From a telegram by the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, I.V. Stalin, to Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, 2 November 1946

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NEW YORK, TO MOLOTOV[[1]](#footnote-1).

Our people obtained a document from the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Bevin’s instruction for representatives of Britain in the USA on the issues of our interest. In the document it says that at the [General] Assembly the British should prevent raising the issue of contingents of allied armies on the territory of the United Nations and that the British should oppose even more raising the issue of allied military contingents on the territory of Germany and the satellites.

From the document it is clear that in this respect there are disagreements between the USA and Britain; that Byrnes is likely to support the Soviet delegation on this issue, and Bevin is asking his people in New York to influence Byrnes so that the latter agrees with the British or at least delaying the declaration of his position until Bevin’s arrival to New York.

Further, the document states that if the Russians use the well-known article of the United Nations Charter and raise the issue of arms reduction, this would cause great harm to Britain’s policy and should be prevented by all possible means.

Bevin is afraid that Britain will not get a majority regarding these issues, that abstentions are now gaining great importance as they will actually define the Assembly decision. That is why he recommends to his people in the USA to influence the neutral voters.

All this proves that we have hit the nail on its head by having raised the issue about contingents and arms reduction. Thus I believe we should consistently continue the policy we took. There is only one thing we should remember: it will be more expedient to conduct the policy in moderate and quiet tones, without abuse and piquing, however without changing anything in the essence of our policy. We should not tease them, and should achieve our goal persistently, calmly and patiently[[2]](#footnote-2).

 DRUZHKOV.

Sochi

[RSASPH, f. 17, inv. 167, file 72, p. 145]

Keywords: United Nations, inter-allied relations

1. It was sent through the channels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR while Molotov was in New York attending the second part of the first session of the General Assembly of the UN. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. At the second part of the first session of the General Assembly of the UN, Soviet representatives continually raised the propagandistically fruitful issue of the presence of troops on the territories of foreign states, aiming primarily at Great Britain which had the largest number of troops based overseas. British diplomacy was categorically opposed to the discussion on this issue, something Bevin had informed his representatives at the UN about; he also informed senior members of the State Department in a telegram that was intercepted by Soviet intelligence and which was referred to by Stalin. However, Byrnes did not object to this discussion and even (without British agreement) divulged locations and numbers of American troops stationed on foreign territories. This caused grave disagreements between London and Washington, which Moscow strived to exploit (for more detail see: Gaiduk I.V. V labarintakh kholodnoi boiny: SSSR i SShA v OON, 1945-1965. М., 2012, s.116-119). In the end, British diplomats succeeded in diluting the Soviet proposal for the disclosure of information about British troop numbers abroad. Nonetheless, Stalin, in a consoling telegram to Molotov, stated that ‘I have no doubt that the Soviet delegation scored a moral-political victory despite Bevin’s formal victory’ (RSASPH, f.558, inv.11, file 103, p.40). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)