From a telegram by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, I.V. Stalin, 13 December 1946

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Sochi, to Comrade DRUZHKOV.

[...]

Today, on 12 December the New York session of Council of Foreign Ministers came to an end[[1]](#footnote-1). Five peace treaties have been agreed upon. Signing will take place on 10 February in Paris. However, Ministers’ signatures will be attached later. Governments will authorize their representatives, in most cases their ambassadors, to sign in Paris.

In sum, all essential clauses of the peace treaties are acceptable to us and are in accordance with the instructions given to the delegation.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to amend, in the slightest the “French line” of the border which remains as was originally accepted[[2]](#footnote-2). Also on the division of the naval fleet of Italy it was necessary to agree to group "B", as Byrnes and Bevin were irreconcilable regarding this issue[[3]](#footnote-3).

In the last days, up to the last minutes of the session, Byrnes and Bevin, supported by France, tried in every possible way to get our consent to remove customs "barriers" in Trieste during the temporary period and to transform Trieste into the base for their economic attack (“cheap goods”) in the southeast of Europe. We have categorically rejected these dangerous attempts[[4]](#footnote-4).

These days the assembly shall finish its work, but the situation is already clear enough on all the issues.

On 14 December I leave by steamship. If it is required, Vyshinsky will stay until complete termination of the Assembly session.

 13.12. MOLOTOV.

[…]

New York.

[RSASPH, f. 17, inv. 167, file 72, p. 341]

Keywords: post-war order, inter-allied relations, Trieste, United Nations

1. 1946 New York session of CFM lasted from November 4 to December 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. A new Italian-Yugoslav border proposed by French Foreign Minister Bidault which was the least disadvantageous for Yugoslavia compared to other Western proposals. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. An agreed upon part of the Italian Navy which did not include the most advanced battleship “Vittorio Veneto” from Group “C” that the Soviet delegation worked hard to get. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. A few days later in his circular telegram to Soviet diplomats abroad about results of the CFM session in New York Molotov described the Trieste compromise more vividly: “Yugoslavia does not get Trieste. But Trieste remains out of Italy becoming a free territory, which provides considerable political and economical advantages for Yugoslavia” (FPARF, f. 3, inv.63, file 251, p. 141). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)