Cypher telegram by Vyshinky to Molotov containing the minutes of a phone conversation with Bramuglia regarding the Soviet response on the Berlin question, dated 14 October 1948

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TO MOLOTOV

1. On 13 October, at around 22:00 o’clock, I received a call on behalf of Bramuglia and was passed on a request to see him immediately. Half an hour after I had just received him.

Bramuglia reported that he had held a preliminary discussion with representatives of the other Five Powers and that they could not understand provision 3 of our response. Bramuglia asked to clarify whether one should understand provision 3 in a way that the Berlin question should be regulated by the Four Powers on the basis of the directive from 30 August before its discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers? I explained that the Berlin question should be regulated on the basis of the directive from 30 August namely in the Council of Ministers. Bramuglia responded that this is exactly how he understood it, but his colleagues understood it differently.

Then he informed me that it was planned to convene the meeting of the Security Council on the Berlin question at 3pm, on 15 October.

The subsequent conversation related to general questions, and Bramuglia expressed regret that he had got himself involved in that story. He said that he had initially tried to avoid chairing the Security Council proceedings on the Berlin question but he had failed to do that.

The remainder of the conversation was not of interest and was of a general character. When leaving, Bramuglia asked Dashkevich (our translator) to pass onto me that regardless of anything he would make every effort to resolve the Berlin question in accordance with the interests of the Soviet Union. This is because he was a sincere friend of the USSR. We obviously know the value of words from Argentinians.

2. The following questions could be put forward on the agenda of the Security Council on Friday:

a) Probably, there will be a proposal made by the USA, Great Britain and France, condemning actions of the Soviet Union and demanding the lifting of the so-called “blockade” and the withdrawal of all other limitations imposed by the Soviet side.

Probably the proposal will be followed by agreement to consider the Berlin question and the German question as a whole in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

It is also probable that it will be proposed to send a special commission of the Security Council to Berlin to study the situation on the ground and to work out measures that would then have to be considered by the Security Council

(p. 184) Probably, the proposal would be combined out of the two provisions, which Bramuglia had handed over to us.

B) We cannot exclude that there would be another proposal that would recommend the four great powers to engage in informal preliminary negotiations with regards to the resolution of the Berlin question through the Council of Foreign Ministers

G) It is probable that it will be proposed to recommend the four great powers to relaunch negotiations in Berlin between commanders-in-chief with the goal of achieving a possible solution

D) We also cannot preclude that there will be a suggestion, combined out of our provisions. Thus, points “a” and “b” from our 2nd provision will be enacted.

3. I believe that in relation to any of the abovementioned proposals, we should follow the following line:

We should object to points “a” and “b” and, in case of a vote, apply the veto

We should not object to point “v” but we should try to demand the simultaneous withdrawal of the Berlin question from the agenda of the Security Council. However, if we cannot achieve this, we should not vote against but make a statement that we remain firm in our view that the Security Council has no competence to consider the given issue.

We should not object to point “g”

We also obviously should not object to point “d”

Obviously, the abovementioned scenarios do not exhaust the list of possible proposals but it seems that they outline the main lines.

I request your directives.

№359/c №35,36,37,38,39

VYSHINSKY

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