Note from Head of the Personnel Department of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, M.A. Silin[[1]](#footnote-1), to Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, A. Ya. Vyshinksy, 10 April 1946

To Comrade A.Ya. VYSHINSKY

The trip of British Members of Parliament to the Iranian Azerbaijan is undoubtedly aimed at getting the “facts” of the Soviet representatives’ intervention in Azerbaijani affairs and to later make corresponding “disclosures” at the British parliament. The British would definitely get the necessary “facts”, since in Tabriz and other cities of Iranian Azerbaijan there are many opponents of the democratic movement who would willingly give the information needed by the British.

Considering that the Iran issue is still on the agenda of the Security Council[[2]](#footnote-2), Having British parliament members as "eyewitnesses" of anti-Soviet information on the Azerbaijan issue is especially undesirable for us.

It is necessary to consider also that having allowed a visit to Iranian Azerbaijan to the British, it would be difficult for us to refuse a visit to American journalists. Kennan addressed us for permission of their visit in a letter dated February, 14th of this year.

Thus, I believe that the delivery of admissions to the British should be delayed, as well as the answer to the letter of Roberts. Should Roberts apply orally, he can be told that the Soviet command is requested on this issue.

 (M. Silin).

[FPARF, f. 069, inv. 30, fold. 100, file 19, p. 17]

Keywords: Iran, inter-allied relations

1. Silin, Mikhail Aleksandrovich (1904 – 1980) – Soviet diplomat. In charge of the Personnel Section of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1943 – 1945), Head of Personnel Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1945 – 1948, until 1946 of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs), Ambassador of the USSR to Czechoslovakia (1948 – 1951), Director of the Higher Diplomatic School of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1951 – 1960). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. A Soviet-Iranian compromise had been reached on 4 April through the exchange of letters between Sadchikov and Qavām; the Soviets were obliged to withdraw all troops over a one and a half month period from 24 March and in exchange for Iranian obligations to form a Soviet-Iranian oil company and to implement the measures recommended by the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers for regulating the situation in Iranian Azerbaijan. Despite this agreement, discussions in the Security Council (in the absence of the Soviet representative who had pulled out in protest) were prolonged. The resolution adopted by the Council on the 4 April put aside discussion of the Iranian issue until 6 May – the period during which the Governments of the USSR and Iran were to inform the Council whether Soviet troop withdrawals had been completed. The withdrawal of Soviet troops was accomplished by 9 May. For more detail see: Yegorova N.I. The ‘Iran Crisis” of 1945 – 46: A View from the Russian Archives’ // Working Paper No. 15 (Cold War International History Project) Washington, D.C. May 1996 (available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Working%20Paper%20%2315.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)