindhya region with its highly feudal characteristics; Mandla from the Mahakaushal region, which is dominated by tribal communities; and Neemuch from the Malwa region, peculiar for the dominance of its backward castes and for high levels of peasant entrepreneurship. In each district, one Block, and within that Block a total of five Panchayats and 13 villages – all told comprising 2,181 households or a population of 10,076 villagers - were sites of intensive

qualitative investigations (A further three villages were also studied partially in a sixth Panchayat). A semi-structured questionnaire comprising of 182 questions spread over six parts was administered to a randomly generated sample of 218 households with a pro-poor bias in their composition (about 80% poor and 20% non-poor). The questionnaire placed special emphasis on eliciting people's voices, views, reasoning and overall understanding of the issues under investigation. About 70% of the questions were qualitative in nature, which was in line with the deep ethnographic stance of the research. 7,924 responses (in Hindi) to qualitative questions were closely studied to identify answers that were similar in content and essence despite differences in their wording. Consequently, 1,153 common answers from these were formulated in English, which helped finally to prepare 158 tables and 113 graphs to present a coherent ethnographic story of different issues studied under the research based on common villagers' accounts.

About 140 deep interviews were conducted with key respondents/insiders. Included, for example, were: the Chief Minister of MP, Ministers, opposition leaders, MLAs, principal secretaries and directors, social activists, media persons, and academicians (at the state level); district collectors, other important district level functionaries, district panchayat presidents, vice presidents, and elected members, and district level political personalities from different parties (at district level); Presidents and members of Block level PRIs, BDOs, other supervisory staff (at block level); and sarpanchs and ex-sarpanchs, panchayat secretaries, presidents and members of Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) and of Watershed Committees, teachers and para teachers, retired government personnel, other knowledgeable villagers (at panchayat and village levels). Additional insights were gained by observations made during participation in, for example: assembly sessions, district government meetings, district panchayat meetings, public meetings addressed by the Chief Minister, election campaign rallies, workshops, offices of government officers and even the homes of Ministers. These were critical to enriching the ethnographic understanding of the dynamics of the agenda.

Further, wherever relevant and feasible, this qualitative study was backed up by District and Block level quantitative analyses both to give the ethnographic findings a wider backdrop and to assess whether findings were unique to the villages studied and/or

reflected a broader pattern. Consider, for example, our work on the EAS. First, a database of 1,435 projects executed in 1,487 panchayats in all 21 Blocks of the three research Districts was prepared from the original handwritten documents collected from the district offices – this ran to 512 pages. Each panchayat’s total population, and those of SC and ST communities, were then compiled for all 21 blocks from the Government of India’s Ministry of Panchayat (MoP) database. Data was also collected on nine parameters of all households of 1,487 panchayats, including for example: Means of Livelihood; House type; Landholding; Income level; Migration, and a few others were compiled in 3,131 pages from the BPL database of MP. After cutting out some less relevant information from these datasets a comprehensive database for the analysis of patterns in EAS resource distribution across the three districts was prepared. This contained information on 20 key dimensions, including: district, block, panchayat names, total EAS fund panchayat-wise, population and other 9 parameters’ information obtained in the aforesaid manner, as also information on *percentage deviation analysis* on additional 63 items, which led the database to cover 125,122 data-points and run into 507 pages of excel sheets. The *percentage deviation analysis* is reported in detail in WP 2, with revealing findings about how EAS resources were disproportionately distributed, privileging a few panchayat and blocks and unjustly depriving others.

Further Methodological Discussion will be provided in Working Paper 6. Working Papers 1 to 4 report on how well (or not) the agenda of reform worked in the areas of the JRY, EAS, EGS and Watershed Development. Working Paper 5 pulls the findings of WPs 1-4 together in an integrated way and discusses the collective implications of the research project –intensive fieldwork for which and data analysis were mainly carried out in 2009 and 2010, although some exploratory work was done earlier. The work has relevance for contemporary debates and experiments on decentralization, participation, CDD and state-society synergy through coproduction. All of these are widely viewed as key to seeking institutional change for securing more pro-poor, accountable and responsive governance institutions. This body of research avoids the pitfall of assuming the existence of participatory dynamics in such experiments and subjects them to an in-depth and penetrating empirical probe for confirming (or not) their causal connections to governance reforms.



## Working Paper 120

### COULD THE POOR DEMAND AND CONTROL THEIR OWN SCHOOLS?

#### *The Story of the Education Guarantee Scheme in Madhya Pradesh, India*

*“Where there is a will, there is an EGS School”*

#### **1. The Shaping of the EGS: Rediscovering and Replanting the “Beautiful Tree” envisioned by Mahatma Gandhi**

In an uncharacteristically strong-worded speech delivered at Chatham House, London in 1931, Gandhiji charged the colonial masters with making India more illiterate by neglecting its indigenous education system, the “beautiful tree” as he termed it, to perish:

We have the education of this future state. I say without fear of my figures being challenged successfully, that today India is more illiterate than it was 50 or 100 years ago, ....., because the British administrators.....instead of taking hold of things as they were, began to root them out. They scratched the soil and began to look at the root, and left the root like that, *and the beautiful tree perished*. The village schools were not good enough for the British administrator, so he came out with his programme. Every school must have so much paraphernalia, building and so forth. .... the schools established after the European pattern were too expensive for the people, and therefore they could not possibly overtake the thing. I defy anybody to fulfil a programme of compulsory primary education of these masses inside of a century. This very poor country of mine is ill able to sustain such an expensive method of education. *Our state would revive the old village schoolmaster and dot every village with a school for both boys and girls.*<sup>1</sup>

This was, indeed, a grave charge, and bound to evoke considerable agitation, especially among the British administrators and the intelligentsia. Sir Philip Hartog in particular,<sup>2</sup> present during the lecture, took it seriously and challenged Gandhiji to prove his point.

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<sup>1</sup>Gandhi (1931); emphasis added. Quoted in Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998: 2551).

<sup>2</sup>Sir Philip John Hartog was an educationist of repute. His contributions to establishing the School of Oriental Studies in London (to which the name “African” was added later) and stints as the Vice-chancellor of Dacca University and the Chairman of the Auxiliary Committee on Education of the Indian Statutory Commission (the Simon Commission) were well recognized. (Dharampal, 2000 [1983]:3; The Times, 1947: 6).

A lively debate followed thereafter for about eight years, but finally remained inconclusive.<sup>3</sup> Despite its interest, this debate cannot be fully captured here. However, the nature of the indigenous education system that came out clearly in the process needs to be highlighted for its important bearing upon the discussion in this paper. An official note of Mr. Prendergast, a Member of the Executive Council of the then Government of Bombay, which was also referred to in the debate, eloquently describes the Indian system<sup>4</sup>:

[T]here is hardly a village, great or small, throughout our territories, in which there is not at least one school, .....where young natives are taught reading, writing and arithmetic, upon a system so economical, from a handful or two of grain, to perhaps a rupee per month to the schoolmaster, according to the ability of the parents, and at the same time so simple and effectual, that there is hardly a cultivator or petty dealer who is not competent to keep his own accounts with a degree of accuracy, .....with a degree of ease, conciseness, and clearness I rather think fully equal to those of any British merchants.

Mr. Prendergast's description of the system mirrored Gandhiji's *beautiful tree*: a decentralized, village-based and community-owned school system. The village school

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<sup>3</sup>Sir Philip Hartog first wrote to Gandhiji on 21<sup>st</sup> October 1931. Thereafter each side relentlessly pursued the matter for 8 long years until 1939. Gandhiji sent him various documents including the reports penned by the British administrators in support of his remarks. Sir Hartog, however, refused to be persuaded on the ground that none of the evidence advanced including the British officials' reports provided supporting *statistics* for accepting Gandhiji's position. In 1939, Gandhiji wrote on 16 August:

Dear Sir Philip, I have not left off the pursuit of the subject of education in the villages during the pre-British period. I am in correspondence with several educationists. Those who have replied do support my view but do not produce authority that would be accepted as proof. My prejudice or presentiment still makes me cling to the statement I made at Chatham House. I don't want to write haltingly in *Harijan* [*a weekly newspaper brought out by Gandhiji himself*]. You don't want me merely to say that the proof I had in mind has been challenged by you. Meanwhile I send you a copy of an article in *Modern Review* on the subject. I should like your reaction to it if you have the time. Yours sincerely, Sd/- M.K. Gandhi.

A note by Sir Hartog was found appended at the end of the letter that read: "The article of which a copy has been sent to me by Mr Gandhi is in my opinion of no value. P.J.H." After this, it seems that the matter came to an inconclusive end (Dharampal, 2000 [1983]:346-382).

<sup>4</sup>Quoted in a letter written to Sir Philip Hartog by Professor K.T. Shah on 20 February, 1932, who was in communication with him on behalf of Gandhiji (Dharampal, 2000[1983]:373-375).

masters in such a system were paid little: “handful or two of grain, [or] perhaps a rupee per month.” And yet they felt deeply accountable to the community, which also revered them for their dedication to the duty of teaching. That the Mahatma’s ideas remained unheeded by the British rulers till 1947 may not come as a surprise to many. But the fact that the leaders of the independence movement, including Jawaharlal Nehru, the first premier of India and the leader most valued by Gandhiji himself, also did not take him seriously may surprise. Or, perhaps not; the time was such that privileged Nehru’s modernising vision - synonymous with ‘big is beautiful’ (gigantic irrigation dams; mammoth steel factories; etc.) – over anything that appeared as romanticism with tradition.<sup>5</sup> All newly developing countries including India usually believed then that catching up with the development and prosperity of the Western type implied traversing an uncomplicatedly linear path: from tradition to modernity. That even traditional institutions can play a role in advancement of a backward society was almost unthinkable in such times.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the education sector too, as other public sectors envisioned by Nehru as the ‘modern temples’, remained big. A centralised bureaucratic management, state-level cadre of well qualified and professionally trained teachers (*and, surely, not the old village school masters*), thus well paid with salaries increasing geometrically over time, vertical accountability system with no role for a community to locally hold teachers to account, substantial investment in building construction, and the like - all the

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<sup>5</sup>The conflict between Gandhiji’s and Nehru’s visions of India has been widely written about. In a recent commentary, Adige (2003) revisits this: “[T]he young Jawaharlal had British tutors and was educated at two of England’s most elite establishments, Harrow and Cambridge. Gandhi’s example transformed a mediocre Anglophile lawyer into a nationalist hero, but the two men’s visions were hardly alike: Gandhi believed India’s future lay in self-sufficient villages, but Nehru, influenced by Soviet socialism, wanted to urbanize and industrialize, filling India with steel mills, hydroelectric dams and engineering colleges. And Nehru’s vision won out.”

<sup>6</sup>Modernity is no longer viewed as a linear progression of human society from a lower (traditional) to a higher (modern - read ‘western’) order. Complex and iterative interactions between tradition and modernity are now better recognized. Nonetheless, the idea that sub-qualified and professionally untrained village school masters could provide quality education in highly competitive times may be difficult to accept even now. Many state governments’ recent policies of bringing in para-teachers – poorly paid local unemployed youth for teaching especially the children of the poor at the primary level – in huge numbers because of acute budgetary constraints have thus come under attack from various quarters (also see discussion on para-teachers in section 2).

paraphernalia that Gandhiji detested and much more, were thus viewed as essential and indispensable features. Interestingly, despite taking this route, the leaders felt confident of realising the goal of the universal free primary education *in only 10 years from independence*. Thus Article 45 was incorporated in the Constitution that formally directed the states to take steps to ensure this.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps by then nothing of what Gandhiji said at Chatham House was even remembered, let alone paid heed to, including his warning that with such an expensive trajectory even a century would not be enough to achieve universal education.<sup>8</sup>

But, in 1997 one sub-national state in India, Madhya Pradesh, its then Chief Minister Digvijay Singh with a select few brilliant bureaucrats<sup>9</sup> unequivocally asserted that it was time when MP, if not India, paid heed to Gandhiji and attempted to rediscover and replant the “beautiful tree” because:

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<sup>7</sup>The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India are guidelines to the central and state governments that are considered fundamental in the governance of the country. Article 45 states: “The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.” It is noteworthy that in 1994, the Supreme Court of India made a major observation in *Unnikrishnan vs. the State* that *the directive principle of free and compulsory education amounted to being the fundamental right to life* (GoI, 1949).

<sup>8</sup>Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998). Those who argue for the Gandhian ideas on education point to the fact that the colossal amount of *Rs. 4192 billion* have been spent cumulatively on primary education since independence (figure till 2004-05). Between 1951-2004, the number of: schools has increased fivefold from 0.22 million to 1.042 million, teachers six times from 0.62 million to 3.75 million, enrolment seven times from 19.20 million to 130.8 million and about 0.7 million buildings constructed. Yet, even after 60 years of independence there is still a lack of universal education, let alone universal quality education, since approximately 13.46 million children (6-13 years age group) were out of school in 2005; the dropout rate continues to be troubling at 29.00% for classes I-V, and *the ability of children in 5<sup>th</sup> grade to do division problems has actually declined from 41% (2008) to 36% (2009)*! Buildings and benches are no substitute for teachers’ accountability to parents and children, which is the mainstay of quality education. But that is still hard to come by, the least by spending more money. (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2008; GoI, 2007; SRI, 2005; Planning Commission of India, 2007; Mehta, 2010; Jayachandran, 2007; Pratham, 2010a and Pratham, 2010b).

<sup>9</sup>After Manor (2007). Manor refers to the pioneering roles played by R. Gopalkrishnan and Ms. Amita Sharma, both senior officers in the IAS, the apex civil service in India, in conceptualizing and moving forward the idea of the EGS under the full support and guidance of the then Chief Minister, Digvijay Singh. As the discussion later would show, he was right in observing this but when it came to arguing why the EGS was successful, he got it all wrong.

From the national commitment in 1950 to ensure universalisation in the ‘next ten years’ to the latest efforts to make it a fundamental right and estimated to be requiring 40,000 crore<sup>10</sup> at the national level, this target has been an elusive one and a particularly daunting one for educationally backward states like Madhya Pradesh. ....[I]t tended to.....dissolve political will to universalise primary education. The rhetoric of compulsory primary education became an escape route to which commitment was sought to be created in principle without matching it with resources.<sup>11</sup>

They had no doubt in their minds that “*there was an immediate need to explore more radical alternatives, unconventional but simple and practical.*”<sup>12</sup> This radical alternative was shaped and initiated by them on January 1, 1997 as the Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS), which was claimed to be a “step in [the] direction” of Mahatma’s vision.<sup>13</sup> The EGS pioneered a community centred, rights-based initiative to universalize primary education. It focussed on reaching hitherto educationally deprived sections with schooling facilities in the quickest possible time, and thereby *converting the rhetoric on universalisation on primary education into a reality in Madhya Pradesh.*<sup>14</sup>

## **2. The Design of and the Deliveries of the Scheme: Bringing the Community, Panchayat and the State Together**

Shaped under these concerns and premises, the EGS thus envisioned a partnership between state and community in the following terms<sup>15</sup>: under the scheme, if there was a *demand from a community*, having at least 25 learners in tribal areas or 40 in non-

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<sup>10</sup>Rs. 400,000 million, or £5.72 billion (at the current exchange rate).

<sup>11</sup>Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998: 2546).

<sup>12</sup>Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998: 2546); emphasis added.

<sup>13</sup>Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998: 2551).

<sup>14</sup>Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998).

<sup>15</sup>The details on the EGS presented in text have drawn upon a number of literatures. For the official documents including academic articles written by the key public servants, see for example: Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1997); Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998); Sharma and Gopalakrishnan (1999); Sharma and Gopalakrishnan (2001); Sharma and Gopalakrishnan (1996); GoMP (1995); GoMP (1998); GoMP (2002); Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Mission (2000); Rajiv Gandhi Mission (2002.); Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Mission (2002). For government sponsored studies on the EGS, see for example: Jha (2000); Srivastava (2000); Vyasulu (2000); Kothari, *et.al.* (2000) Josson (2001); and Clark (2003).

tribal areas, with no primary schooling facility within a kilometre radius, the *government guaranteed* to provide an EGS school within 90 days of the pressing of demand. On the part of the state, teachers' salaries, training, teaching-learning material and contingencies would be provided.<sup>16</sup> The community would select a teacher, offer a space for the school, and own and supervise the school functioning, including motivating and monitoring their children for regular attendance, through its active participation in the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA), the School Management Committee,<sup>17</sup> and the Village Education Committee (VEC).<sup>18</sup> The community could suggest the name of a suitable. Local resident educated up to at least 12<sup>th</sup> standard (higher secondary) to fulfil the role of teacher or '*guruji*'.<sup>19</sup> The gram panchayat would forward the proposed name to its *janpad* (block) panchayat. If the *janpad* panchayat found the proposal consistent with the norms, it would accord its approval (subsequently this task was entrusted to the District). After this approval, the gram panchayat would appoint the guruji upon her signing a contract with the chairmen of the PTA concerned, which was expected to render her fully accountable. to the

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<sup>16</sup>At the start of the programme in 1997, an EGS school's annual cost was kept strikingly low at Rs. 8,500. This was because the teacher's salary, the main cost component, amounted to a meagre Rs. 6,000 or Rs. 500 per month. It gradually increased to Rs. 1,000 p.m. in 2003 and Rs. 2,500 p.m. by 2009, whereas a government teacher's salary is about Rs. 13,000 p.m. after the sixth pay commission, about five times higher. The low cost structure of the EGS was essential to allow the programme to run in an economically feasible way, but was also a reason it attracted criticism (Sharma and Gopalakrishnan, 2003: 5214; Sarangapani, 2009: 67).

<sup>17</sup>PTA, or *Palak Sikshak Sangh* in Hindi, comprises all parents whose children study in EGS schools. In principle, EGS schools are owned and managed by this central community structure. PTAs are also entrusted with the crucial role of selecting and appointing teachers, who thus are expected to remain accountable to them. A School Management Committee (SMC) is its executive committee. Members of a PTA elect one of them as their chairman, who also acts as the chairman of its SMC. The teacher (*guruji*) is the ex-officio secretary of both the PTA and the SMC. Initially funds for EGS schools (salaries, contingency amount, etc.) were credited to the account of gram panchayat. Subsequently those funds started coming to EGS school's account and is managed jointly by the chairman and the secretary (teacher) of a PTA, which has further increased its importance (District Education Centre, Rewa, u.d.).

<sup>18</sup>PTAs are formed for each school running in a village. However, only one Village Education Committee (VEC) is formed per village and is entrusted with a wider responsibility of overseeing all of the schools. In principle, a VEC is formed by the *gram sabha*, the statutory sovereign body of a panchayat, which in an open meeting of villagers select different members who in turn elect a chairman and a vice-chairman from among them (District Education Center, Rewa, 2002).

<sup>19</sup>A traditional and revered name in Hindi for a teacher in India.

community. The training of the guruji would be organised by the district administration, initially for 21 days and subsequently for 14 days as refresher courses on a yearly basis.

In brief, while the government ensured the critical basic inputs for transacting primary education, the community shared the task of universalising primary education by its contribution to creating the demand, identifying the teacher and providing the learning space. Gram panchayat worked as the facilitating link between the community and the state.<sup>20</sup>

A strong belief in Gandhiji's idea was indeed the inspiration behind the EGS. However, a *Lok Sampark Abhiyan* (LSA), or door-to-door survey to contact people, undertaken in 1996 jointly by panchayat leadership, teachers and literacy activists to identify the factors hindering the children from going to school, presented the objective ground realities to turn the belief into a resolve. The LSA led to contacts with 55,295 villages, 6,103,143 households and 10,165,837 children. This revealed that about 20,000 habitations had no schooling facility within a reasonable distance. The tribal areas with highly dispersed habitations, variously called '*majra*', '*tola*', '*phalia*', etc., were particularly affected, since even if a school existed somewhere in a village, it could be often as far as 5 km away from a hamlet located in the same village.<sup>21</sup> With this information, the state of MP pressed ahead with the idea of the EGS with full force and within about two years of its execution spectacular results were reported:<sup>22</sup>

- Madhya Pradesh took 50 years to establish 56,022 primary (government) schools by 2002. But within about 5 years of the EGS in operation, 26,571 EGS Schools had been established by July 2002. Additionally, since these were created by the peoples' demands from below, and not by the governmental assessments from the top, schools were established at places where people felt their acute need.


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<sup>20</sup> Gopalakrishnan and Sharma (1998: 2546).

<sup>21</sup> Sharma and Gopalakrishnan (2001).

<sup>22</sup> These facts and figures have been taken from different official documents and other sympathetic evaluations that have already been referred to in f. n. 15.

- A total of 31,815 gurujis (teachers) were selected by the community. Thus, they were far more accountable to the local parents and communities than their counterparts in the government schools.
- That this worked on the ground was vindicated by the fact that 1.23 million children - 91% of them from SCs, STs and OBCs, were enrolled in the EGS schools. Most of them had never been to school due to living in disadvantageous locations.
- The most significant impact of EGS is a sharp reduction in the absolute numbers of out of-school children from 1,315,000 (boys) and 1,604,000 (girls) in 1996 to 346,000 (boys) and 428,000 (girls) in 2002-03.
- MP witnessed a significant increase in its literacy level during the decade of 1991-2001. The 2001 all India Census recorded a growth of 19.44% in literacy bringing it up to 64.11%, almost at par with the national average (65.38%). Female literacy registered the highest decadal growth of 20.94% in the country.<sup>23</sup> EGS was credited with significant contributions towards making these achievements possible.



- Finally, a striking sense of ownership is generated in the community by its power to choose teachers from the community itself. It is additionally evidenced by the facts of regular visits of parents and keen interest in the teacher's presence and the children's learning. Teacher absenteeism, a huge problem in government schools that has defied solution to date, was insignificant in EGS schools.<sup>24</sup>
- The EGS won the first Commonwealth innovation award.

<sup>23</sup>GoMP (2002: 4). Madhya Pradesh Government was awarded by the Government of India for achieving the highest decadal growth in female literacy in the country. Was awarded what? Or do you mean commended?

<sup>24</sup>Sharma and Gopalkrishnan (2001:292).

Amidst the celebration of the success of the EGS, controversies and criticisms were also reported. Through a micro study of a few EGS schools, the French scholar Leclercq argued that the ‘Guarantee’ might have ensured access to, but not a desirable quality of, education, thus was an “incomplete guarantee.”<sup>25</sup> The officials concerned came up with a rather agitated rejoinder. It was replied to as well.<sup>26</sup> Others joined this exchange taking sides as they deemed appropriate.<sup>27</sup> Other studies also highlight similar concerns, pointing out that systems, including the EGS, which tend to expand access through under qualified, poorly trained and low paid “para-teachers” not only deliver poor quality education, but also establish an unacceptable two-track system of education in the country: a better schooling facility for already advantaged sections in the society; and a deficient (para-teacher based) one for the poor.<sup>28</sup>

### **3. The Focus of the Research: The Institutional Logic of the EGS and its Ground Realities**

These criticisms may have their merit. They are ongoing and inconclusive, as rightly observed by Drèze and Sen (2002), who point out that the contribution of these low-cost schemes so far is uncertain and that it is premature either to applaud or dismiss them. However, these criticisms mostly focus on the quality dimension of education. *This research does not go into this question.* Instead, its primary focus is on understanding whether the principles and practices of the institutional reforms followed in MP in the

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<sup>25</sup>Leclercq’s broad take on the EGS is well captured in these words: “Access to education has improved through EGS, ...visited schools are functional. In that respect, children are offered an ‘education guarantee’. Yet this guarantee is incomplete: some children are nominally enrolled, attendance is erratic, and the *quantity and quality of teaching*, as well as *educational outcomes*, are insufficient” (2003a:1862; emphasis added).

<sup>26</sup>Sharma and Gopalkrishnan (2003); Leclercq (2003b).

<sup>27</sup>For those who expressed critical views, see, for example: Noronha (2003); Govinda and Diwan (2003); Kumar (2003); Sadgopal (2003); and Khera (1999). Even prior to these exchanges Rahul, an activist scholar from MP, had expressed his scepticism about the EGS (1999), which was replied to by Gopalkrishnan and Sharma (1999). For those who viewed the achievements of the EGS broadly in line with the official stand, see, for example: Ramchandran (2004); Clarke (2003); McCarten and Vyasulu (2003); Jain (2000) and Kulkarni (2003).

<sup>28</sup>On para-teachers debate see, for example: Govinda and Josephine (2004); EdCIL (1999); Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao (2009); Pandey (2006); Duthilleul (2004); Duthilleul (2005); Fyfe (2007); Kumar, *et al.* (2001); Pritchett and Pande (2006); Geeta Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao (2010).

education sector, which privilege a decentralized, community-driven and people-controlled accountability system based governance over a centralized bureaucratic one, worked on the ground and, if so, how well or poorly, and why? Thus, notwithstanding its independent importance, questions such as ‘how well the gurjis taught’ is *not* the focus of this research. Rather, it is interested in finding whether or not the gurujis taught at all and, if so, did they perform because the premises of the EGS worked well on the ground? Criticisms of para-teacher based schooling facilities on quality aspects tend to forget that despite the more qualified teachers in government schools, their accountability issues have hugely plagued the school performance.<sup>29</sup> Mere expertise in pedagogy does not guarantee performance unless an effective accountability system is in place. Hence, if the institutional design of the EGS worked to make gurujis accountable, for this reason alone the EGS deserves a serious exploration as the findings could have huge implications in unravelling the conundrums of pro-poor governance reforms.

What are the critical components of the institutional design of the EGS? The programme features described in official documents allude to them and have been mentioned above. However, these descriptions usually do not clearly draw out the institutional variables of the programme analytically. An impressive exception to this, the Human Development Report of the Government of MP (2002) highlights the following as a broad principle, but which also applies well to the case of EGS: “The Panchayats and working with people’s collectives [bring] to the fore people’s demands and the government [responds] to that demand, through programmes in Panchayats, through using people’s collectives more and more in managing people focussed programmes. The two [develop] into a valuable *partnership that is institutional in nature*. Both, not in themselves, but acting in concert, are crucial to Madhya Pradesh’s experience. *This process is perhaps the key institutional change....* .”<sup>30</sup> Among academicians, notably Ramchandran and Manor have attempted to look for the premises that shaped the EGS. Ramchandran draws

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<sup>29</sup>Kremer, *et al.* (2004); PROBE (1999); Ramchandran (2005); Ramchandran, *et al.* (2005); Banerjee, *et al.*(2007); Dufflo and Banerjee (2006); Kingdon and Teal (2002); Kingdon and Muzammil (2001a); Kingdon and Muzammil (2001b); Kremer, *et al.* (2006); Leu (2005); Mansuri and Rao (2004);

<sup>30</sup>GoMP (2002). Quoted in Ramchandran (2004: 5).

attention to the features such as: institutional structures for inclusion; guarantee offered by the state; mutually supportive links between the state government, panchayat and the people; and institutionalisation of the community ownership through making PTAs as an integral part of education management. Manor, however, finds the new accountability mechanism in the EGS ensured “accountability of the new teachers to village councils dramatically reduced teacher absenteeism, which plagues conventional schools”<sup>31</sup> as highly significant. Additionally, he argues that:

The key thing to note here is that at the outset, the Chief Minister and his two aides.....did not know that half of the state’s villages lacked schools. They only discovered this because the Education Guarantee Scheme was a demand-driven programme. *It was the residents of the most deprived villages of the state whose demands informed them of this.* The lesson from this case....is clear. Demand-driven programmes can tell governments what they need to know in order to govern effectively and responsively.<sup>32</sup>

Drawing upon the above and the programme description (section 2), it can be argued that the EGS was founded on the following key institutional features:

(i) *The right to demand the school with the state’s guarantee that it would be met (if in order):* The premise was that this would enable, empower and energise people to demand schools in educationally deprived areas. In the process, the government would also come to know where schooling facilities were critically needed. Both would synergise to expand educational access in inclusionary ways with the least transaction costs

(ii) *A new cadre of community-controlled teachers:* The community was given the power to appoint the gurujis. Through PTAs and SMCs, it was also expected to monitor, motivate and discipline them, thus making them accountable to the community right from the start, thus solving the huge issue of accountability, acutely experienced in bureaucratically controlled government schools, without bearing the

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<sup>31</sup>Manor (2007: 92).

<sup>32</sup>Manor (2007: 92).

costs and complexities of vertical supervision system with its associated intractable principle-agent problems.

(iii) *The overall community ownership of the EGS schools:* The premise here is that schools do not run on quantity of teachers, buildings, furniture, etc. There has to be a sense of ownership, which is best internalised by the community rather than the government. PTAs and SMCs were thus seen as an institutionalised expression of this sense of people's ownership. Consequently, it was hoped that not only would the teachers work diligently, but that the community would play a huge role in motivating their children to go to school, deterring drop-out behaviour, and managing its school well in an overall way to make the EGS a success.

#### **4. The Story of the EGS from the Field**

The field research was designed to focus on these institutional features and their dynamics in the field. The findings from the field reveal not only a rather startling story of a near absent or an extremely weak realisation of these features but also a highly counterintuitive scenario of the positive performance of the EGS in certain respects, despite the collapse of its institutional foundation. The following account may illustrate:

##### **4.1. Were the “rights” known and understood by the people?:**


**4.1.1. Knowledge of the rights:** Unlike the dismal level of awareness of the JRY and EAS (WPs 1 and 2), the EGS was widely known in all three research regions (Table 3.1 and Graph 3.1). The tribal region shows its highest level: 91% and 80% poor were aware in Dongarmandla and Ramhepur panchayats respectively. But even in the notorious feudal region of Rewa, more than 50% among the poor knew of the EGS. More strikingly, the responses on what the EGS stood for demonstrated a fairly good understanding of some of its features, for example: “EGS school is opened when no government school exists within 1-2 km”; “close to hamlets so that small children need not go long distance to study”; and so forth. However, the majority of such responses did not reveal any understanding of the “rights” offered by the EGS and of its

community ownership dimension. A few of them even believed that EGS schools were opened and run by panchayat, sarpanch or the government.

**Table 3.1: Awareness and understanding of the EGS: All Panchayats, MP (Poor)**


Have you heard of EGS? What do you know of EGS?	Delhi (N=39)	Silpari (N=29)	Ramhepur (N=39)	Dongarmandla (N=23)	Sandiya (N=36)	Grand Total (N=166)
<b>Not heard of EGS</b>	<b>46.15%</b>	<b>44.83%</b>	<b>20.51%</b>	<b>8.70%</b>	<b>41.67%</b>	<b>33.73%</b>
<b>Heard of EGS</b>	<b>53.85%</b>	<b>55.17%</b>	<b>79.49%</b>	<b>91.30%</b>	<b>58.33%</b>	<b>66.27%</b>
<b>Almost Complete Understanding: Villagers' right and other criteria</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>10.26%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.78%</b>	<b>3.01%</b>
Villagers' right to open EGS school when no Govt. school within 1 km and 25 or more children in need of education	0.00%	0.00%	10.26%	0.00%	2.78%	3.01%
<b>Knowledge of criteria, but unaware of the "Right" dimension</b>	<b>5.13%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>17.95%</b>	<b>8.70%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>6.63%</b>
EGS school When no Govt's school within 1-2 km	5.13%	0.00%	17.95%	8.70%	0.00%	6.63%
<b>Some General Sense, but unaware of the "Right" and other crucial criteria</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>3.45%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>8.33%</b>	<b>2.41%</b>
Govt's special school to ensure every child is educated	0.00%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%
Have school where there was none	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.56%	1.20%
Panchayat to open school where there was none	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.60%
<b>Knowledge irrelevant to EGS's idea</b>	<b>25.64%</b>	<b>6.90%</b>	<b>12.82%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>8.33%</b>	<b>12.05%</b>
Devi Prasad (Sarpanch) opened School	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.60%
For Teaching Children	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%
Guruji's School	0.00%	0.00%	10.26%	0.00%	0.00%	2.41%
It is a school	5.13%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.81%
School gives meals, clothes, etc.	20.51%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	6.02%
Teacher's salary lesser	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.60%
<b>Only heard the name</b>	<b>23.08%</b>	<b>44.83%</b>	<b>38.46%</b>	<b>82.61%</b>	<b>38.89%</b>	<b>42.17%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from the field research.



Note: For the detail responses, see Appendix I.  
Source: Primary data from the field research.

**4.1.2. The Distinction between EGS and other schools:** When people were asked to differentiate between the EGS and other schools running in their areas, 51% could not and 21% said that there was no difference. This strongly confirms the previous finding of a near absence of an understanding of the rights-framework of the EGS. More interesting, however, are the responses that do say that EGS is different. The reasons reveal people's perceptions surrounding the functioning of the EGS: (i) *EGS is different because it is better*, for example: "better than govt. schools"; "even child labourers can go"; "guruji teaches well/takes care"; and the like, or (ii) *because EGS is not good* due to the factors such as: "guruji is insincere; "sarpanch & secretary misutilise funds"; and so forth (Graph 3.2. For panchayat wise detailed responses, see Appendix II). However, hardly any of these disclose the community control over the EGS schools as the central distinguishing feature. Instead, responses about guruji's insincerity or misutilisation of funds suggest that people considered these matters beyond their reach and control!



Note: For the detail responses, see Appendix II.

Source: Primary data from the field research.

## 4.2. How were the EGS schools opened and gurujis appointed?

**4.2.1. Opening of EGS schools:** 13 schools were opened in the research panchayats (Table 3.3). Were they opened by the people's demand? The findings on this question (Table 3.2) almost conclusively reveal that the demand-driven dimension of the programme - one of the central institutional features - had largely collapsed on the ground. If 70% of the poor said they had no idea as to how the schools were opened, that itself is hugely disturbing. But more damaging are the responses by the remaining respondents, the majority of which said that schools were opened by the sarpanchs without their knowledge and involvement (see Appendix III for panchayat wise detailed responses). Even the majority of the non-poor pointed to the same source: the sarpanchs. The very few correct responses (2.41% poor and 7.69% non-poor), primarily came from chairmen of PTAs, gurujis of EGS schools, sarpanch and ex-sarpanch. As they were themselves the key interested players in opening the schools, their deliberate attempt to present an ideal picture, though understandable, did not reflect reality.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup>In Dongar Mandla, Mandla district: Q no - 1/418, Phool Singh (*Father of the Chairman of PTA*); Q. no - 4/434, Tejlal (*panch*); Q. no - 31/422, Patiram Dhurve (*ex-sarpanch*). In Ramhepur, Mandla district: Q. no - 35/143, Jiwan (*chairman, PTA*); Q. no - 37/65, Kapur Das (*guruji, EGS*); Q. no - 38/46, Sankar Das

**Table 3.2: Knowledge about the process of the opening of EGS schools - Broad sets of responses: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Do you know how the EGS schools were opened? If yes, what do you know of that?	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)	Grand Total (N=218)
<b>No</b>	<b>69.88%</b>	<b>50.00%</b>	<b>65.14%</b>
<b>Yes</b>	<b>30.12%</b>	<b>50.00%</b>	<b>34.86%</b>
<b>By Sarpanch in some way or the other</b>	<b>25.90%</b>	<b>40.38%</b>	<b>29.36%</b>
Sarpanch directly managed (without villagers' knowledge & involvement)	22.29%	26.92%	23.39%
On Sarpanch's initiative and guidance	3.01%	9.62%	4.59%
On block office instruction, Sarpanch opened the school	0.60%	3.85%	1.38%
<b>Managed by influential villager</b>	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.46%</b>
<b>Local youth interested in becoming Gurujis managed paper works</b>	<b>1.20%</b>	<b>1.92%</b>	<b>1.38%</b>
<b>Demand by villagers in open meeting as per their right</b>	<b>2.41%</b>	<b>7.69%</b>	<b>3.67%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Note: For detailed responses, see Appendix III.  
Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Table 3.3: Summary information on EGS Schools running in five research panchayats of Madhya Pradesh**

District, Panchayat & name of EGS School	Year of establishment	Teachers in position and their social group (All qualified up to Higher Secondary)	
		Name (M=Male; F=Female)	Social Group
<b>Delhi, Rewa</b>			
1. EGS Dihiya Tola, Delhi	1998	Arun Prakash Tiwari (M)	General (Brahman Caste)
2. EGS Naveen, Delhi	2002	Geeta Dwedi (F)	General (Brahman Caste)
<b>Silpari, Rewa</b>			
3. EGS Harijan Basti, Mahua	1998	Mahendra Kumar Patel (M)	OBC
4. EGS Patehra	1997	(1) Jagjiwanlal Saket (M) (2) Munni Devi Patel (F)	SC OBC
<b>Ramhepur, Mandla</b>			
5. EGS Moto Tola, Ramhepur	1997	Suresh Kumar Bairagi (M)	OBC
6. EGS Ber Tola, Dalka Gopangi	2001	Kapurdas Bairagi (M)	OBC
7. EGS Jhiria Tola, Dalka Gopangi	1997	Keharsingh Taram (M)	ST
<b>Dongarmandla, Mandla</b>			
8. EGS Mukaddam Tola, Dongarmandla	1997	Dalsingh Tekam (M)	ST
9. EGS Bazar Tola, Dongarmandla	1998	Mahesh Kumar Choukse (M)	OBC
10. EGS Kukra Kol Tola, Katangi	1997	Munnalal Dhurve (M)	ST
11. EGS Mangla Tola, Katangi	1998	Sitaram Dhurve (M)	ST
<b>Sandiya, Neemuch</b>			
12. EGS Kund Kheda, Sandiya	1997	(1) Anuradha Bhatnagar (M) (2) Sawariya Lal Khariwal (M)	(1) General (Forward Caste) (2) ?
13. EGS Chukni Kheda, Chukni	1997	(1) Radhesyam Malviya (M) (2) Shankar Lal Dayama (M)	(1) General (Forward Caste) (2) ?

Source: Primary data from the field research.

(kotwar); Q. no – 82/181, Dharam Das (villager). In Sandiya, Neemuch district: Q. no – 20/414, Rajendar Kashiram (Pvt. teacher).

**4.2.2. Appointment of Gurujis:** Arguably this was the most critical institutional variable of the EGS as gurujis' accountability to communities was primarily premised on this factor. Even in this regard, 72% poor said that they knew nothing about the process of selection of gurujis (Table 3.4 and Graph 3.3). An additional 17% of answers all cited the sarpanchs. They were said to be playing the role of job providers, though for varying reasons: family relationship; helping the poor and unemployed (in people's perception, positive consideration); bribes or extending favours for political support (undesirable considerations) (for panchayat wise detailed responses see Appendix IV).

In-depth interviews of the knowledgeable villagers, the key respondents, gave additional highly revealing inside information. For example: in Delhi panchayat, a sarpanch's brother was appointed.<sup>34</sup> In Silpari panchayat, the sarpanch appointed a brother of a panch who had promised to get him about 400 votes in the next election.<sup>35</sup> In another case, the sarpanch had to appoint a daughter-in-law and a son of two villagers who had donated land for the EGS school.<sup>36</sup>

In Ramhepur panchayat, a gram panchayat secretary, a key functionary on whom the sarpanch remains heavily dependent, leveraged his position to get his brother appointed.<sup>37</sup> The other gurujis were himself, the up-sarpanch prior to his appointment, thus politically very close to the sarpanch.<sup>38</sup> Here and in the other tribal panchayat (Dongarmandla), meetings of a few people were also organised, but mainly to ratify the appointments already made by the sarpanchs. In Dongarmandla, the sarpanch's nephew was appointed as gurujis in one of the schools.<sup>39</sup> Another managed his appointment through the intervention of a Zila (district level) panchayat member close to him, and by also paying some money to the block officials.<sup>40</sup> In Sandiya in the Neemuch district, a

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<sup>34</sup>Interview, B. D. Sharma, Divisional Education Officer (Rtd.), Delhi, Rewa, 07.10.09

<sup>35</sup>Interview, Md. Nurul Haque, Ex-Panch, Silpari, Rewa, 10.10.09

<sup>36</sup>Interview, B. Prasad, Retired Army Personnel, Silpari, Rewa, 11.10.09

<sup>37</sup>Interview, N. Das, Upsarpanch, Ramhepur, Mandla, 12.10.09.

<sup>38</sup>Interview, P. Dhumketi, Sarpanch, Ramhepur, Mandla, 08.10.09

<sup>39</sup>Interview, B. S. Dhurve, Sarpanch, Dongar Mandla, Mandla, 11.10.09

<sup>40</sup>Interview, P. Dhurve, Ex-Sarpanch, Dongar Mandla, mandla, 13.10.09.

guruji appointed in the beginning was highly appreciated by parents, but was replaced by the sarpanch with another who “was close to him.”<sup>41</sup>


These inside details leave no doubt in concluding that the involvement of the community in the selection process was hardly a reality on the ground. Gurujis thus had hardly any incentive to turn accountable to the community, as mostly the sarpanchs controlled the jobs and so were their real *maliks* (masters).

**Table 3.4: Knowledge of the process of gurujis’ appointment: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Do you know how gurujis were appointed? What do you know of the appointment process?	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)	Grand Total (N=218)
Don't know	71.69%	44.23%	65.14%
Yes	28.31%	55.77%	34.86%
Correct appointment done by community itself	11.45%	28.85%	15.60%
No village meeting; Sarpanch appointed directly because of relation	9.64%	13.46%	10.55%
No village meeting; Sarpanch appointed directly for other considerations	7.23%	13.46%	8.72%
<b>Because of good reasons: Candidate meritorious and poor</b>	<b>3.01%</b>	<b>3.85%</b>	<b>3.21%</b>
Sarpanch appointed directly because candidate had merit/was in merit list	2.41%	1.92%	2.29%
Sarpanch appointed directly because candidate was educated & poor	0.60%	0.00%	0.46%
Sarpanch appointed directly because candidate was poor and unemployed	0.00%	1.92%	0.46%
<b>Because of wrong reasons: bribe, political help, etc.</b>	<b>2.41%</b>	<b>3.85%</b>	<b>2.75%</b>
Sarpanch appointed directly because candidate was from home village	0.60%	0.00%	0.46%
Sarpanch appointed directly because of bribe	0.60%	0.00%	0.46%
Sarpanch appointed directly because of friendship	0.00%	3.85%	0.92%
Sarpanch appointed directly for political help	1.20%	0.00%	0.92%
<b>Because of pressure from above: pressure from block officers</b>	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>1.92%</b>	<b>0.92%</b>
Sarpanch appointed under direction/pressure of block officers	0.60%	1.92%	0.92%
<b>Not aware of the other considerations</b>	<b>1.20%</b>	<b>3.85%</b>	<b>1.83%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from the field research.

<sup>41</sup>Interview, A. M. Purohit, Panch, W. 9, Sandiya, Neemuch, 09.10.09




Source: Primary data from the field research.

### **4.3. Community ownership and control of the EGS schools**

**4.3.1 The formation and functioning of the PTAs and the SMCs:** An alert and active role by a PTA, especially its School Management Committee (SMC), was crucial for operationalising the sense of community ownership over the EGS schools. Constant vigilance by a SMC was also expected to keep its guruji's on their toes. However, these bodies were found to be almost non-functional everywhere and appeared to exist only on paper in several cases. Almost all appeared to be primarily guruji's creations; the teachers had picked people close to them to constitute the SMCs so as to keep them under their control. This arrangement on the one hand blunted the possibility of raising an effective voice against a guruji; on the other, it helped guruji's to manage school funds smoothly with their handpicked chairmen (as already mentioned earlier, funds were jointly managed). The supposed community control over the guruji's was in this way dramatically turned upside down. The hard facts from ground that lead to these conclusions are summarised below:

**(a) Non-recognition of SMCs and their members:** When investigations were made about people's knowledge of PTAs /SMCs and their members, 81% of all 166 poor

villagers in the sample did not know that any such committee even existed (Graph 3.4). More strikingly, 55% of a total of 58 respondents whose children went to EGS schools were also similarly unaware (Table 3.5 and Graph 3.6), even when, in principle, all of them were themselves members of the respective PTAs as parents.




Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Table 3.5: Identification of members of the SMC by parents whose children studied in EGS Schools: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non Poor)**

Identification of Members of the SMC		Number	Percent	Group
Total respondents whose children studied in EGS = 58	No knowledge of PTA/SMC	32	55.17%	A
	Aware of PTA/SMC	26	44.83%	B
Those who said were aware of PTA/SMC = 26	No member known	6	10.34%	B1
	Chairman & Guruji or only Guruji	7	12.07%	B2
	Know also few additional members	13	22.41%	B3
Those who either had no knowledge of committee, or did not know any member, or only knew chairman/guruji		45	77.59%	A + B1+B2

Source: Primary data from the field research.



Source: Primary data from the field research.

The picture turned even bleaker when the responses of the remaining respondents, who said they had heard of such a committee (by any name or even no name), were analysed in the light of the lists of SMCs that were obtained in advance from the schools and panchayat offices. As Graph 3.6 clearly shows, the overwhelming majority of the 58 parents (78%) either did not know of the PTA or SMC, or did not recognize any member, or only recognised the chairman and, of course, guruji. This starkly depicts the reality that the question of the functionality and effectiveness of these supposedly crucial community structures barely arose as they were almost unrecognisable on the ground,

The only other micro field study on the EGS, which has similarly attempted to open up the black box of the actual existence, operation and effectiveness of such community ownership structures, is Leclercq (2003a). Interestingly, his study also reports similar findings from the field.<sup>42</sup> Another study of the village education committees in 280 villages in Uttar Pradesh by Banerjee, *et al.* (2007) reports that: “a startling 92 per cent [of total 2800 respondents] responded that they did not know of any such committee.

<sup>42</sup>“Respondents consistently confirmed that most VECs and SMCs are dysfunctional... [P]arents ... consider their EGS school a government institution staffed with civil servants, and would not think of taking initiatives towards improving it. ...[T]eachers, ...secretary of the committee, have no interest in parents controlling them,...” (Leclercq, 2003a: 1864).

Only 2 per cent could name actual members of the VEC.” This is even worse than what was found in MP.<sup>43</sup>


**(b) Some evidences of existence of pocket SMCs:** How could such a vast ignorance of SMCs and their members be possible? A close scrutiny of the members of the SMCs with the help of knowledgeable villagers revealed that in many cases they were related to the chairmen or guruji, mostly the latter, and with each other. While the statistical facts about how many members were so related have been presented for each school in Appendix V, its graphical presentation for one EGS school from Mandla (tribal) district has been provided as an illustrative case below (see Appendix VI for other schools). As Diagram 1 reveals, the core members, the chairman and the guruji are cousins; the chairman’s wife is also a member, thus obviously related to the guruji. Two other members are related to the guruji and the remaining members are all married couples. It is not surprising, therefore, that such a handpicked committee by the guruji, in effect, an extended family affair for him, would hardly be recognised by the parents and villagers.

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<sup>43</sup>Banerjee, *et al.* (2007: 1368). Findings from this research along with those others reported above help to demystify the uncritical acclaim of the community’s role. The fact that whether in MP or UP such micro-level village community organisations, formed though soft engineering from above, hardly work in reality needs further research to explore the deeper institutional constraints and logics that either block them from functioning, or even possibly render them as *ex-ante* infeasible structures on the ground. This and related issues are further discussed in WP 5.

**Diagram 3.1: Members of a SMC: Independent or Interrelated?**  
**EGS Mukaddam Tola, Dongarmandla Village, Mandla District**

**Total SMC Members: 11**



Source: Primary data from the field research.

In one case of EGS, Dihiya tola in Rewa district, a similar type of relationships among its SMC members was not found. The reasons for this, however, were not difficult to locate. The guruji in this school was closely related to the family of the powerful landlord sarpanch. Hence, even though the members of the SMC were unrelated to each other or to him, as villagers they were subservient to the sarpanch and so hardly mattered to the guruji. Since the power hierarchy in other tribal and backward-caste dominated regions was not as sharp as in Rewa, gurujis were more worried that if independent villagers were brought into their SMCs, they might create trouble at some point. Thus, relatives were preferred to ensure their subservience and silence that the power of a forward caste guruji related with the mighty sarpanch from an aggressive feudal region could

ensure on its own. The following account of interactions with the guruji and the vice-chairman illustrates this vividly:

I was sitting in a room of the big house of the sarpanch, Mrs. Pramila Tiwari, which appeared to be her (more aptly, her husband's) residential office since various records of panchayat were kept there. Arun Tiwari, the guruji and sarpanch's brother-in-law, while enthusiastically sharing his experiences of the EGS school also showed me a notebook containing the minutes of the proceedings of the monthly PTA meetings. Those appeared repetitive and stereotyped, highlighting only the problem of low and untimely payment of honorarium to the teacher (himself). After going through the entire notebook, it was not difficult to find out that such records were a managed exercise by the guruji and it appeared that the signatures and thumb impressions of the various members were obtained to deceptively suggest that meetings were being held.


During our conversation, Butan Kol (ST), a sharecropper attached to the sarpanch's family, arrived for some work. Arun Tiwari called him in to join us and as he was approaching, he told me that Butan was the vice chairman of the SMC. After Butan Kol settled down, I asked whether he knew about the SMC, its functions and meetings. He thought for a while but finally expressed ignorance. An understandably embarrassed guruji tried to intervene to prompt him, but he was promptly stopped by me in time. I made several attempts to clarify the questions for Butan Kol, but he continued to plead ignorance. I then closely examined the signatures of the SMC members appearing in the notebook. Butan Kol's signature as the vice chairman of the committee was invariably found. So, the so called vice chairman of the SMC, repeatedly stated in front of the guruji that he was unaware of any committee called SMC or PTA, let alone being vice chairman, yet his signatures were found appended at the end of the minutes recorded for each monthly meeting!<sup>44</sup>

**4.3.2 Actions by the community against delinquent gurujis:** With the SMCs formed either by relatives or subservient villagers, the possibility of taking action against non-performing gurujis was highly unlikely. This stood confirmed in the field when this issue was explored with the villagers. 26 parents had reported dissatisfaction

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<sup>44</sup>*Field notes, Rewa, 20 March, 2003.* Such interactions are not easy to come by in the field because those who manage the ground reality, as guruji Arun Tiwari did in this case, usually avoid situations that could expose them before outsiders. Perhaps Arun Tiwari was over confident that his man Butan Kol would be able to at least say something about SMC . However, he might not have had an occasion to test his assumptions earlier. Thus, when the situation arose during my presence, Butan Kol was a huge embarrassment for him.

with the EGS schools mainly on the grounds of teachers' poor performance (Table 3.6 and Graph 3.7).



Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Table 3.6: Performance of EGS Schools: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Performance of EGS School	Poor (N=42)	Non-Poor (N=16)	Grand Total (N=58)
<b>Children in EGS, now or in past</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
<b>POSITIVE</b>	<b>59.52%</b>	<b>43.75%</b>	<b>55.17%</b>
<b>Very good</b>	<b>16.67%</b>	<b>12.50%</b>	<b>15.52%</b>
Guruji highly dedicated: punctual, teaches well, motivates parents for children's regular attendance	14.29%	12.50%	13.79%
Children showing goods signs of learning	2.38%	0.00%	1.72%
<b>Good</b>	<b>42.86%</b>	<b>31.25%</b>	<b>39.66%</b>
School runs timely, Guruji takes care & teaches well	33.33%	31.25%	32.76%
Guruji teaches well because interested in getting permanent (Govt. )job	4.76%	0.00%	3.45%
Guruji by and large regular and teaches well	2.38%	0.00%	1.72%
Children showing goods signs of learning	2.38%	0.00%	1.72%
<b>NEGATIVE</b>	<b>40.48%</b>	<b>56.25%</b>	<b>44.83%</b>
<b>Bad</b>	<b>21.43%</b>	<b>43.75%</b>	<b>27.59%</b>
Bad result in school, children dropped out	2.38%	6.25%	3.45%
Guruji not punctual, does not teach well, no care of children, busy in his own works	11.90%	18.75%	13.79%
Guruji not fully sincere to his duty	4.76%	12.50%	6.90%
School is not so regular	0.00%	6.25%	1.72%
Guruji taught well earlier, but losing interest and not sincere now	2.38%	0.00%	1.72%
<b>Very bad</b>	<b>19.05%</b>	<b>12.50%</b>	<b>17.24%</b>
Bad result in school, children dropped out	7.14%	6.25%	6.90%
Guruji not punctual, does not teach well, no care of children, busy in his own works	9.52%	6.25%	8.62%
No involvement of parents; and no improvement in gurujis despite villagers feedback	2.38%	0.00%	1.72%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from the field research.

When they were asked as to whether they could take action against those teachers, all of them said they were not capable of doing so (Table 3.7). The reasons expressed by 54% parents were revealing, for example: gurujis are powerful people (27% - mostly these responses came from Delhi panchayat, where this was indeed an issue); no knowledge of rules/methods for taking action (12%); and only government could take action (8%).

**Table 3.7: Possibility of action against non-performing gurujis by the parents (PTAs): All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

<b>(Those who had said EGS schools were not good)</b>	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Non-Poor</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
<b>Can you take action against gurujis who are not performing properly?</b>	<b>(N=17)</b>	<b>(N=9)</b>	<b>(N=26)</b>
<b>Can't take action, with reasons expressed</b>	<b>52.94%</b>	<b>55.56%</b>	<b>53.85%</b>
Don't know rule/method for taking action and where to complain.	11.76%	11.11%	11.54%
I could not complain anywhere because of my carelessness	0.00%	11.11%	3.85%
They are big people, how can we fight, that too alone	23.53%	22.22%	23.08%
Only government knows how to take action because it is govt. school	11.76%	0.00%	7.69%
Thinking action will hurt teacher's family, society generally has soft corner	5.88%	0.00%	3.85%
Can't oppose because teacher, being Sarpanch's man, is powerful	0.00%	11.11%	3.85%
<b>Can't take action, no reason expressed</b>	<b>47.06%</b>	<b>44.44%</b>	<b>46.15%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from the field research.

The fact of the absence of action against poorly performing gurujis, as observed in the research panchayats and its 13 EGS schools, was not confined to these areas only. It found a striking confirmation when this aspect was explored across the entirety of the three research blocks. The macro analysis of a larger database, which was painstakingly compiled for all 465 gurujis working in all 340 EGS schools in the three research blocks, revealed that not a single guruji was ever disciplined or dismissed. The majority of them (431 or 92.69%) have continued in post since the time of their appointments (mostly in 1997, but a few were appointed later as second gurujis in different schools). 34 were found to have left the service, however, it was confirmed that all had resigned, mainly due to having secured another job (mostly in Manasa block, Neemuch district).

**Table 3.8: Gurujis working in the research blocks**

Research Blocks and Districts	Number of EGS Schools	Total no. of gurujis in 2009	Gurujis still in post	Gurujis no longer in post*	Reasons for leaving the service
Raipur (K), Rewa District	177	236	229	7	As per the report from the offices in all cases, gurujis left because they secured other jobs
Ghughri, Mandla District	90	103	101	2	
Manasa, Neemuch District	73**	126	101	25	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>465</b>	<b>431</b>	<b>34</b>	

\*Numbers shown in this column are of those gurujis who left the service and were replaced by new gurujis appointed to the vacancies caused by their exit.

\*\* In one EGS school of Manasa block, the names of gurujis were not available in the database.

Source: Primary data from the field research.

It was also striking to find that none of the parents, who spoke positively about the performance of gurujis (32 out of 58 responses, see Table 3.6), said that that was so because they monitored teachers' conduct, held them to account, or kept them under discipline in any other way. In other words, the responses showed no evidence of any role played by the community in ensuring good performance by the teachers (see Table 3.9).

**Table 3.9: Reasons for gurujis good performance: all panchayats, MP (Poor+Non Poor)**

Reason for guruji performing well in school	Poor (N=25)	Non-Poor (N=7)	Grand Total (N=32)
Guruji expects to get permanent (Govt.) job	24.00%	0.00%	18.75%
Guruji values teaching job, wants to educate children, and also gets respect for this	20.00%	42.86%	25.00%
Guruji was unemployed, now gets some honorarium, satisfied with job	12.00%	14.29%	12.50%
Don't know / No Response	44.00%	42.86%	43.75%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from the field research.

The findings discussed above consolidate to clearly convey that all the crucial institutional variables of the EGS were virtually non-existent on the ground. The expected outcome of this should have been an almost non-functional EGS programme. However, it was also equally clear that all 13 EGS schools in the micro study areas were functional. More parents were satisfied than dissatisfied (see again Tables 3.6, 3.9 & 3.7 above). Some were so happy that they had transferred their children from the government to the EGS schools. Gurujis were working in all schools, though with varying degrees of

dedication, even when they experienced no community control, and had managed to colonise the SMCs with their relatives, friends and close confidants.

#### ***4.4. Performance of EGS schools***

This enormously puzzling scenario pushed the investigation further into examining the performance of EGS schools on some select objective criteria to see how well its findings additionally supported (or not) the positive findings emerging from the ethnographic observations. The enrolment data of the EGS schools were examined and compared with those of the government schools, the assumption being that if an EGS school demonstrated a significant level of enrolment, it reflected its credibility as there was no compulsion for parents to keep their children enrolled if it functioned badly. In each research panchayat other (government) schools were available and, except in the tribal regions, they were located quite close to the hamlets of the poor as can be seen in the diagrams of the research villages below (Diagrams 2 to 4). Hence, proximity to EGS schools mattered to the parents only if they were good enough in their perceptions.



Diagram 3.3: Village Map of Ramhepur Panchayat, Mandla District







Diagram 3.4: Village Map of Dongar Mandla Panchayat, Mandla District



**4.4.1. A closer look at the research panchayats:** With this consideration in mind, first the performances of the 13 EGS schools falling in the micro study area were examined. As already mentioned above, a total of 58 out of 218 respondents, or about 27%, reported that their children, 80 in total, were studying or had studied in the EGS schools (see Table 3.10). Further analysis showed that the children came not only from the extremely poor and very poor strata of society, which was expected, but also from the comparatively upper sections of the poor and even from the non-poor households (see Appendix VII for the panchayat details).<sup>45</sup> That the latter group of parents who could have afforded to send their children to government or primary schools, were also utilising the EGS, indicated confidence in the EGS school.

**Table 3. 10: Poverty profile of the households who reported their children study or studied in EGS schools  
All Panchayat, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Poverty group	Number of HHs whose children study or studied in EGS school	Percent of HHs	No. of children who study or studied in EGS	Percent of children
<b>Poor</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>72.41%*</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>78.75%<sup>#</sup></b>
Extremely Poor	1	2.38%**	1	1.59% <sup>##</sup>
Very Poor	13	30.95%**	19	30.16% <sup>##</sup>
Marginally Poor	28	66.67%**	43	68.25% <sup>##</sup>
<b>Non-Poor</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>27.59%*</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>21.25%<sup>#</sup></b>
Marginally Non Poor	15	93.75%**	16	94.12% <sup>##</sup>
Better off	1	6.25%**	1	5.88% <sup>##</sup>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\* Percentage against the grand total figure of 58 HHs.

\*\* Percentage against the sub-total figures of the poor HHs (42) and the non-poor HHs (16).

# Percentage against the grand total figure of 80 children.

## Percentage against the sub-total figures of the poor HHs' children (63) and the non-poor HHs' children (17).

Source: Primary data from the field research.

Encouraged by this finding, an attempt was made to see how representative these responses were. If these 58 respondents had not concentrated in our sample group by fluke, but were representative of households preferring the EGS schools, then an extrapolation of their responses should give the independent response-based figures of the total enrolment in the EGS schools for each panchayat. If these compared well with the official figures of the enrolment, it would not only lend credence to the

<sup>45</sup>Percentage of non-poor respondents appears higher in certain panchayats, but this is because of deliberate pro-poor bias of the total sample which gives about 20% non-poor in the sample group. Hence, the responses in percentage terms from this group appear at times quite high.

representativeness of the former, but also help to assess the credibility of the official figures, which are usually suspected to be inflated.

Following this approach, the necessary calculations were arrived at<sup>46</sup> and are reported side-by-side with the official enrolment figures in Table 3.11. As this shows, the extrapolated response-based figures of enrolment not only compare quite well with the official figures, but are even higher<sup>47</sup> than the latter except in Sandiya panchayat. This somewhat surprisingly rendered the official figures quite credible since usually they are suspected to remain inflated.

**Table 3.11: Enrolment in EGS school: comparison of people’s response-based figures with the official data: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

All Panchayats, MP	Enrolment in EGS Schools		
	Extrapolated figures from responses of sample HHs (2009-10)*	Official data (2009-10)**	Official data (2008-09)***
<b>Rewa</b>	<b>231</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>222</b>
Delhi	150	123	132
Silpari	81	74	90
<b>Mandla</b>	<b>399</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>302</b>
Ramhepur	123	115	124
Dongarmandla	276	193	178
<b>Neemuch</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>145</b>
Sandiya	61	130	145
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>691</b>	<b>635</b>	<b>669</b>

Source of \*: Calculated from responses of 58 samples HHs who reported that their children, total 80, were enrolled in EGS schools now or in the past. For details of this calculation, see Appendix VIII.

Source of \*\*: Compiled from official data base of enrolment in all types of schools in MP for 2009-10 available at: [www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt\\_Enrollments\\_Schoolwise.aspx](http://www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt_Enrollments_Schoolwise.aspx)

Source of \*\*\*: Compiled from school report cards data base of all types of schools in MP for 2008-09 available at: <http://www.schoolreportcards.in/>

<sup>46</sup>The details of the calculations are provided in Appendix VIII. Basically the average number of children studying in the EGS schools per household was calculated from the sample group responses and proportionally applied to the entire households of the panchayat separately for the poor and non-poor households.

<sup>47</sup>In Dongarmandla and Delhi panchayats, the official figures of 193 and 123 are considerably lower than the extrapolated response-based figures of 276 and 150 respectively. This is understandable because responses included the numbers of children who had studied in EGS schools in the past, but had either gone to higher classes or were not studying during the time of field survey (2009). If these are separated out, the differences would minimise.

This encouraging finding led to a further comparison of the performance of the EGS and the government primary schools along their enrolment figures for all and ST children. Since the number of EGS and government schools were not equal, their school enrolment figures were compared against the panchayat's overall average enrolment figures for all schools combined. The results presented in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 show a higher enrolment percentage in EGS schools in four of the five research panchayats. Most surprising is the fact the EGS schools' enrolments in Delhi panchayat is the highest of all (147.62% and 153.33% in cases of all and ST children respectively, or about 1.5 times the overall panchayat average enrolment in each case).

Further, the disaggregated school picture (Table 3.14) demonstrates that generally the EGS schools have fared better than the government ones except in Ramhepur panchayat. Surprisingly, the EGS school, Dihiya tola, in Rewa district, where the guruji had very close links to the sarpanch, is at the top of all 27 EGS and government schools combined. After seeing how badly the JRY and EAS schemes were implemented and misused in panchayats in Rewa district, primarily because of sarpanchs' unchallenged position in this region, intuitively one would have expected to find similar poor performance in regard to EGS schools here as well at least, if not in others. Thus, the contrary findings appeared remarkably counter-intuitive and puzzling.

**Table 3.12: Panchayat-wise comparison of performance of EGS and PS schools by Total Enrolment: All Panchayats, MP**

All Panchayats, MP	EGS			Primary School			Overall average total enrol. per school in each panchayat
	No. of EGS schools	Average total enrolment per EGS school	% against overall panchayat avg. of total enrol. (% of col. 3 over col. 8)	No. of primary schools	Average total enrolment per govt. school	% against overall panchayat avg. of total enrol. (% of col. 6 over col. 8)	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Rewa</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>128.95</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>78.95</b>	<b>38</b>
Delhi	2	62	147.62	3	30	71.43	42
Silpari	2	37	112.12	3	31	93.94	33
<b>Mandla</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>102.27</b>	<b>44</b>
Dongarmandla	4	48	106.67	3	41	91.11	45
Ramhepur	3	38	88.37	3	48	111.63	43
<b>Neemuch</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>103.17</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>96.83</b>	<b>63</b>
Sandiya	2	65	103.17	2	61	96.83	63

Source: Compiled from official data base of enrolment in all types of schools in MP for 2009-10 available at: [www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt\\_Enrollments\\_Schoolwise.aspx](http://www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt_Enrollments_Schoolwise.aspx)

**Table 3.13: Panchayat-wise comparison of performance of EGS and PS schools by ST enrolment: All Panchayats, MP**

All Panchayats, MP	EGS			Primary School			Overall average ST enrol. per school in each panchayat
	No. of EGS schools	Average ST enrolment per EGS school	% against overall panchayat avg. of ST enrol. (% of col. 3 over col. 8)	No. of Primary schools	Average ST enrolment per govt. school	% against overall panchayat avg. of ST enrol. (% of col. 6 over col. 8)	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Rewa</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>150.00</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>75.00</b>	<b>8</b>
Delhi	2	23	153.33	3	10	66.67	15
Silpari	2	0	0.00	3	1	100.00	1
<b>Mandla</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>39</b>
Dongarmandla	4	32	91.43	3	38	108.57	35
Ramhepur	3	45	107.14	3	39	92.86	42
<b>Neemuch</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>166.67</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>33.33</b>	<b>3</b>
Sandiya	2	5	166.67	2	1	33.33	3

Source: Compiled from official data base of enrolment in all types of schools in MP for 2009-10 available at: [www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt\\_Enrollments\\_Schoolwise.aspx](http://www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt_Enrollments_Schoolwise.aspx)

The individual school findings are also amazingly consistent with the qualitative findings in these areas. Together they clearly establish that gurus' punctuality and dedication to teaching, and also their attitude towards the children directly affected enrolment. Other infrastructures were not so crucial. For example, in the field Arun Tiwari was spoken of with admiration in Delhi panchayat, but Mrs. Geeta Diwedi was not treated as highly as him. The data analysis corroborated this by showing her school's enrolment as lower (126.19%) than Tiwari's (166.67%). The effect of gurus' performance was even more sharply visible in the tribal region. In Dongarmandla, three out of four EGS schools registered higher than the average enrolment (see Table 3.14). Interviewees said that two of them were even felicitated by the Education Department for achieving 100% pass result in their final fifth class. Munnalal Dhurve, guruji of EGS Kukrakol Tola, was the nephew of the erstwhile sarpanch and yet he performed well to ensure both the highest enrolment and 100% pass results. The other guruji, Dalsingh Tekam, also ensured high enrolment and similar results even when, as highlighted above (Diagram 1), he had literally turned his SMC into his pocket committee.

**Table 3.14: School-wise comparison of performance of EGS and PS schools by Total Enrolment:  
All Panchayats, MP**

Name of the schools	School Type	Total Enrolment	% Total enrolment against overall panchayat avg. (% of col. 3 over col. 5)	Overall average total enrol. per school in each panchayat	Rank
1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>Rewa district EGS</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>128.95</b>	<b>38</b>	
<b>Rewa district PS</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>78.95</b>	<b>38</b>	
<b>Delhi EGS Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>147.62</b>	<b>42</b>	
EGS Dihiya Tola (Delhi)	EGS	70	166.67	42	1
EGS Naveen Delhi	EGS	53	126.19	42	2
<b>Delhi Primary Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>71.43</b>	<b>42</b>	
RgPSm PS Mohagarh	PS	36	85.71	42	3
PS Girls Delhi	PS	32	76.19	42	4
GPS Delhi	PS	21	50.00	42	5
<b>Silpari EGS Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>112.12</b>	<b>33</b>	
EGS Patehara	EGS	50	151.52	33	1
EGS Mahua	EGS	24	72.73	33	4
<b>Silpari Primary Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>93.94</b>	<b>33</b>	
GPS Mahua	PS	40	121.21	33	2
GPS Boys Silpari	PS	35	106.06	33	3
GPS Girls Silpari	PS	18	54.55	33	5
<b>Mandla district EGS Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>44</b>	
<b>Mandla district PS Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>102.27</b>	<b>44</b>	
<b>Dongarmandla EGS Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>106.67</b>	<b>45</b>	
EGS Kukrakol Katangi	EGS	55	122.22	45	1
EGS Bajartola Dongarmandla	EGS	54	120.00	45	2
EGS Mukaddamtola Dongarmandla	EGS	48	106.67	45	3
EGS Manglatola Katangi	EGS	36	80.00	45	7
<b>Dongarmandla Primary Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>91.11</b>	<b>45</b>	
PS Dongarmandla	PS	44	97.78	45	4
PS Gullukhoh	PS	43	95.56	45	5
PS Katangi	PS	37	82.22	45	6
<b>Ramhepur EGS Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>88.37</b>	<b>43</b>	
EGS Jhiriyatola Dalkagopangi	EGS	46	106.98	43	2
EGS Bertola Dalkagopangi	EGS	36	83.72	43	5
EGS Mototola Ramhepur	EGS	33	76.74	43	6
<b>Ramhepur Primary Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>111.63</b>	<b>43</b>	
PS Gopangi	PS	67	155.81	43	1
Girls PS Ramhepur	PS	39	90.70	43	3
Boys PS Ramhepur	PS	38	88.37	43	4
<b>Neemuch district EGS Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>103.17</b>	<b>63</b>	
<b>Neemuch district PS Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>96.83</b>	<b>63</b>	
<b>Sandiya EGS Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>103.17</b>	<b>63</b>	
EGS Kund Kheda	EGS	75	119.05	63	2
EGS Chukani Kheda	EGS	55	87.30	63	3
<b>Sandiya PS Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>96.83</b>	<b>63</b>	
PS.Sandiya	PS	91	144.44	63	1
PS.Chukni	PS	31	49.21	63	4

Note: GPS / PS = Govt. Primary School; RgPSm = Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Mission.

Source: Compiled from official data base of enrolment in all types of schools in MP for 2009-10 available at: [www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt\\_Enrollments\\_Schoolwise.aspx](http://www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt_Enrollments_Schoolwise.aspx)


**4.4.2. A broader view across the research blocks:** An attempt was also made to look at a wider picture of the comparative performance of 340 EGS and 415 government schools operational in the three research blocks across 164 out of its 217 panchayats.<sup>48</sup> The same methodology, which has been employed for comparing EGS and government schools in the micro study area (see Section 4.4.1 and Table 3.14), was followed. The comparative findings presented here pertain only to the enrolment of ST children in order to focus on the pro-poor dimension of performance, since the Scheduled Tribes comprise the poorest strata of society in MP. Therefore, panchayats with either negligible or nil ST enrolment, because of minuscule or absent ST population in their areas were excluded from this analysis, giving a final total of 303 EGS schools and 356 government schools for comparison.

Due to the high number of schools compared here, it is not possible to present individual comparative results in the same way as was done for the schools in the research panchayats (see Table 3.14). Therefore, schools have been aggregated into four groups, for example 'Very high' (150% and above) where ST enrolment is 1.5 times or more of their respective panchayat's average ST enrolment and 'High' (149% to 100%) clubs those which have ST enrolment falling within the range of 1.49 times to an equal of their respective panchayat's average (see Appendix IX for individual results).

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<sup>48</sup>14 panchayats in Rewa, 4 in Mandla and 35 in Neemuch have been excluded from the analysis, as they do not have EGS schools in their areas. Consequently, 166 primary schools operational in these panchayats are also not covered by the analysis.

**Graph 3.8: School-wise comparison of ST enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Raipur (K) Block, Rewa District, MP**  
 [ Total EGS School= 164 / Total PS school= 166 ]




Source: Compiled from official data base of enrolment in all types of schools in MP for 2009-10 available at: [www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt\\_Enrollments\\_Schoolwise.aspx](http://www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt_Enrollments_Schoolwise.aspx)

Graph 3.8 shows the result for the research block in Rewa district. It is remarkable to find that 25.61% of EGS schools as against 25.30% of government schools are doing quite well (very high group). Overall, the EGS schools in Rewa seem to be performing as well or as poorly as the government schools. This may appear even more remarkable when the data on the caste background of gurujis are examined. In 164 EGS schools under comparison here, 217 gurujis are employed. 154, or 71%, gurujis come from the forward castes, mostly from the powerful and usually locally dominant Brahman castes, but also from the other powerful Rajput castes.<sup>49</sup> Usually they are connected to sarpanchs (as is the case in Delhi panchayat; see Section 4.2.2). Hence, if they wanted to shirk their duties, or worse, run their schools literally on paper, they might have succeeded because of their local power base that would have shielded them from the people's reactions. Yet a number of schools where they teach appear to be attracting children, from the poorest strata of the society, in as good numbers as the government

<sup>49</sup>These figures come from another comprehensive database compiled on the caste and educational profiles of 466 gurujis working in 415 EGS schools in the three research blocks.


schools. This indeed offers a powerful counter to the received wisdom that elite control of resources and positions of authority is usually the prime factor behind the vitiation of pro-poor programmes.



Source: Compiled from official data base of enrolment in all types of schools in MP for 2009-10 available at: [www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt\\_Enrollments\\_Schoolwise.aspx](http://www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt_Enrollments_Schoolwise.aspx)

In Ghughri block in Mandla district, where there is a comparatively high ST population, the performance of EGS schools looks almost exactly equal (much more than in Rewa) to that of government schools. In fact, 47.78% of EGS schools as against 47.42% government schools appear in the very high and high group combined (Graph 3.9). This, is understandable, since it is in the tribal regions of MP that the problem of widely dispersed hamlets limiting the access of children to schools used to be acutely felt. A comparison of the village maps of Ramhepur and Dongarmandla panchayats (Diagrams 3 and 4) with those of the panchayats in Rewa (Diagram 2) shows this clearly. Hence, the better accessibility factor helps the EGS schools in Mandla in gaining comparable enrolment figures.

**Graph 3.10: School-wise comparison of ST enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Manasa Block, Neemuch District, MP**  
 [ Total EGS School= 49 / Total PS school= 74 ]



Source: Compiled from official data base of enrolment in all types of schools in MP for 2009-10 available at: [www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt\\_Enrollments\\_Schoolwise.aspx](http://www.educationportal.mp.gov.in/Enrollments/Public/reports/Rpt_Enrollments_Schoolwise.aspx)

Neemuch seems to be a completely different story. First, compared to other regions relatively fewer EGS schools opened in Manasa block (73 EGS schools vs. 236 government schools). This may be due to the more densely populated hamlets in this area, thus not fulfilling opening criteria. Second, EGS schools do not seem to be stable here because of a comparatively higher turnover of gurujis (see Table 3.8). This region seems to offer attractive alternative employment opportunities to gurujis more than other regions. This may be a factor in explaining why EGS schools here appear to be not performing as well as in the other regions discussed. As Graph 3.10 shows, in every group the enrolment rate in EGS schools are considerably lower than in the government schools. Only 22% of EGS schools are in the very high and high groups vs. 47.30% government schools and 62% of EGS schools fall into the very low performing group vs. only 30% of government schools.

Bearing this in mind it would be fair to observe that the rather surprising scenario of an overall better performance by EGS schools in the micro study area (Section 4.4.1) does

not appear to be the exception. The macro picture by and large confirms this. The case of Neemuch may be an exception, not so much due to the problem of poor performance by gurujis, but, as already highlighted above, more on account of the high turnover of gurujis because of a more elastic job market prevalent there than in other areas.

## **5. Summary: Failed Logic and Yet Impressive Performance - An Enormous Puzzle**

The findings above taken together strongly challenge the official and also a few academic analyses that claim that the EGS worked because of the force of its institutional foundation and innovation.

*First*, the rights offered by the scheme were supposed to create an enabling and empowering environment for the poor to demand opening of EGS schools in their areas. Manor claims that these people's rights in turn even empowered the government of MP, for "it was the residents of the most deprived villages of the state whose demands informed them that half of the state's villages lacked schools," which "*at the outset, the Chief Minister and his two aides..... did not know.*" They only discovered this because the Education Guarantee Scheme was a demand-driven programme."<sup>50</sup> However, it was found that largely neither the villagers were aware of these rights, nor were schools opened by the people's demand from below. Further, though ironically and also contrary to Manor's understanding, the Government of MP knew of the lack of schooling facilities in different parts of the state, even before the start of the EGS through the LSA and its school-mapping exercise conducted in 1996 (Section 2).

In short, there was no evidence of the people demanding opening of EGS schools. Yet, records showed that a considerable number of EGS schools did open, *as if some hidden force directed them to come up where villagers too might have wanted them had they demanded for such schools.*

*Second*, the appointments of gurujis were left entirely in the hands of the community, with the view that apart from being transparent, such a process would underwrite their accountability to the community right from the beginning. The field realities were starkly different: sarpanchs, and not the community, were the real employers of

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<sup>50</sup> Manor (2007: 92; emphasis added).

gurujis. They dictated this process not always to make money or favour their relatives, but sometimes, like a benevolent *zamindar* of the local area, to help unemployed but educated youth. Whatever the motives, it became clear that the community was largely not involved, nor did they ever feel that they had a moral or an official command over the gurujis appointed.

On the connected issue of the community structures it can be said that while the PTAs and the SMCs were expected to act as a kind of an institutionalized expression of the community ownership and control of the EGS schools including the gurujis, they were hardly formed through any open participatory process. Usually gurujis constituted the SMCs so as to render them silent and subservient, either by bringing in their relatives, or villagers too vulnerable to the power they wielded through their connections with the powerful sarpanch to raise their voice. These structures, therefore, were hardly recognized even by their members, let alone the other villagers and were mostly non-functional or ineffective. These field realities once again contradict Manor's findings that the new accountability mechanism, founded on the principle of the community's power to appoint gurujis and run the schools, ensured "accountability of the new teachers".

And yet it is also the fact that in the research panchayats gurujis were found largely working diligently. A few were said to be quite friendly to and caring of the children, so much so that some villagers moved their children from government to EGS schools. These gave an impression that, despite the collapse of community-controlled accountability system, mostly gurujis worked *as if they were driven by some underlying motives that still made them perform in such ways so as to give an appearance of their accountability towards the parents and the community.*

*Third, gurujis' apparent accountable performance was observed even when they earned pathetically low salaries* in comparison to their counterparts in the government schools, and had to teach under debilitating conditions of lack of teaching spaces and paucity of other infrastructures in comparison to what was available to government schools.

*Fourth,* these qualitative findings indicating largely positive functioning of EGS schools were strongly confirmed by quantitative findings on the comparative enrolment status of government and EGS schools, both in the research panchayats and across wider areas of the research blocks. Enough children were attracted to the EGS schools to keep their enrolment figures comparable to, and even better in some

cases, than those of the government schools, more so in the case of children from the poor sections of the society.

Quite clearly, taken together these findings indicate a collapse of the institutional features and the force behind the EGS. But at the same time they also tell a positive story of the functioning of the EGS schools. Obviously, these counterintuitive outcomes paint a puzzling scenario and throw up a rather unique analytical challenge to the task of unravelling them. It is unique because usually when premises of a programme fall apart on the ground, its outcomes are also vitiated. However, the story of the EGS is in sharp contrast to this understanding, since its outcomes appear largely positive even though its premises had nearly collapsed. This may even push for a rewriting of the saying mentioned in the beginning of the paper: “Where there is a will, there is an EGS school!” to “EGS schools everywhere and largely working well, but neither willed nor controlled by the people!” WP 5 explains how this reversal of the saying regarding the EGS schools could become possible in the field of MP.

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**Appendix I: Awareness and understanding of EGS: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Have you heard of EGS? What do you know of EGS?	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
<b>Not heard of EGS</b>	<b>46.15%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>44.83%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>20.51%</b>	<b>27.27%</b>	<b>8.70%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>41.67%</b>	<b>30.00%</b>	<b>33.73%</b>	<b>11.54%</b>
<b>Heard of EGS</b>	<b>53.85%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>55.17%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>79.49%</b>	<b>72.73%</b>	<b>91.30%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>58.33%</b>	<b>70.00%</b>	<b>66.27%</b>	<b>88.46%</b>
<b>Almost Complete Understanding of Villagers' right and other criteria</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>10.26%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>33.33%</b>	<b>2.78%</b>	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>3.01%</b>	<b>11.54%</b>
Villagers' right to open EGS school when no Govt. school within 1 km and 25 or more children in need of education	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.26%	18.18%	0.00%	33.33%	2.78%	10.00%	3.01%	11.54%
<b>Knowledge of criteria, but unaware of the "Right" dimension</b>	<b>5.13%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>17.95%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>8.70%</b>	<b>22.22%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>6.63%</b>	<b>9.62%</b>
EGS school When no Govt's school within 1-2 km	5.13%	0.00%	0.00%	18.18%	17.95%	9.09%	8.70%	22.22%	0.00%	0.00%	6.63%	9.62%
<b>Some General Sense, but unaware of the "Right" and other crucial criteria</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>3.45%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>8.33%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.41%</b>	<b>9.62%</b>
20-25 children in need of education	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Govt's special school to ensure every child is educated	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	9.09%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	3.85%
Have school where there was none	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.56%	0.00%	1.20%	0.00%
Panchayat to open school where there was none	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
School for Right to free Education	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
School nearby so that small children need not go long distance to study	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
<b>Knowledge irrelevant to EGS's idea</b>	<b>25.64%</b>	<b>27.27%</b>	<b>6.90%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>12.82%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>8.33%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>12.05%</b>	<b>7.69%</b>
Devi Prasad (Sarpanch) opened School	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
For Teaching Children	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Guruji's School	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.26%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.41%	0.00%
It is a school	5.13%	0.00%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.81%	0.00%
School gives meal, cloth, etc.	20.51%	18.18%	3.45%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	6.02%	5.77%
Teacher's salary lesser	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
World Bank's Scheme	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
<b>Only heard the name</b>	<b>23.08%</b>	<b>54.55%</b>	<b>44.83%</b>	<b>54.55%</b>	<b>38.46%</b>	<b>36.36%</b>	<b>82.61%</b>	<b>44.44%</b>	<b>38.89%</b>	<b>60.00%</b>	<b>42.17%</b>	<b>50.00%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix II: Difference between EGS and other schools: All panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Difference between EGS and other schools	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
<b>Yes, EGS Different</b>	<b>30.77%</b>	<b>45.45%</b>	<b>27.59%</b>	<b>54.55%</b>	<b>28.21%</b>	<b>36.36%</b>	<b>4.35%</b>	<b>33.33%</b>	<b>30.56%</b>	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>25.90%</b>	<b>36.54%</b>
<i>Because EGS under community control - discloses correct understanding</i>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.78%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
Because villagers' appoint guruji and supervise EGS school	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
<i>Because EGS under PRI's control - discloses some understanding</i>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>1.92%</b>
Because established by Sarpanch/Panchayat not Govt.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	1.92%
<i>Because EGS better - but main reason of community control not told</i>	<b>20.51%</b>	<b>27.27%</b>	<b>20.69%</b>	<b>36.36%</b>	<b>20.51%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>4.35%</b>	<b>22.22%</b>	<b>5.56%</b>	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>15.06%</b>	<b>23.08%</b>
Because better school	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	10.26%	9.09%	4.35%	11.11%	2.78%	0.00%	3.61%	5.77%
Because better than govt. school	0.00%	0.00%	10.34%	0.00%	10.26%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	4.22%	1.92%
Because children get meal and/or uniform	12.82%	9.09%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.01%	3.85%
Because even child labourers can go	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Because guruji teaches well/takes care	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	1.92%
Because it is Private school	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Because near to dwelling of poor children	7.69%	9.09%	6.90%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.01%	5.77%
Because only upto 5th, govt. upto 8th	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
<i>Because EGS not good - but main reason of community control not told</i>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>6.90%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>13.89%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>5.42%</b>	<b>5.77%</b>
Because Guruji insincere	2.56%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	1.92%
Because not good - only 1 or 2 teacher, more teachers in govt. school	0.00%	0.00%	6.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.56%	0.00%	2.41%	0.00%
Because only upto 5th, govt. upto 8th	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Because sarpanch & secretary misutilised the funds	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Because school timing short and against rule	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Because Teaching in Govt. school better than EGS	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.56%	0.00%	1.81%	0.00%

Difference between EGS and other schools	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
<b>Other reasons - but main reason of community control not told</b>	<b>7.69%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>8.33%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>4.22%</b>	<b>5.77%</b>
Because less control by Govt., funds separate	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Because runs on central fund, govt. school on state fund	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Because teacher's appointment done differently, but education same	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Because teacher's job not secure as in govt. school	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Because teacher's pay controlled by govt. school	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Because teacher's salary less than govt. teacher's salary	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	1.20%	0.00%
EGS building is different, but no difference in education	5.13%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%	1.92%
<b>Don't know</b>	<b>48.72%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>51.72%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>46.15%</b>	<b>45.45%</b>	<b>78.26%</b>	<b>55.56%</b>	<b>41.67%</b>	<b>60.00%</b>	<b>51.20%</b>	<b>36.54%</b>
<b>No, EGS not different</b>	<b>20.51%</b>	<b>36.36%</b>	<b>20.69%</b>	<b>36.36%</b>	<b>25.64%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>17.39%</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>27.78%</b>	<b>30.00%</b>	<b>22.89%</b>	<b>26.92%</b>
<b>Both same - no reason</b>	<b>12.82%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>20.69%</b>	<b>27.27%</b>	<b>25.64%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>17.39%</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>27.78%</b>	<b>30.00%</b>	<b>21.08%</b>	<b>21.15%</b>
<b>Education quality same as in other schools</b>	<b>5.13%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>1.20%</b>	<b>3.85%</b>
<b>Education quality as poor as in other schools</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>1.92%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix III: Knowledge about the process of the opening of EGS schools: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Knowledge about how EGS school was open	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
<b>No</b>	<b>58.97%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>68.97%</b>	<b>54.55%</b>	<b>74.36%</b>	<b>63.64%</b>	<b>86.96%</b>	<b>55.56%</b>	<b>66.67%</b>	<b>60.00%</b>	<b>69.88%</b>	<b>50.00%</b>
<b>Yes</b>	<b>41.03%</b>	<b>81.82%</b>	<b>31.03%</b>	<b>45.45%</b>	<b>25.64%</b>	<b>36.36%</b>	<b>13.04%</b>	<b>44.44%</b>	<b>33.33%</b>	<b>40.00%</b>	<b>30.12%</b>	<b>50.00%</b>
<b>By Sarpanch in some way or other</b>	<b>41.03%</b>	<b>81.82%</b>	<b>31.03%</b>	<b>45.45%</b>	<b>10.26%</b>	<b>27.27%</b>	<b>13.04%</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>30.56%</b>	<b>30.00%</b>	<b>25.90%</b>	<b>40.38%</b>
<i>Sarpanch directly managed (without villagers' knowledge &amp; involvement)</i>	<b>41.03%</b>	<b>72.73%</b>	<b>24.14%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>7.69%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>8.70%</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>25.00%</b>	<b>20.00%</b>	<b>22.29%</b>	<b>26.92%</b>
Few villagers managed meeting and open the school	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
On proposal from higher office above, sarpanch managed to open the school and took bribe to appoint Guruji.	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Panchayat opened the school	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	8.70%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	1.81%	1.92%
Sarpanch and panchayat secretary somehow manage to opened the school	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
Sarpanch managed it for employing her relative as Guruji	15.38%	36.36%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.61%	7.69%
Sarpanch managed to open the school on the request of villagers	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Sarpanch somehow managed to open the school	7.69%	27.27%	17.24%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	19.44%	20.00%	9.04%	9.62%
Sarpanch somehow managed to open the school, seeing the difficulty of children in going to distant Govt. school	12.82%	0.00%	0.00%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.01%	3.85%
Sarpanch stealthily opened the school	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	1.20%	0.00%
Sarpanch stealthily opened the school and got relative appointed as Guruji	2.56%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	1.92%
Sarpanch took people's signature/thumb impression on petition and managed to open the school	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.13%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%	0.00%

Knowledge about how EGS school was open	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
<b><i>On Sarpanch's initiative and guidance</i></b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>3.45%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>4.35%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>5.56%</b>	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>3.01%</b>	<b>9.62%</b>
Sarpanch organised <i>gram sabha</i> and opened the school	0.00%	9.09%	3.45%	9.09%	2.56%	18.18%	4.35%	0.00%	2.78%	10.00%	2.41%	9.62%
Villagers proposed. Block officials verified and opened the school.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
<b><i>On block office instruction, Sarpanch opened the school</i></b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>3.45%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>3.85%</b>
On block office instruction, Sarpanch sent proposal and school was opened	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
On block office instruction, village meeting was organised to open the school	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	1.92%
<b>Managed by influential villager</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.78%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
<b>Local youth interested in becoming Guruji's managed paper works (without villagers' real involvement)</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>5.13%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>1.20%</b>	<b>1.92%</b>
<b><i>Demand by villagers in open meeting as per their right</i></b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>10.26%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>33.33%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>2.41%</b>	<b>7.69%</b>
<i>Gram sabha</i> (village council) opened the school and appointed Guruji	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
<i>Gram sabha</i> (village council) proposed that was approved by Govt., then school opened and Guruji appointed	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	1.92%
<i>Gram sabha</i> (village council) proposed. Block officials verified and opened the school.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.69%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	1.81%	1.92%
On Govt. order <i>gram sabha</i> meeting was organised to open the school	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
School opened after 60 days of <i>Gram sabha</i> (village council) proposal	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.92%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from field research

**Appendix IV: Knowledge of the process of Guruji's appointment: All Panchayats, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Knowledge of Guruji appointment method	Delhi		Silpari		Ramhepur		Dongarmandla		Sandiya		Grand Total	
	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=29)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=39)	Non-Poor (N=11)	Poor (N=23)	Non-Poor (N=9)	Poor (N=36)	Non-Poor (N=10)	Poor (N=166)	Non-Poor (N=52)
<b>Don't know</b>	<b>64.10%</b>	<b>36.36%</b>	<b>82.76%</b>	<b>45.45%</b>	<b>69.23%</b>	<b>54.55%</b>	<b>65.22%</b>	<b>22.22%</b>	<b>77.78%</b>	<b>60.00%</b>	<b>71.69%</b>	<b>44.23%</b>
<b>Yes</b>	<b>35.90%</b>	<b>63.64%</b>	<b>17.24%</b>	<b>54.55%</b>	<b>30.77%</b>	<b>45.45%</b>	<b>34.78%</b>	<b>77.78%</b>	<b>22.22%</b>	<b>40.00%</b>	<b>28.31%</b>	<b>55.77%</b>
<b>Correct appointment done by community itself</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>6.90%</b>	<b>45.45%</b>	<b>25.64%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>26.09%</b>	<b>66.67%</b>	<b>2.78%</b>	<b>20.00%</b>	<b>11.45%</b>	<b>28.85%</b>
<b>No village meeting; Sarpanch appointed directly because of relation</b>	<b>33.33%</b>	<b>63.64%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>8.70%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>9.64%</b>	<b>13.46%</b>
<b>No village meeting: Sarpanch appointed directly for other considerations</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>10.34%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>27.27%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>19.44%</b>	<b>20.00%</b>	<b>7.23%</b>	<b>13.46%</b>
<b><i>Because of good reasons: Candidate meritorious and poor</i></b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.56%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>8.33%</b>	<b>20.00%</b>	<b>3.01%</b>	<b>3.85%</b>
Sarpanch appointed directly because candidate had merit/was in merit list	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.56%	10.00%	2.41%	1.92%
Sarpanch appointed directly because candidate was educated & poor	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Sarpanch appointed directly because candidate was poor and unemployed	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	1.92%
<b><i>Because of wrong reasons: bribe, political help, etc.</i></b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>10.34%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.78%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>2.41%</b>	<b>3.85%</b>
Sarpanch appointed directly because candidate was from home village	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Sarpanch appointed directly because of bribe	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%	0.00%
Sarpanch appointed directly because of friendship	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.85%
Sarpanch appointed directly for political help	0.00%	0.00%	6.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%	0.00%
<b><i>Because of pressure from above: pressure from block officers</i></b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>2.78%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>1.92%</b>
Sarpanch appointed under direction/pressure of block officers	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	2.78%	0.00%	0.60%	1.92%
<b><i>Not aware of the other considerations</i></b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>5.56%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>1.20%</b>	<b>3.85%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Primary data from the field research.


**Appendix V: Relationship between Guruji, Chairman and Members of the School Management Committee**

Panchayat	Village & Tola	Name of EGS	Total PTA Members	Members related to Chairman, Guruji (% to total in parenthesis)	Members related with each other (% of total in parenthesis)	Is Guruji related with Sarpanch? If yes, nature of Relationship.
Delhi	Delhi, Dihiya Tola	EGS Dihiya Tola	12	0	0	Yes, Brother in law of Sarpanch
Delhi	Delhi Main village	EGS Naveen,	13	2 (15.4%)	2 (15.4%)	No
Silpari	Harijan Basti, Mahua	EGS Harijan Basti, Mahua	13	6 (46.2%)	8 (61.5%)	No
Silpari	Patehra	EGS Patehra	12	0	2 (16.7%)	No
Ramhepur	Moto Tola, Ramhepur	EGS Moto Tola	12**	0	6 (50.0%)	No
Ramhepur	Ber Tola, Dalka Gopangi	EGS Ber Tola	13**	2 (15.4%)	12	No
Ramhepur	Jhiria Tola, Dalka Gopangi	EGS Jhiria Tola	15#	2 (13.3%)	8 (53.3%)	No
Dongarmandla	Mukaddam Tola, Dongarmandla	EGS Mukaddam Tola	11*	5 (45.5%)	11 (100.0%)	No
Dongarmandla	Bazar Tola, Dongarmandla	EGS Bazar Tola	12	0	3 (25.0%)	No
Dongarmandla	Kukra Kol Tola, Katangi	EGS Kukra Kol Tola	9	0	0	Yes (Nephew of Sarpanch)
Dongarmandla	Mangla Tola, Katangi	EGS Mangla Tola, Katangi	23	3 (13.04%)	9 (39.10)	No
Sandiya	Kund Kheda, Sandiya	EGS Kund Kheda	9	5 (55.6%)	7 (77.8%)	No
Sandiya	Chukni Kheda, Chukni	EGS Chukni Kheda	10	8 (80.0%)	10 (100.0)	No


Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix VI: Members of the SMCs : Independent or Interrelated?**

**SMC: EGS MANGLA TOLA, KATANGI VILLAGE,  
DONGAR MANDLA PANCHAYAT, MANDLA  
Total SMC Member : 23**




**SMC: EGS MOTO TOLA, RAMHEPUR VILLAGE  
RAMHEPUR PANCHAYAT, MANDLA  
Total SMC Member : 12**



Appendix VI..... contd.

**SMC: BER TOLA, DALKA GOPANGI VILLAGE  
RAMHEPUR PANCHAYAT, MANDLA  
Total SMC Member : 13**



**Appendix VII: Poverty profile of the Households who reported their children study or have study in EGS schools  
All Panchayat, MP (Poor & Non-Poor)**

Poverty group	No. of HHs whose children Study or studies in EGS school	Percent of HHs	No. of boys who study or studies in EGS	Percent of Boys	No. of girls who study or studies in EGS	Percent of Girls	No. of children who study or studies in EGS	Percent of children
<b>Delhi</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>18.97</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10.00</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22.50</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16.25</b>
<b>Poor</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>54.55</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>50.00</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>66.67</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>61.54</b>
Extremely Poor	1	16.67	0	0.00	1	16.67	1	12.50
Very Poor	4	66.67	1	50.00	5	83.33	6	75.00
Marginally Poor	1	16.67	1	50.00	0	0.00	1	12.50
<b>Non-Poor</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>45.45</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>50.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>33.33</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>38.46</b>
Marginally Non Poor	5	100.00	2	100.00	3	100.00	5	100.00
<b>Silpari</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8.62</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5.00</b>
<b>Poor</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>40.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>25.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>25.00</b>
Very Poor	1	50.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Marginally Poor	1	50.00	1	100.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
<b>Non-Poor</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>60.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>75.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>75.00</b>
Marginally Non Poor	2	66.67	2	66.67	0	0.00	2	66.67
Better off	1	33.33	1	33.33	0	0.00	1	33.33
<b>Ramhepur</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>29.31</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7.50</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>32.50</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>20.00</b>
<b>Poor</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>70.59</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>76.92</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>81.25</b>
Very Poor	3	25.00	1	33.33	3	30.00	4	30.77
Marginally Poor	9	75.00	2	66.67	7	70.00	9	69.23
<b>Non-Poor</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>29.41</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>23.08</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>18.75</b>
Marginally Non Poor	5	100.00	0	0.00	3	100.00	3	100.00
<b>Dongarmandla</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20.69</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>25.00</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22.50</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23.75</b>
<b>Poor</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>75.00</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>60.00</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>77.78</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>68.42</b>
Very Poor	2	22.22	1	16.67	0	0.00	1	7.69
Marginally Poor	7	77.78	5	83.33	7	100.00	12	92.31
<b>Non-Poor</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>25.00</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>40.00</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>22.22</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>31.58</b>
Marginally Non Poor	3	100.00	4	100.00	2	100.00	6	100.00
<b>Sandiya</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>22.41</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>47.50</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22.50</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>35.00</b>
<b>Poor</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100.00</b>
Very Poor	3	23.08	7	36.84	1	11.11	8	28.57
Marginally Poor	10	76.92	12	63.16	8	88.89	20	71.43
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100.00</b>
<b>Poor</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>72.41</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>77.50</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>80.00</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>78.75</b>
Extremely Poor	1	2.38	0	0.00	1	3.13	1	1.59
Very Poor	13	30.95	10	32.26	9	28.13	19	30.16
Marginally Poor	28	66.67	21	67.74	22	68.75	43	68.25
<b>Non-Poor</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>27.59</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22.50</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>20.00</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>21.25</b>
Marginally Non Poor	15	93.75	8	88.89	8	100.00	16	94.12
Better off	1	6.25	1	11.11	0	0.00	1	5.88

Source: Primary data from the field research.

**Appendix VIII: Response-based enrolment figures of the children in the EGS schools calculated through extrapolation of information provided by respondents from the sample group**

All Panchayat, MP	Poor							Non-Poor						
	Total Poor HH in sample*	No. Of HH who said their children studied in EGS now or in Past#	No. of children studied now or in past#	Average per HH no. of children studied in now or in past	Total HH in this panchayat**	Proportionate HHs who's children studied in EGS now or in past	Proportionate no. of children studied in EGS now or in past	Total Non-Poor HH in sample*	No. Of HH who said their children studied in EGS now or in Past#	No. of children studied now or in past#	Average per HH no. of children studied in now or in past	Total HH in this panchayat**	Proportionate HHs who's children studied in EGS now or in past	Proportionate no. of children studied in EGS now or in past
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Delhi	39	6	8	1.3	195	30	40	11	5	5	1.0	243	110	110
Silpari	29	2	1	0.5	128	9	4	11	3	3	1.0	281	77	77
Ramhepur	39	12	13	1.1	290	89	97	11	5	3	0.6	94	43	26
Dongarmandla	23	9	13	1.4	309	121	175	9	3	6	2.0	152	51	101
Sandiya	36	13	28	2.2	79	29	61	10	0	0	0.0	410	0	0
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1001</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1180</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>314</b>

Appendix VIII Contd.

All Panchayat, MP	Total (Poor & Non-P:oor)						
	Total HH in sample*	No. Of HH who said their children studied in EGS now or in Past#	No. of children studied now or in past	Average per HH no. of children studied in now or in past	Total HH in this panchayat**	Proportionate HHs who's children studied in EGS now or in past	Proportionate no. of children studied in EGS now or in past
1	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
Delhi	50	11	13	1.2	438	140	150
Silpari	40	5	4	0.8	409	85	81
Ramhepur	50	17	16	0.9	384	132	123
Dongarmandla	32	12	19	1.6	461	172	276
Sandiya	46	13	28	2.2	489	29	61
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>218</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>2181</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>691</b>

Source for

\* : Number of households in the sample group covered by the field research

\*\* : Data compiled from BPL Database 2002 for Madhya Pradesh available at: <http://www.bpl.nic.in>

# : Primary data from the field research

**Appendix IX – Part A**  
**School-wise comparison of ST enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Raipur (K) Block, Rewa District, MP**

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in EGS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	ST Enrolment in PS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (42 or 25.61 % EGS school)</b>	<b>234.91</b>	<b>1220</b>		<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (42 or 25.30% PS schools)</b>	<b>239.70</b>	<b>1496</b>	
E.G.S.Rora Patana	529.41	15	2.83	PS Lohi	431.82	19	4.40
UEGS Mishran Tola Barehi	404.35	31	7.67	GPS Kasai	427.27	47	11.00
UEGS Kushaha Tola 96	376.47	16	4.25	GPS Atala	378.95	48	12.67
UEGS Duroudh	347.83	32	9.20	GPS Jhanjhar	342.86	18	5.25
EGS Badwar 19, 20	302.80	54	17.83	GPS Girls Barahadi	312.50	40	12.80
UEGS Musaua	300.00	17	5.67	GPS Budhiya Tikaitan Tola	311.11	14	4.50
UEGS Chhirhai	294.12	10	3.40	GPS Fareda	305.26	29	9.50
UEGS Bhouwar 2	288.00	48	16.67	GPS Bara	301.54	49	16.25
UEGS Tamara Pahad Dedhi	280.33	57	20.33	GPS Boys Gangahara	294.20	29	9.86
UEGS Ward 3,4, Lohadwar	274.19	17	6.20	GPS Jaraha	279.61	48	17.17
UEGS Barsaita	270.97	42	15.50	GPS Larh	276.19	29	10.50
UEGS Adi. Basti Laxmanpur	259.70	29	11.17	GPS Boys Gurh	265.06	55	20.75
UEGS Podi	259.26	35	13.50	GPS Gudhwa	263.84	143	54.20
UEGS Sukuli	258.62	25	9.67	PS Bagadara	261.22	32	12.25
UEGS Khajhawa	252.13	79	31.33	PS Rampur	260.14	77	29.60
UEGS W-18,19 Ror Bhaluha	250.00	26	10.40	PS Gorgaon 165	255.00	17	6.67
UEGS Adi.Basti Nawagaon	248.52	60	24.14	PS Belhai	254.05	47	18.50
UEGS Adi.Basti Badwar	241.12	43	17.83	GPS Kanchanpur	247.06	21	8.50
UEGS Paipakhara	235.29	20	8.50	GPS Hari.Basti Dwari	243.82	31	12.71
UEGS Amwa 3	222.73	14	6.29	GPS Sagara	236.84	15	6.33
UEGS Adi.Basti Geruari-170	222.22	15	6.75	GPS Roura	228.57	20	8.75
UEGS Dihiya Tola (Delhi)	217.11	33	15.20	GPS Girls Ganghara	223.19	22	9.86
UEGS Ramnai Adi.Basti	209.64	29	13.83	PS Mahasuwa Devarth	220.78	34	15.40
UEGS Khuraha	209.63	49	23.38	PS Chhoti Kuiya	218.18	16	7.33
UEGS Kolan Tola Padariya	206.45	16	7.75	GPS Itoura	213.16	27	12.67
EGS Ticura Tola Bakchhera	200.00	16	8.00	PS Tikuri	208.70	16	7.67
UEGS Mahagana	200.00	28	14.00	PS Dhavaiya 290	205.88	7	3.40
UEGS Hari.Basti Sonoura	192.59	26	13.50	PS Itarpahad	200.00	90	45.00
UEGS Joginhai W. 19	190.16	29	15.25	Govt.PS Padariya	193.55	15	7.75
UEGS W-6 New Adi.Bas.Gangahara	182.61	18	9.86	GPS Dihuli	190.91	12	6.29
UEGS Lanka Tola Duari	180.90	23	12.71	PS Barhadi	187.50	24	12.80
UEGS Unaitp.S.Devgaon P.Tola	168.75	9	5.33	GPS Teparo	181.58	23	12.67
UEGS W-10 Adi.Basti Mahula	167.80	33	19.67	PS Kheera	181.55	61	33.60
UEGS Satgadh	165.31	27	16.33	PS Loua	171.43	42	24.50
EGS Mahasua 516	162.34	25	15.40	GPS Boys Manikwar	167.57	31	18.50
UEGS Kachchiyan Tola	158.29	37	23.38	GPS Hardi	164.91	47	28.50
UEGS Duara 275	158.14	17	10.75	PS Paliya 351	164.38	24	14.60

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in EGS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	ST Enrolment in PS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Very high group</b>							
UEGS Pipari	157.53	23	14.60	GPS Hardua	162.34	75	46.20
UEGS Amiliha Pathari	157.28	27	17.17	GPS Paliya 352	160.98	22	13.67
UEGS Kolan Tola	155.56	14	9.00	PS Ramnai	159.04	22	13.83
UEGS Ps Dadh	154.84	32	20.67	GPS Amawa	157.41	34	21.60
UEGS Chorgadi Dakshin Tola	153.19	24	15.67	GPS Goura	157.38	24	15.25
<b>High group (149% to 100%) (23 or 14.02% EGS schools)</b>	<b>129.56</b>	<b>519</b>		<b>High group (149% to 100%) (33 or 19.88% PS schools)</b>	<b>120.46</b>	<b>746</b>	
UEGS Adiwasi Basti Katara	149.73	35	23.38	GPS Pandentola Sagara	142.11	9	6.33
UEGS Duara 270	148.84	16	10.75	PS Mankahari	141.57	21	14.83
UEGS W-5 Kheera	145.83	49	33.60	PS Banjari No.2	140.63	9	6.40
UEGS Barehi Gautman	143.48	11	7.67	GPS Girls Mankahari	134.83	20	14.83
UEGS Hari.Basti Lakshmanpur	143.28	16	11.17	GPS Marhi	134.69	22	16.33
UEGS Bhothi	141.30	13	9.20	GPS Nawagaon (Roura)	132.54	32	24.14
UEGS Paliya Mauhai	139.02	19	13.67	PS Tatihara	132.43	49	37.00
UEGS Pashchimi Tola Goura	137.70	21	15.25	PS Bandhawa	132.20	26	19.67
EGS Devraphareda Adi.	135.14	25	18.50	GPS Dewgaon	131.25	7	5.33
UEGS Hardi-2	133.33	38	28.50	PS Girls Gurh	127.31	69	54.20
UEGS Sagara Malaihan Tola	132.54	32	24.14	GPS Uparoura	127.27	8	6.29
UEGS Badgaiyan Tola Itaha	130.61	16	12.25	PS Girls Sursa	126.56	27	21.33
UEGS Manpur	129.73	24	18.50	GPS Girls Sagara	126.32	8	6.33
UEGS Amwa 10	129.63	28	21.60	GPS Boys Dwari	125.84	16	12.71
EGS Khajuaawan	128.40	31	24.14	PS Banjari No.1	125.00	8	6.40
UEGS Umari Kasihai Tola	128.21	25	19.50	GPS Sonarupa	123.29	18	14.60
UEGS Geruar	125.00	8	6.40	G.P.S. Kalikan Tola Ramnai	122.89	17	13.83
UEGS W-10 Badagaon	120.00	44	36.67	PS Chorgadi No.1	121.28	19	15.67
UEGS Kushaha Tola Mankahari	114.61	17	14.83	PS Patuna	116.07	39	33.60
UEGS Badheyam Amwa 9	111.11	24	21.60	GPS Bhaluha	115.38	12	10.40
E.G.S. Adi.Basti Bhaluha	105.77	11	10.40	GPS Louhadwar	112.90	7	6.20
UEGS Geruari 169	103.70	7	6.75	GPS Lohadwar(Bangla Tola)	112.90	7	6.20
UEGS Karoun Roura	102.86	9	8.75	GPS Taunga	111.82	41	36.67
				PS Boys Raipur K	110.53	7	6.33
				GPS Kariyajhar	110.39	51	46.20
				GPS Geruar	109.38	7	6.40
				GPS Girls Ramnai	108.43	15	13.83
				GPS Hardi	105.26	30	28.50
				RgPSm PS Mohagarh	105.26	16	15.20
				GPS Paderuya	103.90	48	46.20
				GPS Atara	101.85	22	21.60
				GPS Bela	101.75	29	28.50
				GPS Pahadiya Naveen 367	101.35	30	29.60

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in EGS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	ST Enrolment in PS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (42 or 25.61% EGS schools)</b>	<b>63.96</b>	<b>502</b>		<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (45 or 27.11% PS schools)</b>	<b>61.22</b>	<b>474</b>	
UEGS Raghurajgarh Atari	98.40	23	23.38	PS Laximanpur	98.51	11	11.17
UEGS Uparoura Uttartola	95.45	6	6.29	GPS Girls Manikwar	97.30	18	18.50
UEGS Hardi-3	94.74	27	28.50	GPS Girls Raipur K	94.74	6	6.33
UEGS Madawahi Tola	94.74	6	6.33	GPS Mahagana	92.86	13	14.00
UEGS Sagra Gargantola	94.74	6	6.33	GPS Boys Sursa	89.06	19	21.33
EGS Pahadriya 365	94.59	28	29.60	PS Hinouti	87.10	18	20.67
UEGS Tatihara	91.89	34	37.00	PS Shukulgawan	85.71	9	10.50
UEGS Tikuri No.-1	91.30	7	7.67	RgPSm Dani	83.87	13	15.50
UEGS Chhoti Mankahari	87.64	13	14.83	PS Badi Kuiya	81.82	6	7.33
EGS Naveen Delhi	85.53	13	15.20	GPS Jaldar	81.48	11	13.50
EGS Mahasuan 517	84.42	13	15.40	GPS Khamadeeh	81.18	44	54.20
UEGS Bhatigawan	84.42	39	46.20	GPS Girls Bakchhera	75.00	6	8.00
UEGS Surasa Kala Kachhiyan	84.38	18	21.33	GPS Duara Naveen	74.42	8	10.75
UEGS Manikwar	84.21	8	9.50	GPS Boys Joginhai	72.13	11	15.25
UEGS Baghelan Jaraha	81.55	14	17.17	PS Umari	71.79	14	19.50
UEGS Charpanihan Tola	80.90	12	14.83	GJPS Majhigawan	71.05	9	12.67
UEGS Hari.Adi.Basti Rateh	80.00	34	42.50	PS Girls Dwari	70.79	9	12.71
EGS Tatihari	75.68	28	37.00	GPS Girls Raghurajgarh	68.45	16	23.38
UEGS Hari.Basti Joginhai	72.13	11	15.25	PS Badagaon	68.18	25	36.67
E.G.S.Patana (Ward No-06)	70.59	2	2.83	GPS Budiya	66.67	3	4.50
UEGS Kanchanpur Koriyan	70.59	6	8.50	GPS Girls Joginhai	65.57	10	15.25
UEGS Bara Ahari Tola	67.69	11	16.25	PS Raghurajgarh	64.17	15	23.38
Ps UEGS Kauadhan	67.47	14	20.75	PS Kolaiya	63.64	7	11.00
UEGS Alopa Gaura	59.02	9	15.25	New PS Lakshmanpur Kaharan Tol	62.69	7	11.17
UEGS Umariha-61	56.47	24	42.50	PS Bheeta	62.65	13	20.75
UEGS Ralihan Amiliha	52.43	9	17.17	RGPSM Geruari 170	59.26	4	6.75
UEGS Dhakhra	47.95	7	14.60	PS Umariha 61	58.82	25	42.50
UEGS Gaura Uttar Tola	45.90	7	15.25	GPS Baraiya Tola	58.06	12	20.67
UEGS Chandihar	45.45	2	4.40	GPS Mahiya	57.14	3	5.25
UEGS Pamaran Tola Atari	42.78	10	23.38	PS Girls Delhi	52.63	8	15.20
UEGS Telni Tola	40.45	6	14.83	GPS Girls Jaldar	51.85	7	13.50
UEGS Dai Tola Duari	39.33	5	12.71	GJPS Ledua	45.00	3	6.67
UEGS Shivpurva	37.16	11	29.60	PS Padara (Roura)	44.44	4	9.00
UEGS Chamdauri Basti Laxmanpur	35.82	4	11.17	GPS Majan	41.38	4	9.67
UEGS Ahiran Tola	34.29	3	8.75	GPS Delhi	39.47	6	15.20
UEGS Roura Medhuliyen	34.29	3	8.75	GPS Badwar	39.25	7	17.83
UEGS W-14 Malaihan T. Patouna	32.74	11	33.60	PS Silchat	38.96	18	46.20
UEGS Gonda	31.82	2	6.29	PS Girls Nawagaon	37.28	9	24.14
UEGS Uproura	31.82	2	6.29	PS Mahasuwa Baghelan	32.47	5	15.40
UEGS Bara Patelan Tola	30.77	5	16.25	GPS Girls Barsaita	32.26	5	15.50

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in EGS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	ST Enrolment in PS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Low group</b>							
UEGS Sandura	28.57	7	24.50	GPS Boys Bhaluhi	28.85	3	10.40
UEGS Barehi Dandi Tola	26.09	2	7.67	PS Khaira	28.72	9	31.33
				PS Choudiyar	27.68	15	54.20
				GPS Chorgadi No.2	25.53	4	15.67
				PS Boys Bakchhera	25.00	2	8.00
<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (57 or 34.76% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>28</b>		<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (46 or 27.71% PS schools)</b>	<b>7.45</b>	<b>53</b>	
EGS Patelan Tola Khujh	23.68	3	12.67	PS Mahasua 515	23.81	8	33.6
UEGS Duari Bhujwan Tola	23.60	3	12.71	GPS Paipakhara	23.53	2	8.5
UEGS Patna	22.73	1	4.40	PS Kapuri	23.53	1	4.25
UEGS Shukulgawan	19.05	2	10.50	PS Girls Budiya	22.22	1	4.5
UEGS Kachhiyan Jaraha	17.48	3	17.17	PS Boys Nawagaon	20.71	5	24.14
UEGS Deutaha	16.22	3	18.50	Js Khajhawa	19.15	6	31.33
EGS Itura Gothwa Tola	15.79	2	12.67	PS Narrha	19.05	2	10.5
UEGS Subhash Tola Duari	15.73	2	12.71	PS Duara	18.6	2	10.75
EGS Barehi Badhai Tola Barehi	13.04	1	7.67	GPS Sotha	14.81	1	6.75
UEGS Bhauwar 1	12.00	2	16.67	GPS Boys Tamaradesh	14.75	3	20.33
EGS Kanchanpur Majantola	11.76	1	8.50	PS Barehi	13.04	1	7.67
UEGS Itaha Uncha Tola	8.16	1	12.25	GPS Boys Barsaita	12.9	2	15.5
EGS Atala	7.89	1	12.67	P.S. Kanchanpur	11.76	1	8.5
UEGS Khujh Harijan Basti	7.89	1	12.67	GPS Upkendra Amiliha	11.65	2	17.17
UEGS Kendra Kuinya Khurda	7.14	1	14.00	GPS Girls Badwar	11.21	2	17.83
EGS Badavar Ward No. 3/4	5.61	1	17.83	GPS Bheer Semari	10.87	1	9.2
EGS Bara 393	0.00	0	7.67	PS Manikwar No 2	10.53	1	9.5
EGS Barehi Badhaiyan	0.00	0	7.67	PS Patouna	9.09	1	11
EGS Devraphareda Har.	0.00	0	18.50	GPS Khurha	8.56	2	23.38
EGS Majhboga	0.00	0	4.25	GPS Sonoura	7.41	1	13.5
EGS Nivi	0.00	0	18.50	PS Poudi	7.41	1	13.5
EGS Sc St. Basti Gorgawan 165	0.00	0	6.67	RGPSM Paliya 349	6.85	1	14.6
UEGS Atrari	0.00	0	54.20	PS Pahadriya 365	6.76	2	29.6
UEGS Banjari	0.00	0	6.40	GPS Girls Tamaradesh	4.92	1	20.33
UEGS Barahadi Baban	0.00	0	12.80	RGPSM Kouadhan	4.82	1	20.75
UEGS Barhadi Teliyan	0.00	0	12.80	GPS Umariha 59	4.71	2	42.5
UEGS Budiya Kakuniha	0.00	0	4.50	Janpad PS Dhadhar	0	0	9.67
UEGS Chak Paraswar	0.00	0	3.40	PS Boys Sursa Kala	0	0	16.33
UEGS Dhavaiya-290	0.00	0	3.40	GPS Sirkhini	0	0	13.83
UEGS Dhobiyen Tola Patana	0.00	0	2.83	GPS Dhweya	0	0	9.5
UEGS Dihiya Naveen	0.00	0	9.86	GPS Khujh	0	0	12.67
UEGS Dihiya-2	0.00	0	9.86	GPS Baghamada	0	0	5.67
UEGS Dongari Tola	0.00	0	6.33	GPS Bhouwar	0	0	16.67
UEGS Gadariyan Tola	0.00	0	6.33	GPS Chandehari	0	0	4.4

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in EGS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	ST Enrolment in PS	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Very low group</b>							
UEGS Hardi Harijan Basti	0.00	0	28.50	GPS Girls Patna	0	0	2.83
UEGS Hari.Basti Lohadawar	0.00	0	6.20	GPS Itaha	0	0	12.25
UEGS Hari.Basti Nawagaon	0.00	0	24.14	GPS Kushha 95	0	0	9.86
UEGS Hari.Basti Padariya	0.00	0	7.75	GPS Madnua	0	0	19.67
UEGS Jhanjhar	0.00	0	5.25	GPS Padariya	0	0	7.75
UEGS Kachiyen Tola Badwar	0.00	0	17.83	GPS Parshwar	0	0	3.4
UEGS Kendra Una.P,S Devgaon Ti	0.00	0	5.33	GPS Raitan Tola Barahadi	0	0	12.8
UEGS Kuan	0.00	0	7.33	GPS Ulahi Khurd	0	0	9.2
UEGS Loharan Tola Lakshmanpur	0.00	0	11.17	JPS Bal	0	0	11
UEGS Louhadwar Patelan Tola	0.00	0	6.20	PS Amwa 5	0	0	6.29
UEGS Mahamaya Tola	0.00	0	13.83	PS Boys Patna	0	0	2.83
UEGS Mahiya	0.00	0	5.25	PS Umari (Badagaw)	0	0	5.67
UEGS Mahsu 515	0.00	0	15.40				
UEGS Malaihan Tola Lohi	0.00	0	4.40				
UEGS Muslim Basti Kasai	0.00	0	11.00				
UEGS Paipakhara	0.00	0	10.40				
UEGS Patela	0.00	0	21.60				
UEGS Pokhara	0.00	0	45.00				
UEGS Putari	0.00	0	16.25				
UEGS Semari Khurd	0.00	0	13.67				
UEGS Shuklan Tola Patana	0.00	0	2.83				
UEGS Ulhi U.Mu.	0.00	0	9.20				
UEGS W-13 Kanji	0.00	0	4.25				
<b>Grand Total 164 EGS schools</b>	<b>96.10</b>	<b>2269</b>	<b>2395.70</b>	<b>Grand Total 166 Primary Schools</b>	<b>103.25</b>	<b>2769</b>	<b>16.37</b>

**Appendix IX – Part A  
SUMMARY TABLE**

**School-wise comparison of ST enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Raipur (K) Block, Rewa District, MP**

Performance Group	No. of EGS School	% of EGS Schools in different performance groups	ST enrol. in EGS	Group average of % ST enroll. in EGS	No. of PS	% of PS in different performance groups	ST enrol. in PS	Group average of % ST enroll. in PS
Very high group (150% & above)	42	25.61	1220	234.91	42	25.30	1496	239.70
High group (149% to 100%)	23	14.02	519	129.56	33	19.88	746	120.46
Low group (99% to 25%)	42	25.61	502	63.96	45	27.11	474	61.22
Very low group (24% to 0%)	57	34.76	28	4.00	46	27.71	53	7.45
<b>Total</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2269</b>	<b>96.10</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2769</b>	<b>103.25</b>

**Appendix IX – Part B**  
**School-wise comparison of ST enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Ghughri, Mandla District, MP**

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in School	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	Average of ST Total Enrolment	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (7 or 7.78% EGS School)</b>	<b>176.39</b>	<b>503</b>		<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (13 or 11.21% PS School)</b>	<b>177.89</b>	<b>1221</b>	
UEGS Saraitola Devhara	193.49	113	58.40	GIRLS ASHRAM GHUGHRI	241.46	99	41.00
UEGS Imlitola Dhobabar	184.98	52	28.11	GOVT. PS JOGI LURHIA	209.17	114	54.50
UEGS Sarpanchtola Naijhar	181.42	51	28.11	GOVT. PS ISHWARPUR	200.00	109	54.50
UEGS Chinditola Bhurkur	176.00	66	37.50	PS SUREHLI	200.00	124	62.00
UEGS Tikaratola Sahjar	170.67	96	56.25	PS SALHEGHORI	188.06	63	33.50
UEGS Membertola Bilgaon	165.96	52	31.33	PS LATO	176.47	65	36.83
UEGS Kotwartola Tikariya	162.22	73	45.00	PS KHODA KHUDRA	165.58	85	51.33
				PS MADANPUR	162.21	85	52.40
				PS BHUDKUR	157.33	59	37.50
				PS CHHIWALA TOLA	156.96	97	61.80
				PS DULADAR	152.60	147	96.33
				PS GOPANGI	151.43	53	35.00
				PS CHOBA	151.25	121	80.00
<b>High group (149% to 100%) (36 or 40.0% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>121.06</b>	<b>1913</b>		<b>High group (149% to 100%) (42 or 36.21% PS Schools)</b>	<b>119.08</b>	<b>2494</b>	
UEGS Khairotola Patan	148.39	46	31.00	PS DHOBAWAR	149.41	42	28.11
UEGS Nayatola Umariya	146.27	49	33.50	PS GAJRAJ	146.12	80	54.75
UEGS Pakritola Ilahi	143.89	53	36.83	PS BAMHANI	142.44	73	51.25
UEGS Amatola Paraswah	141.72	77	54.33	PS KISLI	142.13	70	49.25
UEGS Narwartola Salwah	140.78	29	20.60	PS NAHARBELI	140.74	95	67.50
UEGS Kutritola Khodakhudra N	138.31	71	51.33	PS CHEETA PAKHNA	138.04	45	32.60
UEGS Khairotola Dundadei	138.30	52	37.60	PS JHIGARHATA	132.69	82	61.80
UEGS Nichetola Salhenghori	137.31	46	33.50	PS GHOREGHAT	132.51	75	56.60
UEGS Kornitola Salwah	135.92	28	20.60	JANPAD PS CHHATARPUR	131.67	74	56.20
UEGS Pankatola Dundadei	130.32	49	37.60	PS MANGA	131.11	59	45.00
UEGS Hajaritola Lafan	129.79	61	47.00	PS PARASWAH	128.83	70	54.33
UEGS Kukrakol Katangi	129.63	55	42.43	PS DHEKO	125.95	66	52.40
UEGS Baigatola Patan	129.03	40	31.00	PS LODHA	123.98	61	49.20
UEGS Sodhatola Surehli	125.81	78	62.00	PS CHALNI (UPAR)	122.92	59	48.00
UEGS Masultola Kachnari	121.05	69	57.00	PS KUSMI	121.95	50	41.00
UEGS Baheratola Tabalpani	120.72	67	55.50	PS SENDWARA	121.83	60	49.25
UEGS Sarpanchtola Dhangaon	120.21	69	57.40	PS AHMADPURA	121.01	48	39.67
UEGS Chindhartola Ghughri	117.07	48	41.00	PS PADDIKONA	121.01	48	39.67
UEGS Kewlartola Kuntidadargaon	116.73	60	51.40	PS SAHJAR	120.89	68	56.25
UEGS Mototola Banheri	116.50	80	68.67	PS CHALNI (NEECHE)	118.75	57	48.00
UEGS Upartola Khamtara	114.63	47	41.00	JPS KHAJRI	116.99	70	59.83
UEGS Navnadartola Khajri	113.65	68	59.83	PS RAHANGI	116.73	60	51.40
UEGS Nayatola Pipardon	113.24	62	54.75	PS SAJPANI	114.89	36	31.33
UEGS Mukaddamtola Dongar Mandla	113.13	48	42.43	PS KUNTIDADAR	114.79	59	51.40
UEGS Gauritola Kumhi	111.11	75	67.50	PS JHUNJHAR	114.36	43	37.60
UEGS Baigatola Barwani	110.43	36	32.60	PS PATAN	112.90	35	31.00
UEGS Dharmutola Chalni	110.42	53	48.00	PS BANEHARI	110.68	76	68.67
UEGS Kundatola Tabalpani	109.91	61	55.50	PS KANDRA	110.32	62	56.20

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in School	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	Average of ST Total Enrolment	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. High Group</b>							
UEGS Chandatola Bijaura	109.68	34	31.00	PS PONDI	109.76	63	57.40
UEGS Mukaddamtola Bamhani	107.32	55	51.25	NPS BHOITOLA/MUKADAMTOLA	109.76	54	49.20
UEGS Mukaddamtola Tikariya	104.44	47	45.00	PS DHUGHUTI	109.54	62	56.60
UEGS Bhoitola Churiya	104.00	39	37.50	PS KHAJRI	108.64	65	59.83
UEGS Pakritola Kisali	103.55	51	49.25	PS PALAKI	106.92	103	96.33
UEGS Dongartola Pipardon	103.16	29	28.11	PS DHANGAON	106.27	61	57.40
UEGS Barratola Baniya	101.63	50	49.20	PS DHANOULI	106.01	60	56.60
UEGS Konhatola Patan	100.00	31	31.00	PS LAFAN	104.26	49	47.00
				ASHRAM SHALA PADDIKONA	103.36	41	39.67
				PS ILAHI	103.17	38	36.83
				NPS MUKADDAM TOLA	103.16	29	28.11
				PS BISADHAR	102.13	32	31.33
				PS URWAHI	101.75	58	57.00
				PS TABALPANI	100.90	56	55.50
<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (43 or 47.78% of EGS Schools)</b>	<b>76.72</b>	<b>1589</b>		<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (57 or 49.14% of PS Schools)</b>	<b>72.88</b>	<b>1922</b>	
UEGS Jhiriyatola Dalkagopangi	97.14	34	35.00	PS DONGAR MANDLA	98.99	42	42.43
UEGS Bajartola Dongar Mandla	96.63	41	42.43	PS DEVHARA	97.60	57	58.40
UEGS Baigatola Kandra	94.31	53	56.20	PS PIPARIAKALA	97.60	57	58.40
UEGS Bertola Dalkagopangi	94.29	33	35.00	PS SINGHANPURI	95.80	38	39.67
UEGS Amatola Devhara	92.47	54	58.40	PS DADARGAON	95.26	57	59.83
UEGS Bartola Lato	92.31	34	36.83	GIRLS PS RAMHEPUR	94.29	33	35.00
UEGS Baratola Chata	91.87	52	56.60	JPS SIMARIA	93.62	44	47.00
UEGS Tikratola Paddikona	90.76	36	39.67	NPS MUKADDAM TOLA, BHUDKUR	93.33	35	37.50
UEGS Mukaddamtola Kusumi	90.24	37	41.00	PS ERI	93.33	63	67.50
UEGS Shivrajitola Chatarpur	88.97	50	56.20	GIRLS PS SALWAH	92.23	19	20.60
UEGS Mukaddamtola Dhanwahi	88.96	29	32.60	PS KATHAIDEEH	92.02	50	54.33
UEGS Khurritola Manga	86.67	39	45.00	PS GULLUKHOH	91.92	39	42.43
UEGS Chapartola Junwani	85.37	49	57.40	JPS GWARA	91.11	41	45.00
UEGS Manglatola Katangi	84.85	36	42.43	PS PIPARDON	89.50	49	54.75
UEGS Bhointola Mahli	83.77	43	51.33	PS BHANPUR	87.80	36	41.00
UEGS Khalhetola Umariya	83.58	28	33.50	PS KHAMTARA	87.80	36	41.00
UEGS Kursitola Bisandhar	82.98	26	31.33	PS BILGAON	86.17	27	31.33
UEGS Mototola Ramhepur	82.86	29	35.00	PS BARWANI	85.89	28	32.60
UEGS Kendotola Churiya	82.67	31	37.50	PS BANIA	85.37	42	49.20
UEGS Nichetola Chiwlatola	82.52	51	61.80	PS KATANGI	84.85	36	42.43
UEGS Timkitola Dhenko	82.06	43	52.40	PS BEHRATOLA	84.66	46	54.33
UEGS Konhatola Dadargaon	81.89	49	59.83	PS BIJOURA	83.87	26	31.00
UEGS Narwartola Paraswah	80.98	44	54.33	GIRLS ASHRAM KHAJRI	83.57	50	59.83
UEGS Kurlutola Patnipani (Bamhani)	80.00	41	51.25	PS DOONDI	80.85	38	47.00
UEGS Khalhetola Mahli	79.87	41	51.33	NPS TIKRA TOLA	80.65	50	62.00
UEGS Pipartola Rahangi	79.77	41	51.40	BOYS PS RAMHEPUR	80.00	28	35.00
UEGS Darratola Bhurkur	77.33	29	37.50	PS KHODAKHUDRA	79.87	41	51.33
UEGS Mattatola Barwani	76.69	25	32.60	NPS TINSATOLA	79.27	39	49.20
UEGS Lohartola Dundi	76.60	36	47.00	PS JUNWANI	78.40	45	57.40
UEGS Mukaddamtola Pipariyakhurd	72.89	41	56.25	PS KACHNARI	77.19	44	57.00

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in School	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	Average of ST Total Enrolment	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Low Group</b>							
UEGS Chinditola Banheri	72.82	50	68.67	PS IMLITOLA	75.23	41	54.50
UEGS Baigatola Kuntidadargaon	71.98	37	51.40	NPS GHUGHRA TOLA	74.73	42	56.20
UEGS Kundpani Kathaidih	71.78	39	54.33	PS PIPARDON	74.70	21	28.11
UEGS Ghughratola Tabalpani	68.47	38	55.50	PS DUNDAEI	74.47	28	37.60
UEGS Baigatola Khuriya	64.72	40	61.80	PS PATNI PANI	70.24	36	51.25
UEGS Bodhatola Madanpur	61.07	32	52.40	JPS DHEKO	68.70	36	52.40
UEGS Dongartola Ishwarpur	51.38	28	54.50	Sat. Sch. Imali tola(2008-09)	68.07	27	39.67
UEGS Chobatola Choba	48.75	39	80.00	JPS SAHUTOLA	67.96	14	20.60
UEGS Bhilwatola Churiya	48.00	18	37.50	PS BHOKA DEVRI	64.22	35	54.50
UEGS Amatola Chalni	47.92	23	48.00	PS KUDIA	63.11	39	61.80
UEGS Tikaratola Sajpani	47.87	15	31.33	BOYS PS SALWAH	63.11	13	20.60
UEGS Mukaddamtola Jhunjar	42.55	16	37.60	PS CHURIA	61.33	23	37.50
UEGS Amatola Duladar	40.48	39	96.33	PS CHHATA	60.07	34	56.60
				BOYS PS GHUGHRI	58.54	24	41.00
				PS KUMHI	54.81	37	67.50
				PS MEHLI	52.60	27	51.33
				Sat. Sch. Dwahi Tola(2008-09)	51.58	19	36.83
				GIRLS PS GHUGHRI	51.22	21	41.00
				NPS BELTOLA PEEPARDON (M)	51.14	28	54.75
				PS TELANDEH	50.00	31	62.00
				JPS KACHHRATOLA	43.55	27	62.00
				NPS BANJAR TOLA	42.69	12	28.11
				PS NAIJHAR	39.13	11	28.11
				PS PIPARIA KHURD	35.56	20	56.25
				Sat. Sch. Bakal tola (2008-09)	32.58	12	36.83
				ASHARM SHALA SENDWARA	32.49	16	49.25
				NPS BARRA TOLA	29.27	12	41.00
<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (4 or 4.44% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>13.77</b>	<b>24</b>		<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (4 or 3.45% PS Schools)</b>	<b>21.34</b>	<b>31</b>	
UEGS Bhoitola Najjar	21.34	6	28.11	PS TIKARIA	24.44	11	45.00
UEGS Chandnatola Pipariyakala	18.84	11	58.40	BOYS PS UMARIA	23.88	8	33.50
UEGS Jhingratola Dundi	14.89	7	47.00	PS GIRLS PS UMARIA	20.90	7	33.50
UEGS Sahutola Bhaunkadewri	0.00	0	54.50	NPS BANSI TOLA	16.13	5	31.00
<b>Grand Total (90 EGS Schools)</b>	<b>99.41</b>	<b>4029</b>	<b>4175.43</b>	<b>Grand Total (116 Primary Schools)</b>	<b>99.60</b>	<b>5668</b>	<b>5568.57</b>

**Appendix IX – Part B  
SUMMARY TABLE**

**School-wise comparison of ST enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP**

Performance Group	No. of EGS School	% of EGS Schools in different performance groups	ST enrol. in EGS	Group average of % ST enrol. in EGS	No. of PS	% of PS in different performance groups	ST enroll. in PS	Group average of % ST enrol. in PS
Very high group (150% & above)	7	7.78	503	176.39	13	11.21	1221	177.89
High group (149% to 100%)	36	40.00	1913	121.06	42	36.21	2494	119.08
Low group (99% to 25%)	43	47.78	1589	76.72	57	49.14	1922	72.88
Very low group (24% to 0%)	4	4.44	24	13.77	4	3.45	31	21.34
<b>Total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>4029</b>	<b>99.41</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>5668</b>	<b>99.51</b>

**Appendix IX – Part C**  
**School-wise comparison of ST enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Manasa, Neemuch District, MP**

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in School	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	ST Total Enrolment	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (6 or 12.24% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>329.76</b>	<b>240</b>		<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (23 or 31.08% PS Schools)</b>	<b>289.62</b>	<b>1308</b>	
EGS Dudhi Kheda	500.00	45	9.00	PS.Pipliya Hadi	676.92	24	3.55
EGS Bhil Ka Kheda	423.08	15	3.55	PS.Bakhtuni	415.33	89	21.43
EGS Kheda Antri	371.43	26	7.00	PS.Sankariya Khedi	393.94	52	13.20
EGS Rebari Basti	265.63	85	32.00	PS.Bilvas	381.41	119	31.20
EGS Kharni Kheda	232.84	39	16.75	PS.Karanpura	372.82	64	17.17
EGS Besada	185.57	30	16.17	PS.Dhodhar	365.85	75	20.50
				PS.Devran	355.56	24	6.75
				PS.Sonadi	351.52	29	8.25
				PS.Jannod	325.93	22	6.75
				PS.Bhagal	322.58	25	7.75
				PS.Palasiya	309.28	50	16.17
				PS.Banjari Khurd	262.93	122	46.40
				PS.Bhamesar	254.12	36	14.17
				PS.Tamoti	237.07	110	46.40
				PS.Basniya	218.82	31	14.17
				PS.Mokdi	212.12	14	6.60
				PS.Khedli	200.00	48	24.00
				GPS.Bensla	176.92	23	13.00
				PS.Nayagaon	176.87	113	63.89
				PS.Dudhalai	172.73	19	11.00
				PS.Dantlai	172.17	110	63.89
				PS Kheda Baraji	154.96	99	63.89
				PS.Khadavada	151.52	10	6.60
<b>High group (149% to 100%) (4 or 8.16% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>182.03</b>	<b>74</b>		<b>High group (149% to 100%) (12 or 16.22% PS Schools)</b>	<b>117.05</b>	<b>380</b>	
EGS Kund Kheda	327.27	9	2.75	PS.Piplon	144.00	36	25.00
EGS Kishangarh	136.36	15	11.00	PS.Choukdi	135.33	29	21.43
EGS Naya Gram	136.36	9	6.60	PS.Gothda	134.61	86	63.89
EGS Salarmala	128.13	41	32.00	PS.Pokharda	124.00	31	25.00
				PS.Bujha	122.33	21	17.17
				PS Kundaliya Khurd	114.26	73	63.89
				BPS.Bensla	107.69	14	13.00
				PS.Majiriya	106.25	34	32.00
				PS Rup Pura	106.06	14	13.20
				PS Bensda	105.15	17	16.17
				PS.Chenpuriya	104.85	18	17.17
				Balika Ashram Antri Bujurag	100.00	7	7.00

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in School	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	ST Total Enrolment	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (8 or 16.33% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>67.22</b>	<b>126</b>		<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (17 or 22.97% PS Schools)</b>	<b>53.22</b>	<b>187</b>	
EGS Rawat Nagar	84.62	11	13.00	PS.Dayli	95.52	16	16.75
EGS Barla ka Kheda	84.00	18	21.43	PS.Pipalda Pathar	90.91	10	11.00
EGS Magorda	78.13	25	32.00	Balak Asharam. P.S.Dhakadkhedi	78.26	50	63.89
EGS Ram Kheda	74.07	5	6.75	PS.Chukni	72.73	2	2.75
EGS Dayali No. 2 & 3	71.64	12	16.75	PS Barvadiya	65.63	21	32.00
EGS Kundodila Bujurg	68.87	44	63.89	PS.Barkheda Choukdi	56.00	12	21.43
EGS Mazara Devron	44.44	3	6.75	PS.Chikli	51.61	4	7.75
EGS Parot Pipliya	32.00	8	25.00	PS.Bhagori	49.41	7	14.17
				PS.Nali	48.48	4	8.25
				PS.Jamal Pura	46.88	15	32.00
				GPS.Bhadana	44.87	14	31.20
				PS.Brahampura	42.35	6	14.17
				BPS.Bhadana	41.67	13	31.20
				PS.Basantpura	35.29	5	14.17
				PS.Bhimpura	30.77	4	13.00
				BPS.Antri	28.57	2	7.00
				PS.Kundaliya (Junapani)	25.81	2	7.75
<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (31 or 63.27% EGS schools)</b>	<b>1.02</b>	<b>9</b>		<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (22 or 29.73% PS schools)</b>	<b>2.43</b>	<b>13</b>	
EGS Pagara	12.82	4	31.20	PS.Nai Nanor	24.39	5	20.50
EGS Jamalpura Banjara Basti	9.38	3	32.00	PS.Juna Bhadana	19.23	6	31.20
EGS Talai ki Jhopadiya	9.33	2	21.43	PS.Hama Khedi	9.76	2	20.50
EGS Kora Khedi	0.00	0	13.20	GPS.Antri	0.00	0	7.00
EGS Amarpura	0.00	0	24.00	PS.Aamliya	0.00	0	6.75
EGS Anandi Pura	0.00	0	11.00	PS.Navlpura	0.00	0	16.17
EGS Barama Ka Kheda	0.00	0	6.75	PS.Aranya Chandrawat	0.00	0	3.55
EGS Charan Basti Rawali Kunwai	0.00	0	17.17	PS.Bankya Kheda	0.00	0	6.75
EGS Chukani Kheda	0.00	0	2.75	PS.Dhandheri	0.00	0	3.55
EGS Dera No. 1 & 2	0.00	0	3.55	PS.Jodmi	0.00	0	8.25
EGS Dharampura	0.00	0	6.60	PS.Juna Pani	0.00	0	9.00
EGS Dhau Khedi	0.00	0	9.00	PS.Kadi Khurd	0.00	0	9.00
EGS Gogliya Khedi	0.00	0	3.55	PS.Khedi	0.00	0	3.55
EGS Hada Khedi	0.00	0	17.17	PS.Khedi Chandrawat	0.00	0	3.55
EGS Jai Singh ka Tanda	0.00	0	3.55	PS.Molki	0.00	0	6.75
EGS Junapani Majara	0.00	0	17.17	PS.Nagpura	0.00	0	6.60
EGS Karamdi	0.00	0	63.89	PS.Phul Pura	0.00	0	9.00
EGS Kesha ka Tanda	0.00	0	3.55	PS.Pratap Pura	0.00	0	7.00
EGS Khedi Garasiya	0.00	0	3.55	PS.Sandiya	0.00	0	2.75
EGS Mazara Bakhtubi	0.00	0	21.43	PS.Shivpuriya Chakki	0.00	0	46.40
EGS Mokhampura	0.00	0	16.75	Satellite School Gayari Guda	0.00	0	16.17
EGS Nai Barliya (Manoti)	0.00	0	7.75	Satellite School Haripura (Kanjarda)	0.00	0	16.17

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in EGS	ST Enrolment in School	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	ST Total Enrolment	Avg.ST Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
EGS Nali Gurjar	0.00	0	8.25				
EGS Panch Devora	0.00	0	63.89				
EGS Parpadiya	0.00	0	21.43				
EGS Ram Nagar	0.00	0	13.20				
EGS Rup Pura	0.00	0	13.20				
EGS Shiv Puriya Kunwala	0.00	0	46.40				
EGS Shiv Puriya Mandirwala	0.00	0	46.40				
EGS Tol Khedi	0.00	0	14.17				
EGS Zizar Kheda	0.00	0	20.50				
<b>Grand Total (49 EGS Schools)</b>	<b>66.86</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>906.79</b>	<b>Grand Total (74 EGS Schools)</b>	<b>121.95</b>	<b>1888</b>	<b>1430.21</b>

**Appendix IX – Part C  
SUMMARY TABLE**

School-wise comparison of ST enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Manasa Block, Neemuch District, MP

Performance Group	No. of EGS School	% of EGS Schools in different performance groups	ST enrol. in EGS	Group average of % ST enrol. in EGS	No. of PS	% of PS in different performance groups	ST enroll in PS	Group average of % ST enrol. in PS
Very high group (150% & above)	6	12.24	240	329.76	23	31.08	1308	289.62
High group (149% to 100%)	4	8.16	74	182.03	12	16.22	380	117.05
Low group (99% to 25%)	8	16.33	126	67.22	17	22.97	187	50.78
Very low group (24% to 0%)	31	63.27	9	1.02	22	29.73	13	2.43
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>4029</b>	<b>66.86</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>5668</b>	<b>121.39</b>

**Appendix IX – Part D**  
**School-wise comparison of Total enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Raipur (K), Rewa District, MP**

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (3 or 1.69% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>181.01</b>	<b>237</b>		<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (32 or 17.49% PS Schools)</b>	<b>173.74</b>	<b>4553</b>	
UEGS Dhobiyana Tola Patana	207.69	45	21.67	GPS Raitan Tola Barahadi	220.73	230	104.20
UEGS Ahirgaon	170.23	122	71.67	PS Girls Gurh	216.15	380	175.80
UEGS Dihiya Tola (Delhi)	165.09	70	42.40	PS Dhavaiya 290	209.18	123	58.80
				PS Patouna	208.49	113	54.20
				GPS Hariharpur	187.36	168	89.67
				GPS Girls Mankahari	187.28	157	83.83
				Govt.PS Padariya	186.97	122	65.25
				PS Pahadriya 365	186.16	191	102.60
				GPS Jaraha	186.08	98	52.67
				GPS Boys Gurh	181.59	217	119.50
				PS Narrha	179.80	178	99.00
				GPS Atala	178.13	95	53.33
				PS Manikwar No 2	173.38	127	73.25
				GPS Bara	173.23	110	63.50
				GPS Girls Ramnai	171.06	134	78.33
				PS Chhoti Kuiya	168.67	140	83.00
				Janpad PS Dhadhar	165.34	97	58.67
				GPS Gudhwa	164.96	290	175.80
				GPS Bhaluha	164.11	107	65.20
				GPS Lohadwar(Bangla Tola)	163.67	91	55.60
				GPS Boys Gangahara	163.64	54	33.00
				PS Umari	163.23	253	155.00
				PS Patharaha	162.13	137	84.50
				GPS Girls Raghurajgarh	159.59	78	48.88
				RgPSm Dani	159.21	121	76.00
				GPS Ulahi Khurd	157.51	109	69.20
				GPS Girls Raipur K	155.60	139	89.33
				GPS Girls Sagara	155.51	120	77.17
				GPS Roura	154.95	86	55.50
				PS Mahasuwa Devarth	152.78	88	57.60
				GPS Itaha	152.73	84	55.00
				GPS Pandentola Sagara	150.32	116	77.17
<b>High group (149% to 100%) (55 or 31.07% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>117.54</b>	<b>3749</b>		<b>High group (149% to 100%) (76 or 41.53% PS Schools)</b>	<b>120.67</b>	<b>6126</b>	
UEGS Patehara	149.70	50	33.40	G.P.S. Kalikan Tola Ramnai	130.21	102	78.33
EGS Ticura Tola Bakchhera	148.95	71	47.67	PS Mankahari	149.11	125	83.83
UEGS Podi	147.29	95	64.50	PS Laximanpur	149.10	124	83.17
UEGS Adi.Basti Badwar	146.48	156	106.50	GPS Dewgaon	147.92	71	48.00
UEGS Patna	144.27	73	50.60	PS Itarpahad	146.51	126	86.00
UEGS Badheyana Amwa 9	140.82	69	49.00	PS Loua	146.05	157	107.50
EGS Majhboga	137.39	79	57.50	GPS Paliya 352	144.68	68	47.00
UEGS Sagara Malaihan Tola	135.75	83	61.14	GPS Baghamada	144.53	66	45.67
UEGS Gaura Uttar Tola	135.59	80	59.00	PS Ramnai	144.26	113	78.33
UEGS Barehi Dandi Tola	132.87	64	48.17	GPS Sotha	141.94	77	54.25
UEGS Barehi Gautman	132.87	64	48.17	GPS Kharahari	141.74	91	64.20
UEGS Hardi-3	131.35	118	89.83	PS Kheera	140.85	80	56.80
EGS Kanchanpur Majantola	131.30	79	60.17	GPS Bela	140.26	126	89.83
UEGS Chorgadi Dakshin Tola	128.87	122	94.67	GPS Sonoura	138.78	170	122.50

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. High Group</b>							
EGS Pahadriya 365	125.73	129	102.60	GPS Girls Manikwar	136.72	101	73.88
EGS Naveen Delhi	125.00	53	42.40	PS Tatihara	136.67	82	60.00
UEGS Gonda	124.66	52	41.71	GPS Dihuli	136.64	57	41.71
UEGS Barsaita	123.68	94	76.00	GPS Girls Ganghara	136.36	45	33.00
UEGS Duara 270	123.61	72	58.25	GPS Hari.Basti Dwari	136.25	109	80.00
UEGS Khajhawa	123.46	100	81.00	GPS Boys Manikwar	135.36	100	73.88
UEGS Dihiya Naveen	121.21	40	33.00	GPS Girls Karoundi	133.64	98	73.33
UEGS W-6 New Adi.Bas.Gangahara	121.21	40	33.00	PS Belhai	131.30	97	73.88
EGS Barehi Badhaiyan	120.42	58	48.17	PS Badagaon	129.81	135	104.00
UEGS Amwa 3	119.86	50	41.71	PS Silchat	129.07	111	86.00
UEGS Duari Bhujwan Tola	116.25	93	80.00	PS Gorgaon 165	126.44	110	87.00
UEGS Barhadi Teliyan	114.20	119	104.20	PS Banjari No.2	126.28	74	58.60
UEGS Shuklan Tola Patana	112.80	47	41.67	GPS Paderuya	124.42	107	86.00
UEGS Malaihan Tola Lohi	112.65	57	50.60	New PS Lakshmanpur Kaharan Tol	123.85	103	83.17
EGS Devraphareda Har.	112.35	83	73.88	GPS Paliya Naveen	123.81	52	42.00
UEGS Kachchiyan Tola	110.49	54	48.88	PS Bandhawa	123.45	93	75.33
UEGS Pashchimi Tola Goura	110.17	65	59.00	GPS Sirsa	122.80	79	64.33
UEGS Kanchanpur Koriyan	109.70	66	60.17	GPS Jhanjhar	120.00	66	55.00
UEGS Geruar	109.22	64	58.60	GPS Mahua	119.76	40	33.40
UEGS Belaha	108.81	70	64.33	PS Girls Budiya	119.76	50	41.75
UEGS Khuraha	108.44	53	48.88	PS Tikuri	119.05	75	63.00
UEGS Patela	108.16	53	49.00	GPS Girls Badwar	118.31	126	106.50
UEGS Baghelan Jaraha	106.33	56	52.67	GPS Amiliya	116.82	75	64.20
UEGS Hari.Basti Nawagaon	106.31	65	61.14	PS Patuna	116.20	66	56.80
UEGS Mahsu 515	105.90	61	57.60	GPS Bhouwar	115.91	68	58.67
E.G.S.Rora Patana	105.60	44	41.67	PS Padara (Roura)	114.67	86	75.00
UEGS Badgaiyan Tola Itaha	105.45	58	55.00	GPS Sonarupa	114.58	55	48.00
UEGS Mahagana	105.26	40	38.00	GPS Bheer Semari	114.16	79	69.20
UEGS Tamara Pahad Dedhi	103.64	57	55.00	GPS Madnua	114.16	86	75.33
EGS Atala	103.13	55	53.33	GPS Boys Joginhai	114.03	63	55.25
UEGS Adi.Basti Nawagaon	103.04	63	61.14	GPS Hardi	113.54	102	89.83
UEGS Kushaha Tola 96	102.61	59	57.50	PS Girls Sursa	113.51	70	61.67
EGS Mahasua 516	102.43	59	57.60	GPS Girls Bakchhera	113.29	54	47.67
UEGS Surasa Kala Kachhiyan	102.16	63	61.67	PS Girls Dwari	112.50	90	80.00
UEGS Dhavaiya-290	102.04	60	58.80	RGPSM Paliya 349	112.50	54	48.00
UEGS Mishran Tola Barehi	101.73	49	48.17	GJPS Majhigawan	111.69	86	77.00
UEGS W-18,19 Ror Bhaluha	101.23	66	65.20	GPS Mahiya	110.91	61	55.00
E.G.S.Patana (Ward No-06)	100.80	42	41.67	PS Lohi	110.67	56	50.60
UEGS Musaua	100.73	46	45.67	GPS Girls Joginhai	110.41	61	55.25
UEGS Uparoura Uttartola	100.68	42	41.71	GPS Itoura	110.39	85	77.00
UEGS Ps Dadh	100.00	49	49.00	GPS Budiya	110.18	46	41.75
				GPS Marhi	109.94	59	53.67
				PS Khaira	109.88	89	81.00
				GPS Kanchanpur	109.70	66	60.17
				P.S. Kanchanpur	108.03	65	60.17
				PS Banjari No.1	107.51	63	58.60
				GPS Boys Dwari	107.50	86	80.00
				PS Shukulgawan	106.06	105	99.00
				GPS Girls Patna	105.60	44	41.67
				GPS Girls Tamaradesh	105.45	58	55.00
				GPS Mahagana	105.26	40	38.00

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. High Group</b>				GPS Taunga	104.81	109	104.00
				GPS Boys Silpari	104.79	35	33.40
				PS Raghurajgarh	104.35	51	48.88
				PS Paliya 351	104.17	50	48.00
				PS Hinouti	104.08	51	49.00
				GPS Ahirgaon	103.26	74	71.67
				PS Semari Kala Naveen	101.54	44	43.33
				GPS Nawagaon (Roura)	101.40	62	61.14
				GPS Sagara	101.08	78	77.17
				PS Kapuri	100.87	58	57.50
				GPS Hardi	100.19	90	89.83
<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (119 or 67.23% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>74.17</b>	<b>5932</b>		<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (73 or 39.89 PS Schools)</b>	<b>73.44</b>	<b>3744</b>	
UEGS Adi.Basti Geruari-170	99.54	54	54.25	PS Boys Raipur K	99.63	89	89.33
UEGS Bhauwar 1	98.86	58	58.67	GPS Hardua	98.84	85	86.00
UEGS Satgadh	98.76	53	53.67	RGPSM Kouadhan	98.74	118	119.50
UEGS Budiya Kakuniha	98.20	41	41.75	PS Karoundi	98.18	72	73.33
EGS Khajuaawan	98.13	60	61.14	GPS Amawa	97.96	48	49.00
UEGS Kendra Udharega	97.62	41	42.00	GPS Duara Naveen	97.85	57	58.25
EGS Barehi Badhai Tola Barehi	97.58	47	48.17	GPS Baraiya Tola	95.92	47	49.00
UEGS Hari.Basti Lohadawar	97.12	54	55.60	GPS Semari Kala	94.62	41	43.33
UEGS Duara 275	96.14	56	58.25	GPS Khujh	93.75	50	53.33
UEGS Joginhai W. 19	95.93	53	55.25	PS Boys Patna	93.60	39	41.67
UEGS Semari Khurd	95.74	45	47.00	GPS Goura	93.22	55	59.00
UEGS Khujh Harijan Basti	95.63	51	53.33	GPS Girls Jaldar	93.02	60	64.50
UEGS W-5 Kheera	95.07	54	56.80	GPS Boys Bhaluhi	92.02	60	65.20
UEGS Chhoti Mankahari	94.23	79	83.83	PS Boys Sursa Kala	91.30	49	53.67
UEGS Dihiya-2	93.94	31	33.00	GPS Boys Tamaradesh	90.91	50	55.00
EGS Bara 393	93.65	59	63.00	PS Chorgadi No.1	90.85	86	94.67
UEGS Geruari 169	92.17	50	54.25	GJPS Ledua	89.66	78	87.00
EGS Nivi	92.05	68	73.88	PS Rampur	88.69	91	102.60
EGS Tatihari	91.67	55	60.00	PS Boys Nawagaon	88.32	54	61.14
UEGS Kendra Kuinya Khurda	89.47	34	38.00	GPS Badwar	88.26	94	106.50
UEGS Kachhiyan Jaraha	89.24	47	52.67	GPS Louhadwar	88.13	49	55.60
UEGS Kachiyon Tola Badwar	89.20	95	106.50	GPS Khurha	87.98	43	48.88
UEGS Kharahari W.8	88.79	57	64.20	GPS Geruar	87.03	51	58.60
UEGS Loharan Tola Lakshmanpur	87.78	73	83.17	GPS Kasai	86.72	47	54.20
UEGS Manikwar	87.37	64	73.25	PS Bheeta	85.36	102	119.50
UEGS Tikuri No.-1	87.30	55	63.00	RgPSm PS Mohagarh	84.91	36	42.40
UEGS Mahiya	87.27	48	55.00	GPS Boys Sursa	84.32	52	61.67
UEGS Bhatigawan	87.21	75	86.00	PS Kolaiya	83.03	45	54.20
UEGS Bhothi	86.71	60	69.20	PS Duara	82.40	48	58.25
UEGS Ahiran Tola	86.49	48	55.50	GPS Jaldar	82.17	53	64.50
UEGS Uproua	86.30	36	41.71	GPS Chorgadi No.2	80.28	76	94.67
UEGS Adiwasi Basti Katara	85.93	42	48.88	GPS Mahuli	78.57	33	42.00
UEGS Dhakhra	85.42	41	48.00	PS Bagadara	78.18	43	55.00
UEGS Kendra Una.P,S Devgaon Ti	85.42	41	48.00	PS Poudi	77.52	50	64.50
UEGS Kolan Tola	85.33	64	75.00	PS Girls Delhi	75.47	32	42.40
UEGS Bhouwar 2	85.23	50	58.67	GPS Paipakhara	74.79	45	60.17
UEGS Louhadwar Patelan Tola	84.53	47	55.60	PS Badi Kuyia	74.70	62	83.00
EGS Patelan Tola Khujh	84.38	45	53.33	GPS Larh	73.74	73	99.00
UEGS Adi. Basti Laxmanpur	84.17	70	83.17	GPS Dhweya	73.72	54	73.25

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Low Group</b>							
EGS Sc St. Basti Gorgawan 165	83.91	73	87.00	GPS Umariha 59	72.96	112	153.50
UEGS Amwa 10	83.67	41	49.00	PS Amwa 5	71.92	30	41.71
EGS Badavar Ward No. 3/4	83.57	89	106.50	GPS Budhiya Tikaitan Tola	71.86	30	41.75
UEGS Pipari	83.33	40	48.00	GPS Atara	69.39	34	49.00
UEGS Muslim Basti Kasai	83.03	45	54.20	PS Mahasua 515	68.66	39	56.80
UEGS Chandihar	83.00	42	50.60	PS Girls Nawagaon	67.06	41	61.14
UEGS Roura Medhuliyar	82.88	46	55.50	Js Khajhawa	66.67	54	81.00
UEGS Kolan Tola Padariya	82.76	54	65.25	RGPSM Geruari 170	66.36	36	54.25
UEGS Lanka Tola Duari	82.50	66	80.00	GPS Girls Barsaita	65.79	50	76.00
UEGS Subhash Tola Duari	82.50	66	80.00	GPS Fareda	65.53	48	73.25
UEGS Ulhi U.Mu.	82.37	57	69.20	GPS Girls Barahadi	65.26	68	104.20
UEGS Raghurajgarh Atari	81.84	40	48.88	PS Mahasuwa Baghelan	64.24	37	57.60
UEGS Jhanjhar	81.82	45	55.00	GPS Kushha 95	63.64	21	33.00
UEGS Bara Patelan Tola	80.31	51	63.50	PS Umariha 61	63.19	97	153.50
EGS Devraphareda Adi.	79.86	59	73.88	GPS Majan	63.07	37	58.67
UEGS Amiliha Pathari	79.75	42	52.67	GPS Upkendra Amiliha	60.76	32	52.67
UEGS Hari.Basti Joginhai	79.64	44	55.25	GPS Kariyajhar	60.47	52	86.00
UEGS Chamdauri Basti Laxmanpur	79.36	66	83.17	GPS Bara Hariharpur	60.22	54	89.67
UEGS W-14 Malaihan T. Patouna	79.23	45	56.80	GPS Uparoura	59.93	25	41.71
UEGS Ramnai Adi.Basti	79.15	62	78.33	GPS Parshwar	56.12	33	58.80
UEGS Bara Ahari Tola	78.74	50	63.50	PS Umari (Badagaw)	54.74	25	45.67
UEGS Paipakhara	78.22	51	65.20	GPS Girls Silpari	53.89	18	33.40
UEGS Hari.Basti Padariya	78.16	51	65.25	GPS Padariya	52.11	34	65.25
EGS Itura Gothwa Tola	77.92	60	77.00	PS Barhadi	51.82	54	104.20
UEGS Kharahari W-7	77.88	50	64.20	GPS Boys Barsaita	51.32	39	76.00
UEGS Ralihan Amiliha	77.85	41	52.67	GPS Delhi	49.53	21	42.40
UEGS Hari.Basti Lakshmanpur	75.75	63	83.17	GPS Chandehari	49.41	25	50.60
UEGS Karoun Roura	75.68	42	55.50	GPS Pahadiya Naveen 367	46.78	48	102.60
UEGS W.9 Amiliya Mudahan	74.77	48	64.20	PS Choudiyar	45.51	80	175.80
EGS Mahasuan 517	74.65	43	57.60	GPS Teparo	45.00	24	53.33
EGS Badwar 19, 20	74.18	79	106.50	GPS Khamadeeh	40.39	71	175.80
UEGS Mahua	71.86	24	33.40	JPS Bal	38.75	21	54.20
UEGS Tatihara	71.67	43	60.00	PS Boys Bakchhera	37.76	18	47.67
UEGS Sukuli	71.59	42	58.67	Janpad PS Kothi	26.51	19	71.67
UEGS Gadariyan Tola	71.27	55	77.17				
UEGS Banjari	69.97	41	58.60				
UEGS Sagra Gargantola	68.68	53	77.17				
UEGS Rampurwa	68.39	44	64.33				
UEGS Bouliha	68.18	50	73.33				
UEGS Chhirhai	68.03	40	58.80				
UEGS Putari	67.72	43	63.50				
UEGS Unaitp.S.Devgaon P.Tola	66.67	32	48.00				
UEGS Ward 3,4, Lohadwar	66.55	37	55.60				
UEGS Paipakhara	66.48	40	60.17				
UEGS W-10 Badagaon	65.38	68	104.00				
UEGS Chak Paraswar	64.63	38	58.80				
E.G.S. Adi.Basti Bhaluha	64.42	42	65.20				
UEGS Itaha Uncha Tola	63.64	35	55.00				
UEGS Hardi-2	63.45	57	89.83				
UEGS Dai Tola Duari	62.50	50	80.00				
UEGS W-10 Adi.Basti Mahula	62.39	47	75.33				

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % ST enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Low Group</b>							
UEGS Pamaran Tola Atari	61.38	30	48.88				
UEGS Hari.Basti Sonoura	61.22	75	122.50				
UEGS Alopa Gaura	61.02	36	59.00				
UEGS Kushaha Tola Mankahari	60.83	51	83.83				
UEGS Charpanihan Tola	59.64	50	83.83				
UEGS Paliya Mauhai	59.57	28	47.00				
UEGS Duroudh	59.25	41	69.20				
UEGS W-13 Kanji	59.13	34	57.50				
UEGS Deutaha	56.85	42	73.88				
UEGS Kuan	56.63	47	83.00				
UEGS Manpur	55.50	41	73.88				
UEGS Sandura	53.95	58	107.50				
UEGS Pokhara	53.49	46	86.00				
UEGS Dongari Tola	53.13	41	77.17				
UEGS Shivpurva	52.63	54	102.60				
UEGS Bara Hariharpur	52.42	47	89.67				
UEGS Mahamaya Tola	52.34	41	78.33				
UEGS Hardi Harijan Basti	51.21	46	89.83				
UEGS Telni Tola	48.91	41	83.83				
UEGS Barahadi Baban	47.98	50	104.20				
UEGS Madawahi Tola	44.78	40	89.33				
EGS Kolgarh 110	40.80	34	83.33				
UEGS Shukulgawan	40.40	40	99.00				
UEGS Patharaha	37.87	32	84.50				
UEGS Hari.Adi.Basti Rateh	37.79	58	153.50				
UEGS Umari Kasihai Tola	36.77	57	155.00				
Ps UEGS Kauadhan	34.31	41	119.50				
UEGS Atrari	32.99	58	175.80				
UEGS Umariha-61	26.06	40	153.50				
<b>Very low group (0 or to 0% EGS Schools)</b>				<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (2 or 1.09% PS Schools)</b>	<b>18.76</b>	<b>25</b>	
				GPS Sirkhini	22.98	18	78.33
				PS Barehi	14.53	7	48.17
<b>Grand Total (177 EGS Schools)</b>	<b>89.46</b>	<b>9918</b>		<b>Grand Total (183 PS Schools)</b>	<b>110.00</b>	<b>14448</b>	

**Appendix IX – Part D  
SUMMARY TABLE**

**School-wise comparison of Total enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Raipur (K) Block, Rewa District, MP**

Performance Group	No. of EGS School	% of EGS Schools in different performance groups	ST enrol. in EGS	Group average of % ST enrol. in EGS	No. of PS	% of PS in different performance groups	ST enrol. in PS	Group average of % ST enrol. in PS
Very high group (150% & above)	3	1.69	237	181.01	32	17.49	4553	173.74
High group (149% to 100%)	55	31.07	3749	117.54	76	41.53	6126	120.67
Low group (99% to 25%)	119	67.23	5932	74.17	73	39.89	3744	73.44
Very low group (24% to 0%)	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.09	25	18.76
<b>Total</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>9918</b>	<b>89.46</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1448</b>	<b>110.00</b>

**Appendix IX – Part E**  
**School-wise comparison of Total enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP**

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (4 or 4.44 % EGS Schools)</b>	<b>168.06</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>56.24</b>	<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (14 or 12.07% PS Schools)</b>	<b>168.30</b>	<b>1655</b>	<b>70.50</b>
UEGS Saraitola Devhara	181.14	121	66.80	PS SUREHLI	216.42	145	67.00
UEGS Chinditola Bhurkur	164.71	70	42.50	PS KISLI	181.67	114	62.75
UEGS Amatola Paraswah	164.44	111	67.50	JANPAD PS CHHATARPUR	176.71	129	73.00
UEGS Bartola Lato	161.94	78	48.17	PS BAMHANI	170.25	103	60.50
				GOVT. PS ISHWARPUR	169.53	115	67.83
				GOVT. PS JOGI LURHIA	168.06	114	67.83
				PS SAHJAR	167.25	143	85.50
				PS MADANPUR	167.19	107	64.00
				PS KHODA KHUDRA	161.66	104	64.33
				GIRLS ASHRAM GHUGHRI	159.45	100	62.71
				PS GOPANGI	155.21	67	43.17
				PS NAHARBELI	154.70	111	71.75
				PS CHOBA	154.64	150	97.00
				PS DULADAR	153.51	153	99.67
<b>High group (149% to 100%) (35 or 38.89% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>118.58</b>	<b>2264</b>	<b>54.68</b>	<b>High group (149% to 100%) (43 or 37.07% PS Schools)</b>	<b>124.68</b>	<b>3086</b>	<b>57.79</b>
UEGS Kotwartola Tikariya	149.53	79	52.83	PS LATO	149.48	72	48.17
UEGS Khairotola Dundadei	149.45	81	54.20	PS SALHEGHORI	148.91	68	45.67
UEGS Masultola Kachnari	143.64	113	78.67	PS GAJRAJ	148.33	89	60.00
UEGS Baigatola Patan	136.69	66	48.29	GIRLS PS GHUGHRI	148.29	93	62.71
UEGS Membertola Bilgaon	136.59	56	41.00	PS DHEKO	146.88	94	64.00
UEGS Imlitola Dhobabar	136.36	55	40.33	PS SAJPANI	141.46	58	41.00
UEGS Sarpanchtola Naijhar	136.36	55	40.33	PS PARASWAH	140.74	95	67.50
UEGS Nayatola Umariya	135.77	62	45.67	PS PADDIKONA	140.43	66	47.00
UEGS Khalhetola Umariya	127.01	58	45.67	PS NAIJHAR	138.84	56	40.33
UEGS Tikaratola Sahjar	125.15	107	85.50	PS BHUDKUR	138.82	59	42.50
UEGS Kewlartola Kuntidadargaon	123.71	72	58.20	BOYS PS GHUGHRI	138.72	87	62.71
UEGS Nayatola Pipardon	123.33	74	60.00	PS TABALPANI	136.33	91	66.75
UEGS Kukrakol Katangi	121.45	55	45.29	PS CHHIWALA TOLA	132.63	100	75.40
UEGS Mukaddamtola Tikariya	121.14	64	52.83	PS DHANOULI	131.27	89	67.80
UEGS Bajartola Dongar Mandla	119.24	54	45.29	PS KUSMI	130.43	70	53.67
UEGS Pankatola Dundadei	118.08	64	54.20	PS CHALNI (UPAR)	129.91	76	58.50
UEGS Sodhatola Surehli	117.91	79	67.00	PS GHOREGHAT	129.79	88	67.80
UEGS Hajaritola Lafan	115.38	63	54.60	PS BANEHARI	128.57	102	79.33
UEGS Kutritola Khodakhudra N	115.03	74	64.33	PS BIJOURA	128.40	62	48.29
UEGS Pakritola Ilahi	110.03	53	48.17	PS AHMADPURA	127.66	60	47.00
UEGS Navnadartola Khajri	109.92	72	65.50	PS MANGA	124.92	66	52.83
UEGS Nichetola Salhenghori	109.49	50	45.67	PS RAHANGI	123.71	72	58.20
UEGS Sarpanchtola Dhangaon	109.14	74	67.80	JPS KHAJRI	123.66	81	65.50
UEGS Baigatola Barwani	108.81	42	38.60	PS JHUNJHAR	123.62	67	54.20
UEGS Baheratola Tabalpani	107.87	72	66.75	PS KHAJRI	122.14	80	65.50
UEGS Amatola Devhara	107.78	72	66.80	PS KHODAKHUDRA	118.13	76	64.33
UEGS Jhiriyatola Dalkagopangi	106.56	46	43.17	PS PATAN	118.05	57	48.29
UEGS Mukaddamtola Dongar Mandla	105.99	48	45.29	NPS TINSATOLA	117.65	72	61.20

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. High Group</b>							
UEGS Bhoitola Churiya	105.88	45	42.50	GIRLS PS SALWAH	116.88	36	30.80
UEGS Gauritola Kumhi	104.53	75	71.75	JPS SAHUTOLA	116.88	36	30.80
UEGS Kornitola Salwah	103.90	32	30.80	PS CHEETA PAKHNA	116.58	45	38.60
UEGS Konhatola Patan	103.55	50	48.29	PS KANDRA	116.44	85	73.00
UEGS Mototola Banheri	103.36	82	79.33	PS CHALNI (NEECHE)	116.24	68	58.50
UEGS Dharmutola Chalni	100.85	59	58.50	PS JHIGARHATA	114.06	86	75.40
UEGS Mukaddamtola Bamhani	100.83	61	60.50	PS LODHA	109.48	67	61.20
				PS SINGHANPURI	106.38	50	47.00
				PS PALAKI	104.35	104	99.67
				PS DHOBAWAR	104.13	42	40.33
				PS PIPARIAKALA	103.29	69	66.80
				PS JUNWANI	103.24	70	67.80
				PS KUNTIDADAR	103.09	60	58.20
				JPS GWARA	102.21	54	52.83
				PS PONDI	100.29	68	67.80
<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (55.56% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>74.92</b>	<b>2158</b>	<b>58.97</b>	<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (58 or 50.0% PS Schools)</b>	<b>71.98</b>	<b>2377</b>	<b>57.23</b>
UEGS Khairitola Patan	99.41	48	48.29	PS LAFAN	98.90	54	54.60
UEGS Mattatola Barwani	98.45	38	38.60	PS BISADHAR	97.56	40	41.00
UEGS Mukaddamtola Dhanwahi	98.45	38	38.60	PS SENDWARA	97.21	61	62.75
UEGS Narwartola Salwah	97.40	30	30.80	PS DONGAR MANDLA	97.16	44	45.29
UEGS Darratola Bhurkur	96.47	41	42.50	PS GULLUKHOH	94.95	43	45.29
UEGS Kundatola Tabalpani	95.88	64	66.75	PS DHANGAON	94.40	64	67.80
UEGS Pakritola Kisali	95.62	60	62.75	PS DHUGHUTI	94.40	64	67.80
UEGS Bhoitola Naijhar	94.21	38	40.33	PS IMLITOLA	94.35	64	67.83
UEGS Chapartola Junwani	92.92	63	67.80	NPS MUKADDAM TOLA	94.21	38	40.33
UEGS Nichetola Chiwlatola	92.84	70	75.40	PS BHANPUR	93.17	50	53.67
UEGS Chindhartola Ghughri	89.29	56	62.71	PS BANIA	93.14	57	61.20
UEGS Barratola Baniya	88.24	54	61.20	PS DADARGAON	91.60	60	65.50
UEGS Khalhentola Mahli	85.49	55	64.33	NPS BHOITOLA/MUKADAMTOLA	91.50	56	61.20
UEGS Pipartola Rahangi	84.19	49	58.20	PS DEVHARA	91.32	61	66.80
UEGS Bertola Dalkagopangi	83.40	36	43.17	GIRLS PS RAMHEPUR	90.35	39	43.17
UEGS Chandatola Bijaura	82.84	40	48.29	PS BHOKA DEVRI	89.93	61	67.83
UEGS Upartola Khamtara	81.32	51	62.71	ASHRAM SHALA PADDIKONA	89.36	42	47.00
UEGS Kursitola Bisandhar	80.49	33	41.00	PS ERI	89.20	64	71.75
UEGS Baigatola Khuriya	79.58	60	75.40	BOYS PS RAMHEPUR	88.03	38	43.17
UEGS Khurritola Manga	79.50	42	52.83	PS ILAHI	87.20	42	48.17
UEGS Manglatola Katangi	79.50	36	45.29	NPS MUKADDAM TOLA, BHUDKUR	87.06	37	42.50
UEGS Tikratola Paddikona	78.72	37	47.00	PS KATHAIDEEH	84.44	57	67.50
UEGS Baigatola Kandra	78.08	57	73.00	JPS SIMARIA	84.25	46	54.60
UEGS Narwartola Paraswah	77.04	52	67.50	PS PIPARDON	81.82	33	40.33
UEGS Dongartola Pipardon	76.86	31	40.33	PS KATANGI	81.70	37	45.29
UEGS Baratola Chata	76.70	52	67.80	PS PIPARDON	81.67	49	60.00
UEGS Mototola Ramhepur	76.45	33	43.17	PS KUDIA	80.90	61	75.40
UEGS Mukaddamtola Kusumi	76.40	41	53.67	PS KACHNARI	80.08	63	78.67
UEGS Konhatola Dadargaon	76.34	50	65.50	PS DUNDADEI	79.34	43	54.20
UEGS Mukaddamtola Pipariyakhurd	74.85	64	85.50	NPS TIKRA TOLA	79.10	53	67.00

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Low Group</b>							
UEGS Timkitola Dhenko	73.44	47	64.00	PS BARWANI	77.72	30	38.60
UEGS Kendotola Churiya	72.94	31	42.50	GIRLS ASHRAM KHAJRI	76.34	50	65.50
UEGS Bhoitola Mahli	71.50	46	64.33	PS URWAHI	76.27	60	78.67
UEGS Shivrajitola Chatarpur	71.23	52	73.00	PS BILGAON	73.17	30	41.00
UEGS Tikaratola Sajpani	70.73	29	41.00	PS CHURIA	72.94	31	42.50
UEGS Kurlutola Patnipani (Bamhani)	69.42	42	60.50	PS DOONDI	69.60	38	54.60
UEGS Chinditola Banheri	68.07	54	79.33	PS BEHRATOLA	68.15	46	67.50
UEGS Lohartola Dundi	67.77	37	54.60	PS CHHATA	67.85	46	67.80
UEGS Baigatola Kuntidargaon	65.29	38	58.20	BOYS PS SALWAH	64.94	20	30.80
UEGS Kundpani Kathaidih	65.19	44	67.50	JPS DHEKO	62.50	40	64.00
UEGS Jhingratola Dundi	64.10	35	54.60	PS PATNI PANI	59.50	36	60.50
UEGS Bhilwatola Churiya	61.18	26	42.50	NPS GHUGHRA TOLA	57.53	42	73.00
UEGS Ghughratola Tabalpani	59.93	40	66.75	Sat. Sch. Imali tola(2008-09)	57.45	27	47.00
UEGS Amatola Chalni	52.99	31	58.50	PS KHAMTARA	57.40	36	62.71
UEGS Bodhatola Madanpur	50.00	32	64.00	Sat. Sch. Bakal tola (2008-09)	51.90	25	48.17
UEGS Chobatola Choba	45.36	44	97.00	PS KUMHI	51.57	37	71.75
UEGS Amatola Duladar	42.14	42	99.67	PS MEHLI	48.19	31	64.33
UEGS Dongartola Ishwarpur	41.28	28	67.83	NPS BELTOLA PEEPARDON (M)	46.67	28	60.00
UEGS Sahutola Bhaunkadewri	36.86	25	67.83	PS TELANDEH	46.27	31	67.00
UEGS Mukaddamtola Jhunjar	29.52	16	54.20	PS GIRLS PS UMARIA	41.61	19	45.67
				JPS KACHHRATOLA	40.30	27	67.00
				Sat. Sch. Dwahi Tola(2008-09)	39.45	19	48.17
				BOYS PS UMARIA	37.23	17	45.67
				NPS BANJAR TOLA	37.19	15	40.33
				PS PIPARIA KHURD	32.75	28	85.50
				NPS BANSI TOLA	31.07	15	48.29
				NPS BARRA TOLA	25.51	16	62.71
				ASHARM SHALA SENDWARA	25.50	16	62.75
<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (1 or 1.11% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>16.47</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>66.80</b>	<b>Very low group (24% to 0%) (1 or 0.86% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>22.71</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>52.83</b>
UEGS Chandnatola Pipariyakala	16.47	11	66.80	PS TIKARIA	22.71	12	52.83
<b>Grand Total (90 EGS Schools)</b>	<b>95.39</b>	<b>4813</b>	<b>57.26</b>	<b>Grand Total (116 EGS Schools)</b>	<b>102.72</b>	<b>7130</b>	<b>59.00</b>

**Appendix IX – Part E  
SUMMARY TABLE**

**School-wise comparison of Total enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Ghughri Block, Mandla District, MP**

Performance Group	No. of EGS School	% of EGS Schools in different performance groups	ST enrol. in EGS	Group average of % ST enrol. in EGS	No. of PS	% of PS in different performance groups	ST enrol. in PS	Group average of % ST enrol. in PS
Very high group (150% & above)	4	4.44	380	168.06	14	12.07	1655	168.30
High group (149% to 100%)	35	38.89	2264	118.58	43	37.07	3086	124.68
Low group (99% to 25%)	50	55.56	2158	74.92	58	50.00	2377	71.98
Very low group (24% to 0%)	1	1.11	11	16.47	1	0.86	12	22.71
<b>Total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>4813</b>	<b>95.39</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>7130</b>	<b>102.72</b>

**Appendix IX – Part F**  
**School-wise comparison of Total enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Manasa Block, Neemuch District, MP**

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (0 or 0% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>Very high group (150% &amp; above) (33 or 28.45% PS Schools)</b>	<b>190.81</b>	<b>4743</b>	
				PS.Talau	276.79	186	67.20
				PS.Pipliya Hadi	263.94	185	70.09
				PS.Sankariya Khedi	262.71	155	59.00
				PS.Juna Malaheda	250.32	148	59.13
				PS.Chenpuriya	229.93	274	119.17
				PS.Majiriya	216.94	172	79.29
				PS.Bakhtuni	213.26	131	61.43
				PS.Dudhalai	211.60	155	73.25
				PS.Sonadi	209.16	217	103.75
				GPS.Antri	207.22	155	74.80
				PS.Kundwasa	203.47	164	80.60
				PS.Bardiya(Manasa)	192.31	140	72.80
				PS.Khadavada	190.27	129	67.80
				PS.Pavti	186.67	140	75.00
				PS.Kadi Khurd	186.35	101	54.20
				PS.Bhamesar	185.42	106	57.17
				PS.Palasiya	184.96	82	44.33
				PS.Moya	180.00	135	75.00
				PS.Kundla	178.66	144	80.60
				PS.Lasudiya (Antri)	176.43	131	74.25
				PS.Navlpura	173.68	77	44.33
				PS.Bhagori	169.68	97	57.17
				PS.Mokdi	168.14	114	67.80
				BPS.Bhadana	167.21	205	122.60
				PS.Nayagaon	162.25	117	72.11
				PS.Amad	161.88	172	106.25
				PS.Tamoti	158.83	169	106.40
				PS.Raipuriya	157.45	74	47.00
				PS.Devran	157.40	109	69.25
				PS.Khedli	157.01	168	107.00
				PS.Danta	153.23	190	124.00
				PS.Dantlai	152.54	110	72.11
				PS.Jannod	151.04	91	60.25
<b>High group (149% to 100%) (7 or 9.59% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>122.72</b>	<b>580</b>		<b>High group (149% to 100%) (36 or 31.03% PS Schools)</b>	<b>127.81</b>	<b>3518</b>	
EGS Rebari Basti	146.31	116	79.29	PS.Kadi Antri	149.43	132	88.33
EGS Dayali No. 2 & 3	144.59	107	74.00	PS.Pipliya Ghota	146.34	120	82.00
EGS Singhadiya	121.71	57	46.83	BPS.Antri	145.72	109	74.80
EGS Kund Kheda	119.05	75	63.00	PS.Sandiya	144.44	91	63.00
EGS Battisada	115.19	75	65.11	PS.Badkunwa	144.39	103	71.33
EGS Kesha ka Tanda	111.28	78	70.09	GPS.Bhadana	144.37	177	122.60

EGS School				Primary School			
Performance groups and EGS School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat	Performance groups and Primary School Name	Average of % Total enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. High Group</b>							
EGS Keshar pura	100.93	72	71.33	PS.Hanumantiya	144.37	94	65.11
				PS.Choukdi	143.26	88	61.43
				PS.Nalva	141.41	105	74.25
				PS.Phophaliya	139.76	91	65.11
				PS.Pokharda	138.38	137	99.00
				PS.Bhat Khedi Khurd	138.23	90	65.11
				PS.Bhimpura	137.76	83	60.25
				PS Kheda Baraji	137.29	99	72.11
				PS Bensda	135.34	60	44.33
				PS.Chikli	133.85	86	64.25
				PS. Pipliya Singhadiya	132.38	62	46.83
				PS.Bujha	130.91	156	119.17
				PS.Mokham Pura (Khajuri)	130.08	111	85.33
				PS.Durgpura	127.75	93	72.80
				PS.Piplon	125.25	124	99.00
				PS.Kundaliya (Junapani)	121.40	78	64.25
				PS.Banjari Khurd	121.24	129	106.40
				PS Gothda	120.65	87	72.11
				PS.Karadiya	119.57	56	46.83
				PS.Ragasपुरiya	119.53	127	106.25
				PS.Bhagal	118.29	76	64.25
				PS.Nai Nanor	114.67	86	75.00
				PS.Karanpura	113.29	135	119.17
				PS Barvadiya	112.25	89	79.29
				PS.Rajpura	110.64	52	47.00
				PS.Dhodhar	106.67	80	75.00
				PS.Hama Khedi	105.33	79	75.00
				PS.Chaplana	104.30	89	85.33
				PS.Aranya Chandrawat	101.30	71	70.09
				PS Kundaliya Khurd	101.23	73	72.11
<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (64 or 87.67% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>64.35</b>	<b>2991</b>		<b>Low group (99% to 25%) (45 or 38.79% PS Schools)</b>	<b>68.37</b>	<b>2197</b>	
EGS Mazara Bakhtubi	99.30	61	61.43	PS Aamliya	99.64	69	69.25
EGS Kirपुरiya	98.10	58	59.13	GPS.Bensla	99.59	60	60.25
EGS Dudhi Kheda	97.79	53	54.20	PS.Naya Malaheda	98.10	58	59.13
EGS Mokhampura	97.30	72	74.00	PS.Bilvas	97.06	119	122.60
EGS Gogliya Khedi	97.02	68	70.09	BPS.Bensla	96.27	58	60.25
EGS Barama Ka Kheda	96.27	58	60.25	PS.Phul Pura	92.25	50	54.20
EGS Jai Singh ka Tanda	94.16	66	70.09	PS.Sarsi	92.03	67	72.80
EGS Chukani Kheda	87.30	55	63.00	PS.Kirपुरiya	91.33	54	59.13
EGS Mazara Devron	85.20	59	69.25	PS.Doriya Khedi	89.68	42	46.83
EGS Ram Kheda	84.65	51	60.25	PS.Nali	88.67	92	103.75
EGS Khedi Garasiya	82.75	58	70.09	PS.Juna Bhadana	88.09	108	122.60
EGS Shiv Puriya Kunwala	82.71	88	106.40	PS.Brahampura	85.71	49	57.17

Performance groups and EGS School Name	EGS School			Performance groups and Primary School Name	Primary School		
	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat		Average of % Total enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Low Group</b>							
EGS Ratanpura	81.51	72	88.33	PS.Khedi Chandrawat	84.18	59	70.09
EGS Mahesh puria	81.40	53	65.11	PS.Battisdi	82.94	54	65.11
EGS Kharni Kheda	79.73	59	74.00	PS.Barkheda Choukdi	79.77	49	61.43
EGS Kana ki barad	79.49	47	59.13	PS.Dayli	78.38	58	74.00
EGS Malaheda Block	77.80	46	59.13	PS.Pipalda Pathar	75.09	55	73.25
EGS Parpadiya	76.51	47	61.43	PS.Semli Jagir	74.67	56	75.00
EGS Banjara Basti Palda	74.73	35	46.83	PS.Khedi	74.19	52	70.09
EGS Ram Nagar	74.58	44	59.00	Balak Asharam. P.S.Dhakadkhedi	70.72	51	72.11
EGS Dera No. 1 & 2	74.19	52	70.09	Char Bhuja Ki Barad	69.34	41	59.13
EGS Zizar Kheda	73.33	55	75.00	PS.Bhadva	69.06	61	88.33
EGS Nai abadi Sareliya	72.18	47	65.11	PS.Sundi(Barlai)	68.45	46	67.20
EGS Shiv Puriya Mandirwala	70.49	75	106.40	PS.Juna Pani	68.27	37	54.20
EGS Kora Khedi	69.49	41	59.00	PS.Bankya Kheda	68.05	41	60.25
EGS Rup Pura	69.49	41	59.00	PS.Shivpuriya Chakki	66.73	71	106.40
EGS Jamalpura Banjara Basti	69.37	55	79.29	PS.Palda Barlai	61.92	29	46.83
EGS Besada	67.67	30	44.33	PS.Saroliya	61.43	40	65.11
EGS Rawat Nagar	66.39	40	60.25	PS.Basantpura	61.22	35	57.17
EGS Bhil Ka Kheda	65.63	46	70.09	PS Kundla Dhani	59.55	48	80.60
EGS Chota Chaplana	65.63	56	85.33	PS.Molki	57.76	40	69.25
EGS Maniya Khedi	64.51	42	65.11	PS.Jodmi	56.87	59	103.75
EGS Surawat Ki Barad	62.12	66	106.25	PS.Khushal Pura	54.67	39	71.33
EGS Magorda	61.80	49	79.29	PS.Basniya	54.23	31	57.17
EGS Kundodila Bujurj	61.02	44	72.11	Balika Ashram Antri Bujurag	53.48	40	74.80
EGS Dharampura	60.47	41	67.80	PS.Dhandheri	51.36	36	70.09
EGS Banchada Basti Moya	58.67	44	75.00	PS.Chukni	49.21	31	63.00
EGS Talai ki Jhopadiya	58.60	36	61.43	PS.Nagpura	47.20	32	67.80
EGS Banjara Basti Talau	58.04	39	67.20	PS.Jamal Pura	41.62	33	79.29
EGS Charan Basti Rawali Kunwai	57.90	69	119.17	PS.Pratap Pura	38.77	29	74.80
EGS Kotda	57.69	42	72.80	Satellite School Gayari Guda	38.35	17	44.33
EGS Kishangarh	57.34	42	73.25	PS.Dhani Nalva	37.71	28	74.25
EGS Garasiya Ki Barad	56.47	60	106.25	PS.Meriya Khedi	37.22	30	80.60
EGS Anandi Pura	55.97	41	73.25	PS.Devri Parda	35.52	21	59.13
EGS Dhau Khedi	55.35	30	54.20	PS.Bhopali	30.22	22	72.80
EGS Kheda Antri	54.81	41	74.80				
EGS Devri Somiya	53.66	44	82.00				
EGS Salarmala	51.71	41	79.29				
EGS Bachha Khedi	50.60	34	67.20				
EGS Panch Devora	48.54	35	72.11				
EGS Amar Pura	46.77	58	124.00				
EGS Khejdi	46.13	31	67.20				
EGS Karamdi	45.76	33	72.11				
EGS Nali Gurjar	45.30	47	103.75				
EGS Devido	44.44	33	74.25				

Performance groups and EGS School Name	EGS School			Performance groups and Primary School Name	Primary School		
	Average of % Total enrolment in EGS	Total Enrolment in EGS School	Avg.Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat		Average of % Total enrolment in PS	Total Enrolment in Primary School	Avg. Total Enrol. Per School in each panchayat
<b>Contd. Low Group</b>							
EGS Tol Khedi	43.73	25	57.17				
EGS Amarpura	42.99	46	107.00				
EGS Junapani Majara	42.80	51	119.17				
EGS Parot Pipliya	36.36	36	99.00				
EGS Naya Gram	33.92	23	67.80				
EGS Bor Khedi	31.91	15	47.00				
EGS Barla ka Kheda	29.30	18	61.43				
EGS Nai Barliya (Manoti)	26.46	17	64.25				
EGS Hada Khedi	25.17	30	119.17				
<b>Very low group (2 or 2.74% EGS Schools)</b>	<b>12.18</b>	<b>21</b>		<b>Very low group (2 or 1.72% PS Schools)</b>	<b>11.86</b>	<b>14</b>	
EGS Kora Khedi	21.09	17	80.60	PS Rup Pura	23.73	14	59.00
EGS Pagara	3.26	4	122.60	Setellite School Haripura (Kanjarda)	0.00	0	44.33
<b>Grand Total (73 EGS Schools)</b>	<b>68.52</b>	<b>3592</b>	<b>74.38</b>	<b>Grand Total (116 EGS Schools)</b>	<b>120.67</b>	<b>10472</b>	<b>73.79</b>

**Appendix IX – Part F  
SUMMARY TABLE**

**School-wise comparison of Total enrolment between EGS and PS schools: Manasa Block, Neemuch District, MP**

Performance Group	No. of EGS School	% of EGS Schools in different performance groups	ST enrol. in EGS	Group average of % ST enrol. in EGS	No. of PS	% of PS in different performance groups	ST enrol. in PS	Group average of % ST enrol. in PS
Very high group (150% & above)	0	0.00		0.00	33	28.45	4743	190.81
High group (149% to 100%)	7	9.59	580	122.72	36	31.03	3518	127.81
Low group (99% to 25%)	64	87.67	2991	64.35	45	38.79	2197	68.37
Very low group (24% to 0%)	2	2.74	21	12.18	2	1.72	14	11.86
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3592</b>	<b>68.52</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>10472</b>	<b>120.67</b>