International Development

Prizewinning Dissertation 2025

No.25-MN

Between Paradigm and Practice: MINUSMA, Peace and Hybridity

Maili Negi

Published: Feb 2026

Department of International Development

London School of Economics and Political Science

Houghton Street

London

WC2A 2AE UK

Tel: +44 (020) 7955 7425/6252

Fax: +44 (020) 7955-6844

Email: d.daley@lse.ac.uk

Website: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/home.aspx

ABSTRACT

This dissertation applies Mac Ginty's hybrid peace model to the case of MINUSMA in Mali to analyse the interactions that emerged between different understandings of peace, and the agents thereof, during the intervention. It combines these findings with theories of everyday peace, paradigm change, colonial legacies and language to demonstrate that prior hybridisations and attempts at paradigm maintenance distorted outcomes. The study highlights implications of such interactions for future interventions, emphasising the need to account for history and paradigm both within intervention contexts and the actors that intervene.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency)
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
APR	Accord for Peace and Reconciliation
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
G5 Sahel	Group of Five SAhel
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JNIM	Jaa'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (U.S. Department of State)
UN	United Nations

TABLE OF CONTENT

INTRODUCTION

In Mali, the first words exchanged each day are those of peace. A common greeting in Mali's lingua franca Bambara asks: "*hɛɛrɛ sira?*" roughly translating to "Did you spend the day/night in peace?" (An ka taa, 2019). "*Hɛɛrɛ sira*" acts as a reminder that peace is a lived, personal condition rooted within the everyday. Yet, the peace pursued by the UN in Mali has been far removed from this everyday understanding. It has been defined through hierarchical, technocratic and predominantly Western prescriptions. Peace has been treated as a technical project, imposed from the outside, based off of lessons learnt and pardoned from the need of self-reflection or criticality.

This dissertation takes a closer look at one of the more recent of such impositions. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in 2013, spent ten years in Mali. It was initially deployed after a coup in 2012, which had ended Mali's reign of a beacon of stability and good governance in the region (Gottlieb, 2013; van Vliet, 2014). Since being deployed, MINUSMA presided over an ever-widening mandate and closely coordinated with French counterterror and other military operations deployed in the same areas. Eventually, following two coups, on 18 August 2020 and 24 May 2021, the mission was asked to withdraw by the Malian government in July 2023. This is indicative of a wider trend within UN peace operations, which was marked by distrust, disillusionment and frustration. For some, Mali's case marked a pivotal point in the trend, as failure was expected to mean the loss of UN legitimacy and of a central measure to pursue global peace and security (Karlsrud, 2018, p. 103). This sentiment came before the premature withdrawal of MINUSMA, but it predicts the inflection point marked by this case and thus indicates the necessity to analyse this failure.

This dissertation analyses the case of MINUSMA through hybrid peace theory (Mac Ginty, 2011), to examine the relationships and interactions fundamental in influencing the course of the mission. Explanations of MINUSMA's failure often rely on simplified narratives that blame the coups of 2020 and 2021 (Reuters, 2023; IPI, 2024; ICG, 2023). In order to gain a more nuanced understanding, this dissertation examines two central, interrelated research questions: first, "***How do different understandings of peace, and the agents thereof, interact with one another?***" and second, "***What are the implications thereof?***"

By centring the politics of knowledge, power and paradigm, this study contributes to existing literature of hybrid peace theory. It does so in three ways, first, it adds to existing applications of Mac Ginty's model by examining MINUSMA as a case where prior hybridisations shaped and distorted outcomes. Second, it combines theories of everyday peace, paradigm change and postcolonial critique with hybrid peace, highlighting continuities of international interventions. Third, it foregrounds the roles of history and language as central and often overlooked factors in peace operations. Together, these contributions situate the Malian case within wider debates on the future of UN peace operations and the liberal peace paradigm, demonstrating the value of hybrid peace theory for exposing a variety of dynamics underlying international interventions.

This dissertation is structured as follows: section two outlines literature on different concepts of peace, paradigm, conceptualisation and language. Mac Ginty's (2011) hybrid peace model, which serves as a structure for the analysis, is situated within wider literature. Section three presents the methodology and limitations. Section four analyses the case my mapping information onto the hybrid peace model. Section five discusses the implications of these findings, drawing strongly on notions of paradigm (Kuhn, 1962; Hall, 1993) and language (wa Thiong'o, 1986). Section six concludes that prior hybridisation of the relevant actors was fundamental in shaping how the hybrid peace formed in Mali under MINUSMA.

LITERATURE

CONCEPTUALISING PEACE

Peace, and topics surrounding peace have often been oversimplified. This begins with a tendency within academia (Collier, 2000), the media and in politics to over-homogenise groups and their motivations (Keen, 2000; 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011; Stewart, 2002), and is exacerbated through all-encompassing theories lacking nuance, the tendency to compare conflicts and funding for academic research prioritising practical relevance (Autesserre, 2012; Bakewell, 2008; Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009; Malejaqc, 2010; Malejacq & Sandor, 2020; Minear, et al., 1996). It is important to note that such oversimplifications and a "common sense" view of peace may actually serve a function (Keen, 2008), such as hiding inconvenient complexities.

Nevertheless, bypassing such potential functions there exists a diverse and rich literature spanning various disciplines which examines, criticises and prescribes how peace is conceptualised and measured (Caplan, 2019; Choi & Deiana, 2017; Keen, 2000; Richmond, et al., 2016). Such literature is accurate and valuable precisely because of the contradictions within it. This body of literature acts as a first proof that peace is, in fact, not simple or straightforward. While Charbonneau and Sears (2014) argue that it is impossible to define peace, the more convincing argument is that peace is a concept which is fundamentally dependent on context (Choi, 2021; Firchow, 2018). Convincing examples exist spanning disciplines and contexts from feminist research in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Deiana, 2018) to psychological research among Afghan adolescents (Shrestha, et al., 2023).

LIBERAL PEACE AND THE PEACE PARADIGM

The concept of liberal peace is found at the opposite end to nuance, often glossing over contextual intricacies. Despite its place as an understudied ideal, or perhaps precisely because these characteristics, the concept of liberal peace is integral to understanding international communities' actions and peace interventions which are carried out in its name (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014; Doyle, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2005).

Attempts have been made to critically define and dissect what liberal peace means (Chandler, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2011; Paris, 2004), allowing for the possibility to identify broadly what it encompasses. In terms of content, there is a general consensus that liberal peace rests on ideas of democracy, free markets and the rule of law (Doyle, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2011; Millar, 2018). In terms of form, liberal peace is found in formal structures, such as in international and regional organisations, as well as in informal structures, which follow networks of power and influence (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 36). Whilst there is a focus on freedoms reminiscent of Sen's (1999) "Development as Freedom", it is fundamental to note that sets of freedoms that are prioritised by decision makers may come at the cost of other sets of freedoms (Mac Ginty, 2011). Criticisms of the liberal peace exist in abundance, and have been excellently compiled (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 42-43; Taylor, 2009). Importantly, these critiques do not necessarily encompass liberal peace in its entirety, and rather are often focussed on the "manner, pace, and extent to which [it is] pursued" (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 31). Thus, closer analysis of this manner, pace and extent becomes necessary in order to understand criticisms.

THE PARADIGMATIC NATURE OF THE LIBERAL PEACE

Fundamental in understanding how liberal peace operates, as well as the criticisms thereof, is an understanding of the paradigmatic weight attached to it. Drawing on Kuhn (1962), who originally makes his argument relating to the natural sciences, paradigms can be understood as overarching frameworks of knowledge that shape how problems are defined and what counts as a legitimate solution. Changes to this paradigm are caused through repeating anomalies that are inexplicable through the reigning paradigm (ibid.). Hall (1993) extends this notion to the political realm, and argues that efforts to deal with these anomalies may entail experiments in adjusting existing lines of policy, thereby gradually undermining the intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm. Thus, he finds that instances of policy experimentation and policy failure are likely to play a key role in the potential movement from one paradigm to another (ibid.). An important note at this point is that the judgements that move one paradigm to the next will be political, with outcomes depending on positional advantages of proponents in a broader institutional framework (ibid.). This information also shines a light on how it is possible to maintain an existing paradigm. Wade (1996) argues, based on the example of the World Bank's East Asian Miracle report, that a paradigm is maintained through techniques such as by hiring those with supporting views into positions with influence, deeming others incompetent. Thus, a paradigm change will only be complete when supporters of a new paradigm secure positions of authority (Hall, 1993).

Examining where liberal peace has been placed within the paradigm allows us to identify its place and importance within policy. There is a consensus that liberal peace and more generally political and economic liberalism as a one-size-fits-all solution became institutionalised and has remained generally unchallenged since around the end of the Cold War (Mac Ginty, 2011; Millar, 2018; Paris, 2010). Whilst Mac Ginty (2011; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016) convincingly makes the point that liberal peace is not all-encompassing or coherent, this does not take away from its paradigmatic nature, which is determined by the influential proponents supporting it. Therefore, just as is identified in paradigm theory (Kuhn, 1962), despite liberalism's professed tolerance, the dominant form can be intolerant of deviations from its norms, constructing elaborate systems of control alongside sophisticated intellectual rationales for that control (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 29). Alternate forms of peacemaking, when they are allowed, are restricted by the structures of an environment fundamentally shaped by liberal peace norms and institutions (ibid., p. 61). Thus, critiques of

the liberal peace need to recognise variance and contradiction within it (ibid., 2011, p. 17), making detailed study of singular cases and the dynamics within them necessary.

Large, multilateral peace operations reflect the concepts, values and methods pursued by the most powerful global actors. These main actors promoting liberal peace are powerful states from the global north, international organisations and the international financial institutions (ibid.). They exercise their power through methods ranging from influencing mainstream political discourse (Hall, 1993; Malejacq & Sandor, 2020), prescribing a host of technocratic mechanisms to solve post-conflict issues across diverse international contexts (Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2010; 2012; Millar, 2018) or rotating the same experts to different missions and headquarters (Autesserre, 2014; Karlsrud, 2018). Thus, not only has liberal peace been used to justify interventions, it has also led to peace-building norms, such as those concerning indicators, being constructed and upheld (Broome & Quirk, 2015; Firchow, 2018; Kelley & Simmons, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2011). This hegemonic nature is convincingly argues as being harmful as it makes responding to complexity challenging (Charbonneau & Sandor, 2019; Malejacq & Sandor, 2020).

STABILISATION

The shift from traditional peacekeeping to more robust and security-oriented operations has significantly reshaped UN missions. Whilst Paris (2010, p. 338) argues that the conflation of multilateral peace operations with the US-led "war on terror" is "careless," it is imperative to note that this security-led orientation intensified post-9/11 (Mac Ginty, 2011). Academia has been rightly wary about this trajectory, as security-led framing legitimises violence in pursuit of larger goals (Keen, 2008), such as liberal peace. This combined with UN peace operations were being deployed in areas where there was not yet peace to keep, which has meant for a greater use of force (Karlsrud, 2018, p. 85). Thus, since 2013 the UN Security Council has been giving increasingly expansive and robust mandates to UN peace operations (Karlsrud, 2018). In addition to this leading to more force being exercised, Easterly (2006) finds, based on development assistance, that the widening of mandates has made it difficult to measure success.

In line with these trends, the language of stabilisation has emerged as a dominant framing of interventions. Although stabilisation is defined as serving the interests of the people in conflict-affected countries, it is important to question whether the security being promoted

primarily addresses local concerns or whether it is oriented towards a broader conception of Western security (Keen & Attree, 2015, p. 5). A substantial body of literature in security studies and international relations demonstrates how representations of so-called failed states, which are often used as a justification for such interventions, shape our understanding of postcolonial statehood and guide foreign policy (Bilgin & Morton, 2002; Jones, 2008; Malejacq & Sandor, 2020; Woodward, 2017). Though such labels and notions have been dismissed as being analytically unhelpful (Call, 2011; Grimm, 2014; Mazarr, 2014; Mkandawire, 2005), these ideations give an indication of policymaking within a hierarchical system which idealises the West.

Whether stabilisation should be understood as a part of the liberal peace paradigm or as a departure from it remains contested, as indeed it is not at all clear what stabilisation means in UN missions (Karlsrud, 2018, p. 89). Although Mac Ginty (2012, p. 25) at one point situates the ascent of stabilisation firmly within the liberal peace framework, he also identifies a "post-liberal" paradigm in which stabilisation is both a means and an end. Thus, his account is ambiguous regarding whether he truly believes that there is a paradigm shift or whether it is maintenained. Karlsrud (2019) more clearly argues that liberal peacebuilding is decreasing in importance and a shift towards stabilisation and counterterrorism is occurring. However, stabilisation is part of a mainstream approach, which defines conflicts by labelling some actors in terms such as terrorists, violent extremists or radicalised groups (Keen & Attree, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2011); then opposing these with the use of military force and which is then followed by some kind of stabilisation effort which is linked to notions of liberal peace (Müller & Steinke, 2020; Moe, 2021). This logic shows that, although Mac Ginty (2012) is not clear about it, he is correct in his statement that stabilisation takes place within the liberal peace paradigm.

INTERLINKED PARADIGMS

There is a significance in noting that the spreading of liberal peace and of stabilisation occurred around similar times as the neoliberal popularisation (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). Though not exact, this temporal overlap is no coincidence. As Mac Ginty and Williams (ibid., p. 12) argue, the intellectual dominance of neo-liberalism significantly shapes the ways in which leading states, international organisations and international financial institutions respond to problems of conflict, development and peacebuilding. Liberal peace and stabilisation are thus deeply embedded within a wider neoliberal paradigm, one that links

democracy promotion with market-oriented reforms, and that frames peace as inseparable from economic liberalisation.

Mac Ginty (2012, p. 23) amongst others (Esteves, 2010) has explicitly proven the linkage between peacebuilding, stabilisation and neoliberalism. He does so my highlighting that in 2004, the U.S. Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) set out to institutionalise lessons from Iraq to Afghanistan. As he quotes the mandate as stating, the office was to "lead, coordinate and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy." This is significant as it reflects the U.S. mind-set, which is especially important due to its long-standing position of power as one of the largest funders of international interventions (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2022).

Understandably, this link has been subject to substantial and convincing critique. Liberal peacebuilding often marginalises local needs, cultures and processes of reconciliation in order to enact its own priorities and institution building (Richmond, 2011). As Richmond (2015, p. 60) identifies, the commonly favoured freedoms and main tenets pursued, such as those of competition and property rights, can lead to difficulties in post-conflict development settings. The detrimental effects of such prioritisations have been demonstrated empirically through cases such as the DRC (Marriage, 2018) or Sri Lanka (Venugopal, 2009). Such studies can be placed into wider critiques of transposing institutions regardless of context (Chang, 2003; Mkandawire, 2012; Richmond, 2009). While there is a particular focus on post-conflict contexts, neoliberal logics have also been shown to increase inequality in Western contexts (Putzel, 2020), ultimately showing the extent of negative consequences.

ALTERNATIVES AND INTERACTIONS

ALTERNATELY ASSESSING PEACE

Different concepts of peace begin with how they are found and measured. Everyday peace approaches mark a departure from the paradigm, as they prioritise the ordinary signs people use to assess peace in their lives (Firchow, 2018). Firchow (ibid., p. 2) argues that those directly affected by interventions are best placed to define their effectiveness and should shape the tools to measure them. Leading on from that, due to the dynamic and evolving

nature of everyday peace, peacebuilding should share those same features (ibid.) Adding a further nuance to this argument, Perera (2024) stresses the importance of incorporating perspectives form those historically excluded from mainstream political spaces, as they are free from the epistemic constrains of policy-driven knowledge making. Relatedly, Choi (2021, p. 61) adds the call to examine that which remains outside of everyday objects and imaginations, to pay attention to "what is not quite there". Within such approaches, people's responses can be "contradictory and confusing" (Firchow, 2018, p. 1), which, in this case, acts as a marker for complexity and nuance. Such focus on the everyday allows for the distancing from essentialisation or romanticisation of the local which is heterogeneous by nature (Richmond, 2011, p. 119).

LANGUAGE

Language forms a central dimension of the assessment, communication and perception of peace, as can be inferred from post-colonial literature. As wa Thiong'o (1986, pp. 15-16) argues, "language carries culture, and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, the entire body of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and our place in the world." This notion lays the foundation for his argument that colonialism, and especially the imposition of a foreign language, has resulted in "colonial alienation," which describes a dissociation between people's sensibilities and their natural and social environment (ibid., p. 17). On a larger scale, such alienation leads to "a society of bodiless heads and headless bodies" (ibid., p. 28), which is understood as meaning that an important part goes missing when conducting politics on a foreign language. Thus, language is recognised as a site of intense importance and alienation, highlighting its importance in the pursuit of peace.

HYBRID PEACE

More generally, the concept of hybrid peace is interested in analysing how internationally dominant forms of peace interact with "traditional" or "indigenous" practices, which are "necessarily rooted in specific communities and often have highly localised elements" (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 54). This makes hybridity inherently contextual and reflects a long history of encounters shaped by processes such as colonisation and globalisation (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016). Uzoigwe (2019, p. 62) calls the nature of relations between European powers and their former colonies of the non-European world inevitably neocolonial. This makes the portrayal of the international and the local as sterile

binaries not only analytically weak, but also potentially harmful, as it risks attempting to erase the past and romanticising the local (Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2009).

Though hybridisation is not a new phenomenon, contemporary international interventions are one of the ways in which the process can be accelerated. This occurs through the mobilisation of vast resources over short timeframes and the highly interventionist nature of liberal peace (Mac Ginty, 2011). The process is rarely linear, rather, it resembles a "constant process of negotiation" in which "multiple sources of power in a society compete, coalesce, seep into each other and engage in mimicry, domination or accommodation" (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 220; Richmond, 2011). This resonates with Bello's (2022, p. 1327) theorisation, originally about securitisation, of political processes as spiralling, with interactions inhibiting, reinforcing or transforming one another.

Theorisations of hybrid peace have developed in dialogue with critiques of the liberal peace, particularly regarding legitimacy, participation and local ownership (Chandler, 2014; Donais, 2009). As the liberal peace has faced sustained challenges to its credibility and accessibility, scholarship has increasingly examined how and to what extent interventions engage everyday realities, including those of the interveners (Autesserre, 2014; Richmond, 2011). This study is important, as "the effectiveness of [UN] interventions relies on peacekeepers' capacity to engage with local actors" (Kotajoki, 2025, p. 327). However, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016, p. 220) accurately caution that much of this "renaissance of interest in hybridity" remains shallow, and lacks an understanding of its complexity. Similarly, the deliberate attempts to instrumentalise this hybridity often underestimate the potential for unexpected outcomes in this dynamic (Autesserre, 2012; Charbonneau & Sears, 2015; Coulibaly & Diarra, 2004; Millar, 2018), often making such attempts fragile.

Within this wider literature, Mac Ginty's (2011) model of hybrid peace is deemed most analytically clear. It offers a structured yet flexible lens for understanding the multidirectional and often unpredictable interactions between local and international actors. Mac Ginty's model is compelling for two reasons. First, it conceptualises hybridity as a dynamic, long-term process of negotiation, co-option, resistance, domination, assimilation and coexistence (ibid.; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 221) a framing which aligns with postcolonial critiques (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012) and constructivist accounts of norm diffusion and localisation (Acharya, 2004; Checkel, 1998). The model's consciousness of actors beyond the

elite is legitimised by the importance placed on non-elite interactions within, for example, political settlements research (Khan, 2017; 2007). It avoids binaries and allows for the type of insight which challenges that local communities have no influence and that the main liberal peace and that institutions are all-powerful (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 89; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016). Second, it portrays hybridity into four distinct but interconnected components which provide clarity while accommodating complexity. The components are:

1) Compliance power of the liberal peace, encompassing military force, economic leverage and the cultivation of a belief that no viable alternative exists;
2) Incentivising power of the liberal peace, which describes coercive mechanisms, the promise of (liberal) peace, other moral persuasions and market opportunities;
3) Local actors to resisting, ignoring or adapting liberal peace interventions, ranging from outright opposition to selective cooperation;
4) Alternative forms of peace provided by local actors, which exist alongside, resist or circumvent the dominant liberal peace framework and intervention.

METHODOLOGY

CASE STUDY, SOURCES AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY

This research is approached through a case study of the peace intervention MINUSMA, allowing for the combination of various sources, thereby facilitating a triangulation of knowledge (Yin, 2018). Choosing academic literature from different disciplines aims to avoid constraints in scope and concept of singular disciplines (Harriss, 2002; Mac Ginty, 2011). Official UN documentation and opinion polls allow for further triangulation of data. Examining grey-literature resting on interviews conducted in Malian languages and journalistic research is particularly important in a conflict context as knowledge in such a setting is contested, partial and situated (Mac Ginty, 2011; Perera, 2024).

The case is examined in line with Lund's (2014) questioning "of what is this a case?" MINUSMA in Mali is analysed by emphasising certain features while not touching upon others, thereby creating an analytical construct aimed at organising knowledge about reality in a manageable way (Lund, 2014, p. 224). In line with feminist and post-colonial academics such as Elizabeth Dauphinee (2015), Cynthia Enloe (2014) or Donna Haraway (1988) this study embraces that the choice of how this analytical construct is created is informed by the

author's bias. The product of this allows for the exploration of general dynamics whilst acknowledging that it is impossible to compare across contexts without caution (Malejacq & Sandor, 2020).

WHY MINUSMA AND MALI

Mali and MINUSMA are selected as the case because they illustrate the tensions between liberal peacebuilding rhetoric and complex, local realities. In a paper discussing Mali specifically, Charbonneau and Sears (2014, p. 208) argue that liberal peace, when imposed over such complex and coexisting normative orders, significantly oversimplifies ideological struggles that are fully encompassed neither by the dichotomies of 'liberal' versus 'non-liberal' (or illiberal), nor those of 'local' or 'international', nor those of 'state' and 'non-state' actors and spaces. Thus, this case allows for a powerful study beyond binaries, whilst recognising that there is a very clear disconnect occurring between "the daily realities of rural and minority communities" and those that fall in line with the views perpetuated by international donors (ibid., 2015, p. 202).

In a similar dynamic of oversimplification, MINUSMA takes place within a context of simple narratives of rebel greed (Al Jazeera, 2024; BBC News, 2023; Charbonneau & Sears, 2014; Pham, 2010) hiding the role of drivers ranging from neoliberal reforms and deeper challenges (Hansen, 2024; Lacher, 2013; Malejacq & Sandor, 2020; Pérouse de Montclos, 2021). As Bergamaschi (2014, p. 353) most aptly puts it, "the liberal project of democracy is intimately linked to the promotion of neoliberal policies and the retreat of the State," this places Mali firmly within the net of paradigms linking liberal peace, stabilisation and neoliberalism. These reforms, often embedded in peace agreements since the 1990s, have produced uncertainty, patronage dynamics and armed group fragmentation, undermining stability (Malejacq & Sandor, 2020). Thus, studying this case reveals dynamics which are relevant across wider policy paradigms.

The case is indicative of wider trends. MINUSMA's mandate, framed explicitly in the language of liberal peace and stabilisation (Karlsrud, 2019), has emphasised the stability, restoration of democratic governance, rule of law, supporting state authority (Malejacq & Sandor, 2020; UN, 2013; 2022). In combination with other the military interventions in Mali, it is an excellent example of the mainstream approach described by Keen and Attree (2015). Despite significant financial investment and Mali's prior reputation as a "poster child of

democracy" (van Vliet, 2014, p. 46), coups and conflict persisted and security worsened (Al Jazeera, 2024; Karlsrud, 2019), indicating that faults exist in this mainstream approach. By 2023, when the Malian government requested MINUSMA's withdrawal, it had become part of a wider trend of rejecting large-scale peace operations.

Finally, because hybridisation unfolds over time (Mac Ginty, 2011), this moment after the end of the mission is especially opportune for analysis, as it reveals patterns which have cumulated across the course of the intervention.

MAC GINTY'S HYBRID PEACE MODEL

The dissertation applies Mac Ginty's (2011) hybrid peace model as its core analytical framework. The research questions are structured to work through the four components. First, "***How do different understandings of peace, and the agents thereof, interact with one another?***" is addressed by identifying and interpreting multiple understandings of peace and mapping onto Mac Ginty's categories where they reinforce, coerce or undermine one another in the chosen context. The interlinked question "***What are the implications thereof?***" is explored by assessing which categories are more dominant and how specific interactions were significant for MINUSMA in Mali.

CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

This research is based on the recognition that knowledge in conflict contexts in inherently inconclusive and shaped by power relations (Perera, 2024), which is exacerbated by the trust deficit existing in such areas (Malejacq & Mukhopadhyay, 2016; Malejacq & Sandor, 2020). Therefore, concerning research of MINUSMA, certainty is mythical and widely accepted narratives often dismiss knowledge which is not universally verifiable, in a dynamic which detrimentally excludes lived and felt experience as irrational or as "rumours" (Lecocq & Schrijver, 2007; Perera, 2024; Sandor, 2020). This dissertation operates on the understanding that rumours themselves are valuable in providing insight into actors' concerns, world-views, desires and the speaker's positionality within power (Fujii, 2010, p. 234; Sandor, 2020, p. 933; Portelli, 1991).

Whilst it is challenging to come across rumours in desk-based research, secondary academic literature based on extensive fieldwork and interviews, in addition to grey literature which

included excerpts from interviews was selected in an attempt to glean some information from rumour. However, due to this limitation, there is a blind reliance on "brokers" (Baaz & Utas, 2019) and an untapped pool of "meta-data" in the form of denials, evasions and silences which accompanying testimonies within interviews (Fujii, 2010, p. 231).

Relatedly, Kapiszewski, Maclean and Read (2015) stress the importance of partnering with local organisations in field research, since they can legitimise studies and encourage participation. These partnerships can grant insight into otherwise inaccessible culturally embedded methodologies. An example thereof, as ultilised in this dissertation is the Palaver tree, a traditional gathering place across Western Africa, that serves as the site for citizen led approaches to governance, research and storytelling (Diangitukwa, 2014). Such an insight is made use of through the study "Femmes, Crise et Transition 'Les Arbres à Palabres'" (Traore-Peytavin & Gaoukoye, 2022). Interestingly, it is precisely this study which is funded by MINUSMA, which may result in biases and reinforce dominant narratives which potentially oversimplify complex realities.

Overall, the study prioritises interpretive analysis over categorisation, and the urge to establish certainty is resisted (Perera, 2024). These interpretations are, ultimately, shaped by the authors positionality, and limited by factors such as geographical access and the need for translation, particularly of Malian vernacular languages. Some source material was originally published in French. These were initially translated into English using DeepL Pro, and manually refined by the author. There is a possibility of nuance being lost in translation.

ANALYSIS: HYBRID PEACE IN MALI

This section organises empirical findings through Mac Ginty's (2011) hybrid peace model. The four components are organised according to their importance in this context: 1) compliance power; 2) alternative peace; 3) local agency; 4) incentivising power. The analysis addresses my question of how different concepts, and agents thereof, interact. This analysis serves as a base upon which the second question of what the implications thereof are will be answered in the discussion. The most prominent component of the four indicators of a hybrid peace in this context is the compliance power surrounding MINUSMA, especially in its military and economic form. Due to its prominence, this component is divided into subsections.

Following Mac Ginty (ibid., p. 84), "local actors" span all level of Malian policy and society, national government, municipalities, political parties, militant groups, NGOs and civil society, businesses, communities, and individuals.

COMPLIANCE POWER

MILITARY

MINUSMA was not mandated to fully take part in the fight against violent extremism. However, from 2016, the Security Council explicitly asked "MINUSMA to move to a more proactive and robust posture" (Karlsrud, 2017; Sandor, 2020; UN, 2016, p. 7). This created symbolic images of drones, planes and helicopters in combat colours with a UN logo painted on top (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 47). More practically, it meant that MINUSMA shared information with counterterrorism operations in the region (Karlsrud, 2018), and that the mission was mandated to include 13,289 military personnel (UN, 2016). Just as significantly however, French counterterrorist forces, *Opération Serval* and *Barkhane*, were authorised to use all possible means to support the UN mission under the same UN Security Council mandate as MINUSMA and that spanned the whole Sahel region (Charbonneau, 2017; Cold-Ravnkilde & Jacobsen, 2020; Karlsrud, 2018; Malejacq & Sandor, 2020). This robust mandate and military power makes this factor the one with the strongest influence.

The parallel missions, which also included the Takuba Initiative, two European missions and the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Cold-Ravnkilde & Jacobsen, 2020), were part of the same cohesive thought exemplifying the mainstream approach outlined by Keen and Attree (2015): French counterterrorism forces were to eliminate the armed groups deemed as terrorists in the short-term, MINUSMA was to stabilise the region in the medium term and the EU training mission was to build Mali's long-term security capacity (Moe, 2021, p. 2). Thus, though separate from MINUSMA, it is necessary to examine these interventions together in terms of the UN mission's compliance power.

France's capacity to rapidly deploy 4,000 troops for counterterror operations (Charbonneau & Sears, 2015) was deemed to be decisive in halting the advance of jihadist armed groups and enabling MINUSMA's deployment (Bøås & Cissé, 2020, p. 261; Wing, 2016). This military reach, and resulting military compliance power, into the region is significantly rooted in

colonial legacies (Charbonneau, 2008; Charbonneau & Sears, 2014). The significant prior hybridisation, stressed by Mac Ginty (2011) becomes starkly apparent. Foregrounding this information acknowledges the historical context and long-term trends that the mission took place in (ibid.).

The military compliance created an environment in which resistance was met with threat of military force. Bouhlel (2020), as cited in (Malejacq & Sandor, 2020, p. 552), grants an important insight into the relationship between Malian fighters and the missions. Armed groups which distanced themselves from Al-Qaeda affiliates were included in peace negotiations. It thereby became possible for local fighters which had previously been a part of jihadist rule in northern Mali to become signatories of the 2015 Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (APR). However, those fighters who refused to do so were excluded from any formal peace negotiation and were subsequently targeted by *Opération Barkhane*. This shows the strong logic of military compliance, that was possible through high resources, as well as securitisation dynamics.

ECONOMIC

The economic compliance power in Mali was also incredibly high. According to Mac Ginty (2010, p. 79), "economic compliance takes the form of a series of binding relationships predicated on economic and governance norms that emanate from the global north". This was the case even before the deployment of MINUSMA due to the large degree to which liberalising governance in Mali prior to the coup in 2012 had centralised power, concentrated wealth and increased inequalities between the rural and urban population (Charbonneau & Sears, 2015, p. 201). The prior hybridisation through processes such as structural adjustment, and degree to which these reforms had taken hold, becomes apparent as Mali had been praised as an example of successful liberal economic and democratic reform in West Africa (Bergamaschi, 2014; Bøås & Cissé, 2020; van Vliet, 2014). This had resulted in an aid-dependence, which Bergamaschi (2014) argues that Malian authorities have been able to navigate, though the ability for such manoeuvre is questioned in other cases by scholars coming from development studies (Mayer, 2009; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011).

Additionally, the economic compliance mechanisms of withholding or withdrawing economic assistance can be seen, for example, by France suspending Official Development Assistance

from France to Mali in 2022 (AFD, 2025). Denmark suspended its development aid following its soldiers departing (Africanews, 2024), showing, quite starkly, the way in which economic compliance mechanisms were tied to military intervention. This use of aid as a lever is not new in Mali, with the EU suspending development aid following the coup in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). These examples allow for a glimpse into the strong economic compliance mechanisms present within Mali.

EXCLUSIVITY

As the final point of compliance, there exists a prominent narrative that MINUSMA, military interventions and the liberal peace were the only solution to conflict and insecurity within Mali. Charbonneau and Sears (2015, p. 198) argue that political support for military intervention was a last resort. This view mirrors Mac Ginty's (2011) observation that liberal peace is presented as the only viable option. This view of MINUSMA being essential to Malian peace further becomes apparent through public communication such as a UN (2023) press release titled "Amid Endless Violence, Stabilization Mission in Mali Essential for Region's Stability, Special Representative Tells Security Council" or an article titled "Mali faces spectre of anarchy after demanding UN's departure" (Reuters, 2023).

Within the Malian population there is a mixed view on this, there are some, such as a civil society member in Timbuktu citing that there would have been "total chaos" without the missions (FES, 2023b, p. 15)[1], on the other hand, opinion polls carried out in the same year show that 46% of the Malian population is very dissatisfied with MINUSMA's work and that 69% are actually confident in Russia to help Mali is the fight against insecurity (FES, 2023a). This shows that although prominent international actors attempted to portray the mission as the only option leading to peace, the Malian population remained unconvinced.

INCENTIVISING POWER

Very much linked to the economic compliance power, the liberal peace rests, at least in part, on the provision of incentives to secure participation from domestic actors. As Mac Ginty (2011) identifies, these economic incentives can come in the form of peace-support funds, or in the form of the potential of the free market. "The liberal peace logic asserts that

---

[1] Initial translation from French to English by the author using DeepL (2025)

economically liberated citizens will be rewarded by their own entrepreneurship and that their economic success will contribute to the general wellbeing of society" (ibid., p. 83). This, in addition to "peace itself," is presented as a part of a broader package of rewards.

Economic incentives in the intervention landscape were prominent. At the macroeconomic level, policies linked to IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers emphasised liberalisation and market integration (IMF, 2008). The peace-process institutions, such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Security Sector Reform or other peace-agreement structures, which were chosen to be supported further embodied incentives (Malejacq & Sandor, 2020). At the operational level, initiatives such as Quick Impact Projects sought to deliver tangible, visible benefits to local populations (MINUSMA, 2025). These were linked to contributions in humanitarian and development work which can be seen in a more widely applicable tactic described as "winning hearts and minds" (Egnell, 2010). This notion acts as another marker for the strong link between the incentivising power and the more violent compliance power.

As mentioned, the continuous flow of aid from before the 2012 crisis reinforced Mali's embeddedness within the liberal peace architecture (Bergamaschi, 2014). However, there is a consensus that the aid did not actually consolidate democracy, enhance accountability or strengthen checks and balances (Bergamaschi, 2014, p. 369; Resnick & van de Walle, 2013). Rather, newly introduced global opportunity frameworks encouraged behaviours such as fragmentation along communal and clan-based lines (Malejacq & Sandor, 2020, p. 553). Whilst the share of resources entering for Mali was small and unevenly split in comparison to Afghanistan, for example (ibid., 2020, p. 559), the uneven distributional effects of these incentive systems reinforced pre-existing inequalities and increased the complexity of the local political economy of violence (Ahmad, 2018). At the micro-level, the capacity to benefit from donor-funded projects was often contingent on political connections and fluency in development discourse, a dynamic that continued on before 2012 (Bergamaschi, 2014). Thus, financial incentives negatively interacted with local contexts.

As mentioned, the incentivising power theoretically also encompasses the peace itself (Mac Ginty, 2011), this dimension was however lacking in Mali. In line with notions of everyday peace (Firchow, 2018), examining the accounts of Malians paints a picture in which peace is not achieved. The accounts encompass the sharing of feelings such as of being traumatised by

the noises of weapons and *Barkhane* aircrafts, children facing difficulties in attending schools due to French-speaking schools closing and teachers being taken hostage, or the presence of jihadist groups forcing nurses to be accompanied by their spouses in certain localities (Traore-Peytavin & Gaoukoye, 2022, pp. 97-98). Such insecurity, caused by an identified "security vacuum" within rural areas in Mali, was countered with self-defence groups (SIPRI, 2023, p. 187).

ALTERNATIVE PEACE

Though the previous section demonstrated the immense material power and ambition of liberal peace paradigm, local alternatives, though partial and marginal, exist (Mac Ginty, 2011). The alternatives can be purposeful, organic and everyday, or in some cases, people may be so distanced from the centre of power that they have little choice but to provide for their own security and governance (ibid.; Richmond, 2009). Such as the aforementioned creation of village-based defence groups at a community level (SIPRI, 2023).

Some alternative visions of a path to peace were rooted in religious ideologies, ranging from calls for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate across the Sahel (Bencherif, 2020) to more localised, faith-informed mediation practices (Hinkel & Traore, 2020). Others have been tied to an independent state of Azawad in northern Mali (Cold-Ravnkilde & Jacobsen, 2020), or armed Islamist groups such as JNIM, Al-Mourabitoun, AQIM, and Ansar Dine (Bencherif, 2020; Raineri & Martini, 2017). Still others drew from cultural phenomena, such as West Africa's "culture of consensus" and joking relationship, which have historically acted as informal mechanisms for maintaining peace (Bergamaschi, 2014, p. 361; Canut & Smith, 2006). These projects reveal that while alternate peaces were not always peaceful in the liberal sense, but they nevertheless represented distinct visions for the political and social order. Further, these various conceptualisations firmly support the argument that there is not one, homogenous local, rather, many different ideations, conceptualisations and mechanisms for peace existed, alternative views on peace were present within Mali.

Among the most prominent alternative peace actors in Mali was Imam Mahmoud Dicko, whose influence reached into Malian politics. This is true to the degree that Bøås and Cissé (2020, p. 262) describe the growing involvement of religious leaders as "a new chapter in the history of religion in Mali" noting a growing involvement since 2013, that has opened the political space for religious actors. Imam Dicko publicly justifies his actions as being

motivated by peace in Mali: "we pray God for Mali to be led by the one who will bring peace and tranquillity to the country" (Bøås, et al., 2019, p. 10). He draws on both Islamic and pre-Islamic traditions as the foundation holding society together, and commanded the influence to organise mass protests, such as those contributing to the downfall of the president in 2020 (Bøås & Cissé, 2020; Bergamaschi, 2014). This ability to influence political outcomes, and indeed the fate of MINUSMA, demonstrates that local, religiously informed visions of peace were not only available as alternatives to the liberal peace, but in some cases powerful enough to directly challenge it.

The military junta that has ruled Mali since 2020 also presents itself as an agent of peace in the form of an alternative to the corrupt democratic order. It operates under the guise of fighting corruption and reforming institutions, whilst actually, as Baudais (2024, p. v) argues, protecting the interests of the military elite. The junta's openness to new security partnerships, including with the Russian Wagner Group, further reflects a departure from the liberal peace and multilateral cooperation (ibid., 2024).

LOCAL AGENCY

At the final component of the model, non-compliant reactions can take the form of renegotiation, subversion, non-engagement, cherry-picking and outright resistance (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 17) . Two variables determining to what degree local actors can subvert or renegotiate liberal peace: 1) social, political and economic capital, 2) willingness and ability of liberal peace actors to push through their version of state building or peace implementation without reference to local actors.

Ample resistance can be documented within Mali. Bergamaschi (2014, p. 363) notes that the "Post-Washington consensus" was not fully followed within Mali. Similarly, in a report based on a roundtable with member states, UN officials, civil society stakeholders and independent experts with assessments of MINUSMA, participants were reported to agree that the mission faced a "lack of buy-in from governing authorities following two unconstitutional changes of government and increased volatility in the operating environment ultimately led to the withdrawal of host-state consent in June 2023" (IPI, 2024). This stance of resistance is supported by the following quote by a state representative interviewed in Bamako: "but to come and impose your diktat on an independent State at all costs? We are no longer in the colonial era" (FES, 2023b, p. 19). These examples show the resistance that was quite

fundamentally present to the interventions and that that was also known to those working for the mission.

As becomes clear from the last example, resistance is also discursive. This is where rumours play a large role. Such rumours are one symptom or way in which everyday non-engagement occurs, they are also powerful in their own right, as there is a performativity to rumours in shaping the understandings and practices of the groups that occupy the spaces that interventions seek to stabilise (Sandor, 2020, p. 920). This was relevant to the degree that even MINUSMA officials recognise that "rumours about the mission 'hiding in their bases' express a local dissatisfaction with the force's record in enacting the 'protection of civilians' component of its mandate" (ibid., p. 926). This recognition indicates that there was some sort of interaction between such rumours and the proponents of missions.

Resistance did also take a more tangible form. A significant amount of Malians who were dissatisfied with the democratisation process point to corruption, administrative inefficiency, opportunist party politics and supported the goals of moral purification and order that was pursued in 2012 by putschists and Islamists alike (Charbonneau & Sears, 2015, p. 207). Bottom-up contention also appeared in the form of "the march of mothers and wives of soldiers who walked to the presidential palace to demand additional support for the troops on 2 February 2012" (Bergamaschi, 2014, p. 356). This continued when the mission was deployed, and on April 2019 tens of thousands of people protested the lack of response to the escalating violence, following the killing of more than 150 Fulani villagers (Cold-Ravnkilde & Jacobsen, 2020). The protesters also called for external security forces to leave the country, perceiving them to be protecting their own interests rather than the security of the Malian people (ibid., p. 855; Tull, 2019). Such resistance culminated in the coup d'états in Mali in 2020 and 2021 (Baudais, 2024, p. v), thus ultimately, and in combination with the alternative concepts of peace fuelling them, being crucial to the withdrawal of the mission.

More violently, from 2015, in the central regions in Mali and in response to the interventions and the Malian military, there was also an "establishment of radical armed groups. The distrust of these groups towards the state is concretely reflected in targeted attacks against its symbols (barracks, schools, security posts), its representatives (mayors, prefects, judges and magistrates), but also traditional and customary authorities" (SIPRI, 2023, p. 8). Perouse de

Montclos (2021, p. 7) cites members of AQIM as considering UN peacekeepers as "target practice". These examples show resistance that had escalated to the level of physical force.

DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS

The case of MINUSMA is an anomaly as identified by Hall (1993) to the paradigm of liberal peace, stabilisation and neoliberalism. This is because of a distinct lack of peace in Mali, and the mission's failure as evidenced by being asked to withdraw by the host state government. It takes place within a wider sea of anomalies, such as that communities in which interventions have taken place do not experience higher levels of peacefulness than those where no intervention has taken place within the same context (Firchow, 2018, p. 2), or that "Nearly 50 percent of all countries receiving assistance slide back into conflict within five years, and 72 percent of peacebuilding operations leave in place authoritarian regimes" (Barnett, et al., 2007, p. 35). These anomalies are clearly relevant and attracting attention. For example, Karlsrud (2018) finds that inside the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), there are those who argued that the UN needed to adapt to ensure the survival of UN peace operations. Based on interviews, he identifies a large rift within the DPKO about this topic (ibid.). This inability of the paradigm to maintain legitimacy within a leading organisation is indicative of a potential shift within it (Wade, 1996).

What becomes important in the face of such paradigmatic change is why and how it is challenged. Mac Ginty (2011, p. 87) argues that it is precisely due to the material and moral power that alternatives to the liberal peace should not be seen as viable replacements of it. He argues that alternatives are more likely to be context-specific and restricted to certain "issues, geographical areas or peoples over which the liberal peace cannot or will not exercise control." However, the following implications make the point that this is the case because of prior hybridisations and the resulting global system, rather than necessarily a limitation within the alternatives. Thus, these barriers need to be better understood.

In an attempt to do so the implications of the failure in Mali as set out below identify the fundamental interactions or distortions that were neglected in Mali, and which were hidden through mainstream and short-sighted narratives blaming mainly the coups of 2020 and 2021 (ICG, 2023; IPI, 2024; Reuters, 2023). Looking beyond such narratives proves integral to explaining the trajectory and outcomes of international engagement. Though these

implications are not prescriptive or indicative what may happen in the future in Mali or other contexts, they nevertheless offer important insight into important factors to be considered.

PRIOR HYBRIDITY

Due to the position of liberal peace which makes it repellent of critique or caveats, important and potentially disruptive histories are obscured. This was particularly relevant for components of compliance and incentives which were identified as the most prominent within the hybrid peace model. These interactions were indeed subject to a strong distortion due to prior hybridisations that had occurred as a result of colonialism and destructive economic reforms in the form of structural adjustments (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016) being imposed on the Malian population. The prescriptive nature of the mission was overtly reminiscent of colonialism, thereby striking a chord within Mali's deep-rooted history of resistance colonising powers and projects in Mali (Charbonneau & Sears, 2015, p. 200).

However, such significant global history did not only impact Malians. As has been stressed by Mac Ginty (2011), hybridisation occurs in all directions. Consequently, as is shown in refugee studies (Balakian, 2016; Weitzberg, 2017), negative narratives map onto more easily onto specific groups with existing stereotypes, such as Muslims. This is particularly relevant in Mali, where 90 percent of the population is Muslim (U.S. Department of State, 2003) and alternate peaces are often justified through Islam (Bøås & Cissé, 2020). Thus, with counterterror logic adding onto racialised notions persisting within Western societies, proved a fertile ground for securitisation (Keen & Attree, 2015, p. 5). This consequence of hybridisation is sure to have reinforced the increased focus on security and robustness of MINUSMA.

This securitisation is relevant, because, as Karlsrud (2018) argues on the basis of the example of *Opération Barkhane*, there seems to be higher acceptance of using force to solve political problems (Guéhenno, 2015; Bode, 2016), this finding falls in line with the general trend described which results in the prominence of stabilisation (Karlsrud, 2018). Particularly destructive in Mali, there is what Bouhlel (2020, p. 2) describes as a with us or against us logic which has arisen through binary understandings perpetuated through counterterrorism logic and the general preference for simple narratives (Keen, 2008).

Ultimately, the actions influenced by fears influenced by racialised stereotypes had hugely counterproductive functions within Mali. Though the counterterror operations claimed initial success, they failed to address the widespread political marginalisation and neglect of several northern communities, from which many fighters originated (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014, p. 208; Malejacq & Sandor, 2020). Resulting exclusion or oppression can have the counterproductive function of causing further terror (Harmon, 2015; Karlsrud, 2015; Keen, 2006), creating a vicious cycle.

Thus, in a dynamic identified my Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016) counter-insurgency methods married to peacebuilding and development policies are unlikely to result in any positive hybrid peace and may generally lead to military violence (Raeymaekers, 2013). More specifically, the trajectory from liberal peacebuilding to include stabilisation and counterterrorism is accurately outlined by Karlsrud (2019, p. 16) as leading "to more oppressive governments, and more disillusioned people joining the ranks of opposition and terrorist groups." These negative consequences not only occurred for the Malian population, MINUSMA was also the second deadliest UN mission for peacekeepers, with 311 fatalities (UN Peacekeeping, 2025), though it is important to note that such a number is not simply found for non-peacekeepers killed since the deployment of MINUSA.

WHAT IS LOST IN TRANSLATION

Causally linked to colonialism and thereby also a consequence of prior hybridisation, is the use of the former colonial power's language, in this case French, in communicating, interpreting and understanding peace. This links to the hybrid peace component of local alternatives, as these often occur in a native language, rather than in French (Africanews, 2024). Interaction and communication with the international interveners therefore becomes more complicated. One example thereof is that the word "terrorist" does not exist in Malian languages (Pérouse de Montclos, 2021), raising questions on translations between missions and people. Therefore, the dominance of colonial languages in international peace intervention not only reflects historical hierarchies but also continues to shape what knowledge is shared, heard and legitimised in contemporary mission. When peacekeepers lack proficiency in local languages (Autesserre, 2014), they risk reproducing colonial patters of exclusion, such as by privileging actors who can already operate in the colonisers' language.

This is added to the dynamic that attempting to pin down inherently slippery knowledge in conflict settings through rigid verification processes misses the mark by overlooking the diversity in local narratives and strategies for navigating conflict (Fujii, 2010; Lecocq & Schrijver, 2007; Perera, 2017; Sandor, 2020; Vigh, 2006). Accepting and working with these contradictory explanatory narratives requires sensitivity to who is speaking, in what language and under what conditions. Additionally, missions need to reach out to minorities and those who may not be represented (Karlsrud, 2018, p. 151), ensuring that there will be an understanding when they do so.

On a more positive note, wa Thiong'o (1986, p. 23) did identify that people speaking colonisers' languages have managed to make them their own, allowing for genuine incorporation of the "happenings in Africa." One such way is through music, with "singers [pushing] the languages to new limits, renewing and reinvigorating them by coining new words and new expressions". There are pockets of use being made of such a mechanism, as evidenced by initial research into music-based peacebuilding by Gillian Howell (2023) or John Gledhill's research project on "the roles and functions of music in United Nations peacebuilding" (Oxford DID, 2025). These projects their proof of music being used in peace operations already, could indicate that music has already begun to be understood as a vehicle for better communication.

THE TROUBLE WITH HUGE MANDATES

Not linked to prior hybridisation, but granting an insight into how policy experimentation in the face of paradigm maintenance may lead to a gradual undermining of the paradigm is the broadening of mandates. Although interventions like MINUSMA were initially conceived with limited scopes, changes to the mandates significantly impacted it. The UN mission in Mali was progressively drawn into mission creep, transforming into a highly ambitious and long-lasting missions (Malejacq & Sandor, 2020). This expansion reflects not only the inability to address root causes militarily, but also the problem of increasingly sweeping and unclear mandates that attempt to achieve goals from counterterrorism to democratisation, development and governance reform (UN, 2013; UN, 2016).

As Easterly (2006) cautions with regard to the development sector, aid agencies burdened with broad and diffuse goals lack accountability to their intended beneficiaries, since success depends on too many external factors and responsibility is shared too widely amongst

different agencies. Liberal peace interventions such as MINUSMA fall directly into this dynamic. They have huge mandates, and in pursuing them, lose sight of the concrete needs and priorities of the local populations. From the perspective of everyday peace (Firchow, 2018), what communities most often seek is not the fulfilment of abstract liberal goals but the ability to live safely, carry out daily activities and maintain dignity in their immediate environments. When interventions prioritise ambitious objectives in line with paradigmatic priorities, the likely outcome is deep disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the mission.

In a more sinister consequence, the robustness of MINUSMA may have also impacted the safety of the wider network of UN bodies, as Karlsrud (2015, p. 47) identifies, "retaliatory attacks will most probably be targeted at the soft underbelly of the UN – the funds, programmes and agencies carrying out development and humanitarian work" (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 47). Karlsrud (2018, p. 93) later shares a further observation, that at "UN Headquarters, staff only half-jokingy say that the organiszation has moved from being in the cross-fire into the crosshairs, attacked no longer for where they are, but for who they are" (ibid., p. 93). Thereby humanitarian space shrinks in a dynamic which is also observed specifically in Mali (Sauter, 2022) as well as more widely (Esteves, 2010; Hilhorst & Janse, 2010).

Some argue that these failures were due to peace becoming subordinated to external agendas, such as the War on Terror or the search for compliant allies (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 22), rather than the failures of the reigning paradigm. These external agendas are argued to have led to the conflation of peacebuilding with state-building, democratisation, counterterrorism and other agendas, and resulting in a conceptual inflation when all the associated goals and activities are combined under the single banner of peacebuilding (Caplan, 2019; Call & Wyeth, 2008; Keen & Attree, 2015). Viewed through the lens of paradigm maintenance (Hall, 1993), however, these conflations are less accidental and more indicative of how the liberal peace adapts to sustain itself as the reigning framework, thereby negatively affecting the precision of the original paradigm.

CONCLUSION

The interactions of concepts of peace in MINUSMA was heavily distorted by prior hybridisations and the attempts of the reigning paradigm to maintain its position of power, affecting the course, reception and effectiveness of the mission. Applying Mac Ginty's hybrid peace model and choosing to focus on the patterns of hybridisation that persist beyond the

lifetime or scope of a single mission, context-specific configurations are made apparent. To highlight a few: the relative prominence of military and economic compliance was hugely influential in evoking memories of colonial dynamics; nebulous understandings of MINUSMA's expansive mandate and poor everyday markers of peace resulted in destructive dissatisfaction within the Malian population; resistance among the population paired with strong alternatives presented through religious figures mobilised protests for a change. These examples make apparent that hybridisation is phenomenon which spirals (Bello, 2022), where each component links with the others and reinforces the hybridisation.

The most important insights outlined in this dissertation are the distortions and barriers caused by colonial legacies, choice of language or the broadening of mandates. These dynamics extend beyond Mali and past the topic of peace shaping interventions, cooperation and encounters in other contexts. Although unexpected outcomes may never be fully avoided (Millar, 2018), greater sensitivity and nuance can make international engagement more responsive, legitimate and oriented towards downward accountability.

Drawing on paradigm theory provides insight into how experts, policy choices and failures sustain or undermine the liberal peace, stabilisation and neoliberal paradigm. Whilst analysis through the hybrid peace model clarifies that the liberal peace, stabilisation and neoliberal paradigm do not occupy all levels of society, its dominance is nevertheless apparent through the ability to mobilise resources for compliance. The story of how these paradigms deal with anomalies such as in Mali is still unfolding, and the study of the interactions occurring at its borders gives insight into where its failures are situated.

FURTHER STUDY

Analysing hybridity opens the door to examining what is left behind after the withdrawal of missions. Just as colonialism and structural adjustment has been identified as leading to hybridisations which were fundamentally important to contemporary peace intervention, MINUSMA has resulted in hybridisation that will shape any future interactions taking place in Mali in the future.

Another important avenue for study, and in line with Malejacq and Sandor's (2020) identification that the conflict and the mission have affected the country differently on a sub-

national level, is a more in-depth study of hybridisation within different groups, regions or time periods in Mali through MINUSMA.

Beyond the study of Mali, and following Mac Ginty's (2011) argument that hybridisation is a two-way street, the hybridisation within the intervening organisations, states and experts also presents a rich resource for study of what is left behind after the withdrawal of missions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Translations from French to English were carried out using DeepL Pro (2025), and in some cases manually refined by the author.

Acharya, A., 2004. How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. *International Organization,* 58(2), pp. 239-275.
AFD, 2025. *Mali.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.afd.fr/en/page-region-pays/mali
[Accessed on 2 August 2025].
Africanews, 2024. *Denmark announces partial suspension of aid to Mali.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.africanews.com/2022/02/12/denmark-announces-partial-suspension-of-aid-to-mali/
[Accessed on 3 August 2025].
Africanews, 2024. *Language proposal stirs thorny debate in troubled Mali.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.africanews.com/2022/11/17/language-proposal-stirs-thorny-debate-in-troubled-mali//#:~:text=Mali%20gained%20independence%20from%20France,and%20in%20state%20TV%20broadcasts
[Accessed on 12 June 2025].
Ahmad, A., 2018. Why jihadist insurgencies persist. *OpenCanada.org*, 23 May.
Al Jazeera, 2024. *Armed groups committing atrocities in Mali: HRW.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/8/armed-groups-committing-atrocities-in-mali-hrw
[Accessed on 20 Febuary 2025].
Al Jazeera, 2024. *West Africa's 'coup belt': Did Mali's 2020 army takeover change the region?.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/27/west-africas-coup-belt-did-malis-2020-army-takeover-change-the-region
[Accessed on 5 August 2025].
An ka taa, 2019. *2 | Greetings Extended I: "Has the day/night passed in peace?".* [Online]
Available at: https://www.ankataa.com/basicbambarapodcast-blog/2-greetings-extended
[Accessed on 4 August 2025].
Autesserre, S., 2012. Dangerous tales: dominant narratives on the Congo and their unintended consequences. *African Affairs,* 11(443), pp. 202-222.
Autesserre, S., 2014. *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bøås, M. & Cissé, A. W., 2020. The sheikh versus the president: the making of Imam Dicko as a political Big Man in Mali. *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal,* 5(3-6), pp. 260-275.

Bøås, M., Cissé, A. W. & Diallo, A., 2019. *Mali's Religious Leaders and the 2018 Presidential Elections,* Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Baaz, M. & Utas, M., 2019. Exploring the backstage: methodological and ethical issues surrounding the role of research brokers in insecure zones. *Civil wars,* 21(2), pp. 157-178.

Bakewell, O., 2008. Research Beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research into Forced Migration. *Journal of Refugee Studies,* 21(4), pp. 432-453.

Balakian, S., 2016. "Money is your government": Refugees, mobility, and unstable documents in Kenya's operation Usalama watch. *African Studies Review,* 59(2), pp. 87-111.

Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M. & Sitea, L., 2007. Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?. *Global Governance,* Band 13, pp. 35-58.

Baudais, V., 2024. *Military Entrenchment in Mali and Niger: Praetorianism in Retrospect,* Solna: SIPRI.

BBC News, 2023. *Mali crisis: Fierce fighting erupts after Tuareg rebels kill 'more than 80 soldiers'.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66976440
[Accessed on 20 Febuary 2025].

Bello, V., 2022. The Spiralling of the Securitisation of Migration in the EU: from the Management of a "Crisis" to a Governance of Human Mobility?. *Jounral of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 48(6), pp. 1327-1344.

Bencherif, A., 2020. From resilience to fragmentation: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the jihadist group modularity. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 32(1), pp. 100-118.

Bergamaschi, I., 2014. The fall of a donor darling: the role of aid in Mali's crisis. *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 52(3), pp. 347-378.

Bilgin, P. & Morton, A. D., 2002. Historicising representations of "failed states": Beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?. *Third world quarterly,* 23(1), pp. 55-80.

Bode, I., 2016. How the world's interventions in Syria have normalised the use of force. *The Conversation*, 17 Februar.

Bouhlel, F., 2020. *(Ne pas) Dialoguer avec les groupes "jihadistes" au Mali? Entre contradictions normatives, "manqués" de la médiation . . . et nécessité heuristique,* Berlin: Berghof Foundation.

Broome, A. & Quirk, J., 2015. The politics of numbers: the normative agendas of global benchmarking. *Review of International Studies,* 41(5), pp. 813-818.

Call, C., 2011. Beyond the "failed state": toward conceptual alternatives. *European Journal of International Relations,* 17(2), pp. 303-326.

Call, C. T. & Wyeth, V., 2008. *Building States to Build Peace.* Boulder, CO: s.n.

Canut, C. & Smith, É., 2006. Pactes, alliances et plaisanteries: Pratiques locales, discours global. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines,* 46(184), pp. 687-754.

Caplan, R., 2019. *Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices, and Politics.* Oxford: Oxford Academic.

Chandler, D., 2006. *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building.* London: Pluto Press.

Chandler, D., 2014. *Resilience: The Governance of Complexity.* London: Routledge.

Chang, H.-J., 2003. Institutional Development in Historical Perspective. In: H. Chang, L. Sanjaya & B. Harriss-White, Hrsg. *Rethinking Development Economics.* London: Anthem, pp. 499-522.

Charbonneau, B., 2008. *France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Charbonneau, B., 2017. Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping and counterterrorism. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 35(4), pp. 415-431.

Charbonneau, B. & Sandor, A., 2019. Power and comparative methods: performing the worlds of armed conflict. *Civil Wars,* 21(4), pp. 437-447.

Charbonneau, B. & Sears, J., 2014. Fighting for the liberal peace in Mali? The limits of international military interventions. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 8(2-3), pp. 192-213.

Charbonneau, B. & Sears, J., 2015. Defending neoliberal Mali: French military intervention and the management of contested political narratives. In: M. Turner & F. P. Kühn, Hrsg. *The Politics of International Intervention: The Tyranny of Peace.* London: Routledge, pp. 229-250.

Charbonneau, B. & Sears, J. M., 2014. Fighting for Liberal Peace in Mali? The Limits of International Military Intervention. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 8(2-3), pp. 192-213.

Checkel, J. T., 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. *World Politics,* 50(2), pp. 324-348.

Choi, S., 2021. Everyday peace in critical feminist theor. In: T. Väyrynen, S. Parashar, É. Féron & C. C. Confortini, Hrsg. *Routledge Handbook of Feminist Peace Research.* London: Routledge.

Choi, S. & Deiana, M.-A., 2017. Questioning the international: (un)making Bosnian and Korean conflicts, cinematically. *Trans-Humanities,* 10(1), pp. 5-30.

Cold-Ravnkilde, S. M. & Jacobsen, K. L., 2020. Disentangling the security traffic jam in the Sahel: constitutive effects of contemporary interventionism. *International Affairs,* 96(4), pp. 855-874.

Collier, P., 2000. Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective. In: M. Berdal & D. M. Malone, Hrsg. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.* Boulder: Rienner, pp. 91-112.

Comaroff, J. & Comaroff, J. L., 2012. Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa. *Anthropological Forum,* 22(2), pp. 113-131.

Coulibaly, M. & Diarra, A., 2004. *Démocratie et Légitimation du Marché,* s.l.: Afrobarometer Working Paper 35.

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2022. *WHO FUNDS THE UN? Funding sources.* [Online]
Available at: https://financingun.report/un-financing/un-funding/funding-entity#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20maintained,around%2020%25%20of%20total%20funding.
[Accessed on 20 July 2025].

Darby, J. & Mac Ginty, R., 2008. Introduction: What Peace? What Process?. In: J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty, Hrsg. *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction.* Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 1-7.

Dauphinee, E., 2015. Narrative voice and the limits of peacebuilding: rethinking the politics of partiality. *Peacebuilding,* 3(3), pp. 261-278.

DeepL, 2025. *DeepL Übersetzer.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.deepl.com/de/translator/files
[Accessed on 10 August 2025].

Deiana, M.-A., 2018. *Gender and Citizenship: Promises of Peace in Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina.* s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan.

Diangitukwa, F., 2014. La lointaine origine de la gouvernance en Afrique: l'arbre à palabres. *Revue Gouvernance,* 11(1), pp. 1-20.

Donais, T., 2009. Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes. *Peace & Change,* 34(1), pp. 3-26.

Doyle, M. W., 1997. *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism.* New York: WW Norton.

Doyle, M. W., 2005. Three pillars of the liberal peace. *American Political Science Review,* 99(3), pp. 463-466.

Easterly, W., 2006. *Why Doesn't Aid Work.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/04/02/william-easterly/why-doesnt-aid-work/
[Accessed on 13 January 2025].

Egnell, R., 2010. Winning 'Hearts and Minds'? A Critical Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Operations in Afghanistan. *Civil wars,* 12(3), pp. 282-303.

Enloe, C., 2014. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.* s.l.:University of California Press.

Esteves, P., 2010. Peace Operations and the Government of HUmanitarian Spaces. *International Peacekeeping,* 17(5), pp. 613-628.

European Commission, 2012. *EU suspends its development aid to Mali.* [Online]
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_12_214
[Accessed on 4 August 2025].

FES, 2023a. *Mali-Metre: Enquête d'opinion "Que pensent les Malien(ne)s ?",* Bamako: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

FES, 2023b. *Perceptions des Maliens: Sur les Opérations Internationales de Soutien à la Paix,* Bamako: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Firchow, P., 2018. *Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation After War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fujii, L. A., 2010. Shades of truth and lies: interpreting testimonies of war and violence. *Journal of Peace Research,* 47(2), pp. 231-241.

Goetschel, L. & Hagmann, T., 2009. Civilian peacebuilding: Peace by bureaucratic means?. *Conflict, Security & Development,* 9(1), pp. 55-73.

Gottlieb, J., 2013. Civic and Political Behaviour in Mali: Constraints and Possibilities. *Stability,* 2(2), pp. 1-5.

Grimm, S., 2014. The European Union's ambiguous concept of "state fragility". *Third World Quarterly,* 35(2), pp. 252-267.

Guéhenno, J.-M., 2015. *The Fog of Peace.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press.

Hall, P. A., 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. *Comparative Politics,* 25(3), pp. 275-296.

Hansen, E., 2024. Farmer-herder relations, land governance and the national conflict in Mali. *The Journal of Peasant Studies,* 51(4), pp. 1046-1071.

Haraway, D., 1988. Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partical Perspective. *Feminist Studies,* 14(3), pp. 575-599.

Harmon, S., 2015. Securitization Initiatives in the Sahara-Sahel Region in the Twenty-first Century. *African Security,* 8(4), pp. 227-248.

Harriss, J., 2002. The Case for Cross-Disciplinary Approaches in International Development. *World Development,* 30(3), pp. 487-496.

Hilhorst, D. & Janse, B. J., 2010. Humanitarian Space as Arena: A Perspective on the Everyday Politics of Aid. *Development and Change,* 41(6), pp. 117-1139.

Hinkel, T. & Traore, B. F., 2020. Mali's peace networks: the role of Islamic religious leaders in conflict resolution. *Conflict, Security & Development,* 20(3), pp. 401-418.

Howell, G., 2023. Peaces of music: understanding the varieties of peace that music making can foster. *Peacebuilding,* 11(2), pp. 152-168.

ICG, 2023. *What Future for UN Peacekeeping in Africa after Mali Shutters Its Mission?.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/global-mali/what-future-un-peacekeeping-africa-after-mali-shutters-its-mission?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[Accessed on 15 July 2025].

IMF, 2008. *Mali: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,* Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

IPI, 2024. *Emerging Lessons from MINUSMA's Experience in Mali,* New York: International Peace Institute.

Jarstad, A. K. & Belloni, R., 2012. Introducing Hybrid Peace Governance: Impact and Prospects of Liberal Peacebuilding. *Global Governance,* 18(1), pp. 1-6.

Jones, B. G., 2008. The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a critique of "failed state" ideology. *Review of international political economy,* 15(2), pp. 180-205.

Kapiszewski, D., MacLean, L. M. & Read, B. L., 2015. *Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Karlsrud, J., 2015. The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly,* 36(1), pp. 40-54.

Karlsrud, J., 2017. Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?. *Third World Quarterly,* 38(6), pp. 1215-1231.

Karlsrud, J., 2018. *The UN at War: Peace Operations in a New Era.* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Karlsrud, J., 2019. From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism. *International Peacekeeping,* 26(1), pp. 1-21.

Keen, D., 2000. War and Peace: What's the Difference. *International Peacekeeping,* 7(4), pp. 1-22.

Keen, D., 2006. *Endless War? : Hidden Functions of the 'War on Terror'.* London: Pluto Press.

Keen, D., 2008. *Complex Emergencies.* Cambridge: Polity.

Keen, D., 2012. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *International Affairs,* 88(4), pp. 757-777.

Keen, D. & Attree, L., 2015. *Dilemmas of counter-terror, stabilisaiton and statebuilding,* s.l.: Saferworld.

Kelley, J. G. & Simmons, B. A., 2015. Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations. *American Jounral of Political Science,* 59(1), pp. 55-70.

Khan, M. H., 2007. *Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s.* [Online]
Available at:
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9921/1/DESA_Governance_Economic_Growth_and_Development_since_1960s.pdf
[Accessed on 30 November 2024].

Khan, M. H., 2017. Debate: Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions. *African Affairs,* 117(469), pp. 636-655.

Khan, M. H., 2018. Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions. *African Affairs,* 117(469), pp. 635-655.

Kotajoki, J., 2025. United Nations Peacekeepers' Perceptions of the 'Local': Evidence from Military Personnel in Mali. *International Peacekeeping,* 32(3), pp. 327-357.

Kuhn, T., 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lacher, W., 2013. *Challenging the Myth of the Drug-Terror Nexus,* s.l.: Kofi Annan Foundation.

Lecocq, B. & Schrijver, P., 2007. The war on terror in a haze of dust: potholes and pitfalls on the Saharan front. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 25(1), pp. 141-166.

Lund, C., 2014. Of What is This a Case?: Analytival Movements in Qualitative Social Science Research. *Human Organization,* 73(3), pp. 224-234.

Müller, M.-M. & Steinke, A., 2020. The geopolitics of Brazilian peacekeeping and the United Nations' turn towards stabilisation in Haiti. *Peacebuilding,* 8(1), pp. 54-77.

Mac Ginty, R., 2010. Hybrid peace: The interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace. *Security Dialogue,* 41(4), pp. 391-412.

Mac Ginty, R., 2011. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mac Ginty, R., 2012. Against Stabilization. *Stability,* 1(1), pp. 20-30.

Mac Ginty, R., 2012. Routine peace: Technocracy and peacebuilding. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 47(3), pp. 287-308.

Mac Ginty, R. & Richmond, O., 2016. The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders: a reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding. *International Peacekeeping,* 23(2), pp. 219-239.

Mac Ginty, R. & Williams, A., 2009. *Conflict and Development.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Malejacq, R. & Mukhopadhyay, D., 2016. The tribal politics of field research: a reflection on power and partiality in 21st century warzones. *Perspectives on Politics,* 14(4), pp. 1011-1028.

Malejacq, R. & Sandor, A., 2020. Sahelistan? Military Intervention and Patronage Politics in Afghanistan and Mali. *Civil Wars,* 22(4), pp. 543-566.

Malejaqc, R., 2010. L'influence des analyses théoriques de la conflictualité d'après-guerre froide dans la construction de la paix: l'exemple des conflits de la région du fleuve Mano. In: R. Bowd & A. Chikwanha, Hrsg. *Understanding Africa's contemporary conflicts.* Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 3-24.

Marriage, Z., 2018. The elephant in the room: offshore companies, liberalisation and extension of presidential power in DR Congo. *Third World Quarterly,* 39(5), pp. 889-905.

Mayer, J., 2009. Policy Space: What, for What, and Where?. *Development Policy Review,* 27(4), pp. 373-395.

Mazarr, M., 2014. The rise and fall of the failed-state paradigm: requiem for a decade of distraction. *Foreign Affairs,* 93(1), pp. 113-121.

Millar, G., 2018. Decentring the intervention experts: Ethnographic peace research and policy engagement. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 53(2), pp. 259-276.

Minear, L., Scott, C. & Weiss, T., 1996. *The news media, civil war & humanitarian action.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

MINUSMA, 2025. *QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS (QIPS).* [Online]
Available at: https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/quick-impact-projects-qips
[Accessed on 10 July 2025].

Mkandawire, T., 2005. Maladjusted African Economies and Globalisation. *African Development,* 30(1), pp. 1-33.

Mkandawire, T., 2012. Institutional Monocropping and Monotasking in Africa. In: A. Noman, K. Botchwey, H. Stein & J. E. Stiglitz, Hrsg. *Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies.* Oxford: Oxford Academic, pp. 80-113.

Moe, L. W., 2021. The Dark Side of Institutional Collaboration: How Peacekeeping-counterterrorism Converges Weaken the Protection of Civilians in Mali. *International Peacekeeping,* 28(1), pp. 1-29.

Oxford DID, 2025. *The roles and functions of music in United Nations peacebuilding.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/research-project/roles-and-functions-music-united-nations-peacebuilding
[Accessed on 13 June 2025].

Paris, R., 2004. *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paris, R., 2010. Saving liberal peacebuilding. *Review of International Studies,* Band 36, pp. 337-365.

Perera, S., 2017. Bermuda triangulation: embracing the messiness of researching in conflict. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 11(1), pp. 42-57.

Perera, S., 2024. Methodology of the excluded: conspiracy as discourse in the eastern DRC Methodology of the excluded: conspiracy as discourse in the eastern DRC. *Peacebuilding,* pp. 1-16.

Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A., 2021. *Rethinking the response to jihadist groups across the Sahel,* London: Chatham House.

Pham, J. P., 2010. Emerging West African terror-drug nexus poses major security threat. *World Defense Review*, 18 January.

Portelli, A., 1991. *The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Putzel, J., 2020. The "Populist" Right Challenge to Neoliberalism: Social Policy between a Rock and a Hard Place. *Development and Change,* 51(2), pp. 418-441.

Putzel, J., 2022. Bangsamoro Autonomy and the Political Settlement in the Phillippines. In: *Conflict's Long Game: A Decade of Violence in the Bangsamoro.* Manila: International Alert, pp. 219-241.

Putzel, J. & DiJohn, J., 2012. *Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States,* London: LSE: Crisis States Research Centre.

Raeymaekers, T., 2013. Post-War Conflict and the Market for Protection: The Challenges to Congo's Hybrid Peace. *International Peacekeeping,* 20(5), pp. 600-617.

Raineri, L. & Martini, A., 2017. ISIS and Al-Qaeda as strategies and political imaginaries in Africa: a comparison between Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. *Civil Wars,* 19(4), pp. 425-447.

Resnick, D. & van de Walle, N., 2013. *Democratic Trajectories in Africa: unraveling the impact of foreign aid.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reuters, 2023. *Explainer: Why Mali is kicking out U.N. peacekeepers.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/why-mali-is-kicking-out-un-peacekeepers-2023-06-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[Accessed on 11 August 2025].

Reuters, 2023. *Mali faces spectre of anarchy after demanding UN's departure.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-faces-spectre-anarchy-after-demanding-uns-departure-2023-06-18/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[Accessed on 2 January 2025].

Richmond, O., 2009. Becoming liberal, unbecoming liberalism: Liberal-local hybridity via the everyday as a response to the paradoxes of liberal peacebuilding. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,* 3(3), pp. 324-344.

Richmond, O. P., 2005. *The Transformation of Peace.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Richmond, O. P., 2011. *A Post-Liberal Peace.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Richmond, O. P., 2015. The dilemmas of a hybrid peace: Negative or positive?. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 50(1), pp. 50-68.

Richmond, O. P., Pogodda, S. & Ramović, J., 2016. *The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to PEace.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sandor, A., 2020. The power of rumour(s) in international interventions: MINUSMA's management of Mali's rumour mill. *International Affairs,* 96(4), pp. 913-934.

Sauter, M., 2022. A Shrinking Humanitarian Space: Peacekeeping Stabilization Projects and Violence in Mali. *International Peacekeeping,* 29(4), pp. 624-649.

Sen, A., 1999. *Development as Freedom.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shrestha, S., Zhong, N., Sadat, S. M. A. & Zhan, S., 2023. Conceptualizing Peace: A Qualitative Study Among Afghan Adolescents Living in Intractable Conflict. *Psychology Research and Behaviour Management,* Band 16, pp. 4401-4416.

SIPRI, 2023. *Listen To Us! Research on the population's perceptions of security, governance and development in Central Mali,* s.l.: s.n.

Stewart, F., 2002. *Horizontal Inequality: A Neglected Dimension of Development,* Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.

Taylor, I., 2009. What Fit for the Liberal Peace in Africa?. In: R. Mac Ginty & O. Richmond, Hrsg. *The Liberal Peace and Post-war Reconstruction: Myth or Reality?.* London: Routledge, pp. 64-76.

Traore-Peytavin, C. & Gaoukoye, A., 2022. *Femmes, Crise et Transition "Les Arbres à Palabres": Quand les femmes du Mali prennent la parole, pour prévenir et résoudre les conflits par le développement local communautaire,* Bamako: A.C.E Conseil Mali.

Tull, D. M., 2019. Rebuilding Mali's army: the dissonant relationship between Mali and its international partners. *International Affairs,* 95(2), pp. 405-422.

U.S. Department of State, 2003 . *Mali.* [Online]
Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/23719.htm
[Accessed on 10 August 2025].

UN Peacekeeping, 2025. *Fatalities.* [Online]
Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities
[Accessed on 2 August 2025].

UN, 2013. *Resolution 2100 (2013),* s.l.: United Nations Security Council.

UN, 2016. *Resolution 2295 (2016),* s.l.: United Nations Security Council.

UN, 2022. *Resolution 2640 (2022),* s.l.: United Nations Security Council.

UN, 2023. *9350TH MEETING (AM) SC/15325.* [Online]
Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15325.doc.htm?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[Accessed on 1 August 2025].

Uzoigwe, G. N., 2019. Neocolonialism is dead: long live neocolonialism. *Journal of Global South Studies,* 36(1), pp. 59-87.

van Vliet, M., 2014. Weak Legislatures, Failing MPs, and the Collapse of Democracy in Mali. *African Affairs,* 113(450), pp. 45-66.

Venugopal, R., 2009. *The Making of Sri Lanka's Post-conflict Economic Package and the Failure of the 2001-2004 Peace Process,* s.l.: CRISE Working Paper No. 64.

Vigh, H. E., 2006. *Navigating terrains of war: youth and soldiering in Guinea-Bissau.* Oxford: Berghahn.

wa Thiong'o, N., 1986. The Language of African Literature. In: *Decolonising the mind: the politics of language in African literature.* London: Boydell & Brewer, pp. 4-33.

Wade, R., 1996. Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: the East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective. *New Left Review,* 1(217), pp. 3-36.

Weitzberg, K., 2017. *We Do Not Have Borders: Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya.* Athens: Ohio University Press.

Wing, S., 2016. French intervention in Mali: strategic alliances, long-term regional presence?. *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 27(1), pp. 59-80.

Woodward, S. L., 2017. *The Ideology of Failed States.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yin, R. K., 2018. *Case study research and applications: design and methods.* Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Zimmermann, F. & Smith, K., 2011. More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for International Development Co-Operation. *Journal of International Development,* Band 23, pp. 722-738.