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Instrumentalising Threat; An Expansion of Biopolitical Control Over Exiles in Calais During the COVID-19 Pandemic

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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has created a global state of exception, which will likely lead to incredible long-term changes in power relationships and modes of governance worldwide (Appadurai 2020). This dissertation focuses on a specific case of this change, the expansion of biopolitical control over exiles in Calais, France. It uses interview data and thematic analysis of policy documents to unpack three policies that were implemented in Calais in response to the threat of COVID-19. The results show that although these policies were couched in narratives of protection, they actually reflect an attempt to expand state power and biopolitical control. I propose that this expansion results from a purposeful attempt to instrumentalise the global state of exception.
# Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... Page 4
Glossary ............................................................................................................................................ Page 5

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... Page 6

1. Theoretic Background .................................................................................................................... Page 9
   1.1 Biopolitics Overview
   1.2 Biopolitics of Migration
   1.3 Biopolitics and the State of Exception
   1.4 Limitations

2. Calais Background ........................................................................................................................ Page 13
   2.1 General Background
   Figure 1: A Timeline of Policy Changes in Calais
   2.2 Biopolitics in Calais between 2016 and 2019

3. Research Question and Hypothesis ............................................................................................. Page 18

4. Methodology .................................................................................................................................. Page 20
   4.1 Research Rationale
   4.2 Thematic Analysis of Policy Documents
   4.3 Interviews

5. Results .......................................................................................................................................... Page 24
   Figure 2: An Overview of Common Themes
   5.1 False Promises
   5.2 Biopolitical Technologies
   5.3 Resistance
   5.4 Results Summary

6. Discussion ...................................................................................................................................... Page 34
   6.1 False Narratives of Protection
   6.2 Policy Function
   6.3 Instrumentalising the State of Exception
   6.3 Relationships of Power

7. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... Page 41
8. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. Page 43
9. Appendices .................................................................................................................................... Page 53
List of Abbreviations

**NGO**: Non-Governmental Organisation

**HRO**: Human Rights observer

**HRW**: Human Rights Watch

**CRS**: Compagnies républicaines de sécurité (a reserve segment of the French National Police responsible for the policing of exiles in Calais)
Glossary

**COVID-19 Pandemic:** A pandemic of respiratory illness caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

**Préfet du Pas-de-Calais:** The section of local government which oversees the Calais areas.

**La Vie Active:** A state-mandated organisation that provides resources to exiles.

**The Jungle:** An informal migrant encampment that existed between January 2015 and October 2016.

**Exile:** The population of Calais’ informal settlements. Other writers may use terms such as migrant and refugee. The latter is not used here because although most of the population are fleeing from persecution, they are not legally refugees as they have not yet been granted asylum. Conversely, the former is a legally sound term but is not used because it has become associated with derogatory claims that the population are merely economic migrants.

**Governance:** In this dissertation, governance is defined in the Foucauldian sense as the manner and methods by which elites direct population conduct (Foucault 1983). It includes direct control through institutions and laws, as well as subtle movements of power and control that are not explicit in law (Crawley and Chaloupka, 2000).
Introduction

Emergencies, such as global pandemics, lead to a ‘state of exception’, in which political acts can function outside the rule of law (Agamben 2005). This provides opportunities for both elites and marginalised groups to renegotiate their political capital (Agamben 2005; Moreno and Shaw 2018). Thus, emergencies have the capacity to transform modes of governance and relationships of power.

In this dissertation, I use the lens of biopolitics to explore the transformation of power relationships and governance that has occurred in Calais during the COVID-19 pandemic. Biopolitics is a sociological lens used to analyse how contemporary political powers exert control over life (Laurence 2016). Its central tenet is that sovereign power can ‘foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ (Foucault 1990 p138). The governance of exiles in Calais is a strong example of this form of power. While Calais’ citizens are one of the world’s most developed and healthy populations, its exiles face human rights abuses, violence, exposure to preventable diseases daily (Patton and Boitiaux 2020). In short, the lives of citizens are fostered, while exiles are disallowed to the point of death.

The analysis focuses on three political responses to the COVID-19 pandemic which appear to represent a change in the government strategy regarding exiles in Calais.

1. Increased provision of temporary accommodation centres to shelter exiles for the duration of the pandemic (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020a).
2. Increased sanitation provision. The pledge includes the provision of water points and informational posters in different languages (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais and Préfet du Nord 2020).
3. A ban on food distribution in Calais city centre. The rationale given was the avoidance of mass gatherings at distribution points (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020b).

I conclude that, despite their humanitarian framing, the policies represent an expansion of state biopolitical control. This expansion has been made possible by the state of emergency and a reduction in opportunities for biopolitical resistance.

These findings are significant for two reasons. Firstly, they expose an expansion of control and abuse. Awareness of these practices is important as it allows us to question policy and hold authorities accountable for their actions (Lorenzini 2021). This is imperative because, without accountability, ‘temporary’ relationships and technologies of power formed in a crisis tend to persist after the threat dissipates (Hussain 2007).

Secondly, the findings highlight the power that political elites have to construct narratives around threat and solution, even in the face of an objective threat. The concept of the state of exception is typically applied in constructivist arguments to discuss how states construct emergencies to usher in a state of exception (Delanty 2020; Golikov 2020). However, I use the concept to analyse an objective threat, the threat of COVID-19. My analysis shows that although the narrative of threat is not constructed, the narratives of protection are. Therefore, I argue that not only, as Schmitt (1922) claims, is the sovereign ‘he who decides on the state of exception’ but also, he who creates the narrative of protection. This addition shows that constructionist political scholarship should be used to critique COVID-19 policy, despite the threat’s objective reality.

I begin by summarising the theoretical framework of biopolitics and the state of exception (Chapter 1), followed by an overview of their application to Calais (Chapter 2). I then present my mixed-methodology and results, which are comprised of semi-structured interviews and the thematic analysis of policy documents (Chapter 4 and 5). Finally, I use my data to argue that the policies of interest do not protect against COVID-19 but instead function to expand biopolitical control (Chapter 6). Therefore, I conclude that the state has constructed narratives of protection around these policies in order to instrumentalise the state of
exception (Chapter 7). In this dissertation, I focus on the local French government as they implemented the policies of interest. However, it should be recognised that a large proportion of responsibility lies with the British government, as they have externalised their border controls to Calais and provide political and financial support to French border enforcement (Mould 2017; Freedman 2018).
Theoretic Background

1.1 Biopolitics Overview

The concept of biopolitics originates in the work of Foucault and has since been used in social theory to analyse forms of power that exert control over life (Laurence 2016; Rabinow and Rose 2006). Its central tenet is that sovereign power can 'foster life or disallow it to the point of death', an ability that Foucault argues allows the creation of economically useful and politically obedient bodies (Foucault 1976; Foucault 1990 p138; Foucault 2000 p137). After Foucault, biopolitical scholarship diverged into two avenues of thought (Campbell and Sitze 2013). The first focuses on the quantification and understanding of life, using biomedical and demographic developments (Erasmus and Gilson 2008; Lemke 2010). Conversely, the second explores how authorities enact control over life, how values are assigned to different lives, and how such acts are resisted. This dissertation falls into the latter by drawing on philosophical works, such as those by Agamben and Fassin (Agamben 1998; Fassin 2009; Campbell and Sitze 2013). These authors suggest that contemporary biopolitics fundamentally depends on the domination and elimination of the vital existence of marginalised populations. This creates a sense that life is a scarce commodity and causes the majority population to appear well developed and flourishing by comparison (Campbell and Sitze 2013). For instance, Agamben (1998) argues that the exclusion of some human beings is necessary for others to feel like they belong to a political community.

1.2 Biopolitics of Migration

Biopolitics is often used as a theoretical lens to explore the governance of border zones because migrants, especially informal migrants, are vulnerable to deadly biopolitical technologies (Agamben 2005). Migrants are easily positioned as separate from the host community by laws that reserve rights and resources for citizens, and by political and media
discourse (Bauman 2013). Therefore, they seem external to the host population but remain under the sovereign power of the nation-state. This framing justifies resource under-provision, containment, and other biopolitical technologies which let die (Fassin, 2001; Grove and Zwi, 2006). For example, The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights states that all individuals are entitled to an appropriate public health environment (FRA 2015). However, this right has been neglected by authorities in Calais because France claims that exiles are not part of their population, and therefore, that they are not accountable for fulfilling their rights (FRA 2015; Paton and Boittaux 2020; Aribaud and Vignon 2015). As a result, migrants are allowed to die from preventable diseases.

1.3 Biopolitics and the State of Exception

Agamben (2005) presents Carl Schmitt’s (1922) concept of the state of exception as an extension of biopolitical theory. He proposes that in an emergency, the normal rule of law is suspended, and policies that would not usually be permitted are accepted as necessary because they protect life (Brown 2013; Agamben and Kotsko 2020; Demetri 2020; Matthewman and Huppatz 2020).¹

The concept of the state of exception is typically applied in constructivist arguments to discuss how political elites create narratives of emergency in order to override the normal rule of law and expand power (Delanty 2020; Golikov 2020). For instance, in the pandemic’s early stages, Agamben claimed that the Italian government was constructing what was ‘essentially a flu’ into an existential threat in order to curtail political rights (Agamben and Kotsko 2020). Of course, subsequent events have proved Agamben wrong. The death tolls and damage to health services worldwide show that COVID-19 does pose a significant threat, and thus, the curtailment of rights during lockdowns was a justified sacrifice rather than an attempt to expand power (Van den Berge 2020).

¹ To be clear, Agamben has applied this concept to migration and proposed that refugee settlements are permanent states of exception, which create ‘bare life’ (Agamben 2005). This application is different to that used in my dissertation but has a similar outcome. While bare life focuses on how refugees are able to be subjugated because they permanently fall outside of the normal rule of law, this dissertation focuses on a specific countrywide state of exception and how it has been used to subjugate migrants.
However, this does not mean we should write off Agamben’s claims, as some philosophers have argued (Christiaens 2020). Although COVID-19 was not constructed as a threat to expand power, the state of exception still provides an opportunity for states to do so (Matthewman and Huppatz 2020). Moreover, these opportunities can be taken advantage of by constructing narratives, not narratives of emergency, but narratives of protection (Arslanalp and Erkman 2020).

To understand this, we must think of the state of exception not as lawless, but as an alternative paradigm of law. It is not an environment in which any policy can be implemented, but one in which basic rights can be suspended if doing so appears to protect against an existential threat (Humphreys 2006). Thus, those who decide on the narrative of protection form the rules. Political elites can utilise this power to create narratives which suit their interests. Therefore, although the COVID-19 state of exception was not created to expand state power, it can be instrumentalised to this end.

Nevertheless, there is significant debate on how COVID-19 will affect power relationships because elites are not the only agents who stand to gain from political upheaval (McGann 2020). Marginalised groups can also find opportunities to renegotiate their political capital (Moreno and Shaw 2018). Furthermore, emergencies can invoke increased empathy and egalitarianism because shared suffering creates a sense of solidarity (Drury 2018; Reicher and Stott 2020). For these reasons, crises in history have been exceptional periods of social progress. For example, during World War 2, women became prominent in the British workforce, and universal basic nutrition was established in Sri Lanka (Tilakaratna and Sooriyamudali 2017). Similarly, the current pandemic has been used by activists globally to campaign for pro-poor policies such as welfare reform and universal basic income (McGann 2020; Diavolo 2020).

It is important to examine the changes in power that occur during a crisis. Biopolitical scholars claim that power is not necessarily good or bad but is always dangerous if accepted blindly (Lorenzini 2021). Expansions of power forged within crises are especially dangerous
as they are often accepted on the pretence of temporariness (Matthewman and Huppatz 2020). Emergency derivations from the rule of law are typically framed as time-constrained measures which will restore the normal order (Ferejohn and Pasquino 2004; Arslanalp and Erkman 2020). However, they tend to create lasting consequences (Hussain 2007; White 2015). A pertinent example is the policies put in place after 9/11. The 9/11 attacks threatened Western powers, who subsequently constructed narratives of threat that justified exceptional policies, such as detention of migrants (Agamben 2005; Arslanalp and Erkman 2020). However, these apparently 'exceptional' policies remain commonplace twenty years later and have permanently transformed migration governance (Longo 2016).

1.4 Limitations

Biopolitical analysis is critiqued for ignoring the centrality of race in subjugation and downplaying inequalities within migrant populations (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020; Owens 2009). This is a limitation because race intersects with migrant identity to determine the oppression experienced by an individual (Pittway and Batolomei 2001; Pulitano 2013; Collins and Bilge 2016; Bhagat 2019). However, the intersection of race and migrant identities is a vast topic that requires its own dissertation length discussion. Furthermore, a population level analytic lens is useful as it allows us to unpick commonalities that narrower lenses might miss (Bowleg 2008; Lemke 2010).
Calais Background

2.1 General Background

The Calais areas (Calais, Dunkerque, and the Grande-Synthe) have been a choke point for migrants hoping to enter the UK since the late 1990s (Ansaloni 2020; Van Isacker 2019). However, the population grew substantially after the 2003 signing of the Le Touquet treaty. This treaty effectively removed all safe methods of reaching UK shores, which forced exiles wanting to reach the UK to settle in Calais whilst attempting to cross the channel clandestinely (Van Isacker 2019; Tambini 2018). Since then, the governance of exiles has evolved into a system of control, deterrence, and violent inaction (Davies et al. 2017). The key points of change in the management of exiles are depicted in Figure 1. This dissertation focuses specifically on the 2020 policy changes that occurred due to the COVID-19 pandemic and compares them to the methods of control used in the relatively stable period between 2016 and 2019.

2016 marked a significant policy change due to the destruction of the jungle and the dispersal of inhabitants across France. After this point, the primary focus of government policy has been preventing settlement. The authorities have aimed to do this by creating a hostile environment using tactics such as eviction, domicide and the removal of vital resources. Nevertheless, many exiles still return to Calais as it remains the shortest route into the UK (Sanyal 2017). In the summer of 2020, it was estimated that 1500 exiles resided in Calais’ informal settlements (Paton and Boittaux 2020).

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2 This is a generalisation the exiled population also consists of many individuals in various stages of regularisation in France and some European passport holders (Van Isacker 2019)
The large shifts in policy depicted have generally been accompanied by states of emergency deployed by the UK or French government. For instance, the destruction of the jungle followed the 2015 Paris terror attacks (Keen 2021). Furthermore, a de facto state of exception created by framing exiles as a threat has consistently justified small increases in policies of abuse (Fassin 2005; Keen 2021).
2.2 Biopolitics in Calais between 2016 and 2019

Since the closure of Sangatte, the governance of migrants in Calais has been highly biopolitical. In this section, I provide an overview of the literature discussing biopolitical control in Calais between 2016 and 2019. The themes outlined will serve as a baseline for my study of the changes in biopolitical governance during the COVID-19 pandemic. This period was chosen as it is an era of relative stagnancy in French policy, after the demolition of the jungle and before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 1).

**Othering**

Processes of othering are those that frame certain groups as superfluous, often to the point of dehumanisation, or position them as a threat to the main population (Bauman 2013; Dhesi et al. 2018). This is a biopolitical technology which ‘lets die’ by justifying the removal of resources and aid and facilitating the marginalisation of the othered population. The most common form of othering in Calais is discursive othering through government propaganda or the media. These sources often present exiles as a threat to the main population by invoking terrorism or poor hygiene, or they dehumanise them to the extent that containment and neglect of human rights are considered acceptable (Bauman 2013).

In 2018, Dhesi et al. highlighted biopolitical othering as an explanatory factor for the under-provision of public health infrastructure in Calais (Dhesi et al. 2018). The French government justified this under-provision by maintaining that they are not accountable for exiles’ health as they are not legally part of their population (Aribaud and Vignon 2015). This refusal to grant access to French collective goods and services is an overt exertion of biopolitical othering that allows exiles to die of preventable diseases (Schuilenburg 2008; Zena 2019).

**Subtraction**

Aradau and Tazziolli (2020) define subtraction as forced hypermobility through the removal of living space. Between 2016 and 2019, subtraction was a key element of governance in Calais. For example, authorities carried out nightly evictions, destroyed shelters and
belongings, and erected architectures of deterrence in areas where exiles tended to congregate (Van Isaker 2019). Practices of subtraction exert control over exiles’ lives by preventing them from forming communities and spaces of living. Furthermore, over long periods hyper mobilisation and constant domicide take a physical and psychological toll. This is especially pertinent in Calais as evictions usually occur at night, causing prolonged sleep deprivation (Choose Love 2018; Mould 2018).

**Containment**

Containment is the practice of restricting the movement of a population. This includes detention, encampment, and restrictive architectures. The contained migrant has been described as the ultimate biopolitical subject because, whilst contained, every aspect of an individual’s life is subject to sovereign control (Agamben 1998, 2005; Zeveleva 2017).

Between 2016 and 2019, containment practices were a common accompaniment to the subtractive practices described above. After eviction and domicide, the police would offer state-managed accommodation (Van Isaker 2019). The state has not openly discussed the realities of conditions within such accommodation centres (Freedman 2018). However, organisations and scholars have reported unacceptable housing conditions and the use of centres to facilitate detention and deportation (Safe Passage 2016; Freedman 2018).

**Surveillance**

Surveillance is a biopolitical technology that includes all kinds of data gathering, such as CCTV, fingerprinting and police patrols. These practices enable control because they allow governments to understand the behaviours of a population and deter individuals from breaking rules or resisting elites (Topak 2014). This is an especially pertinent mechanism of control in Calais, as exiles are often attempting to avoid recognition by the French asylum system. For this reason, modes of surveillance have been a major part of the governance of exiles since before the demolition of the jungle (Sanyal 2017; Hagan 2019).
A telling example of the French state’s commitment to surveillance was reported by Hagan (2019). In the summer of 2018, a group of exiles formed settlements within a woodland on the outskirts of Calais. Here, they could not easily be observed because of legal restrictions on surveillance. According to French law, open public spaces cannot be fenced-off, have restricted access, or have CCTV. To overcome this, the Préfet de Pas-du-Calais changed the status of the land from a ‘woodland’ to an ‘urban park’, as the latter has no restrictions on surveillance (Hagan 2019). The government claimed that this change was motivated by the desire to protect green space. However, subsequent increases in surveillance in this area support Hagan’s conclusion that this change served to expand biopolitical control (Hagan 2019).

**Resistance**

Resistance terms how populations interact with biopolitical structures in order to overcome technologies of power. Acts of resistance include evading the actions of elites, publicising criticism, and activism.

Between 2016 and 2019, the biopolitical governance of exiles in Calais was resisted by multiple actors, including groups of exiles, NGO advocacy groups, and left-wing French media (BBC 2018; France24 2017; HRW 2017). For example, in 2018, a group of migrant women staged a protest against the third eviction they had witnessed in one week. They demanded suitable accommodation, allocated in a dignified manner with no destruction of their belongings. On that occasion, they were successful in preventing eviction. However, evictions have since continued in this area (Help Refugees 2019).

**Summary**

In summation, between 2016 and 2019, Calais was a highly biopolitical environment. Specifically, the technologies of othering, subtraction, surveillance, and containment were used to exert control over the lives of exiles. However, this was countered by significant resistance by NGO advocacy groups, exiles, and the left-wing media. In the following chapters, I explain how I used the themes highlighted here as a baseline for my study of change during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Research Question and Hypothesis

Research Question: ‘How has the biopolitical governance of exiles in Calais been transformed during the state of exception created by the COVID-19 pandemic?’

Based on my literature review, I hypothesised that the COVID-19 pandemic may have stimulated a transformation of biopolitical control in Calais due to changes in the relationships of power between states, NGOs, and exiles within the state of exception. If this has occurred, we would expect to see either; increased successful resistance to biopolitical control by NGOs and exiles, or an expansion of state biopolitical control, depending on how the balance of power has changed.

To answer my research question, I explore the three main policy changes that responded to the threat of COVID-19 within the exiled population. I aim to unpack the narratives that led to their adoption and the implications of their implementation. These findings are then used to discuss the changes in relationships of power and modes of governance in Calais.

1. Increased provision of temporary accommodation centres. These are able to shelter exiles for the duration of the pandemic (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020a).
2. Increased sanitation provision. The pledge includes the provision of water points and informational posters in different languages (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais and Préfet du Nord 2020)
3. A ban on food distribution in Calais city centre. The rationale given was the avoidance of mass gatherings at distribution points (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020b).
Direct policymaking is only one way that elites exert biopolitical control. Other ways include fostering governmentality and structural violence through bureaucracy (Beresford 2003; Cabot 2012). Focussing on one form of governance was necessary due to the scope of this dissertation. I chose to focus on policy because it reflects a governmental choice and is a clear indication of population control (Talebian 2020). Moreover, there has been a clear change during the COVID-19 pandemic. Other forms of governance will be brought into my analysis, albeit tangentially, as they often impact or are impacted by policy. For instance, policy 3 increases the bureaucracy involved in distributions.
Methodology

4.1 Research Rationale

The research question necessitates a comparative method that compares the rationale and implications of new policies to previous forms of governance in Calais. To do this, a mixed methodology of semi-structured interviews and thematic analysis of media and political documents was used. The themes identified were then compared to those highlighted in previous literature (section 2.2).

The mixed-method approach allows exploration of both policy formation and implementation (Kahn and Rahman 2017). Policy documents and media commentary provided data on policy formation, including political debates and official rationale. Then, data on implementation was collected using semi-structured interviews with NGO staff and volunteers nine-twelve months after the policies were adopted.

4.2 Thematic Policy Analysis

Thematic Analysis is a qualitative method involving a process of identifying, analysing, and interpreting themes (patterns of meaning) within a qualitative dataset (Herzog et al. 2019). The analysis was carried out using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase process for reflexive thematic analysis.

1. Data familiarisation. The articles were read twice, and familiarisation notes were made.
2. Systematic data coding. The documents were uploaded to Nvivo 12 for coding. Codes were given to every segment of data that was relevant to power relationships or
methods of governance. Some pre-set codes for biopolitical technologies which had been discussed in previous literature (section 2.2) were used, and others were formed during the analysis using active crafting (Braun and Clarke 2016).

3. Generating initial themes. Themes were formed by identifying groups of codes which said something specific about the research question. For instance, the codes eviction, mobile technology, and hostile architecture were formed into the theme ‘subtractive practices.’

4. Developing and reviewing themes. The data relating to each theme was reviewed to ensure that it supported the theme to which it had been applied. Where the data for two themes overlapped considerably, they were amalgamated and where a theme revealed disparate sub-themes these were separated.

5. Refining, defining, and naming. The essence of each theme was considered, and the themes were defined. These definitions are listed in Appendix 1.

6. Writing the report. A report of the themes found in each document is provided in Appendix 2.

Dataset

Fifteen documents were sampled, which provided 10,000 words of data. These documents fell into two categories: official press releases and newspaper articles from left and right-leaning sources. A detailed list of sources is provided in Appendix 2 and the bibliography. Newspaper articles were included in the sample to examine the extent of media resistance and to provide further insight into policy rationale. The Préfet du Pas-De-Calais do not publish debate transcripts. Therefore, reports from external sources were the best way to unpick the arguments and rationale that led to policy adoption.

Limitations

- Thematic analysis can reflect personal bias as it relies on the researcher’s interpretations of data and themes (Braun and Clarke 2013). I ensured the quality of analysis by following Braun and Clarke’s six steps and reviewing the data using their guidelines for reflexivity (Braun and Clarke 2020).
• Policy documents and newspaper articles are both used in the analysis; however, they are likely to have different biases. To mitigate this, the types of documents will be discussed separately, and their biases considered throughout.

• Some biopolitical technologies may have been overlooked by previous studies. Therefore, I may falsely identify them as new methods rather than a continuance or expansion. No new technologies were found, so this did not prove a limitation.

4.3 Interviews

The thematic analysis of the policy documents was supplemented by a qualitative interview study of NGO staff and volunteers working in Calais. The study aimed to explore interviewees’ experience of policy implementation and any other changes in the management of exiles during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study underwent an ethics review in accordance with the LSE Research Ethics Policy and Procedure and was classified as low risk. To mitigate ethical concerns, interviewees were asked to complete a consent form and a data management plan was put in place (Appendix 4).

Six participants agreed to be interviewed. Participants were NGO staff and volunteers from four different organisations who had worked in Calais’ informal settlements for at least three months during the pandemic. This sample was chosen because NGO staff and volunteers are likely to understand the experience of refugees and have knowledge of legislation and the actions of authorities. Furthermore, this sample was accessible on online platforms which allowed me to carry out socially distanced research. Other potentially useful informant groups, such as policymakers, security institutions, and exiles, were either inaccessible or unwilling to participate. Nevertheless, interview data is used in this dissertation to make descriptive claims about the policy implementation. For these descriptions, I reached saturation within six interviews. Therefore, although the sample has significant limitations, it was sufficient.
Interviewees were recruited using snowball sampling and were interviewed remotely using the Zoom video conferencing platform for forty-five minutes. The interviews were manually transcribed, resulting in 30,000 words of data. These data were thematically analysed using Braun and Clarke’s six steps as described for the policy analysis. A report of the themes found is provided in Appendix 3.

**Limitations**

- The sample size is small, and not all key groups could be accessed (Barbour 2003). To mitigate this, I focussed on insights that were repeated by multiple interviewees (indicating saturation) and compared interviewee reports with relevant grey literature to check for accuracy.
- Two out of six interviewees had not worked in Calais before the pandemic, therefore their information on the changes in authority action was second-hand. They were included in the sample because they could still provide insights into the implementation of the policies of interest. Furthermore, it was difficult to find individuals who had been in Calais both before and during the pandemic, as there is a high turnover of staff.
- The sample may be biased. For instance, NGO staff tend to be biased against authorities in Calais. Snowball sampling often exacerbates bias as interviewees tend to have worked for the same organisations and have similar experiences. However, this was mitigated because the sample consisted of individuals from 4 different organisations.
- Interviewees may have been worried about how their insights would reflect on themselves and their organisation (Alvesson 2003). This was a significant concern because authorities have previously cracked down on NGOs that report their actions. To mitigate this, interviewees were assured that they would be anonymised and that the names of their organisations would not be included in the dissertation.
Results

Both analyses revealed themes relating to the expansion and consolidation of all four biopolitical technologies discussed in section 2.2 (othering, subtraction, surveillance, and containment). Themes of resistance were also present; however, they were associated with constraints on political acts and a lack of impact. The most common theme in interview data was ‘inconsistency’ which referred to cases in which policy implementation was inconsistent with official rationale.

In this section, I describe how these themes presented themselves in the data, analysing each policy in turn. Subsequently, chapter 6 considers the policies together and explores how the themes relate to the instrumentalisation of the state of exception and changes in the relationships of power in Calais.
5.1 False promises

All three policies were framed as necessary measures to protect the migrant population from COVID-19; however, interview data and newspaper articles showed that none successfully fulfil this function.

**Policy 1: Increased provision of temporary accommodation centres to shelter exiles for the duration of the pandemic (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020a).**

The temporary accommodation centres did not appear to protect their inhabitants from COVID-19. Four interviewees reported a blatant disregard for social distancing and sanitation measures within accommodation centres. For example, they stated that as many as fifty individuals were sheltered in each room (Interviewee 1, 2, 5, and 6).

“There were breakouts of COVID within accommodation centres. We got a lot of reports that there wasn’t social distancing put in place, and people were obviously living on top of each other.” Interviewee 6

Transmission of COVID-19, in this setting, is much more likely than in outdoor settlements (Bulfone et al. 2021). Hence, interviewee 1 reported that many exiles would turn down spaces at temporary accommodation centres due to fears of COVID-19.

It should be noted that although the lack of social distancing was mentioned by four interviewees, it could not be corroborated using other sources due to a lack of transparency from authorities about sheltering operations. Nevertheless, it is consistent with other findings. Throughout the pandemic, authorities made it impossible for exiles to follow stay at home guidelines by carrying out nightly evictions, indicating that perhaps they are not invested in protecting exiles from COVID-19.
Policy 2: The provision of water points and informational posters in different languages (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais and Préfet du Nord 2020).

This pledge and its official rationale suggest increased empathy towards exiles, especially compared to previous policies of sanitary neglect (Dhesi et al. 2018). However, interview data and newspaper articles revealed that the pledge is disingenuous. They reported that the provision of sanitation has remained woefully inadequate, and there has been little to no effort to improve it.

For instance, the state promised to put up informational posters in different languages to help exiles understand how to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2. However, the poster campaign appears to have been limited. All informants had been working in different areas of Calais on a daily basis, yet only 1 (Interviewee 3) reported seeing a poster.

Furthermore, five interviewees reported that the pledge to increase water points was misleading (Interviewees 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6). They recounted that instead of permanent water points, which could be used for handwashing, La Vie Active brought mobile water tanks for limited periods at specific times of the day, and no soap was provided. Moreover, Interviewees 5 and 6 reported that some permanent water points were closed during the pandemic due to the state's concerns over gathering. Interviewee 5 also stated that the CRS ensured the closure of these water points by spraying them with tear gas, which contaminates the supply. As a result, there was only one permanent water point in the Calais areas during the pandemic, so the state's mobile resources were the primary provision.

These reports were corroborated by newspaper articles that also mention mobile water points and under-provision of water.

“"The distribution (Of water) is limited to 20 five-litre cans, i.e., about one litre per day per person. However, the World Health Organisation considers that "a vital minimum of 20 litres of water per day per person is needed to meet basic needs."" (France3 2020c p1 translated)"
These results indicate that, despite a narrative of protection in the policy’s official rationale, it did not protect exiles against COVID-19. Whilst state water provision might have increased, there was a simultaneous closure of alternative water sources, which meant that water provision in total declined.

**Policy 3: A ban on food distribution in Calais city centre (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020b).**

Again, this policy does not effectively protect exiles from COVID-19. The official rationale claimed that the ban prevented dangerous gatherings of exiles. However, the ban did not stop gathering, it only moved those gatherings outside the city centre.

“That was ridiculous because they were just congregating in other places.... It's stopped in the city centre, but it is pushed outside the city.” Interviewee 3

Both NGO advocacy groups and the media recognised this inconsistency and criticised the policy for using the pretext of the health situation to unfairly punish exiles and distributing NGOs (Interviewee 1, 2, 3 and 5; Le monde 2020a)

“This is an "intolerable" decision taken by the local prefecture under the "pretext" of the health situation" (le Monde 2020a p1 translated)

In summary, none of the policies of interest seem to fulfil their official function of protecting from COVID-19, indicating that these narratives of protection are false. This claim is discussed further in chapter 6.1.
5.2 Biopolitical technologies

I did not identify any new biopolitical technologies within the policies of interest. However, I did identify an expansion of previous technologies of control, specifically subtraction, containment, and surveillance.

*Policy 1: Increased provision of temporary accommodation centres to shelter exiles for the duration of the pandemic (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020a).*

The most consistent themes found for policy 1 were containment and subtraction. For instance, newspaper articles reported that the offer of accommodation was accompanied by continuous eviction and domicide practices (Sud Ouest 2020). Furthermore, the accommodation centres have striking similarities to detention centres. For instance, individuals are prevented from leaving, after a certain amount of time residents are forced to enter the French asylum process, and the movements to accommodation centres are usually coerced or forced (Interviewees 5 and 6; Conseil d’état 2020). Although the movement to temporary accommodation is nominally termed voluntary, the policy documents explicitly allow coercion.

“They will be on a voluntary basis. However, coercive measures may be used as necessary on the basis of existing legal means” (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020b p2 translated).

My interview data confirmed these findings, as all interviewees questioned the idea that temporary accommodation centres were voluntary.

Both subtraction and containment have been discussed in previous literature regarding temporary accommodation centres (Van Isaker 2019). These similarities are not surprising, as this policy has simply expanded the scale of the pre-existent centres. Moreover, the justification for previous policies of subtraction and containment (avoiding the creation of
large jungle-like camps) is reiterated in the 2020 documents (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020b).

Another significant theme was othering. Rather than focusing on the benefit to exiles, four out of five documents analysed framed temporary accommodation as a mechanism to protect the host population from exiles.

> "Presence (of exiles) in certain areas on the outskirts of Calais is also causing serious public health problems and disturbing the public peace" (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020b p1 translated).

This quote from the government press release is an example of discursive othering. It positions exiles as a biological threat to the host population and therefore justifies coercive containment (Smith 2016).

**Policy 2: The provision of water points and informational posters in different languages (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais and Préfet du Nord 2020)**

The primary theme associated with this policy was subtraction. As mentioned, other water points were closed during the pandemic, so the main water source was La Vie Active’s mobile water points. The increased prominence of state-controlled mobile water provision is an expansion of subtractive control, as described by Aradau and Tazzioli (2020); the state has full control over the vital resource and can ensure the constant movement of exiles by constantly moving it. For example, Interviewee 4 recounted that during the pandemic, the state removed water provision from an area in which exiles had started to settle.
A particular site grew “from about 100 refugees to about 300-400 refugees living there, and over a space of about six weeks. And at the time, La Vie Active, which is the government-funded water and food provision service, were providing water for drinking, and food for them...they actually pulled out at that site, and they stopped providing food and water. I don’t know, the official rationale, but my personal opinion is they don’t want the site to grow”

Interviewee 4

This story is reminiscent of policies of eviction and subtraction between 2016 and 2019, but it is using the new technology of mobile water points (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020).

The second common theme in policy documents and interviews was surveillance. For instance, the government press release said.

"a water distribution tank and a liquid soap bottle have been installed near private buildings occupied by exiles, with surveillance"(Préfet du Pas-De-Calais and Préfet du Nord 2020 p1 translated)

This addition of surveillance to a vital resource is significant, as any migrant who accesses water here can be monitored by the government. Furthermore, interviewee 5 said that this surveillance deterred some exiles from gaining water.

At the water point “there was a ridiculous police presence. A lot of people would be assaulted or harassed there. That deterred a lot of people from going” Interviewee 5


The most common theme in documents relating to this policy was othering. The policy was repeatedly justified as a mechanism to protect the host community and to prevent public disorder, as well as protecting exiles. In addition, exiles were framed as ‘anarchic’, ‘unruly’ and unwilling to abide by public health guidelines.
the distributions are “characterised by non-compliance with social distancing measures” (Le Figaro 2020a p1 (translated))

This discourse feeds into the demonisation of exiles and the idea that they are fundamentally different to the main population, who are willing to follow the guidelines.

The theme of subtraction was also common due to the highly spatialised and mobile element of the ban. The policy forced exiles to constantly move away from their living spaces to gain a vital resource.

“It was very specifically directed at the places that people were sleeping in the centre of Calais, which is interesting because that’s not necessarily where they gather.” Interviewee 4

Exiles often worry about leaving their shelters as it renders their possessions vulnerable to theft and destruction by authorities (Hagan 2019). Therefore, after the policy’s implementation, many exiles moved their shelters outside of the city centre and closer to the new distribution sites. Over time the areas that the ban applied to were changed to include these new distribution sites, and exiles were forced to move again (Interviewees 3, 4 and 5). Therefore, this policy created hypermobility by the constant moving of resources (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020).

The theme of surveillance was also identified. For instance, newspaper articles reported that the CRS was deployed in the city centre to ensure NGOs followed the new rules.

“The Minister of the Interior has also announced police reinforcements to the mayor, with the arrival of 30 new CRS.” (CNews 2020b p1 translated)

This expansion of surveillance in the city centre was reiterated by Interviewee 2.
After the policy “if you were in the city centre, you’d be lucky if you were there for 10 minutes before they (the CRS) would have come over and asked what you were doing.”

Interviewee 2

In summary, all three policies were associated with an expansion of at least one biopolitical technology, the most common being subtraction and surveillance. The expansion of containment was only identified in reference to policy 1.

5.3 Resistance

Both the interviews and policy analysis presented evidence that NGO attempts at resistance continued during the pandemic. However, they were constrained by rules on gathering and have generally been unsuccessful. Interviewees claimed that this occurred because the French authorities had more surveillance and power to impose fines and prevent actions. For example, Interviewee 1 mentioned their organisation had been fined 20-30 times during the pandemic whilst attempting to witness police violence. Nevertheless, some forms of resistance have increased. For instance, media documents, including right-wing media, have been more critical of authority actions during the pandemic. Interviewee 6 stated that they believe this occurred because the pandemic provided an angle with which to expose the desperate situation in Calais.

Policy 1: Increased provision of temporary accommodation centres to shelter exiles for the duration of the pandemic (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020a).

Three of the four articles sampled were critical of the government (Le Parisien 2020; CNews 2020a; France3 2020a). However, this criticism was not levied at the content of the policy. Instead, they argued that there were not enough places available, and that implementation was too slow.
Policy 2: The provision of water points and informational posters in different languages (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais and Préfet du Nord 2020)

Three of the four articles sampled openly criticised the government for failing to fulfil its pledge to improve sanitation (France3 2020b, France3 2020c and le Figaro 2020b). They also reported that NGOs had petitioned the government to improve provision. However, interview data revealed that this resistance was ultimately unsuccessful because the under-provision of sanitation remained a significant problem nine months after these articles were published.


This policy faced the most resistance from both NGOs and the media. All sampled media sources reported that migrant activists were appalled by the policy. Activists from Amnesty International, the Calais Food Collective, and Help Refugees also appealed to the Court-de-Lille to overturn the policy. However, this appeal was ultimately rejected (Conseil d’état 2020). Nine months later, when my interviews took place, the food ban was still active.

5.4 Results Summary

In summary, my results provide three insights.

1. The policies have not protected exiles against COVID-19.
2. The policies have used othering, and expanded surveillance, subtraction, and containment.
3. The policies have been resisted; however, this resistance has been constrained and unsuccessful.
Discussion

6.1 False Narratives of Protection

The policy documents use humanitarian rhetoric that suggests increased empathy towards exiles. However, interview data and newspaper articles revealed that the protection these policies claimed to provide was non-existent.

While it could be argued that this inadequacy is due to incompetence rather than malicious intent, these policies have also gone against the guidance given to the general French population. For instance, permanent handwashing stations in Calais were closed, whereas, in the rest of France, masses of stationary hand sanitiser stations were installed (Smith 2020). Such inconsistencies suggest that the state was aware these policies would not be effective.

Furthermore, elements of the policies appear wilfully ineffective, arbitrary, and misleading. For example, Interviewees 1, 2, and 5 claimed that surveillance practices, which were officially associated with policing the COVID-19 policies, seemed to be more focused on disrupting distributions than enforcing COVID-19 rules. For example, Interviewee 2 reported that the CRS would stop their cars and ask for papers, then disappear for 20-40 minutes before allowing them to move on. They believed that the authorities did this because delaying a car would disrupt the planned time of a distribution and make it more difficult for exiles to access resources.

This seemingly purposeful ineffectiveness indicates that the narratives of protection surrounding the policies are false.
6.2 Policy Function

Not only do the policies not fulfil their stated function, but they reflect an attempt to fulfil an alternative state interest, increasing biopolitical control over exiles. The policies have led to the expansion of three out of the four biopolitical technologies that were highlighted in the literature between 2016 and 2019. These were surveillance, subtraction, and containment. Othering was also found in documents relating to each policy. However, there was no significant evidence of a dramatic or purposeful increase (mainly because it was already prolific).

Surveillance

There has been a significant increase in police presence around the city centre of Calais and the one permanent water point to monitor the implementation of the COVID-19 policies. However, it appears that, rather than increased surveillance serving to implement the policies, the policies may have served to increase surveillance.

As mentioned in section 2.2, the French state has been attempting to increase surveillance in Calais for years. Moreover, aspects of surveillance outside of COVID-19 policy have been strengthened throughout 2020 and 2021. For example, the wooded area, discussed by Hagan (2019), which was reclassified as an urban park in 2018 to facilitate surveillance, was made more even more accessible during the pandemic period. In September 2020, the authorities cut down the trees in this area to allow increased monitoring of the Eritrean settlements (Interviewee 1; HRO 2021).

“There was this area that used to be wooded, and the police had just cut down, I don’t know, like a couple of 1000 trees, and it had become maybe a kilometre square of marsh area. And I guess the reason for that was that people used to stay there, and the trees are gone so now they’re visible” Interviewee 1
These patterns, alongside the reportedly arbitrary implementation of surveillance, indicate that the French state view increased surveillance as an end unto itself and are using the narratives of COVID-19 protection to enable its expansion. This is a similar argument to that presented by Hagan (2019), who proposed that the French government relied on false narratives of environmental protection to decrease the barriers to surveillance in Calais' woodland.

**Containment**

There is strong evidence that the sheltering operations are detention centres by another name, and therefore the policy may be a strategic expansion of containment. Firstly, the policy allows for 'coercive measures' (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020b). In practice, this has included causing physical distress, destruction of property, and nightly evictions (HRO 2021). Secondly, after a period of time, residents must enter the French asylum system. This prevents onward travel and can lead to deportation (Interviewees 5 and 6; Freedman, 2018; Conseil d'état 2020).

A close reading of policy documents reveals so-called secondary justifications for temporary accommodation that seem to be the real driving force behind the policy (Préfet du Pas-De-Calais 2020a). These are protecting the host population from exiles, preventing public nuisance, and hindering the formation of settlements. They appear to be the primary functions because they are fulfilled by a policy of coercive movements to detention centres that do not enforce social distancing, whereas the function of stopping the spread of COVID-19 is not.

**Subtraction**

My analysis revealed two significant expansions of subtractive technologies within the policies of interest, mobile water points and the ban on food distribution in Calais city centre. Both expand biopolitical control by reducing access to vital resources and forcing hypermobility.
Mobile provision is a subtractive technology that gives the government control over the extent, location, and timing of access to resources necessary for survival (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020). It fulfils state interests by forcing hypermobility and preventing the creation of living spaces (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020). A pertinent example of this was reported by Interviewee 4, who stated that La Vie Active stopped bringing water to a Libyan settlement when it appeared to be growing, forcing exiles to leave this location to find water. Over time, travelling to procure water from La Vie Active became too much, and this settlement disappeared. As individuals moved their temporary shelters closer to the current distribution location, it was moved again. Therefore, this type of provision appears to function as a mechanism of dispersal and deterrence, rather than a mechanism of protection.

The ban on food distribution works similarly. Only La Vie Active can distribute in the city centre, which again puts the government in control of vital resources, and again, this was used to force hypermobility (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020). Interviewees claimed the policy targeted areas where exiles tended to settle. Therefore, it forced exiles to move away from their living spaces and towards the new distribution sites to acquire food. Subsequently, settlements began to form around the permitted distribution sites, and the permissions changed to disallow distributions in these areas (Interviewee 5; Mwazange 2021). Thus, again, the policy appears to be a mechanism of dispersal and deterrence rather than protection.

In summary, the policies of interest have functioned to consolidate and expand biopolitical power over exiles through subtraction, containment, and surveillance.

6.3 Instrumentalising the State of Exception

As argued in section 1.3, political elites can construct false narratives of protection to instrumentalise the state of exception. Within the state of exception, policies that would usually be disallowed can be implemented if they are accompanied by a narrative of protection (Humphreys 2006). So far, I have argued that the policies of interest have a narrative of protection, do not function as protective measures, and fulfil alternative
interests. However, to be strong examples of an instrumentalisation of the state of exception, they must also be policies that could not be implemented in ‘normal times’ or without the narrative of protection. For at least two of the policies of interest, the expansion of temporary accommodation centres and the ban on food distribution, this is clear.

Firstly, the local government has previously attempted to criminalise food distribution in the city centre based on the justification of public nuisance (Tazzioli 2021). However, this ban was suspended by the administrative Court-de-Lille. This indicates that the local government was aware that the policy would be blocked in ‘normal times’ and provides an incentive to construct a false narrative of protection (Duflos 2020).

Similarly, previous attempts at expanding temporary accommodation centres and detention-like schemes have faced high levels of criticism and resistance (MacGregor 2019). However, the narrative of protection from COVID-19 made the 2020 policy seem reasonable. It is unlikely the policy would have been implemented, let alone praised by the media, had containment policies, such as lockdowns, not been central in global narratives of protection during the pandemic (Grothe-Hammer and Roth 2021; Agamben and Kotsko 2020; France3 2020a).

Therefore, these policies have four characteristics that point to the instrumentalisation of the ‘state of exception’. They rely on a narrative of protection, they do not function as protective measures, they fulfil other interests, and they are unlikely to have been accepted in non-emergency times. Moreover, both the ban and the increased accommodation centres are becoming entrenched in policy despite being initially termed temporary. The state has recognised that the threat of COVID-19 is diminishing by reducing rules on gathering across France. Therefore, the narrative of protection is less relevant, yet the policies are still in place. The extension of temporary policy while the threat appears to be diminishing is, again, indicative of an instrumentalisation of the state of exception (Arslanalp and Erkmen 2020).
6.4 Relationships of Power

Part of the reason that the state has managed to expand their control, and construct narratives of protection so effectively, is that biopolitical resistance has been made more challenging during the pandemic. The threat of COVID-19 has been given such high priority that normal political acts, such as protest and witnessing, have been prohibited (HRO 2021). Consequently, agents of resistance have lost power (Demetri 2020; HRO 2021).

Firstly, protesting has been restricted during the pandemic because the risk of COVID-19 has dissuaded individuals from joining mass protests, and the rules on gathering have allowed authorities to disperse protesters (Reicher and Stott 2020).

“It was more difficult to take that direct action, because you can’t legally gather outside...we had to make people aware that if they came on a protest that they were more likely to be targeted by the police” Interviewee 5

Secondly, witnessing, a vital tactic of NGO resistance has also been limited by COVID-19 rules. Multiple NGOs in Calais have programmes that aim to observe and report the human rights abuses carried out by authorities. In 2020, the sub-Prefect of the Pas-de-Calais department attempted to prohibit the presence of observer teams during lockdown (HRO 2021). A UK based migrant advocacy organisation, Choose Love, successfully resisted this prohibition by claiming that it was not lawful for the prefecture to prevent access to the legal services and information that their HROs provide. Nevertheless, the authorities continued to punish those who attempted to observe their actions. They did this by relying on other elements of COVID-19 guidelines. For instance, Choose Love's HROs were fined 32 times during 2020 for gathering and breaking curfew (HRO 2021).

Prohibitions on witnessing meant that authorities were not held accountable for human rights abuses, and many atrocities went unrecorded. All interviewees reported evidence of
such abuse, such as water sources contaminated with tear gas and remnants of shelters that had been destroyed in the nightly evictions. However, without direct observation, the power to hold the authorities accountable for these actions is greatly diminished.

The lack of observations can also lead to a blind acceptance of government press releases and propaganda. For instance, while my interviewees claimed that temporary accommodation centres were essentially disguised detention centres, there are no official witness statements to either confirm or deny this claim. As a result, the news media seem to have taken the humanitarian rhetoric in government press releases at face value, and they have praised the sheltering operations (France3 2020a; Sud Ouest 2020; Le Parisien 2020). For comparison, the press release regarding the 2016 destruction of the jungle also employed humanitarian rhetoric. However, witness statements from exiles and advocacy groups led to more nuanced reporting (Vigny et al. 2018). In short, the lack of witnessing has made it much easier for the government to construct false narratives of their policies as necessary protections.

Nevertheless, it is not all bad news. Despite challenges, there have been protests around France in support of exiles, especially in response to the ban on distributing food (Le Monde 2020a; Le Figaro 2020a). Furthermore, there has been a rise in government criticism in the media (including right-wing media), and in grassroots organisations that work to support exiles and fill the gaps in state provision (L'express 2021; Le Figaro 2020a; Le Figaro 2020b; France 24 2021; Euronews 2020; Calais Food Collective 2020). This increased commitment to resistance, despite challenges, could indicate an increase in public empathy, as predicted by Drury (2018). Such a shift would need to be confirmed and unpacked by further research. Nevertheless, if significant, it could provide an opportunity for hope, as exiles and advocacy groups could capitalise on it to regain power after COVID-19 and hold the government accountable to their promise that the policies are temporary measures.
Conclusion

In conclusion, there has been a transformation in the biopolitical governance of exiles in Calais during the COVID-19 pandemic. This has taken the form of an expansion of previous technologies of biopolitical control which ‘let die’, namely, subtraction, containment and, surveillance. It has occurred because the state has instrumentalised the state of exception to construct narratives of protection which fit their interests. The three policies I have analysed were framed as necessary measures to protect against the spread of COVID-19 in migrant populations, yet none have fulfilled this function. Their inefficacy is not due to ignorance or incompetence, as the policies directly oppose guidelines given to the rest of the French population. Instead, the policies reflect a purposeful construction of false narratives of solution that instrumentalise the state of exception to further state interests. They have been implemented easily because acts of biopolitical resistance, especially witnessing, have been made more difficult by the state of exception, and this has led to the general acceptance of government narratives.

These findings are valuable for two reasons. Firstly, they expose problematic expansions of control and abuse of exiles. Actors of biopolitical resistance, such as migrant advocacy groups, exiles, and sympathetic citizens, should be aware of these expansions so that they can hold the French government accountable for its actions during the pandemic. These findings are especially pertinent because policy changes and power shifts within crises have a strong tendency to persist, despite their promise of temporariness (Matthewman and Huppatz 2020). For instance, the ‘temporary’ ban on food distributions in the centre of Calais has already been renewed multiple times and remains in place, despite the easing of lockdown restrictions in the rest of France. Therefore, agents of biopolitical resistance must work to regain power and hold the French authorities accountable for their promise of temporariness.
Secondly, the findings highlight the state’s power to construct and instrumentalise narratives of solution and threat in the face of an objective threat. In early 2020, Agamben criticised the Italian government for constructing an exaggerated narrative of the COVID-19 threat to usher in a state of exception, which would allow them to curtail human rights (Agamben and Kotsko 2020). Subsequent events have proved Agamben wrong on this account. However, my findings suggest that analyses of COVID-19 should not discount Agamben’s thinking on construction and the state of exception. Despite the threat of COVID-19 being an objective fact, the French state has been able to instrumentalise this threat by constructing false narratives of solution. Therefore, constructionist political scholarship should continue to be used to critique COVID-19 policy, despite the threat’s objective reality. It is likely that this finding has applications outside of the French governance of migrants, however, further research would be needed to confirm this.

My study is limited, as my conclusions rely on observational data on policy implementation from a small sample of NGO staff and volunteers because other stakeholders, such as French authorities and exiles, were either inaccessible or unwilling to be interviewed. However, the research is still valid because the primary insights were repeated by multiple informants (indicating saturation). Moreover, the themes and reports of authority action were consistent with grey literature, media analysis, and close reading of policy documents. Nevertheless, further research, including ethnographic observations and interviews with policymakers and implementers, would be beneficial to gain more insight into the expansion of control in Calais and the mechanisms used to construct narratives of protection.
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Smith 2016.


## Appendices

### Appendix 1 List of Themes used for Thematic analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overarching Theme</th>
<th>Sub-Theme</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Identified in Calais between 2016 and 2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biopolitical Technologies</td>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>All kinds of data gathering used to control and regulate lives and actions.</td>
<td>Biometrics, especially coercion into biometrics (Zena 2019). Monitoring by the host state High numbers of police Cameras</td>
<td>Yes, discussed by Hagan 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biopolitical Technologies</td>
<td>Subtraction</td>
<td>Removing terrain and in doing so forcing hyper-mobility. Spaces of life are destroyed, and exiles are forced to reroute their trajectories, and complete the same routes multiple times. This is a productive power which prevents exiles from forming communities and lives and keeps them away from citizens (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020).</td>
<td>Mobile infrastructures such as water or showers Movement away from citizen populations. Evictions and removal of settlements Infrastructures of deterrence e.g., bollards/boulders (Tazzioli 2021)</td>
<td>Yes discussed by Aradau and Tazzioli 2020, Tazzioli 2021 and Van Isacker 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biopolitical Technologies</td>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>Restricting safe space and constraining movement.</td>
<td>‘Spatial traps’ such as forcible movements to temporary accommodation centres and enforcement of asylum submission (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020) Detention centres Spatialised rights Fences/encampment</td>
<td>Yes discussed by Van Isacker 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biopolitical Technologies</td>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>The art of turning refugees' bodies and movements into quantifiable digital data and capitalising on such data. (Aradau and Tazzioli 2020)</td>
<td>Data extraction use of refugee data to make populations knowable and governable. using data to allow access to ai/rights.</td>
<td>No papers written in this period related to the governance of informal exiles in Calais.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biopolitical Technologies</td>
<td>Othering/exclusion</td>
<td>Processes of exclusion and othering are those that permit certain groups to be separated from the main population. These populations are treated as superfluous, often to the point of dehumanisation (Bauman 2013; Dhesi et al/2018). They are not granted access to the collective goods and services of society</td>
<td>Polices that protect the host population from the migrant population. Discussion of transmission of disease from exiles to host populations but not vice versa. Framing of exiles as vectors rather than victims of disease (Smith 2016). Neglect of exiles environment/letting die (Zena 2019) Setting in competition for scarce resources Prevention of aid for exiles</td>
<td>Yes discussed by Dhesi et al. 2018, Tazzioli 2021 and Zena 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Evasion</td>
<td>Attempts to evade government sanctions and get around restrictive policies.</td>
<td>Action to prevent police interruption of activities</td>
<td>Yes by Tazzioli 2021</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Government criticism</td>
<td>Discourse which disagrees with, and questions policies put in place by political authorities.</td>
<td>Political critiques in Newspapers opposition debates Petitions Negative media reporting</td>
<td>NGOs and Left-wing newspapers have generally been critical of Frances bordering policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Activism</td>
<td>The use of direct and noticeable action to encourage political change.</td>
<td>Protests held by exiles NGO campaigns Citizens protest and petition</td>
<td>Yes discussed by Hagan 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Witnessing</td>
<td>Holding authorities accountable by witnessing and reporting their actions</td>
<td>Human rights watches NGO reports on police violence</td>
<td>Yes HRO 2019</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Constraints on Resistance</td>
<td>COVID-19 rules making it more difficult to resist state control</td>
<td>Fines for resistance activities Inability to perform normal advocacy functions</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptional Measure</td>
<td>Time-limited policy</td>
<td>The promise of time limits in policy indicating this is an exceptional measure used to return to the normal order.</td>
<td>Promise of short term Policies with end date Use of the term temporary</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performativity</td>
<td>Inadequate policies</td>
<td>Policies which seem to protect exiles but are not adequately fulfilling this role.</td>
<td>Under resourced implementation Failure to protect Not adhering to coronavirus guidelines</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Increased use of mechanisms of control that were in place in 2016-2019</td>
<td>More places in accommodation centres More mobile technologies More surveillance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Use of humanitarian focussed language with regard to exiles</td>
<td>Discussing exiles needs Humanitarian rhetoric</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistency</td>
<td>Inconsistency</td>
<td>Used to identify where interviewees felt that policies were not implemented as they were claimed to be</td>
<td>Difference between implementation and pledge</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix 2 List of Sources and Themes Found

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy of interest</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Type of document</th>
<th>Themes Found</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy 1: temporary accommodation centres</td>
<td>Le Parisien</td>
<td>Coronavirus: premières mises à l’arbi pour les exiles de Calais [Coronavirus: first shelters for exiles in Calais]</td>
<td>Newspaper article (Neutral)</td>
<td>Othering (1) Government Criticism (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy 1: temporary accommodation centres</td>
<td>Sud Ouest</td>
<td>Coronavirus: 263 exiles de Calais &quot;mis à l'abri&quot; depuis le début de l'opération. [Coronavirus: 263 exiles in Calais &quot;sheltered&quot; since the beginning of the operation]</td>
<td>Newspaper article (Neutral)</td>
<td>Empathy (1) Containment (2) Subtraction (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy 1: temporary accommodation centres</td>
<td>CNews</td>
<td>A Calais, Le Coronavirus Se Propage Parmi Les Exiles Et Les Réfugiés. [In Calais the coronavirus is spreading</td>
<td>Newspaper article (Right leaning)</td>
<td>Othering (1) Government Criticism (2) Empathy (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Policy 1: Temporary Accommodation Centres

**France3**

Coronavirus: 263 exiles de Calais ont été "mis à l'abri", annonce la préfecture du Pas-de-Calais [Coronavirus: 263 exiles in Calais have been "sheltered", announces the Pas-de-Calais prefecture]

- Newspaper article (Neutral)
  - Othering (1)
  - Empathy (1)
  - Subtraction (1)
  - Government Criticism (2)

### Policy 2: Sanitation Provision

**Préfet du Pas-De-Calais and Préfet du Nord**

DES MESURES DE PROTECTION DES POPULATIONS MIGRANTES ET DE SOUTIEN AUX OPÉRATEURS ET ASSOCIATIONS [COVID-19: MEASURES TO PROTECT MIGRANT POPULATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATORS AND ASSOCIATIONS]

  - Empathy (5)
  - Othering (2)
  - Surveillance (2)
  - Subtraction (2)

**Le Figaro**

Coronavirus: des associations réclament des mesures «urgentes» pour les exiles [Coronavirus: associations call for "urgent" measures for exiles]

- Newspaper article (Right leaning)
  - Government Criticism (2)
  - Activism (1)
  - Inadequacy (1)
  - Othering (1)
<p>| Policy 2: Sanitation provision | France3         | Coronavirus: à Calais, les associations poussent un nouveau cri d'alarme sur la situation des personnes migrantes [Coronavirus: in Calais, associations are pushing for urgent measures for the situation of exiles] | Newspaper article (Neutral) | Othering (4) Surveillance (1) Expansion (1) Government Criticism (1) Subtraction (1) |
| Policy 2: Sanitation provision | Le Monde        | Coronavirus: la situation contradictoire des exiles [Coronavirus: the contradictory situation of exiles] | Newspaper article (Left leaning) | Subtraction (4) Surveillance (3) Othering (2) Expansion (1) Empathy (1) |
| Policy 2: Sanitation provision | France3         | Coronavirus: à Calais et Grande-Synthe, les exiles sont &quot;oubliés&quot;, dénoncent les associations. [Coronavirus: in Calais and Grande-Synthe, exiles are &quot;forgotten&quot;, denounce associations] | Newspaper article (Neutral) | Empathy (2) Othering (3) Government Criticism (3) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy 3: Ban on distributions</th>
<th>Le Monde</th>
<th>Calais: vague d'indignation après l'interdiction de distribuer des repas aux exiles</th>
<th>Newspaper article (Left leaning)</th>
<th>Government Criticism (3) Othering (2) Subtraction (1) Expansion (1) time-limited policy (1)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Policy 3: Ban on distributions</td>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>Calais: des associations scandalisées par l'interdiction de distribuer des repas aux exiles</td>
<td>Newspaper article (Right leaning)</td>
<td>Expansion (2) Othering (2) Government Criticism (1) Surveillance (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy 3: Ban on distributions</td>
<td>Conseil d'état</td>
<td>Le juge des référés refuse de suspendre, en urgence, l’interdiction de la distribution de repas aux exiles dans le centre-ville de Calais</td>
<td>Court hearing</td>
<td>Othering (4) Surveillance (3) Subtraction (2) Empathy (1) Time-limited policy (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee Reference</td>
<td>Type of Organisation</td>
<td>Themes Found</td>
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<td>-----------------------</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 1</td>
<td>NGO that does Non-food distribution</td>
<td>Containment (1) Witnessing (1) Constraints on resistance (2) Inadequate policies (2) Surveillance (4) Inconsistency (5) Subtraction (5)</td>
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<td>Interviewee 2</td>
<td>NGO that delivers multiple types of emergency aid to exiles in Calais.</td>
<td>Witnessing (1) Expansion of previous technologies (2) Inadequate policies (2) Inconsistency (3) Subtraction (3) surveillance (5)</td>
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<td>Interviewee 3</td>
<td>NGO that delivers multiple types of emergency aid to exiles in Calais.</td>
<td>Othering (1) Evasion (1) Witnessing (1) Constraints on resistance (1) Empathy (1) Inconsistency (3) surveillance (4) Subtraction (4) Inadequate provision (4)</td>
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<td>Interviewee 4</td>
<td>NGO that delivers multiple types of emergency aid to exiles in Calais.</td>
<td>Containment (1) Evasion (1) Witnessing (1) Constraints on resistance (1) Surveillance (2)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 3 Interview Themes**

Policy 3: Ban on distributions

CNews

Le Gouvernement interdit la distribution de repas aux migrant aux associations non mandatees [Calais: The government bans the distribution of meals to exiles by non-mandated organisations]

Newspaper article (Right leaning)

Othering (2) Expansion (2) Surveillance (1) Time-limited policy (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee 5</th>
<th>Working with a food water and advocacy organisation</th>
<th>Expansion (2) Inconsistency (2) subtraction (3) Inadequate provision (3)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 6</td>
<td>Working with an advocacy and service NGO</td>
<td>Subtraction (1) Evasion (2) Containment (2) Activism (2) Inadequate provision (2) Expansion (3) Othering (3) Surveillance (3) Inconsistency (4) Constraints on resistance (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 4 Interview consent form and Data Management Plan**

**Informed consent**

I designed an in-depth consent form which all interviewees signed. The statements were also verbally checked at the start of the interview. The consent forms were saved on the LSE secure server.

**COVID-19 Policy in Calais’ informal settlements: Information and Consent Form**

Department of International Development, LSE

I am a graduate student at LSE, carrying out the research program as part of my MSc in International Development and Humanitarian Emergencies. Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of my dissertation project. This document will briefly summarise the project and provide a description of your involvement in the project.

**What is the project about?**

Public health policy in Calais’ informal settlements has been lacking since their inception. For instance, in 2018, hot water for handwashing was unavailable in all of Calais’ informal settlements, and insufficient pit latrines led to a build-up of untreated human waste and Cholera outbreaks. Historically the French government has not intervened in disease
outbreaks in Calais, yet during the COVID-19 pandemic there has been a shift in their policy, including addition of minimal washing facilities and movement of exiles to temporary accommodation. I plan to situate these policy changes into wider themes in migration policy and the biopolitical landscape of migration in France.

**What will your involvement be as an interviewee?**

By conducting interviews, I am trying to gain a better understanding of how the French governments policy have (or indeed have not) been put into practice on the ground. The interviews will not form the main part of my research into the motivations and consequences of policy but be used to gain up to date insight into the actions of French authorities and government. Therefore, you will not be asked to pass judgement on the French policy, but simply give your account of how it was enacted on the ground.

**Specifications for the interview process**

Please mark with an X if you agree to the following:

- [] To be interviewed for 30-45 minutes (1 hour maximum)
- [] For the interview to be recorded so that it can be transcribed later (audio only)
- [] To be quoted in my dissertation

**Safeguarding**

1. Please note that **you may revoke any information provided before, during or after the interview.**

2. All data will be stored on a secure server for the duration of the project and deleted after the submission of the dissertation.

3. All identifying factors will be removed in the final report so insights cannot be attributed to you.

Please declare if there is any information that is off limits/that I may not ask about:

________________________________________________________________________

**Statement of Consent**
I, ______________, consent to the specifications of the interview detailed above. I understand that unless explicitly stated otherwise by myself, the researcher has the right to utilise the information I have provided to inform, and be included, in their investigation.

Signature:  
Date: 

Anonymisation

All identifying factors were removed, including the organisation that interviewees worked for and their position within that organisation. No names were used, and interviewees were given numbers to identify their contributions during analysis and writing.

Data Storage

Interviews were conducted and recorded using the zoom record function on my personal laptop. These recordings were then transferred to the LSE secure server. The recordings were transcribed manually, and these transcriptions were also uploaded to the LSE secure server. Both the transcripts and recordings will be deleted once the dissertation has been submitted.