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## Race and Nationality as Determinants of Refugee Experiences in Accessing Protection: A Case Study of Lebanon

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**Abstract**

This research investigates the role of race and nationality on the experiences of refugees in accessing protection in Lebanon. It utilises a case study approach, with data, from documents, and semi-structured interviews. Lebanon provides an interesting case as it has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and maintains that it is solely a country of transit for refugees. This is despite it having the highest proportion of refugees per capita globally. Overall, this research finds that race and nationality impact access to protection in Lebanon. Government policies produce heightened difficulties for Syrian refugees; however, the implementation of protection results in 'non-Syrian' refugees facing greater challenges. These challenges are also along racial lines, with black refugees facing greater challenges for access to RSD and resettlement. Simultaneously, the work of humanitarian organisations perpetuates hierarchies through affording easier access to some nationality groups, and insufficiently addressing race in vulnerability assessments. Although, their work is shaped by donor governments and third country resettlement states, who maintain authority.

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**Abbreviations**

ARM – Anti-Racism Movement

GoL – Government of Lebanon

GSO – Lebanese Directorate of General Security

HRW – Human Rights Watch

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

MoU – Memoranda of Understanding

RSD – Refugee Status Determination

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency

US – United States

VARON – Vulnerability Assessment for Refugees of Other Nationalities

VASyR – Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees

WASH – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WFP – World Food Programme

## Introduction

There were 43.4 million refugees at the end of 2023, and this figure is growing (UNHCR, 2023a). Refugees are facing pressing challenges in accessing the protection they need, and these challenges are shaped by aspects of identity such as their race, religion, nationality, and gender (Boeyink, 2019). Among these, race and nationality are emerging as critical determinants of refugee experiences. Race scholars, conceptualising the *racialised refugee regime*, place race as central to the oppression of some refugees (Kyriakides *et al.*, 2019). Simultaneously, it is increasingly acknowledged that policies and practices targeting certain nationalities result in the exclusion of some nationality groups from their required protection (de Boer, and Zieck, 2020). In consideration, this research seeks to understand the role of race and nationality on refugees' experiences in accessing protection in Lebanon. Protection here refers to basic humanitarian assistance, RSD, access to durable solutions – i.e., resettlement, repatriation, or integration – and freedom from persecution. Furthermore, as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of [their] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of that country” (Fortin, 2000, p.550).

## Research questions

The aim of this research is to assess how race and nationality impact the experiences of refugees in accessing protection in Lebanon. Two research questions are utilised:

1. Do race and nationality impact the experiences of refugees in accessing protection in Lebanon?
2. To what extent does the work of humanitarian actors perpetuate refugee hierarchies in Lebanon?

The first question owes to the lack of research into race and nationality in the context of refugees in Lebanon. The second question owes to the significant role of humanitarian actors in Lebanon (Ozkul, 2023). These questions will primarily, but not exclusively, focus on the experiences of Syrian, Iraqi and Sudanese as the three largest nationality groups.

## Scope

Given this paper's word limit, parameters are placed on the scope of the analysis. Firstly, Palestinian refugees will be excluded owing to their protection being under UNRWA not the UNHCR. Secondly, the second question will only explore the role of the UNHCR and their partner organisations owing to them holding responsibility for the facilitation and coordination of refugee protection (UNHCR, n.d.a).

## Research Justification

This paper addresses two research gaps: the insufficient attention to race and nationality in refugees' experiences and the scarcity of research on the access to refugee protection in Lebanon. Literature on the *racialised refugee regime* is minimal, and the role of race and nationality on the experiences of refugees has been provided little attention. This is important to bring light to discriminatory practices, and subsequently inform the development of future refugee protection frameworks, ensuring equitable protection for all refugees.

Furthermore, there has been insufficient attention to the Lebanese case. In this context, there is copious academic research into the Syrian or Palestinian refugee response. However, there has been negligible research on other refugee nationalities. The complex environment of refugee protection results in Lebanon provides a unique case study. The accumulation of Lebanon not ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention, its identification as not being an asylum state, and the 'state-to-UN responsibility shift' (Ozkul, 2023), provides a complex and necessary case to research. It also adds to the lack of research on refugee experiences in non-signatory states, providing insights to the unique challenges and protection gaps in these contexts. Finally, race and nationality have seldom been focused on in Lebanon, despite their influence (Janmyr, 2022).

## Outline

This paper has six key sections. Firstly, existing literature on refugee protection, the racialized refugee regime and humanitarian refugee protection will be reviewed to provide a theoretical background on refugees' experiences in the contemporary refugee regime. Subsequently, it will outline the methodological approach, highlighting the amalgamation of primary and secondary data for this research. Context on Lebanon will then be provided, before presenting the findings in two chapters, addressing each of the research questions. The paper will then finish with concluding remarks.

## Literature review

The literature review provides this dissertations' interdisciplinary theoretical framework. It draws from literature on refugee protection, the *racialised refugee regime*, and critical humanitarian studies. The following section presents the key debates on discriminatory refugee protection. Subsequently, the emerging literature on the *racialised refugee regime* is discussed. Finally, ending with the role of humanitarian actors in refugee protection.

## Refugee protection

Refugees endure multiple challenges in accessing protection, including long periods of indefinite waiting (Trad and Frangieh, 2007), unclarified denial of refugee status, and discriminatory RSD and resettlement processes (De Boer and Zieck, 2020). Academia acknowledges these difficulties are shaped by a person's identity, providing greater challenges for some individuals (Abdelaaty, 2021).

Extensive research acknowledges the discriminatory responses of states to refugees – a phenomenon Abdelaaty (2021) terms a “discrimination puzzle” (p.2). It is widely acknowledged that security and foreign policy objectives often drive discriminatory protection regimes (Haddad, 2003; Pulitano, 2013; McConnachie *et al.*, 2017). For instance, due to the perceived security threat of Iraqi and Afghan refugee's post-9/11, they face heightened restrictions when seeking asylum in the US (Waibsnaider, 2006). In other cases, refugee groups are seen as economic or cultural ‘burdens’, leading to exclusionary policies (Boswell, 1999; Salehyan and Savun, 2024). Ethnic identity, including race and language are also influential, with the prioritisation of similar ethnic groups (Abdelaaty, 2021). Şahin-Mencütek and Tsourapas (2023) demonstrates this in Lebanon, where Syrian refugees are said to threaten the demographic and consequently face hostile policies.

Nationality-based discrimination is prominent in refugee regimes, where policy and practice involve selective processes, prioritising certain nationalities (Carpi, 2024; Sánchez Nájera, and Freier, 2022). The provision of *prima facie* status – i.e., group-based refugee status – has become common practice in countries with large displacement flows (Almasri, 2023). However, there is resultant exclusion of smaller refugee groups. In Turkey, for example, Syrian refugees, as the largest refugee population, were prioritised for protection mechanisms



(*Ibid*). Similar findings were identified in Mexico where Sánchez Nájera, and Freier (2022) found Venezuelan refugees had greater access to RSD than Central American refugees.

De Boer and Zieck (2020) refer to discriminatory asylum as ‘cherry-picking’, illuminating inequalities in resettlement opportunities for refugees in Europe. They note the arbitrary nature of resettlement, where states choose their own criteria, as a cause of these inequalities (*Ibid*). This is widely acknowledged, with scholars noting the discretionary and state-centric nature of resettlement, resulting in discriminatory practices (Miller, 2019; Losoncz, 2017). Resettlement programmes targeted at specific nationalities drive discrimination. In the UK for example, specific resettlement schemes based on nationality lead to unequal access to resettlement opportunities (Walsh, 2021). Similarly, in Australia a resettlement programme, driven by the Syrian refugee crisis, was set up for 12,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees, excluding other nationality groups (Higgins and Wood, 2018). Nonetheless, aside from the pressure of current crises, other factors influence resettlement. Cellini (2018) suggests the ability of individuals to integrate into the resettlement country can be a factor, whilst others note resettlement places for African refugees are scarcer than for other groups, due to the preference of certain profiles (Refugee Council of Australia, 2019).

### *MENA*

Despite literature predominantly focusing on the Global North, literature also discusses discriminatory practices in the MENA. In Egypt and Israel, Brucker (2017) notes Sudanese refugees contend with restrictive asylum policies excluding them from access to refugee status and other protection. Similarly, Turner (2023) illuminates the influence of race and nationality in Jordan where individuals from Syria were prioritised for registration and resettlement opportunities. Where ‘non-Syrian’ refugees gained access to protection, they first endured long periods of waiting devoid of assistance (*Ibid*). ARDD-Legal Aid (2015) mirrors this, illustrating that in Jordan refugees from Somalia and Sudan, despite their recognised vulnerability, were overlooked in the context of mass displacement from Syria. This mirrors literature on the global North, where discrimination based on race and nationality influenced access to protection. However, it also demonstrates that nationality-based discrimination can be a secondary effect of mass refugee flows masking the protection needs of smaller groups.

### **The racialised refugee regime**

There is emerging literature which identifies race as a central determinant of refugee experiences (Balogun, 2023; Crawley, 2022). Nonetheless, there remains insufficient attention on this phenomenon – i.e., ‘racial aphasia’ (Achiume, 2021).

In understanding the *racialised refugee regime* it is foremost to understand race.

Theorisations have moved from identifying race as biological – i.e., physical, and genetic attributes, including skin colour – to understanding race as a social construct (Achiume, 2021). The constructivist theorisation foregrounds the meaning, derived from historical, political, or cultural contexts assigned to being “Black, White, Brown or any other racial designation” (Achiume, 2021, p.44). This reflects socially constructed beliefs not fundamental differences. Scholars also acknowledge how race operates as a form of power, maintaining inequality and affording some individuals more benefits than others (*Ibid*).

Crawley (2022) foregrounds the legacy of colonialism in the international refugee regime. This entwining of colonialism results in refugee experiences being dominated by race and ethnicity, regardless of gender identity factors (*Ibid*). Hence, through conceptualising the *racialised refugee regime*, academia seeks to emphasise the centrality of race and its power in shaping refugee experiences. As Kyriakides *et al* (2019) notes, race is an integral part of a deeply entrenched system of oppression which maintains the *racialised refugee regime*. Whilst this is often discussed in the Global North context, Ozcelik (2021) expands this analysis to the Middle East, illustrating that “whiteness” is associated with superiority, which translates into racialized hierarchies, with Black-Arabs or non-Arab minorities facing discrimination.

Research foregrounds racial processes, where race is a factor, often implicitly, in determining access to protection (Balogun, 2023; Ozcelik, 2021). These processes routinely exclude black and brown refugees from accessing the same protection as white refugees (Costello and Foster, 2022). As Balogun (2023) illustrates, discrimination of refugees is often shaped by the idea of ‘sameness’, whereby experiences can be based on who is identified as similar and, in turn, who is ‘othered’. Ukraine is a prominent example in literature. Africans fleeing the war faced exclusionary practices and refusal of protection based on their skin colour (Costello and Foster, 2022; Oyebamiji *et al.*, 2022). At borders, for instance, white refugees crossed freely, whereas black refugees were prevented from crossing (Oyebamiji *et al.*, 2022). Similar

findings are found elsewhere. In Spain, López-Sala and Moreno-Amador (2020) demonstrate that policies use “labelling” of African refugees as economic migrants to identify African migrants as ‘false asylum seekers’ and exclude them from the Spanish protection system. These patterns are also demonstrated in the MENA, for example Ozcelik (2021) found Sudanese refugees in Egypt face disregard from state institutions owing to their race. There is also acknowledgement of the role of race alongside other identity factors. Palillo (2022), for example, discusses the intersection of gender and race in developing “hierarchies of deservingness” (p.333) in Sicily, with discrimination against black refugee men.

### **Humanitarian refugee protection**

Increasingly, humanitarian actors take responsibility for refugee protection, particularly in non-signatory states (Janmyr, 2019). Humanitarian actors are facing increasing criticism for producing and reinforcing refugee hierarchies. In the eyes of humanitarian aid, Malkki (1996) states that all refugees are not viewed equally. Instead, the humanitarian assistance refugees receive is shaped by identity (*Ibid*).

Humanitarian actors’ use of vulnerability assessments has been condemned for emphasising hierarchies of assistance (Bardelli, 2022; Ozkul and Jarrous, 2021). Issues arise due to the vague meaning of “vulnerability”, assessments which fail to consider how several vulnerabilities can intersect (Mendola and Pera, 2022). Notably, Bardelli (2022) draws links between their use and the production of hierarchies in accessing assistance, where vulnerability assessments produce an “ideal refugee” who is both “needy” of and “worthy” of assistance. Therefore, for refugees who are not the most vulnerable, accessing assistance is arduous, and they must perform to the idea of an “ideal refugee” (*Ibid*). This can be seen with Syrian refugees in Lebanon, who are categorised and ‘ordered’ in terms of three categories, including their vulnerability (Janmyr and Mourad, 2018). Those recognised as less vulnerable have less access to protection and are not prioritised for RSD and resettlement (*Ibid*). The way vulnerability assessments themselves are formulated can also be highly exclusionary. In Jordan, for example, vulnerability assessments failed to include individuals from Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen for several years, highlighting the selectivity of protection provision (Turner, 2023).

Amongst this criticism, humanitarianism’s disregard for race is prominent. Literature commonly recognises that humanitarian action often ignores the influence of race, despite its

impact (Benton, 2016). IDC (2022) demonstrated that racism is present in the aid sector structure – e.g., employment practices – and provision of assistance. This has resulted in calls to decolonise the humanitarian sector, to remove racialized hierarchies (Narayanaswamy *et al.*, 2021). Narayanaswamy (2024) notes the role of humanitarian actors in Ukraine, where despite seeking to work neutrally and impartially, the humanitarian evacuation prioritised individuals viewed as European – i.e., white. Thus, race shapes who receives humanitarian assistance. Similarly, Benton (2016) foregrounds how racial bias is prominent in vulnerability assessments, reinforcing the central role race plays.

‘Nationality-based aid’ is also present within humanitarian provision. Humanitarian organisations often proclaim this is due to logistical ease, where different nationalities, with different vulnerabilities, require different assistance (Carpi, 2024). Nonetheless, ARDD-Legal Aid (2015) demonstrates that in Jordan humanitarian aid is predominantly provided to Syrian refugees, with Sudanese and Somali refugees being eclipsed by their number. Hence, despite being highly vulnerable, smaller groups are excluded from assistance (*Ibid*).

Nonetheless, whilst literature often blames the discriminatory regime on humanitarian organisations, Kagan (2011) highlights the challenges which they face when they hold state responsibility owing to limited resources and minimal decision-making power (*Ibid*). States maintain overall authority over refugee protection (see, Norman, 2020). For instance, often humanitarian organisations rely on funding from donor states which is provided based on their own foreign policy, and security interests (Olsen *et al.*, 2003).

### *UNHCR*

The UNHCR faces criticism for its work as a ‘surrogate state’. Foremost, it has been critiqued for acting as a form of Western imperialism, influenced by, and working in the interest of, Western Nations (Opi, 2024). There has also been criticism for unclear and highly unpredictable decision-making processes and long periods of waiting (Ozkul and Jarrous, 2021). This is said to disempower refugees and produce hardship in accessing protection, and thus, has been termed ‘bureaucratic violence’ highlighting the exacerbation of suffering and uncertainty refugees face (Ozkul and Jarrous, 2021). Kagan (2006) also found a lack of fairness in UNHCR RSD procedures, adding that shifting responsibility to the UNHCR places increased pressure on limited resources and damages refugees' trust in their work. Furthermore, Davies *et al* (2016) illustrates that in Jordan, the UNHCR focuses more on

nationality of individuals than their status as refugees when determining access to protection, illuminating the discriminatory processes, often driven by exclusionary vulnerability assessments.

Nonetheless, literature also recognises the UNHCRs' limited autonomy, where states impact their ability to ensure non-discriminatory protection (Kagan, 2006; Suhrke and Garnier, 2018). The necessity of state funding, limited state mandates (Loescher, 2001a; Kagan, 2006) and the need for permission to work in state territories (Loescher, 2009), are all highlighted as constraints. Funding is prominent in literature on UNHCR constraints owing to their reliance on state funding (Loescher, 2009). This is often ear-marked, determining which nationality UNHCR can support (Stephan, 2019) or limited, constraining the services they can provide. For instance, in the MENA, UNHCRs' budget limits RSD (Kagan, 2006). Resultantly, their responsibility to advocate for fairer refugee protection is restricted by the potential consequences of criticising host or donor governments (Loescher, 2009). In non-signatory states, Janmyr (2019) discusses the constraints on UNHCRs' refugee protection posed by foreign policy and security considerations of host governments. They discuss Lebanon, where there is intensified susceptibility to the interference of the government due to their unique approach to refugees (*Ibid*).

## **Conclusion**

In summary, the literature review has provided oversight of the challenges faced in refugee protection. It has demonstrated that refugees' access to assistance is shaped by their identity, including their nationality. States often prioritise certain nationalities over others due to foreign policy and security objectives. However, it can also be down to the size of a refugee population. The theory on the *racialized refugee regime*, despite its scarcity, places race as a central factor which determines refugee experiences. It demonstrates that white refugees are afforded greater protection opportunities than black and brown refugee populations. Although, it is also demonstrated the idea of 'sameness' shapes refugee protection, where individuals with the greatest similarities are often prioritised. Finally, it has demonstrated the contradictions in the work of humanitarian organisations. Their processes exacerbate the inequalities between refugees, with discriminatory provision. However, humanitarian actors' lack of autonomy limits their ability to work in a non-discriminatory manner. Overall, the amalgamation of this literature provides a foundation for the analysis in this research.

## **Methodological approach**

### **Case study research**

This research employs a qualitative case study approach to provide an in-depth analysis on the role of race and nationality in refugees' access to protection in Lebanon (Hays, 2021), as justified in the introduction. A strength of the case study approach is the ability to use varied data sources, thus increasing the quality and validity of findings (Yin, 1994; Yin, 2018). This research has benefitted from this, using secondary data, derived from documents, and primary data, collected through semi-structured interviews. The interviews enrich the limited secondary data on this case study. Moreover, the triangulation of secondary data and interviews improves the credibility of findings (Bowen, 2009).

### **Data collection**

#### *Secondary data - Documents*

The secondary data includes academic articles and grey literature such as news articles, and organisational reports. The quality of the data is also critical for the validity of findings (Braun and Clarke, 2022). Hence, all sources were assessed for their credibility and accessed through reputable databases such as *Scopus* and *JSTOR* or through reputable organisations – e.g., UNHCR.

#### *Primary data – Semi-structured interviews*

Six online interviews using a semi-structured format were conducted on Microsoft Teams, all ranging between 45 and 60 minutes. Questions were produced prior to the interviews, but the interviewer was able to probe, gaining more depth and knowledge on important topics (Petrescu *et al.*, 2017). Interviews began with simple questions, then subsequently, asked more challenging questions, increasing the probability of thought-out answers (*Ibid*).

The six participants included academics, humanitarian workers, and case workers, all with a depth of understanding on current refugee protection in Lebanon. This diversity provides a variety of perspectives and offers more comprehensive insights. A purposive sampling method was used to recruit interviewees based on their qualities - i.e., knowledge of the research topic. Whilst this does not provide generalisability, it was suitable for this research as it provided interviewees with appropriate knowledge of the research topic (Sharma, 2017).

### **Data analysis**

A document analysis, involving an iterative procedure, was used to evaluate and interpret the secondary data (Bowen, 2009). Firstly, documents were skimmed to gain an overview of the content, then subsequently, read thoroughly to identify themes and extract relevant data (Morgan 2022). The efficiency of this method benefitted this research due to its limited time frame (Bowen, 2009).

A thematic analysis technique was conducted for the interview data. Transcriptions, automatically produced on Microsoft Teams, were checked for accuracy, and read for familiarisation. Subsequently, all data was coded, identifying recurring patterns. Some codes were produced prior to this process based on existing literature; however, codes were also derived during the process to ensure no data patterns were overlooked (Lochmiller, 2021). Themes were then identified by grouping similar codes together and finding broader patterns (Terry *et al.*, 2017).

### **Ethical issues**

The interview process needed to address several ethical issues (Nii Laryeafio, and Ogbewe, 2023). Consequently, prior to each interview, participants were provided information on the purpose of the interview, their right to withdraw, their anonymity and data confidentiality (see Appendix A). Subsequently, written informed consent was obtained to ensure the interviewees' willingness to participate, and their understanding of the information provided.

### **Limitations**

Foremost, dependence on secondary data can bring issues with biased selectivity, meaning important perspectives and contradictory data may be missed (Morgan, 2022). Whilst this was mitigated against through the inclusion of primary data, its risk remains. Bias is also an issue which arises during the interview process, with both risk of the interviewer's perspective unconsciously influencing interviewee responses and risk of socially desirable answers from the interviewee (Oltmann, 2016). Again, the triangulation of data allows for findings to be cross verified, reducing this risk. Additionally, the pre-prepared interview questions were developed to ensure no leading questions were asked. Finally, the absence of refugees who face challenges in accessing protection in the interviews limits the findings. Ethical issues which arise from interviews with vulnerable populations, and the inaccessibility of refugees in Lebanon prevented this inclusion.

## Lebanon context

Lebanon has the world's highest number of refugees per capita, accounting for 25% of the population (Stevens, 2017). Syrian refugees are the largest refugee population group. The GoL approximates there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees, however, as of March 2024, only 779,652 were registered (UNHCR, 2024a). There are also 4,958 Iraqi, 2,611 Sudanese, and 3,714 registered refugees from other nations including Eritrea and Ethiopia (*Ibid*).

Nonetheless, these figures don't truly encapsulate the number of refugees as a significant proportion are not registered with the UNHCR (Ozkul, 2023).

Despite the large population of refugees, Lebanon does not see itself as a country of asylum. It has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor its 1967 protocol, and neither does it have a national legal framework on refugee rights (Clutterbuck *et al.*, 2021). Lebanon is said to not have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention due to the Palestinian refugee crisis, which generated significant concern regarding the permanent settlement of refugees, and uncertainty over the meaning and responsibilities of the Convention (Clutterbuck *et al.*, 2021; El Daif *et al.*, 2021). Instead, the protection of refugees falls under the national legislation for entry and residence of foreign nationals (Clutterbuck *et al.*, 2021), and the international human rights treaties which Lebanon has ratified (Frangieh, 2016). The legislation on the entry and residence of foreign nationals only has a few provisions on asylum in Lebanon, which are often not sufficiently employed (Clutterbuck *et al.*, 2021). Within this, the right to seek 'political asylum' is the most applicable. It states, "any foreign national who is the subject of a prosecution or a conviction by an authority that is not Lebanese for a political crime or whose life or freedom is threatened, also for political reasons, may request political asylum in Lebanon" (Ozkul, 2023, p.17). Additionally, the signing of these laws should afford the principle of non-*refoulement*, meaning refugees should not be forcibly returned to their country of origin (*Ibid*). Despite these legislations, the system operates on temporary rules and directives and is subject to manipulation and open to violation of basic rights (Clutterbuck *et al.*, 2021).



## UNHCR's role in Lebanon

The UNHCR has been in Lebanon since 1963 (Janmyr and Mourad, 2018). Owing to the socio-economic pressures due to high refugee numbers, and lack of legislative framework for refugees, the UNHCR is present to maintain a sufficient protection environment (Janmyr and Stevens, 2021). Since 2003, the MoU between the UNHCR and the GSO formalises the arrangement, giving the UNHCR responsibility for refugee protection - i.e., establishing a 'state-to-UN responsibility shift' (Kagan, 2011). This document also emphasises Lebanon's position as a country of transit and "not a country of asylum" and maintains that the presence of refugees is only temporary (Kagan, 2011, p.16). The MoU also does not make mention of the principle of *non-refoulement* and requires the UNHCR to resettle recognised refugees in a third country within 12 months (Ozkul, 2023).

Currently the UNHCR holds responsibility for RSD, humanitarian aid, and identification and referral for resettlement, or other durable solutions (Ozkul, 2023). The provision of humanitarian aid and access to durable solutions rests on the registration of refugees - i.e., RSD. Therefore, RSD is crucial for refugee livelihoods and futures (Ozkul and Jarrous, 2021). However, whilst the UNHCR has responsibility for protection, the GoL maintains authority and can restrict their duties (Janmyr and Stevens, 2021). Moreover, being recognised as a refugee in Lebanon by the UNHCR only affords residence in Lebanon for one year (Ozkul, 2023). Still, aside from registration, refugees must gain a residency permit from the GSO, only then they are protected by the principle of *non-refoulement* (*Ibid*).

As such, the landscape of refugee protection in Lebanon is complex and multifaceted. The UNHCR is responsible for RSD, resettlement, and humanitarian aid. However, the GoL, who has ultimate authority over the UNHCR's work, produces further difficulties for refugees due to their policies and residency permit requirements.

## Findings

### **Empirical Chapter One: Do race and nationality impact the experiences of refugees in accessing protection in Lebanon?**

This chapter seeks to understand whether race and nationality impact the experiences of refugees through insight into governmental policies, and the practical implementation of RSD, residency permits and resettlement, as the core protection mechanisms.

#### *State influence*

The Lebanese government implements ad hoc policies which govern refugee protection, despite RSD, resettlement and humanitarian assistance being the responsibility of the UNHCR (Sanyal, 2018). These policies are implemented based on nationality groups, and thus, produce an environment where nationality shapes refugee protection. At present, these policies are targeted at refugees of Syrian nationality (Hall and Todman, 2024). The GoL has produced a strong anti-Syrian narrative, placing them at the forefront of hostile policies (Wood and Nasser, 2024). Interviewee 5 described:

*“The far-right government in power at the moment is very anti-Syrian. They are putting more and more pressure on Syrian refugees to drive them out of the country and blaming them for things which are not their fault”.*

Boswell (1999) and Salehyan and Savun (2024) note, the perception of refugees as an economic burden can shape exclusionary governmental policies. Syrian refugees have faced blame for Lebanon's economic hardship (Sabaghi, 2023). This is particularly since the economic crisis began in 2019 (BBC, 2024). This underscores the Lebanese government position that the Syrian population have driven the country's crises (The Economist, 2023) and therefore, they have implemented heightened restrictions on their access to refugee protection. The large scale of the Syrian crisis and ethnic identity of Syrian refugees can also be seen as drivers for the anti-Syrian rhetoric. As Cole (2018) proposes, the size of refugee groups determines their prominence on government agendas. Hence, Syrian refugees have become scapegoats for Lebanese struggles owing to their large population. However, other factors also drive the hostile policies. Ethnic identity is highlighted by Abdelaaty (2021) as a factor in government policies. In Lebanon, the Syrian ethnic identity is seen as a threat to the

Lebanese demographic, thus, becoming another factor in driving hostile policies against refugees of Syrian nationality (Şahin-Mencütek and Tsourapas, 2023).

The consequences of hostile government policies on the experiences of accessing protection for refugees of Syrian nationality are vast. In 2015, the UNHCR was instructed to no longer register Syrian refugees (Frangieh, 2016). Simultaneously, government policies placed heightened restrictions upon access to residency papers, especially for non-registered Syrians (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Furthermore, the increasing hostility against Syrian refugees has also materialised through forced returns, despite the principle of *non-refoulement* (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Thus, nationality largely shapes access to refugee protection in Lebanon through ad hoc government policies which target Syrian refugees, impacting their access to all forms of protection. This reflects current literature on nationality in the refugee regime, where nationality is a key factor in determining refugee experiences (Sánchez Nájera, and Freier, 2022).

However, the subsequent sub-sections highlight how other factors also determine access to protection. Due to the multi-faceted process and numerous actors in Lebanon, the government policies, although highly deterministic of refugee experiences, do not demonstrate the full impact of race and nationality.

### *RSD procedures*

Undoubtedly, the government anti-Syrian policies restrict Syrians from accessing RSD (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2017). For example, Syrians who arrived after 2015 cannot go through the RSD process (*Ibid*). Instead, the UNHCR has an alternative route to protection. These refugees are labelled as “recorded”, rather than “registered” (El Daif *et al.*, 2021), although have access to the same protection as registered refugees but in the absence of documentation (Ozkul and Jarrous, 2021). This affords inequitable documentation for refugees of Syrian nationality who arrived after 2015.

Whilst there is significant academic research on the experiences of Syrian refugees, the struggles of other refugee nationality groups have arguably been concealed. Grey literature and interview findings demonstrate that other refugee groups have long and difficult experiences when accessing RSD. Vague processes, long wait times and unclear reasoning for case file closure is a common occurrence, particularly for Sudanese refugees (Chehayeb,

2020; Dagher, 2020; Sewell, 2020). Protests conducted by Sudanese refugees, alongside ARM, vocalise these challenges. For example, in 2012 Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees carried out a hunger strike outside UNHCR offices, demanding they look at their asylum cases (Anti-Racism Movement, 2012). During this, protesters chanted “take my file out of the drawer” and asked, “where are my rights?” (Sewell, 2020). In 2020, similar calls were made during a protest outside the UNHCR Beirut office regarding the long and vague RSD processes (Al-Saadi, 2020). This highlights the ongoing battle which refugees of Sudanese and Ethiopian nationality are facing in the RSD process, a factor interviewee 5 discussed:

*“We work with lots of African refugees who are facing challenges with their cases. Many have been waiting years and have had no communication from the UNHCR...others have had their files closed even though they cannot return to where they are from”.*

Hence, despite hostile policies targeting refugees of Syrian nationality, the hardships faced in accessing RSD is often felt by Sudanese and Ethiopian nationality groups. Ozkul and Jarrous (2021) discuss the exacerbation of suffering due to long wait times and uncertainty under the UNHCR processes as a form of ‘bureaucratic violence’. Hence, Sudanese, and Ethiopian nationality groups are experiencing ‘bureaucratic violence’. Turner (2023) demonstrates that the struggles African refugees face suggests the processes are also impacted by race in Jordan. In a similar vein, the difficulties faced in Lebanon by African refugees also reflect this, where there are arguably racialized hierarchies of RSD. This is reflected in the voices of protesters where a Sudanese protester proclaimed, “there is racism, one hundred percent” (Sewell, 2020, p.1). This adds to the scarce literature, reflecting its racialized nature, where black refugees face heightened struggles in accessing RSD (López-Sala and Moreno-Amador, 2020; Ozcelik, 2021; Turner, 2023).

Language barriers and lack of education also exacerbated difficulties for some refugees.

Interviewee 4 noted:

*“Often when we look deeper into why cases are closed language is an issue. People answer questions incorrectly because they don’t understand the question properly. Maybe they don’t understand the accent well or it isn’t their first language”.*

Interviews conducted by Janmyr (2022) found similar issues, pinpointing a lack of education and the complex process of asylum as a barrier for Sudanese refugees in Lebanon. Lack of education can cause misunderstanding, and heightened barriers in the registration process (*Ibid*). These challenges are not uniform across refugee groups. Instead, as demonstrated, language barriers are faced disproportionately by African refugees (Janmyr, 2022).

Interviewee 1 said:

*“It’s not that the processes are intentionally racist, it’s that often deficiencies in the [RSD] process mean that the interviews are easier for some refugee groups. This is often experienced more by black refugees especially compared to others who are more familiar with the language and culture.”*

Kagan (2006)’s research found a lack of fairness in RSD. This interviewee finding demonstrates, therefore, that this is an ongoing issue with RSD, particularly impacting Sudanese refugees in Lebanon. Hence, whilst RSD may not directly discriminate against certain nationalities or races, the complex procedures are disproportionately felt by these groups, owing to language barriers. The low recognition rates of Sudanese refugees, especially in comparison to Syrian and Iraqi refugees is testament to this. For example, the highest recorded recognition rate for Sudanese refugees was in 2015, where 50% of applications were successful, compared to the highest recognition rate for Iraqi and Syrian refugees being 95% and 100%, respectively (Ozkul, 2023). This sustains findings of analogous research, such as McFadyen (2019) who notes language as a main barrier to obtaining refugee status. However, this finding expands beyond this by demonstrating the discrepancies this causes between race and nationality groups.

Owing to RSD being the foundation of refugee protection, the consequences of arduous RSD processes are vast (Ozkul, 2023). Inability to access refugee status also has implications for accessing residency permits, as the subsequent sub-section illustrates.

#### *Access to residency*

Like RSD, the process for accessing residency is easier for some refugee nationality groups, demonstrated by the varied procedures and differentiated statistics on refugee residency permit possession (Ozkul, 2023; UNHCR, 2021a; UNHCR, 2021b).

Residency permit possession is on the decline for all refugee nationalities in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2021a; UNHCR, 2021b). However, a waiver has been in place since 2017 meaning all Syrian refugees who arrived prior to 2015 do not pay the \$200 permit fee, or renewal (Human Rights Watch, 2017). As a barrier to residency (UNHCR, 2021a), the removal of this fee removes difficulties in accessing residency for these refugees. Considering the hostilities against Syrian refugees, this may seem contradictory to their anti-Syrian rhetoric. However, this can be attributed to the long-standing pressure from international and humanitarian organisations to eradicate the fee for Syrian nationality groups (Human Rights Watch, 2017). This contrasts literature which maintains that refugee protection is predominantly state centric (Haddad, 2003; Pulitano, 2013) and instead demonstrates the incremental role of international and humanitarian organisations in shaping state responses to refugees. Their role has resulted in refugees of Syrian nationality who arrived before 2015 having arguably easier access to residency permits.

However, aligned with the rise in push backs against refugees of Syrian nationality, there has been increasing difficulties obtaining residency permits for those who arrived after 2015. The criterion for these individuals is complex with the need to be in a category such as business or tourism (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2017). They must also acquire a sponsorship from a Lebanese national, or a registered entity (Ozkul, 2023). Acquiring a sponsorship is challenging, with HRW reporting that some Lebanese nationals charge up to \$1000 (Human Rights Watch, 2017). These challenges are reflected in the low rates of residency permit possession for Syrian refugees. As of 2022, for example, only an estimated 17% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon have residency permits (Amnesty International, 2024; UNHCR, 2022).

Nationalities, such as Iraqi and Sudanese, are also subject to challenges, and differential procedures for accessing residency permits (Ozkul, 2023). As a HRW worker noted, only including Syrian refugees who arrived before 2015 in the fee waiver excludes other vulnerable refugee groups (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Interviews and UNHCR reports highlight the cost of residency being one of the principal challenges (Interviewee 4; UNHCR, 2021a). For example, Interviewee 4 discussed:

*“I’ve seen the struggles it [the fee] creates, it is not accessible for some of the people I have tried to support”.*

The 2021 VARON maintains these findings, with 18.6% of ‘non-Syrian’ refugees cited the cost of the residency permit as a barrier, alongside other factors such as inability to secure a sponsor and lack of understanding of the access procedure (UNHCR, 2021a). Even then, these impacts are felt disproportionately between ‘Iraqi’ and ‘refugees of other nationalities’, with more ‘refugees of other nationalities’ citing the cost as a barrier to residency (*Ibid*). These challenges are demonstrated by the different rates of residency permit possession. In the 2020 VARON 23.6% of Iraqi refugees aged over 15 had a residency permit, compared to only 14.9% of ‘refugees of other nationalities’ (UNHCR, 2021a).

Hence, nationality does impact access to residency permits. For ‘non-Syrian’ refugees, the residency process has several barriers including cost and lack of awareness, creating discrepancies between Syrians who arrived before 2015 and all other nationality groups. Nonetheless, these difficulties are, again, felt disproportionately. The highest rates of residency permit possession is amongst Iraqi refugees, and less Iraqi refugees reported cost as a barrier to residency. The ‘refugees of other nationality’ group, who are predominantly Sudanese, face the greatest challenges. Whilst the policies implemented by the GoL are the same for all ‘non-Syrian’ refugees, this demonstrates the barriers to accessing residency are not uniform. This corroborates findings from previous literature where Sudanese refugees faced the greatest challenges due to exclusionary policies in Egypt and Israel (Brucker, 2017).

The challenges in accessing residency feed into other aspects of protection. As discussed, the absence of a residency permit leaves individuals at risk of arrest, detention, and deportation (UNHCR, 2021e). For example, in 2018 two Sudanese men, without a valid residency permit, were arrested by the General Security and under threat of deportation, despite being registered with the UNHCR, and the continued fear of persecution in Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2018). At the same time, there has been a vast increase in raids and arrests targeted at Syrian refugees, coupled with new policies to drive Syrian refugees outside the country (Amnesty International, 2024). These findings contrast those of Janmyr (2022) who demonstrated that the principle of *non-refoulement* is often maintained for individuals of Syrian nationality. This is likely due to changing government policies which, as of recently, have increased their hostility towards Syrian refugees with increasing instances of deportation (Amnesty International, 2023). Refugees’ freedom of movement without a residency permit is compromised due to fear of arrest and detention, impacting access to

services such as education and healthcare (El Daoui, 2017; Kolbi, 2024). For example, El Daoui (2017) discusses the “bureaucratic limbo” a lack of residency permit causes, where individuals are placed in a state of uncertainty and insecurity, with risk of arrest when, for example, going to school, or seeking medical care. Hence, the challenges which refugee groups face as a consequence of differential procedures to access residency permits also feed into other aspects of refugee protection. As such, the impact of nationality on the experiences of accessing refugee protection is broad.

The findings undoubtedly demonstrate that nationality impacts upon access to residency permits. Nonetheless, there is insufficient evidence from secondary literature and interviews to suggest race impacts access to residency permits. This is in part due to the uniformity of policies for all “non-Syrian” refugees and Syrian refugees who arrived after 2015.

### *Resettlement*

Third country resettlement is vital for the majority of refugees in Lebanon. Although UNHCR is responsible for finding these durable solutions, resettlement is ultimately under the discretion of the resettlement state (Frangieh, 2016). There are limited resettlement slots available globally (Garnier, Sandvik, and Jubilut, 2018), with only 1% of the world’s refugees being resettled in their lifetime (Refugee Council, 2023). In Lebanon, all refugee groups, irrespective of their race or nationality, suffer from an application backlog caused by COVID-19 (UNHCR, 2022). As such, the resettlement process is highly selective (UNHCR, 2021c).

The UNHCR has the first step in resettlement, identifying refugees. They note their lack of autonomy in the resettlement process, maintaining that resettlement opportunities are based on “third country quotas” and “country-specific eligibility criteria” (Sewell, 2020). However, an individual at the ARM noted their important position in advocating with resettlement countries to ensure fair processes (Sewell, 2020). There are discrepancies between nationality groups in the UNHCR identification process. As Janmyr (2022) notes, in 2022, only a small number of Sudanese refugees were identified as priority for resettlement spaces. The discrepancies between nationality groups in the identification process by the UNHCR may be explained by the use of vulnerability assessments, which as discussed in the subsequent empirical chapter, can identify some refugee groups as more vulnerable than others due to insufficient criteria. However, interviewee 3 noted:



*“The process for resettlement is confusing. The UNHCR identifies more people for resettlement from Syria compared to other nationalities, but the process is unclear so there is no explanation for why this occurs”.*

Interviewee 3’s experience is symbolic of the UNHCR identification statistics suggesting that nationality is influential in the resettlement process and therefore offering less opportunities to ‘non-Syrian’ refugees. This reflects the theory on the refugee regime, which illuminates that nationality is criteria which influence the experiences of refugees, thus nationality impacts which refugees access resettlement (for example Ozkul and Jarrous, 2021; Losoncz, 2017).

The second stage of the resettlement process is conducted by third country resettlement states. From Lebanon, resettlement countries often prioritise Syrian or Iraqi refugees, with refugees from other nationalities having a smaller percentage of resettlement slots (Janmyr, 2022). Although available data on resettlement is scarce, a report in 2021 demonstrates 94.5% of individuals resettled from the cases submitted by the UNHCR were Syrian (UNHCR, 2021c). Whilst it is expected that the resettlement rates for Syrian refugees is higher due to them making up the highest proportion of refugees, this figure demonstrates the discrepancies in resettlement with all ‘non-Syrian’ refugees making up only 5.5% of resettled refugees. These discrepancies have also been acknowledged by the UNHCR, who noted ‘non-Syrian’ refugees have a lack of resettlement places available (Anti-Racism Movement, 2019). The scale of the Syrian refugee crisis, and the advocacy by humanitarian and international organisations to respond to this crisis (UNHCR, 2020), has resulted in resettlement programmes tailored to individuals of Syrian nationality (Higgins and Wood, 2018; UNHCR, 2021d). However, the consequence of this can be seen in Lebanon, where other nationality groups fall into the shadows of the Syrian crisis and face unequal opportunities for resettlement. Hence, just as recent literature demonstrates that resettlement schemes which target certain refugee groups influence the experiences of refugees, through affording some nationality groups greater access to resettlement opportunities than others (for example, Higgins and Wood, 2018; Walsh, 2021), this demonstrates that the same challenges are faced by ‘non-Syrian’ refugees in Lebanon. This is a consequence of the ‘cherry picking

approach' as discussed by De Boer and Zieck (2020) in the context of Europe, where states exercise selective discretion over who they wish to resettle.

Whilst all 'non-Syrian' refugees face unequal access to resettlement spaces compared to Syrian refugees, evidence suggests these challenges are greater for black refugees. As Turner (2023) states, nationality can be used as a proxy for race and the preceding analysis will be analysed through this lens. Finding resettlement spaces for African refugee groups has often been noted as an arduous task in previous literature, with racial bias embedded within the criteria of resettlement states (Losoncz, 2017). Although data is not available for Ethiopian refugees in Lebanon, in 2023, only 131 Sudanese refugees were resettled from Lebanon, in comparison to 8443 Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2024d). The protests of Sudanese refugees reflected their struggles in accessing resettlement, where they noted waiting for years for resettlement places (Sewell, 2020). As Janmyr (2022) notes, for Sudanese refugees, the US was their key destination for resettlement. However, more stringent checks, and lengthier processes has limited the resettlement of Sudanese refugees from Lebanon, thus producing greater difficulties for these refugees to access resettlement (*Ibid*). Interviewee 4 supported the findings from the secondary data:

*"They [Sudanese refugees] are forgotten really. There is so much attention on the Syrian crisis... This isn't saying that the attention on the Syrian crisis isn't necessary...it is...but it does leave less opportunities for others and that is what we see in resettlement."*

Whilst there is insufficient evidence to understand why Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees face heightened challenges in accessing resettlement, their struggles are reflective of the racial bias in resettlement processes previously demonstrated (Refugee Council of Australia, 2019). This suggests race impacts upon access to protection, particularly due to the resettlement being under the discretion of resettlement states. However, the interview also shows there is an overshadowing of the needs of smaller refugee groups, such as Sudanese and Ethiopian. This adds to the literature which illuminates that the size of the refugee population can determine their opportunities, (for example, ARDD-Legal Aid, 2015), by demonstrating the same phenomenon in Lebanon, at the cost of smaller refugee groups such as Sudanese.

Overall, race and nationality impact the experiences of resettlement due to three factors: the overshadowing of the Syrian crisis which leaves all 'non-Syrian' refugees with less

opportunities for resettlement, racial bias in state selection criteria which makes the resettlement opportunities for African refugees inequitable, as well as UNHCR identification process identifying only a small number of Sudanese refugees. This results in a hierarchy of assistance, where Syrian refugees have more ease in the resettlement process than other refugee groups. Simultaneously, refugees from Sudan and other African countries face the greatest challenges in accessing resettlement, demonstrating a hierarchy based on nationality, but also race.

#### *Chapter One: Conclusion*

Overall race and nationality impact access to protection for refugees in Lebanon. Nationality can be seen to impact all the core mechanisms of protection. Whilst the government policies suggest Syrian refugees are the most impacted by their nationality the insight into RSD, residency, and resettlement all foreground that the Syrian crisis has hidden and contributed to the struggles of other nationality groups.

However, race also impacts upon access to protection through greater difficulties for black refugees in processes of resettlement and RSD. Nonetheless race was not found to be influential for refugees to access residency permits, although further research is necessary.

## **Empirical chapter 2: To what extent does the work of humanitarian actors perpetuate refugee hierarchies in Lebanon?**

This chapter will discuss whether humanitarian organisations contribute to hierarchies of refugees, looking at nationality-based aid, funding, vulnerability assessments and external influences.

### *Nationality-based aid*

Humanitarian organisations provide assistance based on the recency and size of the displacement crises. In turn, their assistance is provided based on nationality. Interviewee 3 said:

*“If we had the funding to provide for everyone then we would but in Lebanon there are so many people that need aid that we will never be able to get funding for them all. That’s when we have to provide aid based on nationality”.*

At the same time, the size of a population and the time of mass displacement also impact upon the humanitarian assistance provided to refugee groups, a finding which mirrors the previous literature (for example, ARDD-Legal Aid, 2015; Carpi, 2023). Interviewee 1 noted:

*“When a new crisis occurs it’s all hands on deck. We quickly move our attention to the new crisis. So yes, we do end up providing more attention to some nationality groups more than others. But that’s just because we need to cater to the immediate needs of incoming refugees.”*

This demonstrates humanitarian actors often prioritise recent displacement crises over more protracted displacement. Therefore, humanitarian assistance is often provided based on nationality.

When humanitarian organisations provide aid based on the recency and size of the displacement crises, smaller refugee groups, and protracted crises, become lower down the agenda. In Lebanon, the Syrian refugee crisis is prioritised for assistance over other nationality groups. Interviewee 3 and interviewee 1 discussed this prioritisation. Interviewee 3 said:

*“There are so many Syrians that are in need of assistance in Lebanon it is overwhelming the system. They are our focus because the population is so great...we can't provide assistance to all of them, although we try.”*

Refugee groups, such as Sudanese and Eritrean refugees, are significantly smaller than the population of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2024a). As a consequence of this, Janmyr (2022) found these smaller groups have often been neglected in the Lebanese humanitarian arena. Similarly, interviewee 6 said:

*“It's not that they [non-Syrian refugees] aren't on our radar...It's hard, it's true that they don't get the same...attention, shall we say [as Syrian refugees]. But it's not that we are intentionally trying to exclude them”.*

This illustrates the Syrian refugees are in the spotlight of humanitarian actors on account of their large population and the relative recency of the crisis. In turn, other refugee groups do not get the same access to assistance. The effect of these discrepancies in assistance is demonstrated through rhetoric of Sudanese refugees during interviews by Carpi (2023). Sudanese refugees in Lebanon noted the need to rival with Iraqi and Syrian refugees for necessary assistance (*Ibid*). In Jordan, ARDD-Legal Aid (2015) demonstrated that Sudanese and Somali refugees were eclipsed by the Syrian refugee crisis owing to the size of the Syrian refugee population. Hence, the findings of this paper are analogous, demonstrating the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon also leads to smaller refugee groups facing greater challenges in accessing assistance. Therefore, nationality-based assistance from humanitarian actors drives discrepancies between refugee groups causing heightened challenges for ‘non-Syrian’ refugees in accessing assistance, reinforcing hierarchies demonstrated in chapter one.

The provision of nationality-based aid, however, also drives racialized hierarchies.

Interviewee 2 stated:

*“The thing is Sudanese refugees are always ranked the lowest in Lebanon. So, when they struggle to access the services from humanitarian organisations it makes it worse and it damages their trust and makes them feel neglected.”*

In interviews with Sudanese refugees in Lebanon, Carpi (2023) demonstrated that they often believed their struggles in accessing protection were due to their darker skin. Hence, the difficulties faced by black refugees in Lebanon reproduces hierarchies, where black refugees face the greatest difficulties in obtaining protection. Costello and Foster (2022)'s research displayed, in Ukraine, exclusionary practices of aid provision produced hierarchies where black refugees are often lowermost. These research findings mirror that of previous research and demonstrate that similar consequences of exclusionary aid provision are present in Lebanon.

### *Funding*

Humanitarian assistance is shaped by funding to humanitarian organisations. Lack of funding and targeted funding necessitates humanitarian organisations to limit who receives aid. In turn, reproducing inequalities between nationality groups.

Whilst all refugees face difficulties in accessing protection, demonstrated through the UNHCR vulnerability reports (see, UNHCR, 2021; UNHCR, 2023b), limited funding makes these difficulties unequal between nationality groups. In UNHCRs' latest funding report, they demonstrated that they only raised 13% of their required \$545.2 million for 2024 (UNHCR, 2024b). A consequence of limited funding is the necessity to decide who gets access to aid, often done in an inequitable manner (Davis *et al.*, 2016). Furthermore, the international community devotes a significant proportion of their funding to the Syrian refugee crisis, often driven by funding appeals (for example, European Commission, 2023; UNHCR, 2023c). For example, the European Commissions' funding of €860 million since 2011 has targeted Syrian refugees, with an expansion to the Lebanese population since 2023 (European Commission, 2023). Hence, Syrian refugees are often prioritised for humanitarian assistance, creating inequalities between nationality groups. This echoes prior research, where funding in other Middle Eastern countries also prioritises Syrian refugees (Almasri, 2024).

Organisations such as the UNHCR have some advocacy power to drive funding (Loescher, 2001b). ARM has sent open letters to the UNHCR calling for them to diversify their funding to ensure there is no discriminatory aid provision (Anti-racism movement, 2019). In the absence of diversified funding, it inevitably produces inequalities between refugee nationality groups. Interviewee 6 mentioned:

*“Limited funding materialises into unequal access to assistance between groups. Some individuals have easier and more access to humanitarian aid, others might struggle...but we won’t ever have funding which covers everyone”.*

Some progress has been made by humanitarian actors to expand assistance to other nationality groups. For example, WFP began to provide e-cards for food purchases to ‘non-Syrian’ refugees in Lebanon in 2019 (Johnson, 2019). There are nonetheless discrepancies which remain in aid provision, driven by limited funding, and humanitarian organisations have some ability to influence this.

#### *Insufficient vulnerability assessments*

UNHCR, alongside other humanitarian actors, prioritise their protection based on vulnerability assessments. These assessments accentuate disparities between groups owing to insufficiencies in their production and implementation.

The assessment's design overshadows the needs of some refugee nationality groups. At present two separate vulnerability assessments are conducted in Lebanon; the VASyR for Syrian refugees and the VARON for ‘refugees of other nationalities’ (UNHCR, 2021a; UNHCR, 2023b). Within the VARON, refugees are further labelled as either ‘Iraqi’ or ‘refugees of other nationalities’ (UNHCR, 2021a). The use of these labels demonstrates the embeddedness of nationality within humanitarian procedures. Moreover, they can be seen as contributing to a process which Janmyr (2022) terms *invisibilisation*, where in this case, the Syrian refugee crises is overshadowing the needs of other refugee groups. Sudanese refugees are the third largest refugee nationality group in Lebanon, and largest population in the ‘refugees of other nationalities’ category (UNHCR, 2021a). In the absence of a category which specifically identifies their vulnerabilities, and unique humanitarian needs, it arguably masks their vulnerabilities. It also, as Janmyr (2022b) proposes, risks making these refugees subordinate to other refugee groups. As Turner notes in the context of Jordan, categorisations of ‘Syrian’ and ‘non-Syrian’ demonstrate that humanitarian organisations prioritise the need of Syrian refugees (Turner, 2023). This pattern is mirrored in the case of Lebanon. Hence, the design of vulnerability assessments in Lebanon, produce discrepancies between Syrian refugees and refugees of other nationalities, reinforcing the hierarchies of refugees demonstrated in empirical chapter one.

It is crucial that vulnerability assessments are wholly representative of the vulnerabilities which all refugees face to ensure fair and non-discriminatory provision (Mendola and Pera, 2022). However, there are notable deficits in the assessments used in Lebanon. Firstly, it fixates on access to economic resources for refugees (El Daif *et al.*, 2021). Secondly, Janmyr (2022) also identified that these assessments ineffectively address the way race produces exacerbated vulnerabilities for African refugees and do not identify the way in which multiple aspects of vulnerability can intersect (Janmyr, 2022). As Bardelli (2022) notes, when humanitarian vulnerability assessments identify the most vulnerable individuals, they produce “ideal refugees” who are deemed more “worthy” of aid. In Lebanon assessments which do not adequately acknowledge race as a category of vulnerability, mask the exacerbated vulnerabilities of refugee groups such as Sudanese (Janmyr, 2022). This risks these groups being identified as less “worthy” of assistance, and therefore excluding them, partially or wholly, from provision. Moreover, it can also lead to interventions that fail to address the specific needs and challenges faced by racial and ethnic minorities. As such, the utilisation of vulnerability assessments by humanitarian actors in Lebanon can have adverse impacts upon inequalities between refugee groups in the presence of ineffective procedures and categories to identify vulnerability. This corroborates findings in previous literature, that vulnerability assessments can have negative repercussions for some refugees, making access to humanitarian assistance more arduous (Bardelli, 2022).

Black refugees face the largest consequences of this, owing to race not being addressed effectively. This is in spite of vast evidence demonstrating the presence of racial discrimination against refugees in Lebanon (El-Tani, 2011; Nesrine, 2010). The inadequacies in recognising the heightened vulnerability which race produces reflects the pattern highlighted by Benton (2016), that humanitarian organisations often do not adequately acknowledge the impact of race, and the adverse effects it has, particularly for black refugees. The consequences of this in Lebanon is the perpetuation of racialized hierarchies, where the true extent of the vulnerability of black refugees is not acknowledged.

### *External influences*

It cannot be discounted that humanitarian organisations’ work does impact upon hierarchies of refugees in Lebanon. However, their work is not solely in their control. Hence other actors contribute to the perpetuation of hierarchies.



Literature points to the dynamic, particularly for the UNHCR, where they have some autonomy, but this is diminished by their reliance on states for funding, or the provision of resettlement (for example, Olsen *et al.*, 2003; De Boer and Zieck, 2020). In two interviews, it emerged that the capacity of humanitarian organisations hinges on the funding they are provided (Interviewees 6 and 2). Interviewee 6 noted, when capacity is limited by funding, the organisations in Lebanon have to decide on which refugee groups to fund. As 85% of the UNHCR's funding is from donor states (UNHCR, n.d.b) this suggests that hierarchies of assistance are also a consequence of this insufficient funding. This situation is exacerbated by the ear-marked funding from states. A large proportion of the funding to the UNHCR in 2024 was ear-marked, and this ear-marking can be based on nationality groups (UNHCR, 2024b). Therefore, humanitarian actors do not have autonomy to spend elsewhere, leading to discrepancies between nationality groups. State interests, rather than the drive to save lives, have previously been found to shape the funding patterns of donor states (Olsen *et al.*, 2003). As such, funding patterns of donor states also emphasise hierarchies of refugees.

Moreover, as discussed in empirical chapter one, opportunities for resettlement are different between nationality groups. Whilst the responsibility for resettlement is with the UNHCR, they lack autonomy over resettlement places. As prior literature has demonstrated, resettlement states have full discretion over whom they resettle and often base their allocations on criteria, such as the perceived ability for individuals to integrate (Cellini, 2018). Hence, the UNHCR's lack of autonomy in the resettlement of refugees and the influence of state criteria (De Boer and Zieck, 2020), contributes to the hierarchies of refugees in Lebanon. The influence of states is hidden due to the UNHCR's responsibility for resettlement.

### *Chapter two: Conclusion*

This chapter has demonstrated that factors such as nationality-based aid, funding and insufficient vulnerability assessments have driven hierarchies between groups based on nationality and race. Discrepancies between refugee groups are caused by some having greater access to assistance owing to greater funding or size of their population, whilst insufficient vulnerability assessments mask the specific vulnerabilities of 'non-Syrian' refugees. However, humanitarian actors in Lebanon do not have full liberty over their work due to the influence of donor and resettlement states. Therefore, perpetuation of hierarchies in Lebanon cannot merely be ascribed to humanitarian actors but must instead be understood in

the broader context of the humanitarian system, where other actors play a significant role in determining inequalities based on nationality and race.

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, this dissertation has used a case study approach with documents and interviews as the source of the data to understand the role of race and nationality in shaping the experiences of refugees in accessing protection in Lebanon. It has utilised literature on refugee protection, the racialised refugee regime, and critical humanitarian studies to provide its theoretical framework.

## **Findings**

It has demonstrated that both race and nationality influence access to protection. Syrian refugees are at the forefront of hostile government policies, thus creating heightened barriers for access to RSD and residency. However, the practical implementation of RSD, resettlement and residency all demonstrate that there are heightened challenges for ‘non-Syrian’ refugees. Often these refugee groups are eclipsed by the Syrian crisis, are not prioritised by states, and more arduous processes due to language barriers. Thus, they face long wait times for RSD, unexplained closing of case files, difficulties in accessing resettlement places and inequitable residency permit processes. However, race also plays a role in access to resettlement and RSD, where heightened challenges are often faced by black refugees when accessing these protection mechanisms. There was insufficient evidence, however, to show that race was influential in accessing residency.

Furthermore, it has highlighted the role of humanitarian actors in contributing to hierarchies of refugees in accessing protection. Nationality-based aid, and lack of diversity in funding sources often leads to Syrian refugees being at the forefront of the humanitarian agenda, and other refugee nationalities facing greater difficulties. Simultaneously, insufficient vulnerability assessments fail to effectively address race, and create barriers between Syrian and ‘non-Syrian’ refugees owing to categorisation of these refugee groups. Nonetheless, perpetuation of hierarchies cannot solely be attributed to humanitarian actors. There are also

external influences, such as donor governments and third country resettlement states who influence the hierarchies of protection.

### **Future research**

It is crucial that further research includes the voices of refugees in its analysis to understand their experiences of accessing protection, and to gain further insights into the influence of race and nationality. Moreover, whilst this research has assessed Lebanon as a whole, further research could benefit from also understanding the regional differences in refugee experiences (Ozkul, 2023). This would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the experiences of refugees in Lebanon and, therefore, will develop advanced understanding on how to improve the experiences of refugees in accessing protection. Finally, further research on the role of race and in Lebanon is crucial, especially considering the scarcity of literature on this topic.

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## **Appendix A – Participant information and consent form**

Dear.....,

Thank you for your interest in this project about the influence of race and nationality on the experiences of refugees in Lebanon in accessing protection in Lebanon. In this email, I give you information about the project and ask for your consent to participate. If you agree, please reply to this email, stating your name and that you agree to the statements in the table below to give your consent.

### **What is the study about?**

This study is focusing on how race and nationality impact upon the experiences of refugees in Lebanon. It will gain insights into whether race and nationality impact upon access to refugee protection such as humanitarian assistance, refugee status determination, and durable solutions. It also seeks to understand the extent to which humanitarian organisations perpetuate hierarchies of refugees.

### **What will my involvement be?**

You will be involved in interviews which will be used to inform the findings of the study.

### **Do I have to take part?**

Participation is **voluntary**. There are no negative consequences for you if you decide not to take part in this study. If you decide to take part but then later on you change your mind, you can let me know by [date] - you will not have to give any explanation why. It is also absolutely fine if you feel that you don't want to answer any specific questions – you can just tell me, and we will move on.

### **What will my information be used for and how will it be stored?**

The interviews will be recorded, and the information will then be used in the production of a master's dissertation. All data will be stored securely and deleted upon the completion of the research.

### **Will my information be anonymous?**

Your participation will be anonymous - your name will not be used in any reports or publications resulting from the study.

**If you agree to take part in the research, please complete the section below**

**Participant's name:** [\(type first name and surname here\)](#)

<b>Please read these three statements. If you agree with them, put a X in the boxes below</b>	
I have read this message and had the opportunity to ask questions.	
I agree to participate in the interview	
I understand that my responses will be kept confidential and anonymous and that my personal information will be kept securely and destroyed at the end of the study	

**Once completed please email this back to me. Thank you!**

**Researcher name:** [Researcher name]

**Email address:** [email address]