LSE IDEAS

Emerging Powers in Africa

SPECIALREPORT

SR016 June 2013

Managing Editor

Dr Ursula Durand-Ochoa

IDEAS Editor-in-Chief

Dr Nicholas Kitchen
IDEAS.reports@lse.ac.uk

Creative Director

Indira Endaya

Cover image:

istockphoto.com

IDEAS Special Reports are unique one-off research products that harness LSE's academic expertise to present in-depth analyses of issues of fundamental international importance. Special Reports can be commissioned on request.

LSE IDEAS is a centre for the study of international affairs, diplomacy and grand strategy. Its mission is to use LSE's vast intellectual resources to help train skilled and open-minded leaders and to study international affairs through world-class scholarship and engagement with practitioners and decision-makers. As its name implies, IDEAS aims at understanding how today's world came into being and how it may be changed, in line with LSE's old motto: *rerum cognoscere causas* - to understand the causes of things.

Contents

SR016 June 2013

Executive Summary

Nicholas Kitchen, Editor, IDEAS Reports

Emerging powers are playing an increasingly consequential role in Africa, and are set to deepen their impact upon political, economic and security dynamics across the continent in coming years. In many respects this is an expression of wider global trends characterised by the shifting balance of wealth and power away from the US and Europe to the rapidly growing economies. In Africa, the impact of these emerging – or in some cases, re-emerging – actors is becoming more substantial and more complex almost by the day.

Emerging power activism takes a number of different forms, both in terms of the goals pursued and the means used. FDI, aid and trade agreements are the more familiar forms of interaction by which emerging powers engage the continent, from the expansion of Indian mining companies into Zambia and DRC to the infrastructure construction undertaken by Chinese firms across the continent. Less heralded, perhaps, has been the activism of Turkish diplomacy and NGOs in Somalia, and Brazil's solidarity discourse rooted in cultural and ethnic ties. Emerging powers are therefore bringing financial capital, business acumen and new models of development and diplomacy to the continent. In doing so they see in Africa a resource partner, an export market, and a relatively uninhabited geopolitical space in which they can leverage their growing influence. Assessing this dynamic is crucial to developing an understanding of Africa's growing importance in the global supply chain, its growing relevance as a market and its centrality to the new international order in the making.

Yet, the implications for Africa itself should not be overlooked. Africa may be back in the limelight, but the continent's history is one of false dawns and unfulfilled potential: the danger is that African states will be unable to capitalise on the attention currently being lavished upon them and the possibilities of the commodities boom to recast the continent's development and forge a new role for Africa in the international system. As this report highlights, so far African responses to the activism of emerging powers have been predictable, either seeking to emulate the means to success of the emerging powers that are now so interested in them, or to react to that interest with concerns of a renewed colonialism. The challenge for African states is to transcend such tropes and realise the opportunities to become significant multilateral actors, able to leverage their particular assets and potential to formulate and pursue their own interests. The extent to which Africa is able to build its own independent diplomatic and economic identity, distinct from either its old colonial masters or its new emerging power suitors, will determine whether its relationship to the shifting global economic order is a productive one. ■

Emerging Powers in Africa

Contributors

CHRIS ALDEN is a Reader in International Relations at the LSE and Head of the Africa International Affairs programme at LSE IDEAS. He has conducted extensive field work across the Southern Africa region both on this topic and other areas. He has published widely on international politics and conflict in Southern Africa as well as work on Asia-Africa relations.

ANA CRISTINA ALVES (Ph.D.) is Senior Researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in the Global Powers in Africa Programme. Her current research focuses on the engagement of China, Brazil and other emerging powers in Africa, with a particular focus on the Portuguese-speaking countries.

ALEXANDRA A. ARKHANGELSKAYA is Research Fellow at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. She lived and studied in South Africa (1994 -99), has a degree in Law and International Relations and Ph.D. in International Relations. She has more than 35 publications on the role of emerging powers in Africa, BRICS - Africa relations, South-South Cooperation and South African foreign policy, including her monograph *Foreign Policy of Democratic South Africa* (2012).

ZHANG CHUN is Deputy Director of the Centre for West Asian and African Studies, and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the journal of *Global Review* of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. His main research areas include African peace and security, Chinese foreign policy, and international theory.

SOYEUN KIM is Lecturer at the University of Leeds, Senior Research Fellow at the Korean think-tank Re-shaping Development Institute, policy advisor to the Korean NGO ODA-Watch and consultant to South Korea's aid agency. She has a Ph.D. in Geography from King's College London. Her research interests include political ecology and the political economy of development and climate change. She has co-edited special issues in *Journal of International Development* (2011), *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* (2012) and published in journals including *Geoforum*, *Global Environmental Politics*, *Journal of International Development and Japanese Studies*.

DANIEL LARGE is Assistant Professor at the School of Public Policy, Central European University. He is also director of the Sudan Open Archive (www.sudanarchive.net). His publications include *Sudan Looks East: China, India and the Politics of Asian Alternatives* (Oxford: James Currey, 2011), co-edited with Luke Patey.

MEHMET OZKAN is a Researcher at the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research in Ankara, Turkey. He studied in Turkey (Istanbul University), South Africa (University of Johannesburg) and Sweden (Linkoping University) and is about to defend his Ph.D. thesis at Sevilla University in Spain. His website is works.bepress.com/mehmetozkan/.

VLADIMIR G. SHUBIN is a Principal Research Fellow at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Professor of the Russian State University for the Humanities. He has a Doctor of Science (History) degree from the Moscow State University and Ph.D. (Honorius Causa) from the University of the Western Cape. He has more than 150 academic publications, including the monographs: *Social Democracy and Southern Africa, ANC: a View from Moscow* and *The Hot 'Cold War: the USSR in Southern Africa.*

Introduction

Chris Alden

After decades in the shadow of global affairs, punctuated only by a seemingly endless news stream of debilitating conflict, venal corruption and grinding poverty, Africa is back in the international spotlight. With fast growing economies fed by the commodity boom, a spate of reforms to governance structures and a widening consumer class, the African continent appears poised to enter a new phase of development.[1] At the heart of this revival of African fortunes lies the engagement of emerging powers whose drive for resources and markets, increasingly bolstered by diplomatic activism, is reshaping the continent. Playing out in the oil acreage of the Gulf of Guinea and the chaotic retail markets of African cities, the role of emerging powers is heralding a sea of change in Africa's standing in the international system.

At the forefront of the coterie of emerging powers operating on the continent is the behemoth that is China, a country whose remarkable rise to prominence is the subject of unbridled admiration, clinical study and, in some cases, even profound trepidation.[2] A minor player at the margins of African affairs a mere two decades ago, China has assumed a leading position as Africa's top trading partner, major investor, provider of loans and significant diplomatic partner. Following in China's wake, developing countries as diverse as India, Brazil, Korea and Turkey are investing in resource extraction, building infrastructure, setting up light industries and selling consumer goods. Their appetite for risk and proven development experience is shifting the weight of economic engagement away from traditional North-South configurations towards the South, and is in the process transforming the development prospects of the African continent.

Some scholars point out that 'emergence' is a misnomer – that, for example, China and India's growing portion of the global economy merely reflects a return to historical conditions that prevailed for a millennium until the late 18th century. Arguing from a somewhat different angle, under Russia's previous incarnation as the Soviet Union, Moscow's diplomatic and military cooperation with liberation movements and newly independent states played a formative role in shaping African policies and institutions during the Cold War. Either way, the key feature shared by all these actors operating in Africa is their status as non-Western countries propelled by their growing economic standing onto the global stage in the late twentieth century.

What is distinctly new about this phenomenon is that the continent has never experienced this level of collective emerging power involvement in the modern era, especially when measured in economic terms. Moreover, the nature of this involvement – from large-scale loans without political conditions to deepening diplomatic cooperation – differs in important ways from the approaches adopted by Western governments. Indeed, the story of emerging powers in Africa cannot be told without reference to the declining position of traditional Western partners within the continent's affairs. At the same time, the conscious employment of narratives that draw on history and identity to situate their penetration of

1 See *The Economist*, 'Africa Rising', December 2011; *Time Magazine*, 'Africa Rising', 3 December 2012;'Africa on the Move', Ernest and Young 2012; Donald Kaberuka, President of African Development Bank, presentation, 'Emerging Powers and Africa', University of Cape Town, 9 May 2013.

2 See Chris Alden, *China in Africa (*London: Zed 2007).

African economies speaks to emerging powers' own discomfort with a relationship that is in danger of replicating features of traditional Western engagement. Finally, as the blizzard of novelty settles into the familiarity of daily engagement, Africans are beginning to ask hard questions of this growing partnership with new actors and its future for the development of the continent.

THE SUN ALSO RISES

The declining share of Western countries in the world economy, and the concomitant rise of an emerging South, is the most significant development of the 21st century. For instance, according to the IMF, in 1980 the European Union and the US accounted for 31 percent and 25 percent of world GDP respectively; by 2011 they had slipped to 20 percent and 19 percent.[3] During the same period, Asian economies – led by China and India – jumped from 8 percent of global GDP in 1980 to 25 percent in 2011. Far from being isolated from these trends, African trade and investment is more closely tracking these developments. Since 2010, China has taken the lead in two-way trade with the continent, now estimated to be $220 billion in 2012, while BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) trade with Africa is expected to surge to $500 billion by 2015.[4]

Though it can be understood with reference to the shifting economic fortunes of industrialised economies on a global scale, the outmoded attitudes which shape some key Western policy initiatives towards the continent is arguably the most telling difference between the traditional and new actors in Africa. The Western governments' single-minded promotion of major Africa policy initiatives, from the controversial European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) or the seven year search for an African basing site for the Pentagon's Africa Command, is the most vivid example of how the legacies of colonialism and Cold War politics exercise continued influence over European and US policies towards Africa. These contemporary approaches, which reflect paternalism and purpose rooted in the policies of the past, are coupled with a gradual evolution away from policy support for modernisation by the established Western aid industry. Where such assistance was once geared towards enhancing the productive sectors of developing countries such as commercial agriculture and infrastructure development, the last two decades have seen a shift towards aid aimed at ameliorating the social impact of modernisation on developing societies.[5] From tackling the environmental consequences of resource exploitation to targeting the most vulnerable and marginalised population groups, Western aid agencies and NGOs have redefined their role in African development to one increasingly at odds with the requisite needs of modernisation. The result has been wholesale Western neglect of the basic hardware of development – roads, communication networks – and a paucity of investment in the sectors that the continent has in abundance – resources and agriculture – that left Africa economies mired in the poverty trap.

The arrival of emerging powers flush with cash and confident of their development achievements marked a revolutionary change in African fortunes. China's critical role in shattering the donor consensus on development and a demonstrated willingness to invest in high risk areas, symbolised by its large investment into war-torn Sudan's oil sector after 1995, paved the way for others to follow.[6] For most of these new actors, the pillorying of OECD-DAC modalities of aid – particularly the notion of 'political conditionality' – and the celebration of interest-based forms of South-South cooperation became a hallmark of their approach to Africa. Backed by export credits and astute diplomacy, Chinese, Brazilian and Indian multinationals have been able to secure access to African resources as well as open up new markets for the sale of commercial goods. Private firms and individual migrants, especially but not exclusively from China, are making inroads into retail sectors and even begun setting up manufacturing and assembly plants in countries like Egypt, Kenya and Botswana.

3 Jeffrey Sachs, 'A World Adrift', 24 December 2012, project-syndicate.org.

4 Standard Bank analysts, cited in 'Africa becoming an increasingly important trading partner for BRICS countries', 15 February 2013, howwemadeitinafrica.com.

5 See Emma Mawsley, *From Recipients to Donors – emerging powers and the changing development landscape* (London: Zed 2012).

6 Dan Large and Luke Patey, eds., *Sudan Looks East – China, India and the politics of Asian alternatives* (Oxford: James Currey 2012)

At the same time, the cold truth of the resource trade between emerging powers and Africa, which echoes the unequal patterns of North-South economic relations, has necessitated a new rhetoric of engagement. The fact is that the bulk of emerging power trade and investment remains tied to Africa's resource sector – whether directly into energy, minerals, timber and increasingly agriculture or indirectly in infrastructure that supports economies of extraction. For some Africans, the nagging fear that they are merely trading one set of exploitive relationships for another, however attractively packaged, remains a significant source of concern. For instance, the Governor of the Central of Nigeria, Malama Sanushi Lamido Sanushi, declared in March 2013 that trade relations with China carried with them 'the whiff of colonialism'.[7] Others have found in Indian, Brazilian and Korea actions disturbing elements of exploitation that have drawn similar protests from governments and local civil society.[8]

This has produced the need amongst emerging powers for a new story of proximity and modernisation with Africa. Therefore, in constructing relations with Africa a notable feature is the active employment of historical, identity and solidarity narratives to frame contemporary ties. In particular, there is an overt effort to retrieve 'lost' history with Africa and claim, on that basis, an identity that purports to lend an exceptional character to the bilateral relations and daily commercial interactions.

For the Chinese, this has concentrated on a rediscovery of the Ming dynasty admiral, Zheng Ho, and his visit to the East African coast in the early 15th century. The fact that his voyage did not precipitate Chinese colonial expansion, unlike that of Vasco de Gama a few decades later, is held to be proof of China's benign intentions for the continent. For the Turkish government, an assertion of its Islamic identity in conjunction with a 'neo-Ottomanist foreign policy' is shaping the target of its interests in northeast Africa. The Brazilians take the legacy of the slave trade, a substantial Afro-Brazilian population, to posit a commonality of culture and concurrent obligation to the continent. It goes without saying that these archival daguerreotype memories are selective – forgotten, for instance, is Brazil's diplomatic support for Portuguese colonialism; Chinese support for regimes and liberation movements which ended up 'on the wrong side of history'; the Ottoman Empire complicity in the slave trade; and Soviet promotion of economic policies that damaged development prospects. For Russia in particular, grappling with the Soviet legacy and its enduring and sometimes personal imprint on Africans' experiences is more complex and even divisive, perhaps in part because of the proximity of this near-contemporary history.

The search for an understanding of this new South-South axis of trade and development and its transformative role in shaping Africa that goes beyond the fanfare is crucial to any assessment of Africa's future rise. The aim of this report is to provide a balanced, comparative analysis of these new actors that sheds light on the motives, impact and meaning for the continent. ■

7 'Nigeria: Central Bank Governor's Protest Against Trade Imbalance Ruffles China', *This Day,* 7 April 2013, allafrica.com/stories/201304070073.html

8 See Sergio Chichava et al, 'Chinese and Brazilian Cooperation in African Agriculture – the case of Mozambique', Working Paper 49, www.future-agricultures.org, p. 15; 'Zambia criticises Vedanta for not generating enough jobs', LiveMint-Wall Street Journal, 3 April 2013, www.livemint.com; 'Madagascar's new leader says Daewoo land deal off', Reuters, 18 March 2009, www.reuters.com.

The Sino-Africa Relationship: Toward a New Strategic Partnership

Zhang Chun

Sino-Africa relations have progressed significantly since the end of the Cold War. In 2006, the Chinese government declared that China will '…unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa'.[1] President Hu Jintao confirmed this sentiment at the Beijing Summit of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2006.[2] Still, this relationship has a long way to go. There is now a more balanced development in the political, economic and societal aspects of this relationship than in previous periods, meaning that the time has come for this relationship to transition to a new trend in terms of Africa's international engagement.

This paper explores the historical developments of this relationship over the past six decades and its current state, to understand the basic logic of its development and provide a fresh angle of analysis. It then explores the future of this relationship, considering three significant transitions it has taken and the various measures the Chinese government has adopted throughout. It concludes by discussing the need for strategic thinking in promoting the Sino-Africa relationship and moving to new strategic partnership.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Although the economic interactions and cultural exchanges between China and Africa go back many centuries, then contemporary Sino-Africa relationship began with the formal establishment of diplomatic ties with Egypt in 1956. China and Africa have since then become all-weather friends that understand, support and help each other. Fifty-one of the continent's fifty-four countries have established diplomatic ties with China thus far, the most recent being South Sudan in 2011. China and Africa have shared comprehensive consensus on major international issues, common interests and a willingness to deepen their cooperation. Frequent high-level reciprocal visits (known by some in Africa the 'frequent flyer' form of diplomacy) have promoted mutual understanding and trust, and have effectively boosted the development of bilateral ties. Currently, the first foreign visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister is always to Africa.[3] China-Africa relations also contribute to both sides' struggle for a higher international status.

1 Chinese MOFA, *China's African Policy*, 2006, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm.

2 Hu Jintao (speech, Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, China, 4 November, 2006), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/SP32009/t606840.htm.

3 While 2011 was an exception because of the Sino-America summit held in mid January. However, if counting the lunar New Year, the first trip of Chinese Foreign Minister in 2011 was still Africa.

Like the political dimension, the economic dimension of this relationship also has developed rapidly. Sino-African trade volume increased from $12 million in 1950, to $34.74 million in 1955 and to $250 million in 1965. China has attached great importance to friendly cooperation with African countries since its Open Up and Reform policy at the end of the 1970s, and Sino-African trade has seen annual growth of 3.6 percent on average. Bilateral total export and import volume kept growing throughout the 1990s, during this time it was as not unusual to see increases of over 40 percent. In 2000, bilateral trade volume for the first time exceeded $10 billion, and in 2008 it reached a record $106.84 billion. While it decreased in 2009 due to the global financial crisis, Sino-Africa trade regained momentum in 2010, with $126.9 billion in 2010 and then $166.3 billion in 201. It is estimated that the figure may exceed $200 billion in 2012. In 2008, the number of African countries with which China had more than $1 billion in trade reached 20.[4] This shows that China's engagement with Africa is broad and extensive.

For the last six decades, cultural exchanges have also increased between China and Africa, which has helped to promote cooperation. As of 2005, China entered into 62 inter-governmental agreements on cultural exchanges and cooperation with 45 African countries, under which the two sides have organised over 200 cultural exchange delegations and hosted hundreds of cultural or art exchange events.[5]

To summarise, the Sino-Africa relationship has had three phases of development in the past six decades. The first phase ran from the early 1950s to the adoption of the Open up and Reform policy in the late 1970s. During this period, both China and Africa focused on political development because of their newly gained independence. The aim of this bilateral relationship was political mutual support, with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism as the core.[6] In addition to providing political and military support, China built Tazara, the railway linking Zambia to Tanzania, which helped free Zambia from its dependence on trade routes to the sea dominated by white-minority ruled Rhodesia.

The second phase took place in the 1980s. After adopting Open Up and Reform policy at the end of 1970s, China turned to the industrialised developed west for its abundant capital and development experience. China still attached great importance to Africa. For example, the Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang embarked on series of diplomatic overtures in December 1982 to eleven African countries, promoting the 'Four Principles' of Chinese cooperation with Africa: equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversification in form and economic development.[7]

China shifting its eyes back to Africa after the end of Cold War. Along with the new thinking of seeking external support for domestic development, China strengthened the economic dimension of this relationship - or use Ian Taylor's term, China began to re-engage actively with the continent 'now on different terms'.[8] Sino-Africa trade has grown since this period, as has China's investment in Africa. Investment patterns have had three phases since China began to invest in Africa in the 1980s. Chinese businesses first relied heavily on government-sponsored assistance projects to gain a presence in local markets. Due to the limited strength of Chinese enterprises, most investment projects were small. Between 1979 and 1990, China invested $51.19 million in 102 projects in Africa, equivalent to $500,000 per project. In 1990s, China's investment in Africa expanded within the context of improved investment environment in Africa and the emergence of Chinese businesses. Since 2000, China's investment in Africa has entered a fast track facilitated by both governmental policies and market drivers. China has made a sizeable investment in Africa over the past 30 years.

4 'China-Africa Trade Ip 45% in 2008 to $107 Billion,' *Xinhuanet*, 11 February, 2009.

5 'Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation,' 21 September, 2006, http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-09/21/content_899.htm.

6 It is important to note that there were few exceptions with Angola as the example. SeeSteven F. Jackson, 'China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-1993,' *The China Quarterly*, 142 (1995), 388-422.

7 Judith van de Looy, 'Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?' *Working Paper African Studies Centre* 67 (2006), http://www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/wp67.pdf.

8 Ian Taylor, 'China's Foreign Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s,' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36/3 (1998), 443-460.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China invested $2.1 billion in Africa in 2010. Africa has become a major investment destination for Chinese enterprises, where over 2,000 Chinese companies have invested in various sectors including electronics, telecommunications and transport. Chinese investment in Africa represents a small (three to four percent in 2011) yet growing piece of total Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) worldwide. Africa is the third largest recipient of Chinese OFDI after Asia and Europe. By the end of 2011, the cumulative Chinese direct investment net stock in Africa reached $14.7 billion (a 60 percent jump from 2009) (Figure 2).

Figure 1: African share in Chinese FDI, 2003-2011[9]



Figure 2: Accumulated net stock of China's investment in Africa, 2003-2011 (billion USD)[10]



In short, the Sino-Africa relationship during the past six decades went from imbalanced to balanced in regard to its political, economic and cultural dimensions. Political relations developed quite well in all three periods, economic relations gained momentum largely in the third period and cultural relations eroded with the development of economic ties.

9 Chinese MOFCOM.
10 Ibid.

CURRENT SINO-AFRICA RELATIONS

China has gradually upgraded its Africa policy in the 21st Century with the establishment of FOCAC in 2000. Six years later, Sino-Africa relationship reached a level as it defined its Africa policy for the first time with four principal guidelines. These include:

- Sincerity, friendship and equality (the political dimension)
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity (the economic dimension)
- Mutual support and close coordination (the international dimension
- Mutual learning and seeking common development (the cultural dimension)[11]

The Sino-Africa relationship gained new momentum under these principles. According to a 2011 report from African Development Bank, 'China is a valuable trading partner, a source of investment financing, and an important complement to traditional development partners. China is investing massively in infrastructure, which helps alleviate supply bottlenecks and improve competitiveness'.[12]

Most western analysts believe that the main driving force behind China's investment in Africa is for natural resources and thus focuses on a few resource rich countries.[13] Chinese investments actually reach 49 African countries, the fraction of coverage is about 83 percent (second to Asia and much higher than the average rate of 71 percent). These figures also exceed those of other powers in Africa, including the US, EU, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea. For example, in 2010, the top 10 African recipients included South Africa (31.8 percent), Nigeria (9.3 percent), Zambia (7.2 percent), Algeria (7.2 percent), The Democratic Republic of Congo (4.8 percent), Sudan (4.7 percent), Niger (2.9 percent), Ethiopia (2.8 percent), Angola (2.7 percent) and Egypt (2.6 per cent), comprising 76 percent of all Chinese investment in Africa (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Distribution of Chinese investment in Africa, 2010[14]



11 Chinese MOFA, *China's African Policy*, 2006, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm.

12 R. Schiere, 'China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development? – An overview of issues,' *Working Paper*, No. 125, May 2011, African Development Bank Group, p. 17.

13 For a more detailed analysis and discussion of the opposing views regarding China's involvement in Africa, see Sarah Raine, *China's African Challenges* (London: Routledge, 2009).

14 Chinese MOFOCM.

As to diversification, China has invested in African sectors, including agriculture, mining, manufacturing, service, infrastructure, capability building and human resources. According to a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, during the period from 1979 to 2000, 46 percent of Chinese investment in Africa went to manufacturing (15 percent to the textile industry), 28 percent to mining, 18 percent to services and seven percent to agriculture. In 2009, only 29 percent of Chinese investment went to mining. In contrast, in 2010, 56.6 percent of US investment in Africa went to the mining sector, more than 30 percent to services and less than 10 percent to manufacturing and agriculture combined.

China has also built platforms to promote its relationship with Africa. The most important one is the FOCAC. Established in 2000, the FOCAC brings together the 51 states that have diplomatic relationships with China.[15] Since its establishment, FOCAC has gradually become an important platform for collective dialogue and an effective mechanism for enhancing practical cooperation between China and African countries. Since its establishment, FOCAC has held five ministerial conferences (the latest in July 2012) and one summit at the level of heads of state and government (in 2006). It has arguably provided the political umbrella for the boom in bilateral relations.[16]

Table 1: Five FOCAC Ministerial Conferences

Year	Place	Results
2000	Beijing	Beijing Declaration of FOCAC Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development
2003	Addis Ababa	Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006)
2006	Beijing	Beijing Declaration Beijing Action Plan (2006-2008)
2009	Sharm El Sheikh	Declaration of Sharm El Sheikh Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)
2012	Beijing	Beijing Declaration Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)

15 See Li Anshan, 'Why the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Analysing China's Strategy in Africa,' *Foreign Affairs Review*, 29/3. FOCAC was initiated by African states. The Chinese emphasise its bilateral character. It is interesting to note that foreign observers - and many Africans – see FOCAC as multilateral as it encompasses more than 50 African states. For an assessment of FOCAC's political role, see S. Grimm, 'The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation - Its Political Role and Functioning,' *CCS Policy Briefing*, Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch, May 2012.

16 S. Grimm, May 2012.

China also engages with Africa through multilateral organisations, including the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the G20. Multilateral organisations give great relevance to the South-South cooperation mechanism, G7+China, the Non-Alignment Movement and BRICS. The latter has great potential in terms of its ability to support African development. The invitation of South Africa to the BRICS and recent discussions on the establishment of a BRICS development bank highlight this, as well as the theme of the most recent BRICS summit ('BRICS and Africa') held in March 2013.

The rapid development of Sino-Africa relationship shows a trend of diversification of actors and interests. Aside from state actors like the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Commerce and other central governmental ministries and agencies, many other actors like state-owned companies, provincial agencies, province-owned companies, private companies and even individuals have a role. For example, national companies do not dominate China's investment in Africa. Rather, SMEs account for more than 85 percent of the 2000 Chinese companies that operate in Africa.[17]

Table 2: Selected features of support provided by Africa's development partners[18]

	AFRICA'S SHARE OF AID BUDGET (%)	FORM OF SUPPORT	CONDITIONS IMPOSED	MODE OF DELIVERY	DEBT RELIEF PROVIDED	MONITORING MECHANISM
China	30–50	Grants and loans	Non-policy conditions	Project	Yes	Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
India	1.5–3.6	Grants and loans	Non-policy conditions	Project	Yes	India–Africa Forum Summit
Brazil	27–30	Co-financing, often through triangular cooperation	Non-policy conditions	Project	Yes	Republic of Korea
Turkey	6*	Grants		Project	No	Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit
Arab countries	11*	Grants and loans		Project	Yes	
South Africa	95	Co-financing, also through triangular cooperation	Non-policy conditions	Project	n.a.	

17 'Vice Minister Wang Chao Addressed in China-Africa Small and Medium Enterprises Trade & Economic Exchanges and Investment Cooperation Seminar,' *MOFOCOM*, September 9, 2010.

18 UNCTAD, *Economic Development in Africa Report 2010: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership* (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2010), 67.

Many scholars have explored the reasons for the transition behind the Sino-Africa relationship. Some point to China's equal treatment of Africa, embodied in a non-interference principle and no-string-attached assistance. While China has received criticism for instrumentalising its traditional emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference to carve out economic deals,[19] most of the other developing countries imitate China in regard to their engagement with Africa (Table 2).

FUTURE TRENDS

The most significant aspect in the progress of the Sino-Africa relationship regards its transition from a linear or single-dimension relationship to a multi-dimension relationship, with the support of institutionalisation efforts (particularly FOCAC). This development facilitates the current transition and also is of great importance to its sustainable development.

The transition includes the following three aspects. First, the Sino-Africa relationship is shifting from one based emotional/ideological intimacy to one based on economic interests. The historical emotional/ideological intimacy is fading due to various developments, including the passing away of the older generation of leaders that share the experiences of national liberation movements with older Chinese leaders, the rising number of new western-educated and the growing number of people-to-people exchanges that have both positive and negative impacts on mutual understanding between two peoples. With considerations of economic interests rising and emotional/ideological intimacy fading, economic indicators have gradually become the main criteria for measuring bilateral relations.

The second transition regards the natural consequence of the growing importance of economic consideration — the change from economic interest promotion to economic interest protection. The Going Global Strategy has had tremendous achievements and needs to plan for sustainable development, which requires attending to a lot of issues. In addition, while wars and conflicts have decreased, instabilities in African continent continue to present hurdles for international investment, trade and even humanitarian aid. The outbreak of the 'Arab Spring' highlighted the importance of protecting China's overseas economic interests and national citizens. Based on the principle of 'People First', protecting overseas Chinese and economic interests remains a top priorities of China's foreign policy in general and China's Africa policy in particular.

While the first two transitions have begun to take place, the third transition in Sino-African relations will take place in the next few years or decade. This transition regards the change from asymmetrical to symmetrical interdependence. The current Sino-African relationship is an asymmetrically interdependent, as China depends more on African natural resources and Africa depends more on opportunities associated with China's rising and Sino-African relation development. Several developments have potential for undermine the current interdependence between China and Africa. The first is the slowing down of China's economic growth - a natural development after three decades (the growth rate for the first quarter 2012 was about 7.5 per cent). While China has slowed down, Africa has accelerated. Six African countries have taken a place on the list of the 10 fastest growing economies in the first decade of 21st Century, and seven African countries have a place on the list of the 10 fastest growing from 2011 to 2015. A third development will likely change the interdependence between China and Africa: Africa has returned to the traditional powers' strategic considerations and has entered that of emerging powers. We have witnessed the recovery of EU-Africa Summit and Japan's TICAD, and the creation of the India-Africa Summit, South Korea-Africa Summit, India-Africa Summit and Turkey-Africa Summit.

19 J. Holslag, 'China's New Mercantilism in Central Africa,' *African and Asian Studies* 5/2 (2006).

Aware of these developments and the challenges that they potentially pose for Sino-Africa relations, the Chinese government has adopted some counter-measures. First, to enhance the Sino-African emotional intimacy, China is shifting its development assistance for Africa from 'hard' to 'soft' infrastructure assistance. The 3rd and 4th FOCAC Ministerial Conference included eight measures for promoting Sino-Africa relations, many of which provide support for 'hard' infrastructure in Africa, like roads, studios and conference centres. However, the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference attaches more importance to 'soft' ones like education, people to people exchange and joint research. Taking sub-fora building as example (see Table 3), the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference Action Plan (2013-2015) mentioned 10 sub-for (including those to create, to strengthen and institutionalise). Of these 10, five (in bold) are 'soft' or related to China's soft power in Africa.

Table 3. Sub-Fora mentioned at 5th FOCAC Meeting

TO CREATE	TO STRENGTHEN	TO INSTITUTIONALIZE
China-Africa forum on cooperation between local governments	FOCAC Legal Forum	**FOCAC Think Tanks Forum**
China-Africa Radio and Television Cooperation Forum	Forum on China-Africa Financial Cooperation	**China-Africa People's Forum**
China-Africa Energy Forum	FOCAC Science and Technology Forum	**China-Africa Young Leaders Forum**
	FOCAC Cultural Ministers' Forum	

Second, to protect its overseas rights and interests, China will give more importance to security. The 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference declared that China will launch the 'Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security', deepen cooperation with the African Union and African countries in peace and security in Africa, provide financial support for African Union peace-keeping missions in Africa and the African Standby Force and train more officials in peace and security affairs. For example, China is participating six out of seven UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. It sends more than 1500 peacekeepers to the African continent, the biggest contributor of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Third, China focuses more on supporting sustainable development support than searching for natural resources in promoting symmetrical interdependence. Considering the prospect of symmetrical interdependence, President Hu Jintao declared at the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference that, China 'will expand cooperation in investment and financing to support sustainable development in Africa' and 'support the African integration process and help Africa enhance capacity for overall development'. This includes giving support to the Millennium Development Goals, the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP), the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa and the Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative, as well as extending aid-for-trade to African countries, increasing the China-Africa Development Fund to $5 billion and implementing the 'African Talents Program'.[20]

20 Hu Jintao, 'Open Up New Prospects for A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership' (speech, Opening Ceremony of the 5th Ministerial Conference of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, China, 19 July, 2012).

CONCLUSION

The rapid development of the Sino-Africa relationship reveals on-going transitions that facilitate the move towards a new strategic partnership. While the relationship has manoeuvred well through this trend, there is still an urgent need for longer-term strategic planning to steer and sustain the future development of Sino-African relations.

First, China needs to build a stronger social basis for Sino-African relations. Lacking a non-governmental capability, current people-to-people exchanges have more negative than positive contributions. China should strengthen NGOs and civil society groups to nurture these relations, create better platforms for public diplomacy and diversify diplomatic skills and stakeholders.

Second, China should make concrete contributions to African peace and security. On the one hand, China now has a blueprint for peace and security cooperation between the two sides without a detailed strategy or plan. On the other hand, initiating peace and security cooperation poses a risk of violating China's principle of non-interference. Thus, China needs a strategic plan for such an initiative, with multilateral institutions as the main platform.

Finally, China must pave the way for future symmetrical interdependence between China and Africa. China needs to adapt, strengthen and protect its relationship, and learn how to build a real friendship between a would-be 'developed' country (China) and a real 'developing' continent (Africa), how to consolidate the global South and how to be a reliable friend and partner for developing countries. The future is bright, but there is still long way to go. ■

Is Russia Back? Realities of Russian Engagement in Africa

Alexandra Arkhangelskaya and Vladimir Shubin

Russia occupies a unique place among the so called 'emerging actors' in Africa. On one hand, Russia is not as active in Africa as China or Brazil; on the other hand, it is not a newcomer to the continent and it maintained intensive relations with many African countries during the Soviet period. This piece discusses the evolution of the Africa policies of the Soviet Union/Russia, including the reasons for their regression and new upsurge in the 21st Century. It pays special attention to the current state of Russia's relations with Africa, both bilateral and multilateral, in various spheres ranging from growing direct investments (primarily in mining) to peace-keeping.

Russia's historical connection with Africa is an important asset in developing its contemporary relations with the continent. Although Russia never had colonies in Africa, it made essential contributions to Africa's decolonisation and the eradication of apartheid. Two episodes of pre-revolutionary Russia merit mention. First, Russia supported Ethiopia's (then called Abyssinia) sovereignty and provided practical assistance in its struggle against Italian aggression in late 19th Century. It did so not only because of its geostrategic interests, but also because of the proximity between the Russian and Ethiopian Orthodox churches. At about the same time, more than 200 Russian volunteers supported the Boers in their war with the UK. In both cases, Russia gave support to those seen as the victims. 'Old' Russia also maintained several diplomatic missions in Africa and re-established relations with Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa during World War II.

THE COLD WAR: THE SOVIET UNION IN AFRICA

Active ties to Africa developed from the late 1950s onwards, when African countries began to gain independence. This coincided with a significant turn in Moscow towards the Afro-Asian world. Josip Broz Tito played an important role here as he maintained close personal contact with statesmen such as Abdel Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru and 'recommended' them to Nikita Khrushchev as champions of socialism. Moscow welcomed the emergence of the Afro-Asian movement, as signified by the convening of the Bandung conference in 1955.

In 1956, the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union confirmed the turn towards Africa as it pointed out the 'collapse of the colonial system of imperialism'[1] and emphasised the role of the Soviet Union in the 'irreconcilable struggle against colonialism'.[2] This was reiterated when Moscow initiated the adoption of the UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in December 1990.

1 '20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (trans.),' (Moscow: State Publisher of Political Literature: 1956), 24.
2 Ibid, 28.

Three cases of Soviet involvement in Africa during the Cold War deserve analysis. The first is Moscow's support of Egypt during the Suez crisis in 1956. In addition to the US' negative attitude towards what became known as 'tripartite (British-French-Israeli) aggression', the Soviet Union's involvement led to the withdrawal of foreign troop and confirmation of Egyptian control over the Suez Canal.

The second case is Moscow's support for Lumumba's government in Congo and its allies in Africa, which facilitated the development of relations with a number of African countries. Whilst Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah had at first shown a reluctance to become close to Moscow,[3] he later invited a Soviet military specialist to advise him on plans to create the united African Armed Forces in early 1961.[4]

At a recent conference in Moscow, Ben Amathila, one of the founders of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the ruling party in Namibia, stated the following: 'Again, the demonstration that the Soviet Union was ready to intervene and rescue the weaker in Africa did not miss our attention. Two of my colleagues in Namibia in 1961 during the Congo crisis, recognising the potential [of] the Soviet Union have sent a telegram to Mr. Khrushchev to send troops to Namibia…'[5] As naïve as this request may seem, it shows the appreciation for Moscow's role in the Congo crisis.

The third case involves the Soviet Union's involvement in the dramatic events in Angola in 1975-1976. The Soviet Union lent its support to the government of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which faced opposition not only from domestic actors but also from South Africa and Zaire. In his speech at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in January 1976, Murtala Muhammed, head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, compared the policy of the Soviet Union and the US:

> We are all aware of the heroic role which the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have played in the struggle of the African people for liberation. The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have been our traditional suppliers of arms to resist oppression, and to fight for national liberation and human dignity. On the other hand the United States which now sheds crocodile tears over Angola has not only completely ignored the freedom fighters whom successive United States administrations branded as terrorism, she even openly supported morally and materially the fascist Portuguese Government.[6]

Moscow policy in Africa has also seen failure, such as the 1966 coup in Ghana that toppled the government of Nkrumah and the political somersaults by Anwar Sadat in Egypt and Siad Barre in Somalia. Nevertheless, it was quite successful overall.

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union signed hundreds of agreements with African countries. About 25,000 Africans trained in Soviet universities and *technikons* in various fields, and thousands graduated from Soviet military and political schools. These alumni include the current presidents of Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique and South Africa. Soviets also trained at least 200,000 specialists on African soil. The Soviet Union made agreements with 37 African countries on technical and economic assistance, and with 42 countries on trade agreements.[7]

3 Sergey Mazov, *A Distant front in the Cold War. The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964*, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press), 54.

4 Marshal V.G. Kulikov, 'Brezhnev, Zhukov, Rokossovsky,' http://www.ogoniok.com/archive/2001/4701/26-20-21/.This specialist was Major-General Vassily Kulikov, future Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chief of the General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces.

5 *50 years of the Africa Year. Destiny of National Liberation Movements: View from Africa, Russia and Western Europe* (trans.), (Moscow: Eastern Literature, 2011), 192.

6 Patrick Wilmot, *Ideology and National Consciousness* (Ibadan: Lantern Books, 1980), 183-184.

7 Tatyana Deich ed., *Africa in the Foreign Policy Priorities of Russia* (trans.) (Moscow: Institut Afriki, 2003), 52. For more on the Soviet Union's cooperation with African countries see EvgenyTarabrin, *USSR and Countries of Africa: Friendship, Cooperation, Support for Anti-Imperialist Struggle* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980).

Human capital development constituted an important part of the legacy of this cooperation and its influence on current bilateral relations. In 1985, for example, a group of five military commanders of South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) 'were staying in an apartment on Gorki [Tverskaya] Street, Moscow' and undergoing highly specialised military training. Three of them became later ministers: Siphiwe Nyanda, Charles Nqakula and Nosiviwe Maphisa-Nqakula (Naqakula's wife and current Minister of Defense).[8]

The Soviet Union also gave multifaceted support to liberation movements, primarily in southern Africa, over three decades.[9] Its assistance was significant and often vital when others could or chose not to offer help.

What prompted Moscow to become active in Africa? The superpower rivalry of the Cold War was not the only factor. The Soviets never regarded the independent African countries and political bodies as 'proxies'. On the contrary, the constitution of the Soviet Union cited the support for the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress as one of the aims of its foreign policy.[10] The national liberation movement was viewed as one of the 'detachments' of global anti-imperialist forces. While the Soviet Union did show a preferential attitude towards countries whose leaders claimed to favour one or another form of socialism, it also maintained good relations in various fields, including defence, with other countries such as Nigeria.

The changes in the political situation near the threshold of the 1990s and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 in particular largely wasted this political capital. The deterioration of relations with Africa reflected a negative trend in Russia's foreign policy, although it suffered more than other vector in that time period. Apart from the demise of Russia's economy due to the IMF-proposed (or rather, imposed) reforms,[11] other factors, both political and psychological, contributed to this deterioration. The new rulers and the 'pro-Western' media often automatically held negative attitudes toward the friends of the former Soviet Union. When F. W. de Klerk made an official state visit to Russia in June 1992, Boris Yeltsin assured him that 'Mandela would not be received as the ANC President in Moscow but would be visiting the Russian capital as an international figure, a fighter for human rights'.[12]

In this period, Russian foreign policy largely abandoned the global South in general and Africa in particular. Russia also used Africa as a scapegoat for its problems, falsely claiming that Africans were 'eating Russia out of house and home'.[13] Some people seemingly did not understand the derogatory and even racist character of their statements. For example, during his presidential electoral campaign in 1991, Boris Yeltsin remarked that socialist transformations took place in Russia, and that they should have tried it 'in some small African country'. Such pronouncements and claims encouraged manifestations of xenophobia and racism that unfortunately spread in 'new Russia' in the early 1990s.

Russia decreased its diplomatic presence in Africa as it closed nine embassies, three consulates, most of its trade missions and 13 of its 20 cultural centres. It also terminated most of its development projects, such as a multi-million steel plant in Ajaokuta, Nigeria that had neared 98 percent completion, which proved even more damaging.[14]

8 Siphiwe Nyanda, (e-mail communication with Vladimir Shubin, 10 December, 2002).

9 Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot 'Cold War': The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008).

10 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (adopted at the Seventh [Special] Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union Ninth Convocation on 7 October, 1977), http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons01.html#chap04.

11 According to former foreign minister and then prime minister Evgeny Primakov, the losses of the Russian economy between 1992 and1998 were twice high than the losses during World War II; see *M. Rossiyskaya gazeta,* 15 January, 2008, http://www.rg.ru/2008/01/15/primakov.html.

12 Ibid., 2 June, 1992.

13 Alexey Vassilev, *Africa: A Stepchild of Globalisation* (trans.) (Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2003).

14 Tatyana Deich (ed.), 2003, 52.

However, the failure of this one-sided policy and the loss of hope for Western economic assistance eventually encouraged a turn to realism. Many attribute the changes in Russia's foreign policy to the replacement of Boris Yelstin by Vladimir Putin on the eve of 2000. In actuality they began several years earlier in 1996 when Evgeny Primakov became foreign minister. The rise of the Russian economy and accumulation of huge currency and gold reserves also placed it in a position to conduct independent policy on major international issues such as Africa. Russia's admission to the G8 in 1998 encouraged further attention to Africa as the continent regularly appeared on G8 summit agendas; it also meant that it had effectively joined the 'club' of those who historically colonised and exploited Africa. Nevertheless, Russia's G8 membership lost its significant as the world economic crisis highlighted the G8's growing inefficiency and obsolete nature.

The new turn in Russian foreign policy became quite visible. Aside from South African President F.W. de Klerk's reception in June 1992, heads of African states did not begin to go to Russia until 1997.

RUSSIA IN AFRICA TODAY

There is a general consensus in Russia on the multi-dimensional nature of its foreign policy, which has strengthened in the last decade as several electoral defeats have marginalised openly 'pro-Western' political forces.

Several documents outline Russia's current foreign policy. The most important is the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which President Vladimir Putin approved on 12 February 2013. This document replaced an earlier version signed by Dmitry Medvedev in 2008.[15] The new version reflects a 'rapid acceleration of the global processes in the first decade of the 21st century, strengthening of the new processes in the world development' that requires a reassessment of the priorities of Russia's foreign policy. It also speaks proudly of Russia's 'increased responsibility for the formation of the international agenda and fundamentals of the international system'.

The Concept cites the 'deployment of a broad and non-discriminatory international cooperation, promoting the emergence of flexible network alliances that transcend blocs' as one of the main aims of Russia's foreign policy. It is worth noting that the G8 is mentioned as third (after the G20 and the BRICS) in the list of 'formats' where Russia 'will make itself more fully engaged', rather than as the first as five years earlier.

Still, as in the previous version, Africa remains far from the central scene. The Concept essentially repeated previous promises by declaring that 'Russia will expand its multipronged interaction with African States at the bilateral and bilateral basis with a focus on, improved policy dialogue and promotion of mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation, and facilitate the settlement and the prevention of regional conflicts and crisis situations in Africa. An important part of this line is the development of partnerships with the African Union and sub-regional organisations.' In contrast, the document gives extensive coverage to developments in 'the Middle East and North Africa'.[16]

Another important document is Russia's National Security Strategy (adopted in 2010 and valid until 2020). This document states that 'Russia will increase its interaction with multilateral forums such as the G8, G20, RIC (Russia/India/China), BRIC (Brazil/Russia/India/China), and will likewise capitalise on the potential of other informal international institutions'.[17] However, it almost completely neglects Africa as it mentions it only once in the following statement: 'The situation in a number of African countries will continue to exert a negative influence on the international situation'.[18]

15 'Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,' http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bdc3.pdf .
16 Ibid.
17 'Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020,' http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020.
18 Ibid.

Russia's new constitution, adopted after Boris Yeltsin's bloody 'victory' over the Russian parliament in October 1993, established an implementation mechanism for foreign policy.[19] The constitution declares that 'the President of the Russian Federation shall: a) supervise the conduct of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation; b) conduct negotiations and sign international treaties of the Russian Federation; c) sign instruments of ratification; d) accept credentials and instruments of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited with him'.[20] While the implementation of the foreign policy is one of the government's functions, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is directly subordinate to the president, as are heads of the Ministry of Defence and the External Intelligence Service. The president chairs the Security Council, a lesser known body that 'assesses the challenges and threats to the national interests and security of Russia in the international sphere' and submits proposals 'for his decision on issues of foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the field of national security'.[21]

Other state bodies that deal with Africa include the Ministry of Economic Development, responsible for developing bilateral economic cooperation,[22] and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, whose own Department of Foreign Economic Relations deals with 'strategy of state's export support.'[23] The parliament (the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, consisting of the Federation Council and the State Duma) has a rather limited power in practice. Apart from maintaining inter-parliamentary ties, it ratifies international treaties and plays a role in the appointment of ambassadors.

The current state of Russia-Africa relations in the political sphere, bilateral and multilateral, is generally positive. Forty Russian embassies operate in Africa, and 35 African countries maintain embassies in Moscow. Additionally, Russia has representatives in the African Union and in the regional economic communities — South African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and East African Community (EAC).

Still, top-level exchanges have not been intense. Russian presidents have visited only eight African countries over the past two decades. The choice of countries visited reflects Russia's geographical priorities on the continent: Putin went to Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Morocco and Libya, and Medvedev went to Nigeria, Angola, Namibia and Egypt. Furthermore, the signing of agreements, even in the presence of top leaders, does not guarantee their realisation. Nigerian Ambassador to Russia Assam Ekanem Assam has affirmed that Russia has not fulfilled any of the six documents signed in Abuja during Medvedev's visit in 2009.[24]

Russia has also had a limited interaction with the African Union. For example, Russia invited Jean Ping Alpha Oumar Konare, chairman of the African Union, to a visit in 2006. The visit failed to take place whilst he held that position, and his successor has yet to visit Moscow in this capacity.

Russia retains an interest in African peace and security in Africa and collaborates with African countries and the African Union on such issues. It participates in all UN peace-keeping missions in Africa and has trained Africa policemen in Russia since 2006.[25] Furthermore, Russian naval ships began safeguarding sea routes in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Aden in 2008.[26]

19 The constitutional referendum was so controversial, that Gennady Burbulis, then a close confidante of Yeltsin, later stated that the new constitution was dragged 'through the arsehole'; see http://ria.ru/analytics/20100804/261572775.html#ixzz2MNULYTbp

20 'Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993,' www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm.

21 Ibid.

22 Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Department of Asia and Africa, http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/about/structure/depAsiaAfrica/.

23 Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia Department of Foreign Economic Relations, 2013, http://www.minpromtorg.gov.ru/ministry/structure/dep/inter/tasks.

24 H.E. Assam Ekanem Assam, (presentation by the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the Russian Federation, Institute for African Studies, Moscow, 19 December, 2012).

25 UN, 'Russia is training representatives of African countries for the participation in the UN peace-keeping operations,' http://www.un.org/russian/news/story.asp?newsID=7123#.UTDyuzsU-NY.

26 'Neustrashimyi Will Visit Somali Pirates Again,' http://www.siliyan.ru/neystrashimiy.

Russia also has aims to collaborate with Africa in the sphere of natural resources. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself partly deprived of vital minerals for its economy. Imports cover its deficit of certain minerals: manganese (almost 100 percent), chrome (80 percent) and bauxites (60 percent).[27] It also has undeveloped deposits situated mostly in the remote areas of Siberia and far east. Currently, over 30 major Russian companies are involved in African natural resources development projects.

These projects have emphasised interaction with priority partners on the African continent, namely Angola, Guinea, South Africa, Namibia and Nigeria. For example, several major investment projects continue to be implemented in Guinea. These include the development of the bauxite and alumina deposits by RUSAL (the world's largest aluminium company), a mining and gold production project by Severstal and a palm oil development, manufacture and export project by Gammachim.

The case of Angola, one of Russia's priority countries, highlights achievements and challenges. A feeling of trust lingers towards Russians and Russian businesses due to the former Soviet Union's support for Angolan liberation. However, Russian companies often lack the experience and marketing skills necessary to enter the highly competitive markets, and they often lose competitions with stronger players.

A major success of Russian business in Angola is a deal by the VTB bank in Luanda, which offered $1 billion credit with a seven year payment period from the Russian bank VTB Capital. The Angolan government is considering whether to issue $2 million dollars in treasury bills in early 2013, a debt that the VTB Capital will commercialise. Andrey Kostin, the VTB group president, has stated that the new issue may require remuneration below the 7 percent rate required last August when VTB Capital privately placed $1 billion (the first time Angola placed debt on international markets). The administration has approved the additional sale of a 15.9 percent stake in its Angolan subsidiary, Banco VTB-África, with Angolan investors now holding a 49.9 percent stake.[28] The Luanda-based VTB Africa has thus transformed from a commercial bank to an investment bank. The deal took place by negotiating the reduction of company's 66 percent share to a 50 percent plus one share in the bank, allowing VTB to remain in the market and create a good base for promising projects.

Another major project is ANGOSAT, which holds a contract of approximately $327 million to create a satellite communication and broadcasting system. Negotiations for the project began in 2007 and ended two years later. It took a further two years to sign the credit agreement of over $300 million from a consortium of Russian banks. The implementation of the ANGOSAT project began last December.[29]

Alrosa, a major actor in Angolan diamond mining with seven on-going projects aside from Catoca and Gidroshikapa, broadly cooperates in geological research with Endiama, the leading Angolan company in the field. Cooperation has also penetrated education. Last year, Angola sent 55 graduate students and five doctoral students to Russian universities, as well as a significant number of military and policemen. However, trade turnover between Russia and Angola is only $46 million.[30]

Several companies thus successfully operate in southern Africa (EVRAZ, Renova, Renaissance Capital, Norilskiy Nickel, Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, RosAtom), as well as several banks (VTB, VEB, Gazprom Bank). Russia's foreign trade with Africa has recovered since the considerable drop of 2009 and the turnover was expected to reach up to $10 billion in 2012. However, this figure represents less than 2 percent of all Russian trade.

27 *The World of Africa* 1 (2011), 17.

28 http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2012/11/14/russia%E2%80%99s-vtb-capital-bank-may-place-more-angolan-debt/.

29 'ANGOSAT Project Entered a Stage of Practical Realisation' (trans.), http://avia.mirtesen.ru/blog/43508340776/Proekt-ANGOSAT-vstupil-v-fazu-prakticheskoy-realizatsii.

30 'Russian-Angolan Trade Grew 4.5 Times in 2011,' http://www.giac.ru/PressRelease/PressReleaseShow.asp?id=404212.

The Russian state plays a vital role in strengthening ties with Africa. Even under conditions of the so-called 'market economy', developing broad economic ties with Africa requires support from the state, especially for medium and small businesses. Otherwise, only the most efficient Russian companies and businessmen would manage to find niches for exports. Bilateral inter-governmental commissions formed with a number of African countries, but many are simply not active enough to make a valuable contribution.

Russian businesses interested in Africa have taken steps to self-organise, such as the 2009 formation of the Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan African Countries (Afrocom), chaired by Vladimir Dmitriev (chairperson of the state-owned Vnesheconom Bank - VEB) under the auspices of the Russian Chamber of Trade and Industry. In 2011, the VEB helped create the Russian Agency on Insurance of Export Credits and Investments,[31] which aims to facilitate the activities of Russian companies in Africa by protecting export credits from entrepreneurial and political risks and, since 2013, investments from political risks.[32]

Africa has many potential opportunities for Russian investments. However, Russian investment figures in Africa often differ because of the difficulty in identifying the origin of investments. For example, Renova Holding is registered in the Bahamas, Evraz plc in the UK and Gazprom International in the Netherlands.

The major areas of Russia cooperation with Africa include mineral resources, energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, fishing, education, health, tourism and defence.[33] Russia's arms trade sometimes attracts criticism. In the early 1990s, the so-called 'democratic' media in Russia launched a campaign against arms sales, portraying them as immoral and, along with the demise of Russian defence industry, as a cause of the loss of a number of traditional markets for Russian arms to the West and China. Overall arms export dropped almost tenfold between 1990 and 1994,[34] but rose to $11 billion in 2011. However, only 10 percent of this figure corresponds to northern Africa and seven percent to sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to note that the Russian government has strengthened its control of the industry by channelling all arms deals through the state-owned Rosoboronexport to observe all sanctions and limitations imposed by the UN Security Council.

In regard to aid, Russia has made a major contribution to debt-reduction for Africa (around $20 billion) and has introduced a preferential system for traditional African export commodities with no import duties or quota limitations. It has signed several agreements with African countries regarding the use of remaining debts to fund development projects.[35] The bulk of Russian aid is delivered through international organisations and funds. The Concept of the Russian Federation's participation in international development assistance was approved in 2007, which affirms that 'with creation and development of the national system of IDA [International development assistance]' Russia would provide aid 'in the form of bilateral assistance'.[36] However, no such system has appeared so far. Russia aims to provide a stable pattern of aid, reaching 0.7 percent of GNP, as recommended by the UN. However, it has a long way to go before reaching this goal.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation declares that executive bodies cooperate on a permanent basis 'with political parties, non-governmental organisations, the expert academic community, cultural humanitarian associations, business circles and mass-media of Russia, assisting in their participation in international cooperation'.[37] Although the process of 'democratisation' should have enhanced civil society,

31 The annual meeting of the Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan African countries took place at the Chamber of Trade and Industry; see http://www.tpprf.ru/ru/news/about/index.php?id_12=36575.
32 'Export Insurance Agency of Russia Activity Profile,' http://www.exiar.ru/about/profile/.
33 'Russia's Economic Engagement with Africa,' *Africa Economic Brief*, 2 July, 2011.
34 The Soviet Union figure corresponds to 1990.
35 'Russia Forgave Africa $20 Billion,' *Lenta*, 20 February, 2013.
36 http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c325787a0034c255/00cc9154529e1c7fc32575bc002c6bb5!OpenDocument.
37 Ibid.

reality looks somewhat different. Amongst 59 registered Russian political parties, only three or four have some bilateral contact with Africa. The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee gave many African organisations political and practical support during the liberation struggle. In 1992, the committee was reorganised as the Society of Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity and Cooperation. It has since then centred on the problems of the Middle East and does not focus much on Africa.

Moscow has unfortunately lost many of its 'soft power' instruments. Several of them closed, including the Africa Service of Radio Moscow, Progress Publishers and the Friendship House in Moscow. Fortunately, the Russia Today channel still operates and maintains a positive reception in Africa. The Russian media's inadequate coverage of Africa developments presents another problem because it concentrates on armed conflicts, natural calamities or at best African nature and safaris. Most news comes from western sources as the Russian media has a limited number of African offices.

Regarding African studies in Russia, the major centre is the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, followed by the Centre for African Studies at the Institute of General History. Universities in Moscow, St Petersburg, Kazan, Yaroslavl and others also conduct multi-disciplinary studies. These studies have expanded their scope of research to include current 'burning' issues, in particular problems of political and economic integration, recent developments in northern Africa and new power alignments after the creation of BRICS.

Russian academics vary in their assessment of the situation in Africa. Those dealing with global problems mainly have a negative outlook that claims that the continent 'will not be able to find its niche in the global economy and most probably will continue developing non-stable regimes of adaption to external and internal shocks'.[38] However, most African scholars in Russia are rather optimistic. They believe that the convergence of interests, positions and efforts is the main trend of the development of political relations between Russia and Africa, and they criticise what they still see as a lack of attention to Africa. According to Tatiana Deich: '… [M]any officials in the Russian government continue to be guided by old stereotypes of Africa as a continent of famine, disease and ethnic conflicts and, besides, the preserve of the West, that captured every aspect of its economy and dictates them policy'.[39]

Often, Russia's 'come back' to Africa is seen in a competitive light vis-à-vis China. This approach has flaws, because Russia and China often have different in the field of economic relations. Russia is neither willing nor able to compete with China in exporting clothes or footwear. Also, the demographic nature of its interaction with Africa differs. For example, there are around 700 Russian citizens in Angola compared to 200,000 to 300,000 Chinese citizens. On the other hand, Russia remains strong in engineering and science and can fill markets in Africa in this respect. Northern African and some sub-Saharan African countries, especially their armed forces, are historically adapted to Russian products.

Finally, education presents good opportunities for cooperation. Soviet graduates hold important posts in nearly every African country. In 1996, the Russian government resumed granting of scholarships to citizens of developing countries. However, as they practically only cover tuition and students often refuse them. In any case, currently about 8,000 African students study in Russia, and about a half of them hold Russian government scholarships.[40]

38 Alexander Dynkin, ed., *World Economy, Forecast until 2020* (trans.) (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2008), 84.
39 Tatyana Deich and Evgeny Korendyasov, eds., *Russian-African Relations and Russia's Image in Africa* (trans.) (Moscow: Institut Afriki RAN, 2007), 40.
40 Vladimir Fedotov (presentation, 'Russia's Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa,' Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia, 31 October, 2012).

CONCLUSION

With a new interest in Africa, it has become clear that Russia and Africa need each other. Russia represents a vast market not only for African minerals, but also for various other African goods and products. At the same time, Russia's activity on the continent can strengthen the position of African countries vis-à-vis old and new external players.

Last February, a visit of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Algeria, South Africa, Mozambique and Guinea highlighted the new dynamism of Russia's Africa policy. Vladimir Putin's working visit to South Africa and his participation in the BRICS summit in Durban in March 2013 reinforced it. Putin and Zuma signed the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Africa.[41] In addition, a package of bilateral intergovernmental documents on cooperation in various fields was signed in their presence. These fields included flight safety, mutual recognition of educational documents and academic degrees, astrophysics research and a cooperation programme for joint cultural projects. In the economic sphere, the two parties signed documents regarding cooperation in the energy sector, with respect to platinum group metals, fishing, ferroalloy production and solar energy.[42]

The signing of cooperation agreements between the BRICS countries, especially on co-financing infrastructure projects in Africa and establishing the BRICS Business Council,[43] should encourage Russian business dealings with Africa. Apart from the BRICS summit, Putin took part in the 'Retreat', a meeting of BRICS leaders with the heads of African continental and regional bodies. During the meeting, Putin noted that BRICS countries jointly champion the rights and interests of African and other countries with emerging economies and spoke out in favour of increasing their role and influence within the global governance system, particularly within international financial and economic organisations. As to the role of Russia in Africa, Putin underscored debt relief and an intention to increase the number of scholarships provided to sub-Saharan African countries.[44]

Putin's visit demonstrated a new impulse for Russia's involvement in Africa. It helped high officials and business people who accompanied him to better understand the realities and potential of Africa. Time will tell whether this impulse will bring about a steady process and what practical actions will follow the declarations made in Durban. ■

41 http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/98.
42 http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/5172.
43 http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/5177.
44 http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5184.

India's African Engagement

Daniel Large

India's African engagement has become more organised in the past five years as New Delhi has sought to fashion a rejuvenated role in the continent on the back of expanding business. Following on from a distinctive history of connections, the key drivers of India's more recent relations with Africa feature strategic objectives linked to political goals of Indian foreign policy and wider international politics, coupled with the imperatives of sustaining and expanding economic growth amidst high external resource dependence. While the government has become more involved in organising India's Africa partnership, Indian business has been more actively pursuing economic gains on the continent. India's development cooperation, including emphasis on training, is deepening at the same time as India seeks to reposition itself and become more involved in African development.

India is now more widely seen as important in Africa, even if it remains upstaged by China. However, Africa is not the priority for India that many assume, or might appear to be, if New Delhi's rhetoric is taken at face value. India has more important foreign policy priorities, grounded in its regional neighbourhood and the considerable domestic challenges facing the world's most populous democracy. Nonetheless, Africa has become a more important engagement for the Indian government and especially Indian business, which has led the way in actively engaging different parts of the continent.

This chapter offers a short sketch of India's African engagement. It begins by arguing that India's historical connections and unique identity credentials remain important today. Second, it outlines the key political and economic drivers of India's engagement with Africa. Third, it discusses how, in a somewhat ad hoc process, the government of India's has sought to develop its African partnership. The fourth section suggests that Indian business has been at the forefront of recent relations as part of growing economic relations with important state backing. The final section, demonstrating the mixed nature of economic interests, development assistance and political objectives, discusses how India's efforts to contribute developmentally to Africa have lately come to the forefront of its policy engagement and promise to become more central in the years to come.

HISTORY

History matters in myriad ways to India's relations with Africa. Different histories are constitutive influences in India's multifaceted relations with the continent today. The past is active in the present, and it goes back a long way. Notions of civilisational connections between India and parts of Africa — such as ancient links between the Nile Valley and the Indus Valley — remain popular. Before Africa's decolonisation, India had a much more involved role in the continent, which featured human movement from India to regions such as east Africa. This role initially stemmed from India's distinctive position within the British Empire and increased after 1947 because of its shared experience of colonial rule. A distinctive aspect of Indian engagement takes the form of large diasporas in Africa. Whereas Chinese migration to Africa is historically quite new in its current form, the deeper Indian presence means a different historical relation.

Overall, the shared experience of colonialism has been most formative. India has served as an example for colonial Africa. The Indian National Congress, for instance, was a model for certain African political parties like the Sudanese Graduate Congress and the Tranvaal Indian Congress during the movement for independence. Such colonial connections and the post-colonial legacy continue to inform relations today.

The core principles informing India's relations with Africa demonstrate a strong sense of continuity with the 1954 *Panchsheel* principles of peaceful coexistence, based on mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit. Adopted by the original 1955 Bandung Conference, these were again reaffirmed in 2005 as the basis of the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership. India continues to uphold a sovereignty-based doctrine emphasising reciprocal non-interference, equality and mutual benefit. Framed within the language of South-South cooperation, this also translates into an Indian form of South-South development cooperation, based not on a narrow form of aid 'but rather as economic, technical, and cultural cooperation for mutual benefit'.[1]

While not without some basis in experience, the official language of India's Africa relations is an officially sanctioned history, edited at the expense of nuanced and sometimes more controversial histories. However, with this history and the Indian identity it carries used positively, this is important for attempting to enhance ties or, more reactively, to offset criticism. An essential dimension is the performative nature of this rhetoric, which is deployed in ritual performances that embody otherwise abstract notions of friendship or partnership. In other words, 'the performance of egalitarian solidarity' underscores India's difference from the West and its status as an alternative partner with different ideas, modalities and objectives.[2]

Such an approach, emphasising partnership, demonstrates the strong continuity of the post-colonial language of political and moral solidarity. In the new circumstances of a more open and globalising India, it is not always easily reconciled with recent forms of more material, pragmatic and economically-driven business. At the same time, it could be argued that as much as India's democratic status is important, including to its externally presented identity, it is the solidarity founded in its colonial past that acts as a more powerful underlying source of connection, attraction and advantage. This was underscored in India's diplomacy over Sudan's Darfur crisis, when India, comprehensively overshadowed by attention to China, engaged in its own form of solidarity politics with the government of Sudan as it sought to protect its investments in the country.

KEY DRIVERS OF INDIA'S AFRICA ENGAGEMENT

The main drivers of India's relations with Africa feature an assorted mixture of inter-related political, strategic and economic factors related to its national and international ambitions. While such drivers can be ascribed to the government of India and its foreign policy, the term 'India' clearly encompasses a much more complex set of internally diverse actors. Despite efforts to enhance the coherence of India's engagement, these do not always cohere in the pursuit of common goals. This is indicative of how Indian relations with Africa now mix government engagement with various other actors, to which Indian business is central.

A defining overarching driver is India's pursuit of strategic autonomy in new, global circumstances characterised by economic interdependence and the pursuit of status and influence in the international system. The ideal of strategic autonomy, which reprises the old doctrine of non-alignment, has recently been the subject of much debate but continues to be promoted as the core of a renewed Indian global engagement seeking to

1 Renu Modi, ed., *South-South Cooperation: Africa on the Centre State* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 9.
2 Emma Mawdsley, 'The Non-DAC Donors and the Changing Landscape of Foreign Aid: The (In)significance of India's Development Cooperation with Kenya,' *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4/2 (2010), 361-79.

'enhance India's strategic space and capacity for independent agency'.[3] Such an aim is couched within efforts to forge a new India's historic promotion of its own form of alternative universalism based on the moral and democratic political credentials pioneered by modern India's founding fathers, like Gandhi, Nehru or Ambedkar.

India has sought to develop and pursue a long-term strategic partnership, while at the same time following other bilateral foreign policy objectives.

One area where this is seen, if not always publicly acknowledged, is in India's relations with China. Made more competitive and compelling due to neighbourhood proximity, these have developed into an unstated form of rivalry projected onto Africa. This motivation for India's Africa policy has been especially important in the process whereby a formerly distant continent has come to be more noticed within India by a slightly wider, though still restricted domestic audience. Only in the last decade, especially since 2008, have more people within India started to take an interest in Africa, a process significantly catalysed by China's visible irruption into the continent after the globally visible third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in November 2006.[4]

Second, India pursues wider international objectives via its African relations. Africa features in India's efforts to position itself as an aspiring smart power with global reach, trying to reconcile global aspirations with its domestic developmental imperatives and the need to balance development assistance with the promotion and expansion of its own interests in Africa. New Delhi's commitment to reforming and democratising international relations dovetails with its aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Africa is seen as a support base for this ambition, mirrored by India's support for the Security Council's ambitions for key regional African states.

Collaboration with Africa is bound up in India's wider international roles in other senses. This is seen in India's contribution to international peace and security via its active UN peacekeeping role in Africa, from which India can claim and receive credit. This is also evident in India's role in different forms of regionalism, of which the BRICS framework is today perhaps the most prominent (India hosted the BRICS Summit in March 2012 in New Delhi). However, there are other forms of engagement. One example is the trilateral India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum, which was agreed in 2003 and seeks to promote South-South cooperation.

Third, economic interests are a further and important driver in India's relations with Africa. Energy security clearly demonstrates this point. Holding 0.3 percent of the world's total oil reserves and a fifth of its population, India has been importing on average more than half of its crude oil needs since 1965. The 'India Hydrocarbon Vision 2025' of February 2000 called on India 'to assure energy security by achieving self-reliance through increased indigenous production and investment in equity oil abroad'.[5] While outlining a greener, cleaner India using renewable energy, oil was at the core of this vision, galvanising efforts to find new overseas sources. India's dependency on foreign oil stood at around 75 percent in 2010 and was projected to rise to 90 percent by 2025.[6] As a result, it is compelled to engage resource endowed African states to continue its economic growth. This is then a vital domestic driver: India's outstanding challenge continues to be lifting millions of impoverished Indians out of poverty. This is an immense challenge, especially in the face of India's recent economic slowdown to five percent growth in 2012.

3 Sunil Khilnani et al., 'Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century,' (2012), 8.

4 New efforts to publicise Africa within India are being made in order to redress the limited awareness. In 2012, for example, the IDSA launched a new bimonthly newsletter *Africa Trends*.

5 Planning Commission of the Government of Indian, *India Hydrocarbon Vision 2025* (New Delhi: Government of India, 2000).

6 Planning Commission of the Government of Indian, *Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the Expert Committee* (New Delhi: Government of India, 2006), 45.

Finally, a related factor concerns the geostrategic propulsion behind India's mounting interest in and engagement with the strategically important African Indian Ocean Rim. India's maritime doctrine, published in 2004 and revised in 2007, spelled out the immense importance of the Indian Ocean to India's security and economic development, manifest in the high dependence upon seaborne supplies of natural resources (for instance, nearly 90 percent of its oil supplies are seaborne). New Delhi's quest for natural resources — especially oil and natural gas — to power continued economic growth renders its interdependence with overseas supply sources a strategic matter.

INDIA'S AFRICA PARTNERSHIP: INCREMENTAL ENGAGEMENT

From the outside, India's Africa partnership looks well calibrated, expressed as it is in a noble and fluent language of South-South cooperation and all the impeccable credentials of mutuality and partnership that flow from this. However, even a cursory genealogy of its recent genesis and development reveals a different story in which growing links with Africa started and developed in a much more organic, ad hoc manner led by corporate and corporate-related bodies that first championed greater connections and the cause of investing in Africa. These were later institutionalised by government entities into red carpet summits.

Indian business, albeit with some support from government departments, mobilised before the Indian government in pursuing a more organised, ambitious and active outreach to Africa. In other words, the government of India did not lead, but was led to Africa, and remains beset by a policy-making capacity deficit. The first high-level India-Africa business conclave, following earlier business efforts, was organised by the Confederation of Indian Industry and India's Export Import (Exim) Bank (in association with other government ministries and the African Development Bank) in March 2005. This has become a vibrant, popular and busy annual event.

The first 'India Africa Forum Summit', attended by 14 African heads of states, was held in New Delhi in April 2008. It concluded by declaring an 'Africa-India Framework for Cooperation' — an ambitious set of commitments to advance the breadth and depth of an Indian-African partnership formally predicated upon mutual benefit. The second India Africa Forum Summit was held in Addis Ababa in 2011 and produced the Addis Ababa Declaration and the Framework for Enhanced Cooperation.

Whereas once the far-sighted internal champions of enhanced African economic relations had to work hard to get government attention, now the government is more focused on Africa.[7] For India, its politics is held up as a comparative advantage. A notable self-articulation by Indian leaders, intellectuals and corporate CEOs is the notion that India has a benign positive image and is not regarded as a threatening power. Linked to its domestic democratic record, and other achievements such as in agriculture, this is expressed as the power of India's example and, with the ideological capital it is perceived as holding, is seen as 'India's great advantage'.[8]

7 Interview with corporate executive, New Delhi, India, 10 March, 2012.
8 Sunil Khilnani et al., 10.

ECONOMIC TIES

Following the period of neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, and in the context of pressing concern about strategic questions like energy security, Indian foreign policy became more oriented toward economic concerns, even though it has never jettisoned the more normative principles of its foreign relations. It has allowed the expansion of new economic ties at the same time as the continuation and evolution of more established forms of economic and developmental interaction.

Overall trade between India and Africa more than doubled from $25 billion in 2006-07 to $57 billion in 2011 — the official target for 2015 is $90 billion. This meant that India accounted for a comparatively small proportion of Africa's trade (some 5.8 percent of in 2012), but the rate of growth in India's trade and investment has been such as to be comparable to China's.

India's economic profile in Africa is characterised by a number of aspects that conform to wider patterns. First, trade geography is concentrated: India's leading four African trade partners (Nigeria, South Africa, Angola and Algeria) account for some 68 percent of total trade (Nigeria alone accounted for 29.4 percent in 2011 and South Africa for 21.3 percent). Second, the composition of trade rests on a commodity base. Oil dominates overall trade. Africa supplies some 20 percent of India's fuel imports. African imports from India are dominated by manufactured goods. Africa had a trade surplus with India of some $14.8 billion in 2011, mostly due to primary commodity exports (making up 91 percent of Africa's exports to India in 2010). Third, Indian investment has increased markedly in recent years, especially in agriculture, infrastructure, telecoms and mining. The majority has been concentrated in India's top ten trading partners. Finally, financial credit mechanisms are the centre of India's economic engagement, underwriting business expansion and funding a plethora of projects. The leading mechanism is Exim Bank credit lines. In May 2011, Indian Prime Minister announced a further credit of $5 billion for Africa. Africa is the largest regional recipient of Exim Bank's total line of credits.[9]

There have been efforts to promote economic links and enhance business connections. In 2008, for example, India launched a Duty Free Tariff Preference scheme. Indian corporations have stepped up operations, with the likes of Tata Motors, Dabur, Marico, Essar Group, Godrej, Bharti Airtel or Kirloskar Brothers increasingly active in targeting Africa as a market or centre of resource extraction, like Vedanta Resources in Zambia's copper industry. Overall, India has been most active in the areas regarded as its comparative advantages such as agriculture, information and communication technology, communications infrastructure and petroleum refining. As the 2011 Summit emphasised, agriculture was one area designated for the expansion of ties, including through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme. When it comes to the operations of certain Indian companies in this sector, however, it has not all been plain sailing. Notably, in Ethiopia, the likes of Karuturi Agro Products, a subsidiary of Karuturi Global Ltd., along with other Indian companies have attracted criticism for the nature of their work in the Gambella region from without India.[10] There has been a small debate about 'agro-imperialism' within India as well,[11] indicative of emerging questions about the conduct of Indian corporations in Africa.

Energy security has influenced India's moves into the African oil sector. Partly facilitated by the Indian government and its leaders, the strategic importance of this predictably meant that hard commercial considerations have trumped the normative thrust of Indian foreign policy. Debate within India over the risks of the engagement in Sudan by its leading national overseas oil company, ONGC Videsh (OVL), predominantly focused not the morality of investing but on the company's safety. India's petro-partnership with Sudan began in 2003 when

9 Export-Import Bank of India, *30th Annual Report 2011-2012*, 47. Of a total of $8,160 million, operative LOCs as of 31 March 2012, Africa accounted for $4,313 million (and Asia for $3,458 million). Ethiopia was the top African recipient with $705 million.

10 The Oakland Institute, *Unheard Voices: The Human Rights Impact of Land Investments on Indigenous Communities in Gambella* (Oakland: Oakland Institute, 2013).

11 Ajoy Ashirwad Mahaprashasta, 'Recolonising Africa,' *Frontline*, 23 March, 2012.

OVL bought a 25 percent stake in Sudan's main oil consortium. Further investments made Sudan one of the largest destinations for Indian foreign investment between 1995 and 2005. Following a hugely profitable peace dividend from 2005, Sudan's financial importance for OVL began to decline in 2010-2011 as growing assets in Russia began to produce significant amounts of crude. OVL encountered diminishing returns amidst declining production, insecurity, political uncertainty and then South Sudan's secession.[12] India has been working hard to nurture its relations with other major oil-producing African countries, including Nigeria, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea or Côte d'Ivoire.

The Indian business engagement in Africa extends significantly beyond energy. More than oil, India imports a range of other commodities such as coal from South Africa. One area where India stands out in its economic relations flows from Africa is its position as the world's largest customer of gold bullion (important in its relations with South Africa), and as the leading processor of diamonds, making up some 86 percent of the world market. In terms of Indian exports to Africa, there are strong links in such sectors as automobiles, with Tata buses, Maruti cars, or Bajaj motorbikes and auto-rickshaws leading operators, and the active pharmaceutical business, as a range of Indian companies look to Africa to increase overseas sales and the government plans to further 'Pharma India' promotion.[13]

DIASPORA OUTREACH

The Indian diaspora in Africa, rooted in colonial and post-colonial history, is connected with but not reducible to India. The Indian government has made efforts since the 1990s to re-engage the global Indian diaspora, including in Africa. The Hindu nationalist party, the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP), which won power in 1996, took steps to enhance connections with overseas Indians. In 2004, India's Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs was established. One of its activities is the Overseas Indian Award (*Pravasi Bharatiya Samman*), which is open to Indians in overseas countries, including those in Africa.[14]

Since 2003, an annual *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* convention geared toward enhancing diaspora ties has been held on 9 January, the anniversary of Gandhi's return to India from South Africa in 1915. At one such event in 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh initiated an 'Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre' geared toward promoting economic ties, in which Africa and other developing regions now feature more prominently. In October 2010 a mini *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas*-Africa was held in Durban, along with other celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the arrival of the first indentured Indian labourers. Home to the largest number of Indians outside of India, with around 1.3 million South African Indians, South Africa is an important economic partner for India on the continent. Another such convention was held in October 2012 in Mauritius, another country of significant Indian population.

State-sponsored efforts to harness overseas Indians to wider national Indian objectives and the 'global India' vision have been complicated by the uneven nature of relations with overseas Indians and the accompanying tensions. Outside of South Africa, this is notable in East Africa, where many Indians felt abandoned following a troubled post-colonial history (notably in Uganda under Idi Amin). Today, for example, the Kenyan Indian population has an established place, multifaceted role and primarily 'African' identity that render official Indian efforts to promote diaspora diplomacy more complex and less straightforward than New Delhi might wish. New Delhi might want to advance synergies between Indian communities in Africa and India's own interests, but this is a negotiated relation with no such automatic synergies.[15]

12 Luke Patey, *The New Kings of Crude: China, India and the Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan* (London: Hurst, forthcoming)

13 Renu Modi, 'The Role of India's Private Sector in the Health and Agricultural Sectors of Africa' in Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi eds., *The Rise of China and India in Africa* (London: Zed, 2010), 120-131.

14 In 2013, awards were made to Ismail E. Ebrahim from South Africa (for business) and Ashok S. Vaswani from Guinea (for community service). Previous awards been granted to people from countries including Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Tanzania.

15 Gerard McCann, 'Ties that Bind or Binds that Tie? India's African Engagements and the Political Economy of Kenya,' *Review of African Political Economy* 37/126 (2010): 465-482.

INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

India's development assistance has become more intertwined with commercial considerations. This is partly seen in how either the Ministry of Commerce or Exim Bank has assumed more important roles in overseeing concessional finance agreements with African states. The Ministry of External Affairs had previously been the principal coordinator of Indian development assistance. Development cooperation policy is based on the twin foundations of economic and technical cooperation, with the former focusing on trade, investment and other linkages together with efforts to promote business regulation and opportunity. The latter engages with capacity building and human resource development.

A notable area where India styles itself as different in Africa is human resource development and capacity building support. This has deep roots, notably in generations of Africans educated in India, and in the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme dating to 1964 (its corollary is the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme). India's role here is held to be different on account of its approach, including emphasis on local skills development and emphasis on 'a people centric development approach in Africa'.[16] Human resource development is seen by India as a distinctive aspect of its engagement, which is competitive also through the advantages it has of a good quality affordable higher education sector and advanced IT. The 2008 India-Africa Summit launched a plethora of new training initiatives. Particularly, India committed to establishing 19 new institutions for capacity building.[17] How far this agenda advances will rest partly on the extent and manner by which this programme is realised and carried out in future years.

Indian business has also been involved in technology transfer, pursuing approaches held to be applicable like the 'Triple A' strategy championed by the Confederation of Indian Industry for affordable, adaptable and appropriate technology. In 2004, India launched the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-Indian Movement, a special credit facility for eight West African countries, to promote socio-economic development through access to Indian technology. It has also been extending support for cotton sector development in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali and, since May 2010, Nigeria and Uganda. India's Pan African E-Network Project, with African Union cooperation, uses Indian IT expertise to link academic institutions and hospitals in 47 African countries with counterparts in India via a satellite network enabling 'tele-education' and 'tele-medicine'.

India's new development cooperation phase is proceeding amidst the on-going reality of domestic poverty and on the back of moves to reposition India in international development. India ranked 134 (out of 187 countries) in the 2011 UN Human Development Index. This places it in a medium category, but it is still is beset by severe poverty. Following government insistence that all donors apart from the main six stop official flows to India in 2003, New Delhi moved to announce debt relief for seven African states. An excess of development initiatives followed. India has also been engaged in efforts to mobilise support at international bodies like the UN for its development cooperation.

India's development cooperation with Africa follows on from and contributes to New Delhi's efforts to move from a former aid recipient to a more active development actor with a wider international voice. While such ambition may for now exceed the present capability of an already overstretched government machinery, persistent debate about establishing a ministry for international development is indicative of how being more active in developing others, albeit through the mutualism of South-South means, is bound up with India's changing international stature.

16 Ajay K Dubey, 'India-Africa Relations: Historical Connections and Recent Trends' in Ajay Dubey, ed., *Trends in Indo-African Relations* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2010), 37.

17 These included the India-Africa Institute for Information Technology, the India-Africa Diamond Institute, the India-Africa Institute of Planning and Administration, the India-Africa Institute of Foreign Trade, 10 Vocational Training Centres and five Human Settlement Centres.

India's development cooperation is far more significant than its narrowly defined aid per se.[18] In January 2012, the government of India created a new Development Partnerships Administration to harmonise the work of Indian agencies involved in development assistance under the Ministry of External Affairs and streamline aid spending. While partly indicative of the growing scale of development assistance and future aspirations, this also underlined 'the intent to manage them more effectively and strategically, including in terms of public diplomacy — building India's image around the world'.[19]

INDIA'S PEACE AND SECURITY ENGAGEMENT

India's peacekeeping role in Africa is framed within its support for 'African initiatives for peace and security', thus combining multilateral UN participation with efforts to enhance African-led initiatives. Much of this is officially predicated upon the necessity of peace for wider socio-economic and political developmental aims. As affirmed by Manmohan Singh at the March 2013 BRICS summit in Durban: 'Sustainable economic development requires an environment of social and political stability'.[20]

India's UN peacekeeping, however, upstages this form of engagement. One aspect of India's peace and security engagement has been support for African regional bodies. It has thus, for example, contributed financial support to the African Union Mission in Somalia and, following the January 2013 French military intervention, to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali.

Currently ranking as the third largest contributor of UN peacekeepers in the world, India deploys some 7,840 military and police personnel.[21] India has a long history of UN peacekeeping in Africa, dating to India's military contribution to the UN Operation in the Congo in 1960. This translates into considerable experience across the years, much channelled by the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in New Delhi. The current UN Indian deployments include the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and large contingents in the UN Mission in South Sudan and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. UN peacekeeping is widely cited as evidence to support India's Security Council ambition. It plays a role for India as a global actor, and is also a subject that is not only supported within India but can also secondarily promote Indian national interests.

Beyond its multilateral participation and support for African organisations on security matters, India pursues its own strategic interests. Most notably, its resource supply imperative is complicated by competition, principally from China. New Delhi moved to counter mounting Chinese activity after former Chinese president Hu Jintao ended his Africa tour of 2007 in the Seychelles. India has been increasing its military ties with African states on the Indian Ocean, including Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar, Tanzania, Mozambique and especially South Africa. The Indian navy has also contributed to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. It has a track-record in robust policing actions, notably the sinking of a hijacked Thai trawler in 2008 and the recent capture of a Somali pirate ship off south-western Indian early in 2013.

18 Some $22.38 million of India's aid and loan programmes totalling $617.85 million (excluding lines of credit) in 2011-2012 went to African countries; Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report 2011-2012.

19 Emma Mawdsley, *From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape* (London: Zed Books, 2012), 97.

20 'India Committed to Support Africa, says Manmohan Singh,' *ANI*, 28 March, 2013.

21 See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.

CONCLUSION

India is neither a new actor in Africa, nor is it merely 'emerging'. In 2010, the US President Obama drew applause from the Indian parliament not only by declaring that 'India is not simply emerging; India has already emerged' but also by calling it 'a rising global power'.[22] The language of India as a 'rising power' or 'emerging actor', folded as these are into the wider meta-narrative of a 'rising Africa' and Asian global economic ascendancy, is convenient. However, this is also unhelpful in conveying a simplistic uni-linear trajectory, eschewing complexity and taking official rhetoric at face value. It is revealing that some in New Delhi oppose such terms, arguing that it creates a psychology of its own for leaders out of touch with gravity. At a more basic level, this entry point neglects the much more deep rooted, interesting and problematic histories beyond a multifaceted and diverse Indian role in the African continent and, concomitantly, the new histories in the making.

While India has avoided direct competition with China in Africa, instead positioning itself to exploit its niche areas, it has been looked to more as a collaborator in African development, not only from within but also from outside the continent. Established development agencies from the US, the UK or Japan are increasingly seeking to engage and work with India on African development cooperation, even while adjusting their own development relations with India. Following the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in late 2011 in South Korea, India endorsed the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and appeared set on a more prominent international role should it choose to pursue such a path and participate more actively. For now, in its Africa relations, it appears to prioritise its own approach and prefer the South-South partnership track.

In previous decades, India's economic relations with Africa never went 'beyond a verbal repetition of [the] South-South cause'.[23] The recent phase of enhanced business relations, expanding investment and more involved government engagement has marked a departure that if continued and sustained looks set to have an increasingly consequential significance. Whereas India's relations with the continent were previously stronger on ideology than on substance, this new underlying change has pointed to the opposite: an increasingly substantive, business-led engagement over which official rhetoric of South-South partnership is overlaid and subject to increasing strain by virtue of the nature of emerging Indian relations with Africa.

India's Africa relations in their current form remain a comparatively recent rejuvenation as an area of deliberate government attention and activity. Having moved to a more important position within India's foreign policy, yet still not a clear priority, Africa has been elevated as a policy concern sometime after Indian business mobilised into more active forms of engaging various opportunities. The government of India was widely being urged to move 'from agreement to action'[24] in its Africa relations. This begged the question of how, in the context of the Indian government's capacity constraints and practical limitations on its Africa endeavour, India can not only articulate but also pursue an engagement with Africa that delivers and more effectively realises the substantive principles and commitments upon which it is based. ■

22 'Full Text of Obama Speech in Parliament,' *India Today,* 8 November, 2010.
23 Ajay Dubey, *Indo-African Relations in the Post-Nehru Era 1965-1985* (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1990), 80.
24 Rajiv Bhatia, 'India-Africa Summit: From Agreement to Action,' *The Hindu*, 9 June, 2011.

Brazil in Africa: Achievements and Challenges

Ana Cristina Alves

Brazil's footprint in Africa has intensified dramatically in recent years, not only in terms of trade and investment, but also in terms of development cooperation and political alliance building. This has largely resulted from Lula da Silva's presidency, which maintained a strong determination to unite the voices of the global South. Its cause has benefited from more conducive domestic conditions on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as from a ripening international framework marked by the economic decline of the developed world. The contemporary drivers behind Brazil's foreign policy shift toward Africa include a broad political goal of contributing to a greater say of the global South in the new world order in the making, a narrower political goal of securing a key position within this emerging international architecture and lastly a more pragmatic goal of promoting the expansion of Brazil's economic interests in Africa.

Brazil has initiated a concerted soft power offensive in Africa in pursuit of the first two goals, which has been spearheaded by the dramatic intensification of its development cooperation commitments. To further its business in the continent, Brasilia is putting in place a logistical platform rooted in financial support at home and a proactive economic diplomacy offensive. However, the necessary domestic institutional adjustment has not followed the recent rapid expansion of Brazil's economic and development cooperation footprint in Africa. This has generated challenges to the sustainability of this pace of engagement.

This paper offers a brief overview of Brazil-Africa relations, the central role of history in Brasilia's contemporary Africa discourse and an analysis of the main drivers behind this rapprochement with the continent. It argues that although Brazil has successfully managed to position itself as a reliable development partner for Africa in a very short time, alarming signs of institutional overstretch and contradictions threaten the sustainability of this project. The continuation of its success depends on Brasilia's capacity to adjust its structures and ensure coherence between its normative rhetoric and practices of its agents in the continent.

BRIEF HISTORY OF RELATIONS

Much like Russia and China, Brazil's Africa discourse at present places a strong emphasis on historical ties. Brazil's friendship credentials, however, are not rooted in the battleground of the independence struggle; its ties with Africa go further back and much deeper. Not only was Brazil built upon the sweat and blood of slaves brought from western Africa throughout colonial and imperial eras, but the heritage of these slaves imprinted strong African nuances in modern Brazil. To this day, the African dimension remains very robust and apparent in Brazil, namely through its genetic, cultural (such as folklore, music, religion, literature and cuisine) and linguistic legacy.

Although Africa has been a constant element throughout Brazil's history, the links between them declined significantly after the abolition of slavery in 1888. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Africa figured very low in Brazil's foreign policy agenda. It surfaced briefly in the late 1950s in the framework of independence processes in the continent, and in the early 1960s under the presidencies of Janio Quadros and Joao Goulart, when Brazil opened diplomatic representations in eight African countries. This rapprochement, however, suddenly came to a halt by the military dictatorship that commenced in 1964. Throughout the rest of the decade, Brasilia's Africa policy was driven by its allegiance to Portugal (that against all odds kept its colonial grip over its African 'overseas provinces') and South Africa's apartheid regime, as the two countries accounted for most of its commercial exchanges with the continent.

The independence of Portuguese speaking African countries in the 1970s and the increasing economic allure of independent Africa led to a gradual shift, with 'Itamaraty' (Brazil's Ministry of External Relations) progressively adopting an anti-colonial and anti-apartheid stance. The steady democratisation of Brazil in the late 1980s led to the gradual liberalisation and stabilisation of its domestic economy throughout the 1990s, although it remained very inward looking. The improved macroeconomic situation of Brazil in the early 2000s coincided with Africa's economic revival, and this converging framework set the stage for the resurfacing of Africa in Brazil's foreign policy over the past decade. The quantum leap forward, however, largely resulted from the vision of Lula da Silva's presidency (2003-2010).

Although Brasilia maintained diplomatic relations with all African countries represented in the UN, Brazil had a relatively light diplomatic footprint in the continent when Lula came to power. Brazil has since then doubled the number of embassies in Africa, from 18 to 37, and African embassies in Brasilia have increased from 16 to 34.[1] During his two administrations, President Lula made a total of 28 visits (bilateral and multilateral) to the African continent, covering a total of 21 countries.[2] His successor, Dilma Russeff, has thus far visited five African countries over the past three years and has two more visits planned for 2013.

Brazil's new Africa discourse initiated by Lula draws heavily on the solidarity dimension rooted in the historical debt and cultural and ethnic ties with the continent. A closer analysis, however, reveals that the drivers behind this rapprochement are in reality much more pragmatic — namely political and economic.

THE POLITICAL DRIVERS

The warming up towards Africa in the 2000s in reality forms part of a broad foreign policy shift inside Itamaraty. The alliance with the US dominated Brazil's foreign policy paradigm until the late 1990s, cutting across the different regimes.[3] Some rival narratives nonetheless persisted within Itamaraty's bureaucracy that favoured a more independent foreign policy and argued for the diversification of partnerships. This line of thought gained traction in three different periods in Brazil's modern history: 1961-1964 (Jânio Quadros/João Goulart), 1974-1979 (Ernesto Geisel) and 2003-present (Lula da Silva/Dilma Rousseff).[4] In all three periods, the general aim was to counterbalance the dominant role of the US in Brazil's foreign policy. Itamaraty attempted to strengthen relations with other developing countries through the expansion of bilateral, regional and multilateral exchanges at various levels. However, the international framework and domestic context impaired Brasilia's efforts in its first two attempts.

1 Andre Souza, 'Brazilian Development Cooperation' (presentation, BRICS Academic Forum, Durban, South Africa, 12 March, 2013).

2 Secretariat of Diplomatic Planning, Ministry of External Relations, *Visitas Internacionais do Presidente Lula e Visitas ao Brasil de Chefes de Estado e de Chefes de Governo 2003-2010* (Brasilia, 2010), http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/balanco-de-politica-externa-2003-2010/visitas-internacionais-do-presidente-lula-e-visitas-ao-brasil-de-chefes-de-estado-e-de-chefes-de-governo-2003-a-2010.

3 Carlos Milani, 'Brazilian Foreign Policy in Africa: Actors, Agendas and South-South Cooperation' (public lecture, Jan Smuts House, SAIIA, Johannesburg, South Africa, 27 February, 2013).

4 Patricia Soares Leite, *O Brasil e a Cooperação Sul-Sul em Três Momentos de Politica Externa: Os Governos de Jânio Quadros/João Goulart, Ernesto Geisel e Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva* (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2011).

Internal and international conditions became more favourable when Lula came to power.[5] Brazil had become a thriving democracy, boasting a stable and rising economy that was lifting millions out of poverty and enhancing Brazil's credibility abroad. The onset of the world economic crisis further eroded the dominance of the developed world and opened an unprecedented window of opportunity for the southern hemisphere to have a greater say in the international arena.

This framework finally brought to an end the enduring predominance of the US alliance paradigm in Brazil's foreign policy. Without underrating relations with developed countries, Lula's government placed a clear focus on the southern hemisphere, starting with its neighbours (South America, Mercosur) and the regional geometries that link Brazil to other parts of the global South (CPLP-Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries; IBSA; BRICS; ASA-America do Sul-Africa Summit; South Atlantic), which soon became the new dominant paradigm in Itamaraty.[6]

Brazil's rapprochement with the African continent over the past decade evolved within this significant foreign policy shift. By fostering strategic alliances with the developing world, Brazil aims to first promote the global South agenda within the current transformation of the international system into a more inclusive and equitable architecture. In the words of Lula: 'A new global political and economic geography will only be possible if actors with similar interests chose direct dialogue and joint action in international fora'.[7] Second, Brasília aims to boost its international stature internationally to better reflect its demographic and economic weight. Africa may not yet stand as an important stakeholder in the southern hemisphere, but it surely represents a key constituency. This is of critical importance for Brazil's pursuit of its international political agenda that includes a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

THE ECONOMIC DRIVERS

Brazil's economic interests in the African continent are equally strong. The emergence of a more stable and dynamic Africa in the 2000s coincided with the globalisation of Brazilian economy. The geological, climatic, economic and social similarities between Brazil and Africa present endless opportunities for Brazilian investors. These include Brazilian technology and expertise in infrastructure construction, tropical agriculture and agribusiness, biofuels, hydrocarbons exploration, mining and telecommunications. The exponential growth in Brazil-Africa trade and investment flows over the past decade clearly reflects this.

Trade

Brazil-Africa trade has expanded nearly seven fold over the past 12 years, having surged from $4.3 billion to $26.5 billion from 2000 to 2012. Although Africa still accounts for only a small part of Brazil imports (6.8 percent in 2011) and exports (4.8 percent in 2011),[8] Africa's stake in Brazil's foreign trade overall increased steadily from 3.9 percent to 5.7 percent between 2000 and 2012. Bilateral trade has the potential to expand further in the near future, particularly when taking into account the complementarities mentioned above.[9]

5 Ibid, 11.

6 Carlos Milani, 'Brazilian Foreign Policy in Africa: Actors, Agendas and South-South Cooperation' (public lecture, Jan Smuts House, SAIIA, Johannesburg, South Africa, 27 February, 2013).

7 Lula da Silva, 'Opening Speech at the Africa-South America Summit, Abuja-Nigeria, 30 November' in Ministry of External Relations, *Discursos Selecionados do Presidente Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 2006* (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2008), 65.

8 Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, SECEX, *Balança Comercial Brasileira Dados Consolidados, 2011*, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_1331125742.pdf, 7 and 17.

9 For all figures in this paragraph (unless otherwise stated): MDICE-SECEX, *Intercâmbio Commercial Brasileiro: Paises e Blocos Económicos 2012* http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=576.

A closer look at bilateral trade flows highlights a number of distinctive features. Since the late 1990s, trade balance has presented a persistent healthy surplus for Africa as a whole. In 2012, bilateral trade registered a deficit of -$2.05 billion for Brasilia. This is largely explained by Brazil-Nigeria trade flows, its largest trade partner in the continent, with which it has a trade deficit of -$6.95 billion, a result of heavy of oil imports. Brazil has a surplus with most other countries. Another telling feature is that Brazil-Africa trade is very concentrated in a handful of countries. In 2012, four countries alone accounted for nearly 60 percent of Brazil-Africa trade: Nigeria ($9.1 billion), Egypt ($3 billion), South Africa ($2.6 billion) and Angola ($1.2 billion).[10] Brazil's exports to the continent are relatively balanced by aggregated value: 42 percent manufactured, 27 percent semi-manufactured, 31 percent basic.[11] As for imports, there is a high concentration on natural resources: 66 percent fuels (oil, natural gas and liquefied natural gas — mostly originating from Nigeria) and 34 percent raw materials. [12]

Although this may at first sight resemble China's trade with Africa, the logic behind this differs greatly. Brazil has a rich endowment of mineral resources and consequently does not have many energy security concerns. Brazil's imports oil from Africa (Nigeria) primarily because Africa's oil is more suitable for the existing refinery complex in Brazil (heavy grades). Oil imports from Africa will likely diminish when Brazil completes the new refineries and the conversion of the old ones to suit the oil coming from the massive pre-salt oil reservoirs (light grades).

Investment

Brazil only became a significant source of overseas foreign direct investment (OFDI) in the 2000s. Its FDI stock expanded from $50 billion in 2001 to $181 billion in 2010.[13] Even though the number of Brazilian MNCs investing overseas has steadily increased over the past decade, OFDI stock remains highly concentrated in a small number of companies. The top four companies (Itau-Unibanco, banking; Vale, mining; Odebrecht, construction; Petrobras, hydrocarbons) account for 78 percent of Brazil's OFDI stock. Brazilian OFDI stock in the primary sector rose substantially in recent years, from two percent in 2008 to three percent in 2010, totaling nearly $57 billion. The lion's share is mining and quarrying ($49.6 billion), mainly driven by Vale's foreign assets, followed by hydrocarbons ($6.8 billion) mostly under Petrobras.[14] Not surprisingly, a significant share of these investments target Latin America and Africa.

Much like China's, Brazil's OFDI into Africa targets strategic sectors such as mining, energy and infrastructure. However, Brazil's OFDI differs quite a lot in terms of motivations, structure and policies. As mentioned before, domestic demand does not drive Brazil investments. Brazil is becoming a major oil producer (owing to its newly found pre-salt hydrocarbons reservoirs) and sits on largely unexplored rich mineral deposits (such as iron ore, phosphates and nickel). Brazilian resources MNEs are driven by market and profit considerations, and they perceive developing regions as an expanding ground for their operations rather than pursuing a strategy to secure resources. Moreover, unlike Chinese resources companies, Brazilian ones are not fully state owned enterprises. Although Petrobras and Vale have a para-statal background, they were partly privatised in the 1990s. Even though Brasilia kept stakes in both companies (a majority sharehold in Petrobras and a smaller stake in Vale), these are now also accountable to their private shareholders, meaning that, unlike China, Brasilia has to reconcile national interests with corporate considerations.

10 Ibid.

11 Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade - SECEX, *Balança Comercial Brasileira Dados Consolidados, 2011*, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_1331125742.pdf, 7 and 17.

12 Ibid.

13 Milton Campanario, Eva Stal and Marcelo da Silva, 'Outward FDI from Brazil and its Policy Context,' *Columbia FDI Profiles* (May 2012), 12.

14 These figures are according to the Brazilian Central Bank (ibid., 10-13.)

At the same time, Brasilia has yet to develop a comprehensive institutional policy to support OFDI.[15] Although the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES in its Portuguese acronym) has a couple of credit lines (export credit facilities) in place to stimulate Brazilian companies' investments overseas (offering low interest rates), they are not easily accessible to SMEs.[16] This state of affairs may, however, change in the short term, since OFDI is increasingly seen as a critical instrument to improve the competiveness of Brazilian companies. Brazil is currently discussing the creation of an Export Import Bank to encourage foreign trade and investment and a state owned investment fund (sovereign wealth fund — higher risk tolerance than national banks) to invest some of Brazil's foreign exchange reserves in cross border mergers and acquisitions and greenfield projects in response to new investment opportunities.[17]

In sum, if on the one hand the internationalisation strategies of Brazilian MNEs are much more detached from politics in Brasilia, on the other hand they enjoy much less financial and diplomatic support from their government than, for instance, their Chinese counterparts. Still, they have a number of similarities regarding their business style in Africa. The largest Brazilian mining projects in the continent (Vale's investments in Guinea and Mozambique) also knit together mining exploration with supporting infrastructure (namely railways and ports), with Vale partnering up preferentially with Brazilian construction companies (namely Odebrecht). Unlike their Chinese counterparts, Brazilian construction enterprises are fully private. They do, however, rely to some extent on BNDES and Banco do Brazil credit facilities for their operations abroad. Similar to China, Brazilian credit lines to African countries target mostly infrastructure development and are tied to procurement of services and equipment in Brazil. However, Brazilian companies hire most of the labour force locally (Odebrecht is the largest private employer in Angola), invest in capacity building and often hire them for operations in other parts of the continent.[18] Although Brasilia does not make use of the Chinese model of infrastructure for resources loans, it favours resources revenue as guarantee for its credit lines. Brazil has had this guarantee system running with Angola since 2004 (five credit lines worth $5.2 billion) and has considered applying this same guarantee formula to its credit lines to Mozambique (coal revenue) and Ghana (cocoa, oil) to circumvent risk in countries with low credit ratings.[19]

The majority of Brazilian investment in the continent is channelled by the large oil and mining corporations (Vale and Petrobras) and the construction companies (Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and Camargo Correa). Most of these companies have had operations in Africa since the late 1970s, but mostly only in Portuguese speaking countries until the past decade. Their operations now spread across south, west and north Africa, with Angola and South Africa as the largest OFDI recipients.[20] The footprint of Brazilian SMEs in the continent remains very sparse, but is growing thanks to Brazil's economic diplomacy.[21]

Although Brazil-Africa trade and investment flows have made remarkable progress over the past decade and future prospects seem very promising, a number of serious challenges exist. One involves communication across the Atlantic (air, maritime and telecommunications). Specific to the African side, other challenges include infrastructure bottlenecks, unattractive investment environment (incentives and protection), unstable regulatory frameworks, inefficient institutional framework (the red tape and heavy bureaucracy) and scarcity of qualified labour.[22] On the Brazilian side, these include the poor efficiency of institutional, logistic, diplomatic and financial support and oftentimes the poor corporate social responsibility practices of its companies.

15 Pio Pena Filho, 'O Investimento do Brasil em Africa' (public lecture, Second Brazil-Africa Forum, Fortaleza, Brazil, 9 May, 2012).
16 Interview with employee at the International Department of the BNDES, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 23 May, 2012.
17 Milton Campanario, Eva Stal and Marcelo da Silva, 8.
18 Interview with employee, Vale-Mozambique, Maputo, Mozambique, 20 February, 2012
19 Interview with employee at the BNDES- international Department, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 23 May, 2012.
20 World Bank, *Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South-South Partnering for Growth* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf, 82- 83.
21 Interview with employee at the Department of Trade and Investment Promotion, Ministry of External Relations, Brasilia, Brazil, 16 May, 2012.
22 Interview with a representative of the Brazil Entrepreneurs Association of Angola, Luanda, Angola, 18 February, 2013

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Brazil is still a receiving country and its history as a cooperation provider is relatively recent. Nevertheless, development cooperation has quickly become a key feature in Brazil's efforts to promote the South-South cause. Lula's second administration (2006-2010) greatly boosted and refined development cooperation as a strategic instrument to push forward Brazil's foreign policy agenda.[23]

Brazilian cooperation for international development includes various modalities: humanitarian assistance, scholarships for foreigners, technical cooperation and contributions to international organisations. According to a 2010 study by the Institute for Economic Applied Research (IPEA) and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC in its Portuguese acronym), the cumulative value of Brazilian development cooperation resources reached 2.9 billion Reais (equivalent to $1.7 billion) between 2005 and 2009. The bulk of these resources went to contributions to international organisations, regional banks and peacekeeping operations (76 percent), followed by scholarships to foreign students (10 percent — mostly directed at Latin America and Portuguese speaking countries), humanitarian aid (five percent, — mostly into Latin America followed by Africa) and technical cooperation (nine per cent — with Africa as a major beneficiary).[24] Despite its relatively low financial allocation,[25] the impact of technical cooperation goes much beyond these figures. Through this instrument, rooted on solidarity diplomacy, Brazil makes its knowledge and experience available to other developing countries aiming to promote their economic and social development.[26]

Clearly Lula's administration saw technical cooperation as a strategic soft power tool. This explains the substantial increase of the ABC budget in the second term of Lula's presidency, which tripled between 2005 and 2009.[27] Brazilian technical cooperation, run by the ABC under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is strongly rooted in South-South solidarity principles and on its own development experience grounded on democratisation, economic growth and equalitarian distribution of wealth.[28] According to official Brazilian records, its technical cooperation subscribes to the following set of principles: knowledge transfer, capacity building, use of local labour, project design based on local specificities, no conditionality, respect for sovereignty and drive by demand.[29] Brazilian diplomats also emphasise the different nature of its cooperation vis-à-vis traditional donors, stating that it does not provide aid but rather offers a partnership rooted in mutual benefit and peer-learning embedded in the spirit of horizontal cooperation, and that it ultimately aims to plant the seeds for autonomous development. [30]

The ABC currently has technical projects in 81 countries around the world (36 in Africa). Its cooperation relies on the deployment of its own development solutions, which found in Africa a fertile terrain owing to the many similarities in terms of structural conditions and challenges — 'for each African problem, there is a Brazilian solution'.[31]

The lion's share of Brazilian technical assistance goes to training and capacity building (90 percent done bilaterally and the remainder multilaterally). Africa is the main recipient of technical assistance, in particular the Portuguese speaking countries (Mozambique is currently the single largest recipient)[32] owing to historic and cultural ties. ABC's cooperation focuses mainly on five areas: skills development (in partnership with

23 Interview with the director of Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), Brasilia, Brazil, 17 May, 2012.

24 IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009* (Brasilia: Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada and Agencia Brasileira de Cooperação, 2010), http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/Book_Cooperao_Brasileira.pdf, 21.

25 The figure for Brazilian technical cooperation is based on the budget allocated for the ABC, but in reality it is much higher as the agency draws heavily on human and financial resources paid for by other ministries (namely agriculture and health) to pursue its projects, making it difficult to account for the real total cost.

26 IPEA and ABC, *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2005-2009*, 32.

27 Ibid, 34.

28 Interview with the director of Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), Brasilia, Brazil, 17 May, 2012.

29 Ministry of External Relations, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/cooperacao-tecnica.

30 Ibid.

31 Interview with an ABC representative, Maputo, Mozambique, 16 February, 2012

32 Interview with an ABC Department of Bilateral Relations representative, Brasília, Brazil, 15 May, 2012.

SENAI, the national service for industrial learning); education (reproduction of successful programmes such as *bolsa escola* or *alfabetização solidária*); public health (in partnership with the ministry of Health and Fundação Oswaldo Cruz — FIOCRUZ, prevention and control of HIV, malaria and other tropical diseases, technological transfer and medication production); agriculture (in association with EMBRAPA, focusing on biofuels projects and tropical agriculture); social development (fostering the state's role in promoting social development and fighting inequalities by adapting Brazilian successful programmes such as *bolsa familia* and *fome zero*).

In addition to bilateral and multilateral components, Brazilian technical cooperation also has an important trilateral dimension. Trilateral cooperation projects stem from Brazil's experience as a recipient and aims to give continuity to this valuable legacy. Therefore, most of traditional donors that partner up with Brazil to pursue cooperation projects in other developing states had previously engaged in technical cooperation in Brazil. In general, the developed country provides the financing and Brazil provides the expertise and technology to run the project. This arrangement allows Brazil to circumvent the limitations of its financial capacity. The main developed partners in this regard include Japan, the US, and Germany. Trilateral projects also involve multilateral organisations (the World Bank, UNDP) and sub-national institutions (such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in PROSAVANA in Mozambique). [33]

Brazil's technical cooperation with Africa has come a very long way in a very short time, mostly due to Lula de Silva's enthusiasm. However, this progress has led to some dysfunctional challenges that Brazil must address for its technical cooperation to prosper. Firstly, the massive expansion of cooperation projects in a short period of time has not only created severe capacity overstretch (human and financial resources)[34] but also considerable institutional fragmentation, poor central planning and coordination among all agents involved (ABC, BNDES, SOEs and various ministries).[35] This produces overlaps and prevents synergies, undermines evaluation of costs and benefits and leads to ad-hoc projects that present serious long term planning challenges. [36] Second, Brazil still lacks a Cooperation Law (currently in discussion, but progressing very slowly) necessary to clarify the authority line, legitimise the use of public funds and regulate the funding of cooperation projects — this is the main reason why Brazil's cooperation still lacks a financial component, which has proven extremely impairing.[37] Third, Brazil needs to address the increasing pressure to include civil society in this process, in order to make it more democratic and transparent as these funds originate from tax payers in a country that still faces a lot of economic and social challenges.[38] Fourth, the ownership of the recipient country is in some cases questionable (flow is unidirectional) and this represents a direct threat to Brazil's credentials as a South-South partner in the future.[39] Lastly, the institutional structure lacks a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess the impact of its cooperation.[40] This is critical for correcting inefficiencies, avoiding waste of resources and ensuring the expected results, and key for gaining full domestic legitimacy as well as credibility abroad.

33 Interview with an ABC Department of Trilateral Cooperation representative, Brasilia, Brazil, 15 May, 2012.
34 Interview at the BRICS Policy Centre Director, Durban, South Africa, 12 March, 2013.
35 Andre Souza, 'Brazilian Development Cooperation' (presentation, BRICS Academic Forum, Durban, South Africa, 12 March, 2013).
36 Ibid.
37 Interview with the director of the BRICS Policy Centre, Durban, South Africa, 12 March, 2013.
38 Paulo Esteves, 'The BRICS and the Reshaping of International Development Policy' (public lecture, Jan Smuts House, SAIIA, Johannesburg, South Africa, 19 March, 2013).
39 Ibid.
40 Interview with a professor from the University of Brasília, IR Department, Brasília, Brazil, 17 May, 2012.

CONCLUSION

Mostly owing to Lula da Silva's vigorous impulse, Brazil is increasingly regarded as a reliable development partner in (and outside) Africa. Even though it has a much smaller scale engagement in the continent than other emerging countries like China, Brazil enjoys a very comfortable position sustained by a number of critical comparative advantages that promise more efficient solutions for African development problems. In addition to the advantage of a greater cultural and linguistic proximity, significant geographical affinities give Brazil an edge, especially when it comes to agriculture cooperation. Brazil's cooperation practices in the continent have substantiated its normative discourse with concrete actions in a very short period of time, which has greatly enhanced its prestige in the region. Brazil has generally received less criticism regarding the way it engages with the continent, namely from traditional donors that seem to perceive Brazil as a more palatable form of South-South cooperation.

The solidarity argument, however, does not exclude other aspirations. Brazil's economic engagement in the continent has become much more consequential over the years, with its trade and investment now reaching far beyond the Lusophone boundaries. Yet, as companies expand their operations in the continent, some tensions have begun to show. Much like China, the profit driven orientations of the private sector pose a threat to Brazil's image as the champion of the South-South cause despite Brasilia's coordinating efforts.

As Brazil's engagement with Africa deepens, it is likely that more friction between the various agents and actors as well as between norms and practices will emerge. The strain has already become apparent within the cooperation mechanism. Making justice to her outstanding reputation as a technocrat, Rousseff seems aware of the challenges and Brasilia has begun the process of readjusting the existing institutional structure. It does not involve a downscaling of Brazil-Africa relations, but a mere lowering of intensity while the reformulation proceeds. Yet the question remains whether Brazil will manage to uphold its South-South solidarity principles while expanding its economic footprint in the continent. ■

Turkey's Religious and Socio-Political Depth in Africa

Mehmet Ozkan

Until recently, it was almost unimaginable that religious symbols would become increasingly visible in Turkish embassies, especially those in Africa. When an academic delegation visited the Embassy of Turkey in Dar-as-Salaam, Tanzania in January 2013, one object in particular stood out at the embassy's entrance: a glass decoration with the word *Allah* (God) written on it in Arabic. Its highly visible location made it impossible to miss. Similarly, when an unofficial observation mission visited Bamako, Mali, in July 2012, the Turkish ambassador extended the observers an invitation to his residence to celebrate the first day of *Ramadan*.

What do these stories say about Turkey's foreign policy in Africa? While these experiences are generally uncommon in the embassies of Turkey throughout the world, these particular occurrences demonstrate the unique side of Ankara's involvement in Africa. They indicate that Ankara's involvement in the continent has more dimensions than those related to economic relations and humanitarian aid. Africa features prominently and represents a novel dimension of Turkish foreign policy. In particular, Turkey's active involvement in Somalia has highlighted its position as a new player on the continent. However, contextualising Turkish involvement — both at the state and NGO level — requires a broader perspective in order make understand and measure the possible influence of its involvement in Somalia and the continent. Humanitarian and development aid, along with a significant interest in trade development, have been the main pillars of this new policy. However, religion is another key — and to some extent a legitimising — element of this involvement. Aside from state institutions like the Directorate for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*), Turkish NGOs like the Human Right and Freedoms Humanitarian Aid Foundation (IHH) and the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) also actively contribute to Turkey-Africa relations. Ankara's involvement in Somalia and other African countries indicates its interest in becoming a 'political' player in the continent (and not only in economic terms) in years to come. This interest stems from its engagement so far and from an increasing desire to influence structural issues.

AID AND TRADE: THE MOST ARTICULATED ELEMENTS

Aid and trade comprise the most visible elements of Turkey's relations with Africa. They are also the most articulated and most popularised element in the official discourse. The year 2005 marked a turning point in Turkey's relations with Africa as Turkey obtained observer status in the African Union (and later became a strategic partner in January 2008). In May 2008, Turkey joined the African Development Bank and strengthened its relations with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa and the Economic Community of West African States. The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey has established business councils as part of Ankara's attempts to increase business activities with Africa. Indeed, Turkish opening to Africa is underwritten by soaring bilateral trade.

Turkey's trade volume with African countries has increased from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $16 billion in 2008 and, despite the economic crisis, to $17 billion in 2012. Yet, the current trade volume with Africa countries is insignificant compared to Turkey's total trade volume with the rest of the world. Turkey aims to increase trade volume with Africa to around $50 billion by 2015.[1]

The socio-political and aid dimensions of Turkey-Africa relations have always supported each other. As a member of the OECD, Turkey is both a provider and recipient of international assistance. The OECD lists Turkey as a non-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donor. Turkey closely follows the agenda set by the Paris Declaration and has adopted a programme-based approach to aid delivery. This is why Turkey participated in the 4th High Level Forum in Busan in 2011.

Numerous NGOs have played a crucial role in Turkey's presence and relations in Africa in a development and social dimension. Since 2002, the Justice and Development Party (known as the AK Party or AKP) has given the Opening Up to Africa Plan, first proposed in 1998, serious attention. Several NGOs such as TUSKON and the IHH have also helped implement the plan. In 2005, Turkey declared 'The Year of Africa' and made the according diplomatic, political and economic preparations.

Among the many Turkish NGOs operating in Africa, the most active are TUSKON and the IHH. Through the World Trade Bridge meetings and other means, TUSKON has pioneered in bringing African businessmen to Turkey and encouraging Turkish businesses to expand to Africa. These meetings have taken place without interruption since 2006 with increasing participation each year. TUSKON also sends delegations to Africa to examine investment opportunities.

The IHH is one of the leading humanitarian aid organisations in Turkey. Along with its developmental work in 43 African countries, it has helped thousands of people to gain eye-sight with its Cataract Project conducted in hospitals in Sudan and elsewhere. It also has well-drilling projects and supports technical and vocational education by setting up schools and hospitals.

Turkey's state-level humanitarian involvement and leadership in Africa gained much visibility when drought and famine began to have dire consequences in east Africa. On 19 August 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan visited Somalia, arguably the worst affected country, to draw international attention to its dismal situation. The first leader from outside Africa to visit Somalia in nearly two decades, Erdogan brought his wife, daughter and an entourage consisting of cabinet members and their families, and visited refugee camps and hospitals to witness the devastation caused by the severe drought. Erdogan brought the issue to the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2011 and called on the international community to undertake a continued approach to finding a long-lasting solution. Turkey has also opened an embassy in Mogadishu and taken several measures to help Somalia improve its infrastructure, such as building wells, a major hospital and six field hospitals, a highway from Mogadishu Airport to the city centre and facilities for waste management. Additionally, as a result of the 2001 visit, the Housing Development Administration of Turkey has pledged to build houses and schools in the near future. Time will tell whether Turkish involvement in Somalia will bring any peace and stability remains, but it has already elevated Turkey to 'a new humanitarian aid power' in Africa.[2] Turkey's role in Somalia also points to a rising involvement in Africa more generally and to a shift in its focus toward the political aspects of the continent's problems.

1 'Turkish PM Erdogan Sees $50 Billion in African Trade,' *Hurriyet Daily*, 7 January, 2013.

2 Ali Abdirahman, 'Turkey's Foray into Africa: A New Humanitarian Power?' *Insight Turkey,* 13 (2011): 65-73.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) until recently maintained three offices in Africa, in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and Dakar. In 2011, it opened offices in Mogadishu and Tripoli, and in 2012 in Nairobi, Cairo and Tunisia. These offices function mostly as regional bureaus for supervising projects in surrounding countries. TIKA currently has projects in over 37 African countries, and they are mostly related to educational, health and agricultural areas. Turkey's total overseas development aid reached around $102 million in 2010, and it grew by more than 50 percent in the following year to $156.4 million.[3]

DIPLOMACY: INSTITUTIONALISATION OF DEEPENING RELATIONS

Thee political dimension of Turkey-Africa relations has generated less of an interest thus far. However, as the case of Somalia demonstrates, interest in 'political' issues is rising. A brief categorisation may help to better contextualise the political dimension.

Turkey's active foreign policy towards Africa falls into three main periods. The first period spans from the adoption of the Africa Plan in Turkey in 1998 to the announcement of 'The Year of Africa' in 2005. During this time, Turkey spent most of its energy on developing the diplomatic infrastructure and preparing for better structured Turkey-Africa relations. Throughout the second period, from 2005 to 2011, Turkey aimed to deepen relations with Africa at every level. Turkey's role as an observer and strategic partner with the African Union, and in the Turkey-Africa Summit in 2008, has helped deepen institutional relations. Trade volume between Turkey and Africa has increased. Furthermore, the involvement of Turkish civil society has helped establish a better framework where both Turkey and Africa benefit from these relations. Turkey's involvement in Somalia and its leading role in shedding light on the plight of Somalis marked the beginning of the third period of relations in 2011. In this current period, activities of Ankara will prove crucial not only as a 'litmus test'[4] as to whether or not Turkey will manage to use its accumulated power for the benefit of Africa and for problem-solving, but also as an indication of Turkey's real influence — in the political dimension — on the continent.

Very much in line with its interest to become a 'political' actor, Ankara has shown an eagerness to find solutions to Africa's persistent problems. Turkey hosted the 2nd Somalia conference, entitled 'Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015', in cooperation with the UN between 21 May and 1 June 2012 in Istanbul. Fifty-seven countries and 11 regional and international organisations attended the conference. Partnership forums met to discuss issues such as water, energy, roads and secessionism. The conference demarcated the pathway to Somalia's rebirth and put forth a comprehensive five point plan for rebuilding the failed state. The five points included constructing national unity, establishing a new political system, comprehensively restructuring the economy, rebuilding Somali national forces and lifting the country from isolation.[5] Turkey's Somalia involvement continues and its deputy prime minister and various ministers frequently make visits to follow up on projects. Somalia has to some extent become somewhat of a 'domestic' issue for Turkish government and society.

Turkey's political interest in Africa has also prompted a diplomatic expansion. Turkey has increased its number of embassies on the continent from 12 in 2002 to 34 in 2012. African countries have also proved responsive to Turkey's interest in developing political relations. After Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo opened new embassies in Ankara in 2011, Angola, Kenya, Djibouti, Niger, South Sudan and Ghana followed suit in 2012. Currently, 21 African embassies operate in Ankara, and the embassies of Benin and Republic of the Congo are in the process of opening. Twelve more African countries have indicated their willingness to open embassies in Ankara in the next years. If this is realised, Africa will have 35 embassies in Turkey.

---

3 Ahmet Davutoglu, *2013 Yılına Girerken Dıs Politikamız* (Ankara: Dısisleri Bakanlıgı, 2012), 95-96.
4 Erdogan argued that the case of Somalia is a 'litmus test' for the international community. See 'BM'ye Somali albümü,' *Sabah*, 23 August, 2011.
5 'United Somalia a Must: Davutoglu,' *Al Shahid*, 10 December, 2012.

Ankara's involvement in Africa has also caught the attention of international actors that have expressed an interest in cooperating with Turkey. The international dimension of Turkey's Africa opening has steadily developed as Turkey makes inroads into the continent. In 2012, Turkish leaders held political consultations with the leaders of the US, Spain, the UK, Sweden, Norway, Italy and the EU. Some countries like France have even suggested that Turkey and the EU should team up for joint trade missions to Africa in order to counter China's growing power in winning African contracts.[6]

ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY: ENGINE BEHIND THE SCENE

Religion and history comprise subtle but highly important elements of Turkey-Africa relations, and religion may even have a legitimising role. This is valid both at state and societal level. The Directorate for Religious Affairs in Turkey until recently did not have a role in foreign policy and focused solely on the domestic religious needs of Muslims. With the change toward a multidimensional approach to foreign policy, religion has become one of Turkey's soft power elements, and especially so in Africa.

Diyanet now brings together African religious leaders in Istanbul. The first Religious Leaders Meeting of African Continent Muslim Countries and Societies took place in November 2006 and brought together representatives from 21 countries.[7] Turkey, a constitutionally secular state, had until recent times refrained from participating in Islamic or religious meetings, let alone from organising such meetings domestically. This began to change after the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* - AKP) assumed power in 2002. Turkey has since then actively participated in the activities of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (Turkish citizen Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu has held the post of secretary-general since 2004). Turkey's hosting of African religious leaders in Istanbul relates directly to two paradigmatic shifts in Turkish foreign policy. First, Turkey softened its approach toward religious-based organisations and meetings, seeing these as opportunities to further Turkish national interests through soft power instruments. Secondly, Turkey understood that completing and sustaining its opening to Africa required a religious dimension. This also relates to Africa's Ottoman past, as evidenced by the fact that almost all religious leaders at the meeting positively emphasised their countries' Ottoman legacy and affirmed their wishes to restore it.[8]

Diyanet organised a second meeting in Istanbul and Ankara in November 2011. At this meeting, Muslim religious authorities from Africa called on Turkey to take on a greater role in Islamic education in African communities. They urged in a joint declaration that 'educational institutions similar to the Imam-Hatip schools in Turkey should be used as an example for schools in Africa and backed with faculties providing higher religious education like [Turkey's] theology faculties'.[9]

On a broader level, *Diyanet* also hopes to contribute to the development of religious education and to a quality environment for praying in Africa, and has established mosques to this end. Religion has thus become a most distinctive aspect of Turkey's involvement in Africa. It has made Turkey unique in comparison to other emerging actors, as its policy extends beyond the humanitarian and economic fields.

Many Turkish civil society organisations operating in Africa also employ religion to legitimise and motivate their activities. Traditional religious groups such as the Hüdayi Foundation, the Gülen Movement and *Suleymancılar* actively promote projects in Africa. They generally focus on the educational field, most commonly religious schools, high schools and vocational schools that emphasise education.

6 'France Seeks Turkey as Trade Ally in Africa,' *EU Business*, 8 February, 2011, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/france-turkey-china.6v4/.
7 Deniz Faik and Serhat Orakci, 'Afrika Kitasi Musluman Ulke ve Topluluklari Dini Liderler Toplantisi,' *BSV Bulten* 62 (2006).
8 *Final Communiqué*, 1-3 November 2006, http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/bildiri.asp?id=123.
9 'Africa seeks Turkish Islamic Education,' *Hurriyet Daily*, 24 November, 2011.

The Hüdayi Foundation has a particular focus on family, society and education issues. It has offices in nine African countries, mostly located in central and west Africa, from where it manages operations in over 40 countries in the continent. Education comprises its main activity. It runs Imam-Hatip schools, religious schools and colleges where graduates can work as teachers. The schools in Africa are modelled after their Turkish counterparts with minor differences, such as the language of instruction (French) and some other local elements.[10]

Suleymancılar, a religious group composed of students and followers of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959), also engages in Africa. Its activities have increased since the late 1990s and centre on students' Islamic education. Still, the details and the scope of its activities remain almost unknown as it tends to stay out of the public eye.

Another very active religious group in Africa is the Gülen network or *Cemaat.* This worldwide movement is inspired by the moderate Islamic teachings of Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, whose writings read like a virtuous power doctrine as they emphasise altruism, tolerance and education. The Gülen movement has links with more than 1,000 schools around the world. Schools operated by adherents of Gülen's teachings began to spring up across sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1990s. Africa has become a priority area for the Gülen movement in the past decade as it aims to expand its network. While the movement at first opened only secular schools, it has begun to open Imam-Hatip schools in the past several years.

With the maturation of democracy at home, Turkey's rise in Africa has predominantly focused on economic and political dimensions. Turkey is now moving to a new direction for making its presence felt in other fields, such as education, as part of its active foreign policy. Educational systems close to those of France or the UK had been considered the best in Africa since the colonial period. While these systems worked well in Christianity-dominated societies, they did not work as well in Muslim-dominated countries that required alternative educational facilities for children to learn about Islam. This process led to competing parallel educational systems. In this regard, Imam-Hatip schools have proven successful in bridging the gap between religious and scientific teachings.[11]

It is important to clarify why almost all Islamic groups seek to open Imam-Hatip schools in Africa and elsewhere. First, it is a Turkish educational system that teaches students Islamic studies and modern sciences. This makes it unique because it does not operate like *madrasas,* which only teach Islamic studies. Second, the system is widely accepted as the best available educational system in the Islamic world for creating a new generation that remains pious but that is more tolerant, interactive and moderate in its readings of the world.

Additionally, Imam-Hatip schools have helped export a modern educational system from a non-western country. While time will test their impact, it is safe to say that Turkey's social and religious role in Africa in part depends on the success of these educational institutions.

10 This is based on the author's personal observation in several countries and on limited information on the website. For example, see the travel notes of the chairman on Africa, http://www.hudayivakfi.org/ayin-makalesi/183-afrka-seyahat-notlari.html.

11 For more on Imam-Hatip Schools see Iren Ozgur, *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey: Faith, Politics, and Education* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

CONCLUSION: WHAT MAKES TURKEY UNIQUE?

Turkey has proven unique in comparison to other actors in Africa for several reasons. First, it has a distinctive way of providing aid, as it has aimed to create long term and developmental projects ranging from infrastructure to education. Second, religion has played an important legitimising element and is an area in which westerners and others may not have the chance to enter. Religion also generates a certain 'trust' in Turks and Turkey's activities.[12] Third, Turkish schools have mushroomed as educating future generations has become critical for the continent's ability to stand on its own. In this sense, one can compare Turkish schools to the missionary educational institutions of the late 19th and 20th centuries, which produced many activists, intellectuals, presidents and leaders. Educational activities in particular will likely generate change and even shape the social dynamics of the continent in coming years.

Domestically, Turkey's opening to Africa has served as the best expression of domestic peace. It is an area of Turkish foreign policy that has produced virtually no disagreement between the state, civil society and the business sector. Moreover, it has not produced much divergence or demands for justification from the general public.

Aside from this unique aspect, in the long run Turkey's social-political depth and persistence depends not only on its increasing trade with the continent but also on its ability to contribute to finding solutions to Africa's problems, as it did in Somalia. If Turkey's close attention to Somalia transforms into a clear attempt to bring peace and success to Somalia, it would certainly leave the category shared by India, China and Brazil, which sees Africa solely from an economic point of view, and join the category shared by the US, France and the UK, which sees Africa from an economic and political point of view. Turkey's experience in Somalia is not only an important test of Turkey-Somalia relations, but also of its opening strategy across Africa. Success or failure will shape and affect Turkey's overall Africa initiative, and how Africans and others will view Turkey in coming years.■

12 The best expression of this is Ankara's involvement in Somalia. See Besir El-Bekri, 'Türkiye'nin Somali ile ilgili bilmesi gerekenler,' DunyaBulteni, 9 March, 2013, http://www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=yazarHaber&ArticleID=18936.

Korea in Africa: A Missing Piece of the Puzzle?[1]

Soyeun Kim

The paper explores the relatively little studied Korea-Africa relations via development cooperation in order to better appreciate Africa's changing development landscape. It examines various stages of Korea's Africa strategy in the post-Korean War era in exploring its three key motivations: achieving resource security, gaining political clout in UN voting and promoting soft power through 'contributive' diplomacy. In the early days of its diplomatic relationship with Africa, Korea received criticism for advancing a limited and short sighted strategy aimed at securing African votes at the UN for its formal membership. Since the mid-2000s, Seoul's Africa policy has become more formalised and institutionalised via various forums and initiatives. This has implications not only for the diversification of objectives of South Korea in Africa, but also for the fast-changing landscape of development cooperation. An analysis of both historical and recent data of South Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA), trade flows and FDI flows into Africa suggests that South Korea places a strategic value on African resources and markets, and that a possible link exists between ODA flows and trade priorities, especially FDI for resource development.

Korean Air launched a new route between the Seoul/Incheon and Nairobi on 21 June 2012. With flights operating three days a week at a capacity of 253 passengers, Korean Air advertises itself as the first airline in east Asia to run *regular direct* services to an African destination.[2] This bold exemplifies Korea's recent 'African rush'. Yet, despite burgeoning economic and political ties between African countries and Korea, very few studies have touched upon this emerging relationship.

Studies of Africa's emerging partners have thus far placed a great emphasis on China. However, this 'Sino-centric' approach runs the risk of limiting efforts to fully understand the changes in African development. Not surprisingly, the 2011 *African Economic Outlook* report highlights the importance of other key emerging partners such as Brazil, India, Korea and Turkey, which together comprise a larger share of many dealings (see Figure 1 and Table 1).

Given that Korea accounts for 7.2 percent of Africa's total trade with emerging partners and ranks third among these partners, what does this mean for the changing landscape of African development? How and why do flows matter for Korea's development cooperation with Africa, and vice versa? This paper addresses these questions by shedding light on the motivations behind Seoul's Africa policy, focusing in particular on its ODA flows.

1 I am grateful for the constructive comments of Laura Savage and Kevin Gray. All errors remain my own.

2 Korean Air, 'Korean Air to Introduce Direct Flights to Nairobi Starting June,' 2012 http://www.koreanair.com/local/kr/gd/eng/au/pr/20120314_85316.jsp.

Figure 1. Distribution of Africa's total trade with emerging partners (2009, in percentage) [3]



Source: Adapted from AfDB et al. (2011, 103)

Table 1. Number of African countries in which emerging partners have significant trade (at least 10 million USD a year)

	Exports by Africa		Imports by Africa	
	2000	2009	2000	2009
China	22	34	30	41
India	19	31	28	38
Korea	13	15	22	29
Brazil	11	10	12	28
Turkey	13	13	9	24
Thailand	15	14	19	25
Russia	6	13	12	15

Source: Adapted from AfDB et al. (2011, 104)

3 UNDP, 'African Economic Outlook: Africa and its Emerging Partners,' 2011, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Reports/UNDP-Africa-2011-Economic-Outlook.pdf.

Although sparse, academic literature on Korea-Africa relations (both old and new) points to three key motivations conditioned by the post-Korean War political economy.[4] All three are closely linked to how Korea has (or has not) balanced its national interests, international standing and sense of 'global responsibility' in recent years.[5] The first motivation, which largely dominates both international and Korean media, relates to economic interests.[6] Like many other emerging actors rushing to Africa, Seoul's aims to diversify and secure supplies of raw materials and resource supplies, and to expand its export markets. The second motivation seeks political influence in Africa through diplomacy. The third motivation combines the first two motivations and relates to the more recent issue of the role of emerging actors in development cooperation. Korea promotes its global standing and exerts its 'soft power' as a bridge between developing and developed countries through the provision of ODA and as an OECD DAC member.

In exploring these motivations, the first section of this paper contextualises the recent phenomenon of Korea's 'Africa rush' within its diplomatic history and position in the international political economy since the 1960s. The second section explores the state of Korea's development cooperation with Africa, while relating ODA flows with other economic activities including trade and FDI.

HISTORY OF KOREA-AFRICA RELATIONS

Seoul's relations with Africa date back to the Korean War. The two divided Koreas have since sought to win diplomatic recognition and political legitimacy, especially vis-à-vis African countries.[7] Until quite recently, Seoul has had a rather limited engagement with Africa that is dependent on its relationship with the major powers, in particular with the US.[8] Various elements contributed to this limited diplomacy, including geographical distance, insufficient availability of information and, consequently, a mutual lack of interest. In contrast to Chinese officials' numerous official visits to Africa, a Korean president made only one such visit in the first five decades after the Korean War (Chun Doo-hwan in 1982). Presidential visits did not become more frequent until recently (Roh Moo-hyun in 2006 and Lee Myung-bak in 2011).

Inter-Korean Tension and the Road to the UN membership

Seoul's initial interest in Africa, based on its aim of political recognition, dates back to the 1960s. North Korea's already significant ties with many decolonised African nations spurred South Korea's recognition campaign.[9] In the 1970s, North Korea had 23 embassies in Africa whilst South Korea had only ten.[10] Thus, Seoul's motivation in the early years focused on establishing diplomatic ties to compete with North Korea. These ties ultimately helped Seoul secure its membership in the UN.

Three consecutive presidents implemented various diplomatic strategies to this end. In 1973, President Park Chung-hee abandoned the 'ideological' Hallstein Doctrine, which refused relations with any country that recognised North Korea.[11] Park subsequently adopted a more 'practical' diplomatic strategy of a simultaneous

4 This is by no means an exhaustive list of literature on Korea-Africa relations.

5 Thomas Kalinowski and Hyekyung Cho, 'Korea's Search for a Global Role between Hard Economic Interests and Soft Power,' *European Journal of Development Research*, 24/2 (2009), 242-260.

6 In particular, Daewoo's land deal in Madagascar. See Ryall Julian and Pflanz Mike, 'Land Rental Deal Collapses After Backlash Against Colonialism,' *The Telegraph*, 14 January, 2009.

7 Yoon-dho Ra, 'The Perspective of Cooperation between Korea and Africa in 1990's,' *Africa Research*, 4 (1988), 93-113.; Ui-sup Shi and Je-gyeong Park, 'The Direction of Korea's Foreign Policy towards Africa,' *Journal of Africa Studies Association Korea* 4/2 (1989), 145-155.

8 Gyudeuk Hwang, 'Korea's Diplomacy towards Africa: Evaluation and Proposal,' in Eunsook Chung, ed., *Korea's Diplomacy with Developing Countries* (Seoul: Hanwool Academy, 2009), 157-189.

9 Young-tae Chung, 'The Stage of Inter-state Relationship Development between Korea and Africa,' *Africa Research* 4 (1988), 49-72.

10 As of 2012, South Korea has 19 embassies and North Korea has ten; see
http://www.mofat.go.kr/introduce/abroad/list/middleeast/index.jsp?menu=m_70_50_10&tabmenu=t_4.

11 Barry K. Gills, *Korea versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy* (London: Routledge, 1996), 105.

and separate entry of North and South Korean to the UN.[12] In the early 1980s, President Chun Doo-hwan advanced Park's policy by promoting South-South diplomacy. Chun invited two African heads of state to Korea to this end (Liberia and Zaire, see Figure 2). He became the first Korean head of state in history to make a presidential visit to Africa after receiving official invitations from Nigeria, Gabon, Senegal and Kenya. His strategy paid off as the Cold War came to an end. Seoul normalised diplomatic ties with the countries of the former Soviet Union in 1990 and with China in 1992. President Roh Tae-woo's strategy, touted as 'Nordpolitik', promoted commercial relations whilst reducing military tensions with North Korea.[13] The two Koreas finally entered the UN together in September 1991 amidst these policy changes and diplomatic efforts.

Figure 2. Six stamps issued to commemorate the state visits to and from Africa in 1982[14]

12 Ho-Young Lee, 'Korea's Foreign Policy toward Africa: Re-estimation and New Direction,' *The Korean Political Science Association Journal* 33/3 (1999), 371-390.

13 Robert Bedeski, *The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth Republic Under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992* (London: Routledge, 1994).

14 Regards to the Korea Post and K-stamp for their permission to use the images of stamps in Figure 2.

Seoul's goal of securing formal recognition from African nations to support its entry to the UN required spontaneity mattered as it needed to respond swiftly to the requests of African leaders in order to gain their favour.[15] This narrow aim (alongside the various constraints mentioned above) meant that Seoul lacked a systematic and sustainable approach to its relations with Africa. It received criticism for its limitations and short-sightedness.

Global Korea: From Resource Diplomacy to Soft Power and Global Responsibility

Seoul's relations with Africa stagnated after it gained entry to the UN in 1991. Since that year, the number of Korean embassies and consulates in Africa fell from 18 to 13 (8.3 percent of Korean diplomatic missions). Its limited diplomacy began to change around the mid-2000s. Two successive administrations played a significant role in putting Africa firmly on Seoul's foreign policy agenda. In the Roh Moo-hyun administration, Foreign Minster Ban Ki-moon (who later became UN Security-General) led changes to Korea's trade and aid policies.[16] In 2006, he set in motion several prominent Korea-Africa initiatives: Roh's official visit to Africa; the Africa Initiative, which pledged to triple Korea's ODA to Africa between 2006 and 2009; the launch of two Korea Africa forums.[17] Ban's efforts to put Africa back on Seoul's agenda simultaneously aided his campaign for the UNSG position. He was the first Korean foreign minister to visit Africa. Amongst the countries he visited (Algeria, Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Liby, and Tanzania), four were then non-permanent members of the UN Security Council.[18]

Roh's 2006 visit to Africa essentially launched Korea's 'resources diplomacy'. This new diplomacy followed the 'Asian formula' of offering a 'mutually beneficial' package deal, which contrasted with the resource diplomacy of the Lee Myung-bak administration. Key figures from the Korea Electric Power Corporation, the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) and major construction companies accompanied Roh.[19] The visit targeted Africa's leading economies and oil producers, including Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria, and led to several package deals linking ODA-funded projects to resource concessions or large scale infrastructure bids.[20] For example, the KNOC-led Korean consortium's production sharing contracts with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.[21]

During the visit, Roh also announced the 'Korea Initiative for Africa's Development', which set out to put forth a comprehensive framework for Korea's cooperation with African countries. Two items addressed in the initiative have served as the backbone of the institutional structure of Korea-Africa relations (see Table 2): the pledge to treble ODA to Africa, upheld by the subsequent Lee administration (see Figure 3); the initiation of two Korea-Africa forms in 2006 — the triennial Korea-Africa Forum led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and the biennial Korea Africa Economic Cooperation Conference (KOAFEC) led by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF). The initiative thus helped to systematically formalise and institutionalise Korea-Africa relations.

15 Ho-Young Lee, 1999. 145

16 Colum Lynch, 'S. Korean Contender for U.N. Post Has an Edge; Ban Ki Moon's Rivals Complain About His Role in Foreign Aid and Trade Policy,' *The Washington Post*, 29 September, 2006.

17 'Ban Ki-moon, Regrettable to See Lack of Interest in Korea Africa Forum,' *Yonhap News*, 8 November, 2006.

18 'Ban Ki-moon began Election Campaign?' *Minjung-ui-sori*, 14 March, 2006.; John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations And Abroad* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2007).

19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Korea, 2005, http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=235&seqno=290617&c=&t=&tableName=TYPE_DATABOARD&px=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du.

20 Ui-sup Shim, 'Korea Initiative for Africa Development,' *Journal of Africa Studies Association Korea* 24, 115-140.

21 The consortium holds 60 percent share of the two off-shore deep water blocks, of which KNOC owns 43.88 percent, Korea Electric Power Corporation 8.78 percent, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering 5.85 percent and GT&R 1.5 percent.

Table 2. Selected points from the 2006 Korea Initiative for Africa's Development

Increase the ODA volume • **tripling ODA to Africa by 2008**
Sharing Korea's development experience • by 2009, inviting 1000 African officials for capacity building • dispatching of Korean experts and volunteers • assisting African governments to devise national development plans via holding workshops
Setting up Korea-Africa cooperation fora • **establishing 'the Korea Africa Economic Cooperation Forum' as a tripartite (business/ government/ academia) committee**
Promoting Africa's ownership • Supporting NEPAD's efforts to promote social and economic development

The third forum and the fourth KOAFEC deserve particular attention as they clearly highlight all three motivations behind Seoul's Africa strategy. The two meetings convened during the official 'Korea-Africa Cooperation Week' to promote public interest in Africa and in Seoul's cooperation with Africa.[22] This coordinated effort by the Lee administration proved a success, and the meetings provided a useful campaign ground for the bid to host the Green Climate Fund (GCF) secretariat in Songdo, Korea.[23] In return for African votes, Seoul announced a $60 million comprehensive assistance plan at the KOAFEC meeting.[24] During the GCF bidding process, Korea consistently emphasised three points. First, it highlighted its role as a bridge (mediator) between developed and developing countries in forming a global partnership for climate change action. Second, it promoted Korea's own development experience and the green growth strategy — the Lee administration's driving initiative from the start. Third, it critiqued the geographical bias of the environment-related international organisations, which have headquarters heavily concentrated in Europe. Korea put forward a case for an Asian location, which contains half of world's population.[25]

Seoul's strategy to become an active and respected player in international relations with Africa involved hosting various important international meetings (for example, the G20, the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the Seoul Nuclear Summit), joining the OECD DAC and promoting an 'aggressive' use of ODA for business and resource diplomacy.[26] ODA has become the key instrument for securing resources from African nations and for strengthening 'soft power' by promoting the 'Korean model of development'.[27] Moreover, it provides important opportunities for Korea to further embed and extend its approach.

22 African Development Bank, *Strengthening Partnerships for Development and Inclusive Growth*, 2012, http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/strengthening-partnerships-for-development-and-inclusive-growth-9790/.
23 Ministry of Strategy and Finance, *White paper on hosting of Green Climate Fund* (Seoul: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2013), 65-66.
24 Jinhyung Kim, 'A Match between David and Goliath: The Story of Successful Hosting of GCF,' *Money Today*, 20 October, 2012.
25 Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2013, 84.
26 Hangyu Lee, 'A Study on the Meaning of Korea-Africa Forum & President Lee's Adminstration's Policy toward Africa,' *Journal of Africa Studies Association Korea* 33 (2011), 43-77.
27 Tosin Sulaiman and Jon Herskovitz, 'Africa Money: Africa Studies "Made in Korea" Model to Push Growth,' *Reuters*, 19 October, 2012.

What does Korea's ODA to Africa look like in practice? How has Korea's ODA to Africa developed and evolved? Has Korea effectively implemented its pledges and policies? Answering the question requires a closer look into the state of Korea's development cooperation with Africa, relating the ODA flows with other economic activities including trade and FDI.

ODA TO AFRICA IN NUMBERS

ODA is the resource flow from one government to another and thus signals the relationship between donor and recipient countries. The political economy of both countries matters in understanding the effect of the flows. The present section focuses on the donor side.

Korea's ODA has increased rapidly since the early 2000s (see Figure 3). Between 2006 and 2010, ODA flow increased by an average of 29 percent each year.[28] In 2011, ODA flow reached $1.32 billion, a nearly six percent increase from the previous year. Korea's ODA to Africa in particular (both its volume and ratio) has also steadily moved upwards since 2006.

Korea's ODA is often referred to as a 'two-pillar system' as, in principle, two ministries manage ODA. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) oversees ODA grants through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). The Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) manages ODA loans through the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF). The ODA system is highly fragmented both in policymaking and delivery. The tension between the two ministries has intensified over the years over issues relating to

Figure 3. Korea's Total ODA and ODA to Africa 1987 - 2010 (Commitment-Base)[29]



28 OECD, 2012.

29 Adapted from Korea EXIM Bank. 2013. Online ODA statistics. http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oda/use.jsp. N.B. The reason for analysing the commitment-based data here is that it better reflects how the pledges are translated into actual decision made by Korean' government. Actually disbursement takes time and often gets delayed so neither gross or net disbursement is suitable here.

compliance with the DAC aid norms (for example, over increasing the volume of grants and proportion of ODA), and the idea of reforming the current system to establish a single ODA agency under the (MOFAT-led) KOICA umbrella. Their separate arrangements for the Africa Forum demonstrates this tension. One must thus look into both types of ODA flows (actual disbursements) separately to better understand the nature of Korea's engagement with Africa.

Figure 4. Grants and Loan disbursements in Africa[30]



Figure 5. KOICA's grants disbursements to Africa[31]



Grants vs. Loans in Africa

Despite the media hype about the link between large scale development projects and ODA loans, Figure 4 tells a different story. Although both flows have increased steadily since 2006, the total grant disbursement has overtaken loan disbursements.

KOICA's grants have shown similar trends with Korea's overall ODA flows over the years — in particular, the sharp increase after a series of events in 2006 (see Figure 5).

30 Adapted from the OECD.StatExtracts. 2013. Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a]. Data extracted February 27. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE3A#

31 KOICA Online Grants Statistics, 2013, http://stat.koica.go.kr/.

In 2011, KOICA's grants to Africa totalled $65.6 million, or 16.1 percent of Korea's total ODA.[32] In terms of sector expenditure, KOICA spent the largest share of its grants on education, followed by public administration, fishery and forestry, agriculture and health (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. KOICA's 2011 activity by sector (disbursement based) [33]



KOICA's top five recipients in 2011 — Tanzania, Ethiopia, Morocco, Kenya and Rwanda (Table 3) — accounted for 8.4 percent of KOICA's total disbursement and 51.8 percent of its disbursement in Africa. Asia still took the largest share of KOICA's activities at 45.5 percent.

Table 3. Top five KOICA recipients in Africa (disbursement based)[34]

Rank	County	Amount USD	Ratio (%)	
			KOICA's total disbursement	Total disbursement in Africa
1	Tanzania	8,864,806	2.2	13.5
2	Ethiopia	8,079,111	2	12.3
3	Morocco	7,070,351	1.7	10.8
4	Kenya	5,152,172	1.3	7.8
5	Rwanda	4,868,599	1.2	7.4

On the other hand, EDCF loan disbursements to Africa accounted for 13.1 percent of total flows in 2011. Asia again dominated Korea's loan assistance at 79.8 percent, but the proportion of its share surpassed that of KOICA. Here, the business-oriented EDCF still seems to prioritise the rapidly growing Asian economies over Africa.

32 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 KOICA, *KOICA Annual Report 2011* (Seoul: KOICA, 2011).

Table 4. Approved ODA loan projects from 1987 to 2011 (as of December 31, 2011)[35]

		USD millions	Project details
1987	Nigeria	10	Modernisation of railcar modernisation
1990	Ghana	13	Construction of a storage building for refined oil products
1991	Nigeria	15	Railcar modernisation
	Uganda	7.5	1st phase project for waste water treatment system
1992	Kenya	14.4	Skill training centre construction
1994	Ghana	8	LPG container production factory construction
2000	Ghana	38.2	Buipe-Bolgatanga oil pipeline (265Km) construction
2004	Kenya	25	Road work equipment replacement
	Tanzania	28	Skill training centre construction
2005	Angola	31.44	Agricultural modernisation
	Equatorial Guinea	20	Bata Water Supply Project,
2006	Angola	35	Construction of National Information Processing Centre
2007	Madagascar	14.12	Toliara Province Road Rehabilitation Project of RN 35 – co-financed with AfDB
	Senegal	25	Government ICT Infrastructure Project
	Angola	49	Rural development for food security (chicken farming modernisation + farmer capacity building)
	Kenya	10.74	Skill training centre expansion and improvement
	Tanzania	25	Construction of Malagarasi Bridge and access roads
2008	Madagascar	30	National disaster management centre construction
	Mozambique	45	Construction of Quelimane General Hospital
	Cameroon	35	Establishment of Vocational Training Centre
2009	Mali	21.58	Irrigation development programme Phase 1 – co-financed with AfDB
	Mali	39.65	Government ICT Infrastructure Project
	Mozambique	20	Rehabilitation of Nacala road corridor Phase 1 – co-financed with AfDB
	Mozambique	49.08	Rural Electrification in *Gaza* Province
	Tanzania	49.62	Improvement of Water Supply System in Dodoma Town
	Tanzania	49.5	Muhimbili University hospital construction
2010	Ghana	55.5	Wa Water Supply Rehabilitation and Expansion Project
	Mozambique	35	Construction of solar power station
	Mozambique	25	Emergency Management Information System Project
	Angola	18.5	Agricultural modernisation
	Angola	34.83	Establishment of Advanced Technology Center
	Angola	44.04	Public Security Innovation Project
	Uganda	26.8	Education IV Project
	Tanzania	36.42	IRINGA-SHINYANGA BACKBONE TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT PROJECT
	Tanzania	27	Muhimbili University hospital medical equipment supply project
2011	Ghana	67.23	*Prestea-Kumasi* Transmission Enhancement Project – linked to KOICA
	Mali	25.03	Markala Sugar Project – cofinanced with AfDB
	Mozambique	18.1	Education project
	Ethiopia	78.4	Sululta-Gebregurach Power Transmission Project
	DRC	67.91	Remba Imbu Water Project
	Tanzania	50	Construction of Zanzibar Irrigation Infrastructure Project

Africa only	14 countries (Angola, Cameroon, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda) and 41 projects	1318.59
total	49 countries and 277 projects	7291.15

35 Source: Adapted from EDCF. 2013. ODA statistics. Last modified January 31. http://www.edcfkorea.go.kr/edcf/info/statis/report.jsp

The scale and speed of growth in EDCF's loan assistance to Africa has changed in recent years. According to loan approval data (see Table 4), between 1987 and 2006, 12 projects in seven countries received approval with a total of $245.54 million. Between 2007 and 2011, 29 projects in 12 countries received approval with a total of $1073.05 million — nearly four times the value of loans approved during the previous 19 years.

As Table 4 highlights, ECDF loans to Africa mainly focused on economic and social infrastructure projects. The top five recipients of the EDCF loans included Angola, Mozambique, Ghana, Mali and Senegal (see Table 5.)

Mutually Beneficial?: Current Korea-Africa Economic Relations in Numbers

There has been much emphasis so far on the 'mutually beneficial' partnership between Korea and Africa. What, then, links ODA flows to strategic business deals by the Korean private sector? This comparison does not aim to suggest a concrete causal relationship between ODA flows and private sector engagement, but rather to gauge a trend that may suggest a possible (and complex) relationship between governmental and private flows. This aim is important given the recent paradigm shift from aid effectiveness to wider development effectiveness, which includes debates 'beyond aid' and the utility of 'policy coherence'[36] in the midst of aid scepticism, financial crises and the subsequent political pressure.[37]

Table 5. Accumulated total ODA loan disbursements from 1987 to 2011 (as of 31 January 2013)[38]

	Disbursement		Number of projects
	KRW million	(%)	
Angola	146,347	3.90%	5
Mozambique	31,173	0.80%	5
Ghana	77,729	2.00%	4
Mali	13,538	0.40%	1
Senegal	55,334	1.40%	2
Tunisia	24,874	0.60%	1
Madagascar	11,071	0.30%	1
Kenya	45,708	1.20%	3
Cameroon	5,406	0.10%	1
Uganda	5,406	0.10%	1
Nigeria	18,981	0.50%	2
Tanzania	71,250	1.90%	7
Africa total	513,939	13.40%	33
World total	3,835,842	100.00%	239

36 Helen Clark, 'The Future of Development Co-operation: from Aid to Coherence?' (presentation, Belgian Development Days, Brussels, Belgium, 8 May 2012). http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2012/05/08/helen-clark-the-future-of-development-co-operation-from-aid-to-coherence-/.

37 S. Bilal and F. Rampa, 'Emerging Economies in Africa and the Development Effectiveness Debate,' Discussion Paper 107, (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2011).

38 Adapted from EDCF. 2013. EDCF assistance data by country (as of 31 January 2013). Last modified January 31. http://www.edcfkorea.go.kr/edcf/info/statis/nation.jsp

With a nominal GDP of $1.116 trillion in 2011, South Korea is the world's 15th largest economy, the seventh largest exporter ($555 billion) of merchandise trade volume and the ninth largest importer ($524 billion). Korea's FDI inflow ranks 26th ($4.661 billion) and its outflow ranks 15th ($20.355 billion) in the world.[39] Relative to Korea's other global economic relations, trade with Africa remains rather small — 1.85 percent of Korea's total trade in 2011.[40] Still, as Figure 7 shows, Korea-Africa trade has increased rapidly since the early 2000s, which shows similarly steady growth as ODA flows.

Figure 8. Korea Africa trade trends (1972 -2011)[41]



Korea's imports mostly resource or raw materials goods from Africa (see Figure 9).[42] Oil and gas, mineral and metals accounted for over 80 percent of imports in 2009.

Figure 10 shows that, consistent with previous years, Korea's major export items in 2009 mainly included capital goods: transport vessels (59.3 percent), automobiles (6.8 percent), ethylenepropylene (4.2 percent) and mobile phones (2.7 percent).

39 The World Bank Group, *GDP Ranking Table*, 2012, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table; WTO, *Prospects for 2012*, 2012, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr658_e.pdf; OECD, *FDI in Figures*, 2013, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI%20in%20figures.pdf.

40 KOTRA, *Recent Trends in Export and Import*, 2013, http://stat.kita.net/top/state/n_stat_include_top_kita.jsp?menuId=01&lang_gbn=.

41 Adapted from KOTRA. 2013. Statistics of Korea's Trade : Export/Import. Last modified January 31. http://stat.kita.net/kts/rel/gikt3320d.jsp?cond_user_init=Y.

42 Adapted from Korea Customs Service. 2010. Korea Africa Trade Trends. Last modified March 3. http://www.customs.go.kr/kcsweb/secureDN.tdf?board_id=GPB_NEWSDATA&seq=1701&idx=1.

Figure 9. Korea's top five import destinations and major import items[43]



Figure 10. Korea's top five export destinations and major export items[44]



43 Adapted from Korea Customs Service. 2010. Korea Africa Trade Trends. Last modified March 3. http://www.customs.go.kr/kcsweb/secureDN.tdf?board_id=GPB_NEWSDATA&seq=1701&idx=1, and The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 2012. Africa: Country Profile. http://global.korcham.net/Service/Country/appl/MapSub.asp?submenu=GS02

44 ibid.

Yet, such increases in trade do not necessarily benefit African partners due to their trade deficit with Korea (see Table 6). Korea-Africa trade weighs heavily in favour of Korean exporters. Korea's balance of trade with African countries has risen consistently since 2005. Compared with the 2005 record, the trade value in 2009 increased by 28 percent (with a six percent increase in volume and a 62 percent increase in the trade surplus). Furthermore, the trade surplus with African countries accounts for 13 percent of Korea's total international trade surplus.

Table 6. Korea's trade balance with Africa (2005-2009) [45]

USD Million	Export to Africa	% of Korea's total world trade	Import from Africa	% of Korea's total world trade	Trade Balance	% of Korea's total world trade
2005	6,202	2.2	2,946	1.1	3,256	14
2006	7,729	2.4	4,372	1.4	3,357	20.9
2007	8,253	2.2	4,316	1.2	3,937	26.9
2008	9,384	2.2	4,052	0.9	5,332	N/A
2009	8,445	2.3	3,185	1	5,270	13

Figure 11. Korea's FDI to Africa[46]



As shown in Figure 11, Korean business made significant investments in manufacturing in Africa in the 1990s, including Hyundai Motor's assembly factory in Botswana ($50 million) and Daewoo Group companies (approximately $149 million) in Sudan. Yet, both operations proved short lived as they closed by early 2000.[47]

45 Adapted from Korea Customs Service. 2010. Korea Africa Trade Trends. Last modified March 3. http://www.customs.go.kr/kcsweb/secureDN.tdf?board_id=GPB_NEWSDATA&seq=1701&idx=1.

46 Adapted from Korea Exim Bank. 2012. Overseas Investment Statistics. http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oversea/use.jsp

47 Hyundai shut down the operation in February 2000, and most of Daewoo's operations also closed after the collapse of the Daewoo Group in 1999 (apart from the General Medicine Company). See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Korea, *Republic of Botswana*, 2007, http://www.mofat.go.kr/world/af/intro/20070822/1_12494.jsp; The Embassy of Republic of Korea in Sudan, *The Current Status of Korea-Sudan Investment*, 26 August, 2010, http://sdn.mofa.go.kr/korean/af/sdn/policy/relation/index.jsp

Since 2005, similar to ODA flows, Korea's FDI to Africa has dramatically increased. In particular, FDI for resource development has risen rapidly, reflecting what Korea seeks from Africa (as demonstrated above via the major import items). Thus, the average share of FDI for resource development against total FDI from 2001 to 2011 was 83.4 percent. Historically, Madagascar has been by far the largest recipient of Korea's FDI for resource development (solely in mineral resource sector including the recent investment in nickel mining), along with Libya, Nigeria and Egypt (see Table 7 and Figure 12). Since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, FDI to Libya has dropped drastically. Instead, for the past few years resource development FDI to countries like Equatorial Guinea, South Africa, and Cameroon has visibly increased.

Table 7 . Resource development FDI – accumulated from 1981-2011 (USD 1,000)[48]

1	Madagascar	2039759		15	Chad	662
2	Libya	265300		16	Central African republic	627
3	Nigeria	152225		17	Senegal	431
4	Egypt	145805		18	Tanzania	389
5	Equator Guinea*	79,815		19	Angola	218
6	Côte d'Ivoire	55349		20	Gabon	152
7	Sudan	34445		21	Zimbabwe	120
8	Benin	27,398		22	Liberia	110
9	South Africa*	16705		23	Zambia	70
10	Mali	5035		24	Guinea-Bissau	69
11	Cameroon*	1484		25	DRC	66
12	Swaziland	1207		26	Congo	60
13	Morocco	1158		27	Tunisia	40
14	Ghana	824		28	Zambia	36

* - rapid increase since 2010

When comparing all four flows — ODA grants, ODA loans, trade and resource development FDI — the data suggests a possible link between ODA flows with trade and especially resource development FDI. For example, apart from Ethiopia and Rwanda, all three KOICA recipients are found in the flows of ODA loans (Kenya and Tanzania), trade (Kenya) and resource FDI (Morocco, Tanzania). Nine ODA loan recipients (apart from Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, and Uganda) are also the destinations of resource FDI. Two (Angola and Kenya) were export, and one (Nigeria) was import. Apart from Kenya, all major export and import destinations were major resource FDI destinations.

African resources and market thus comprise one of the key motivations behind Korea's strategy. This is in large part due to Korea's resource scarcity, which has led to heavy dependency (in particular, on energy imports from the Middle East). Korea's overall energy import dependency rose from 87.9 percent in 1990 to 97.2 percent in 2000 and slightly decreased to 96.2 percent in 2010. It clearly needs to diversify its supply from the increasingly unstable Middle East region, which represents the largest source of Korea oil import (74.3 percent in 1990, 76.8 percent in 2000 and 81.8 percent in 2010).[49] This trend drives Seoul's emphasis on energy and resource diplomacy.[50]

48 Adapted from Korea Exim Bank. 2012. Overseas Investment Statistics. http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oversea/use.jsp

49 Korea Energy Management Corporation, *Energy and Climate Change Handbook 2011* (Seoul: KEMCO, 2011).

50 See Ho-young Lee, 'The Change of Korea's Foreign Policy toward Africa: Energy and Resource Diplomacy,' *Journal of International Politics* 16/2 (2011), 137-163.

Figure 12. Top five resource development FDI destination between 2006 and 2011[51]



CONCLUSION

Three key factors have motivated Korea's Africa strategy: achieving resource security, gaining political clout through the UN voting system and promoting soft power via contributive diplomacy.

The early years of Korea's Africa diplomacy focused on securing formal support from African nations for Seoul's entry to the UN. This has changed drastically since the mid-2000s, as Africa became Seoul's battle ground for conducting resource diplomacy and promoting soft power by propagating a Korean model of development. The renewed interest in Africa also provided a space to formalise and institutionalise hitherto limited Korea-Africa relations.

Past and current ODA data, trade flows and FDI flows suggest that African resources and markets are key to Korea's strategy. These flows have increased sharply since the mid-2000s — and in favour of Korean exporters. In terms of trade, Korea imports mostly oil and gas, minerals and metals, and exports high-end capital goods like transport vessels, automobile and mobile devices.

In regard to Korea's much heralded resource diplomacy, FDI directed at resource development in Africa has increased rapidly since 2006. This has in large part resulted from Korea's resource scarcity. The analysis suggests a possible link between ODA flows and trade, especially resource development FDI. ■

51 Adapted from Korea Exim Bank. 2012. Overseas Investment Statistics. http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oversea/use.jsp

Conclusion

African Agency and the New Multi-polarity

Chris Alden

As this report highlights, the dramatic changes underway in Africa today are reshaping the continent and its position within the international system. New economic opportunities are breeding new opportunities for Africans and, for some, the possibilities of a profoundly different relationship with external powers. Several years ago, this author speculated that the rise of emerging powers in Africa was setting in motion 'an Africa without Europeans'; that is, a world where the content and meaning of Africa no longer subject to its ties to the West but in fact defined and produced in conjunction with partners from the developing world.[1] Indeed, every day this seems closer to becoming a reality and it becomes possible to speak of an Africa where genuine multi-polarity is a given condition of the continent's relations with the outside world.

In facing these changing circumstances, however, in many respects Africans seem set on replaying old patterns of engagement with the outside world. To date, the African response to this developing reality has taken the form of two time-worn reactions.

The first approach is adaptive, aimed at learning the lessons of emerging power development success and grafting these onto African policies. The pursuit of a 'Chinese model' or 'Brazilian model' by African leaders, reflecting a genuine admiration of their development achievements and a desire to use emerging power resources and experiences to further African development, underpins this whole-hearted embrace of all things 'South'. This takes specific form in the efforts to emulate China's state-managed development, spearheaded by large state-owned enterprises, or the role of Brazil's *bolsa familia* in transforming the lives of millions of impoverished citizens. This is further enhanced by the possibility of forging longstanding ties with other developing countries which are free of the mantle of paternalism, promises to generate the requisite measure of self-respect and mutual interest to sustain the relationship into the future.

The second approach is that of critical distance to emerging powers. As welcome as these new actors' involvement is for African governments, questions about the nature of particular resource contracts, the conduct of some firms, the impact of their investments are all beginning to dampen the unbridled enthusiasm of the last few years. For instance, the actions of Brazilian firms like mining giant Vale displacing communities in central Mozambique or the suspicions aroused amongst SADC[2] leaders by Chinese arms sales to Zimbabwe have produced sharp reactions within the continent's elite and from civil society alike. Individual governments, from Nigeria to South Africa have pressed China to move beyond trade and investment in minerals and into value-added industrial production.[3] As noted earlier,

1 Chris Alden, 'Africa without Europeans', in Chris Alden, Dan Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds., *China Returns to Africa – an emerging power and a continent embrace* (London: Hurst 2008).

2 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) consists of 15 member countries from the region.

3 *Financial Times*, 'South Africa to China: let's make it more than about minerals', 24 August 2010.

the conduct of some Korean and Indian investors in acquiring agricultural land has produced local fallout and even contributed to the toppling of a government. Some African elites, like the Sudanese multimillionaire businessman Mo Ibrahim, have gone so far as to urge traditional powers like the US to stem their 'retreat from Africa'.[4]

These sentiments are not mutually exclusive, vary from country to country and are influenced by specific circumstances. Moreover, it would be a mistake to see in either of these approaches a resounding commendation of an 'African pivot to the South', a sharp critique of emerging power conduct on the continent or plaintive endorsement of deepening ties with traditional partners: rather it is an expression of a preference for a diversity of external partners. This time-honoured African strategy of extracting resources from the international community in the service of particularist domestic needs remains a constant of its foreign engagements in the modern era.[5] Aligning this impulse to a set of discourses based on declarations of political parity but underpinned by profound economic asymmetries suggests African agency must go beyond these conventions if it is to put in place genuinely sustainable partnerships. Time will tell whether this classic response is pro-active enough, strategic in form and likely to reproduce the development successes of emerging power while at the same time carving out a sphere of African autonomy.

Navigating the untested waters of this new relationship with emerging powers and armed with the crude maps of the past, Africans are only just beginning to fully recognise the opportunities and challenges inherent in emerging power engagement. Crafting a sustainable development partnership from this new beginning promises to be the key task of Africans in the twenty first century. ■

4 Mo Ibrahim, 'United States Disengaging from Africa', South African Foreign Policy Initiative, Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 30 April 2013.
5 Jean-Francois Bayart, 'Africa and the World – a history of extraversion', *African Affairs* 99/395, 2000.

LSE Ideas

STRATEGIC UPDATES



Back during the Cold War, when the politics of the Kremlin were opaque, journalists and analysts often became obsessed with the personality of the leader of Russia, speculating about his taste in whiskey or suits, tracking his wife's fashion sense or lack of it, hoping that would give them some clue about his policies. Times have changed, but the personality and beliefs of Vladimir Putin, the current Russian president, still matter just as much as those of his predecessors - if not more. In a state where authority is still vested in personalities, not in institutions, the Russian president's vision of his country, his understanding of its history, his training as a KGB officer and his personal experience of life in the Soviet Union now have an incalculable impact on Russian political life.

Anne Applebaum is Philippe Roman Chair in History and International Affairs 2012-13 at LSE IDEAS.

This paper analyses the consequences of the US pivot to Asia on the US-Japan alliance and on Japanese foreign and security policies. On the one hand, the US pivot is reassuring for Tokyo, since it seeks to 'rebalance' Chinese military ascendency and to strengthen extended deterrence in the region. On the other hand, it contributes to the acceleration of the 'normalisation' of Japanese security policies, speeding the process of overcoming the institutional self-binding prescriptions that underpinned Japan's post-war pacifism.

Dr Matteo Dian is a teaching assistant at the Faculty of Political Sciences 'Roberto Ruffilli' of the University of Bologna. He received his PhD in Political Science from the Italian Institute of Human Sciences in Florence. Previously, he was a visiting research student at the LSE IDEAS, and a visiting graduate student at the European University Institute and at the Paul H. Nitze SAIS, Johns Hopkins University.





The signing of Anglo-French Defence Treaty has been one of the least reported, and analysed, of the UK coalitions Government's policies, whilst being, without question, one of its most significant. In the context of defence cuts on both sides of the Atlantic and the Channel, and of a Libyan operation in which Britain and France's dependence on American assets surprised some observers in Washington, this paper assesses the consequences of the Treaty for Anglo-French defence cooperation.

John Stevens is a Visiting Fellow at LSE IDEAS.

LSE Ideas

SPECIALREPORTS

Southeast Asian states risk becoming pawns in a geopolitical clash between two extra-regional superpowers. This report analyses how the states in the region are responding to the challenge posed by the strategic interests of the US and China in their geography and economy.

If the Southeast Asian states are to take advantage of the opportunities presented by China's rise and the United States' pivot, they must stand together in the geopolitical contest currently taking place in the region. However, this is not an easy task: regional states are caught in what game theory would view as a classic 'prisoners' dilemma' that will require a deep degree of trust to escape.



The economic and political position of Europe in the world is changing, particularly its relationships with China and the United States. The Eurozone crisis represents a strategic opportunity for Europe to rethink itself and become a more powerful united force.

The report, Europe in an Asian Century, explores how China looms large in Europe's recovery from the crisis and is increasingly interested in Europe's future for economic and wider strategic reasons. And as the US increasingly focuses on Asia, Europe is impelled to carve a role for itself beyond the old certainties of the transatlantic relationship. Europe therefore has a pivotal strategic opportunity to capitalise on these shifts in global power to lay claim to the same key status as China and the US. However, the UK's obstructionism will prevent Europe from achieving this.

Since 1909 the international community has worked to eradicate the abuse of narcotics. A century on, the efforts are widely acknowledged to have failed, and worse, have spurred black market violence and human rights abuses. How did this drug control system arise, why has it proven so durable in the face of failure, and is there hope for reform?

This IDEAS Special Report was launched at *The Global Drug Wars* event.



international
affairs

diplomacy

strategy

LSE
THE LONDON SCHOOL
OF ECONOMICS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE