Top Secret report by C.F.A. Warner from the British Embassy in Moscow, 2 April 1946[[1]](#footnote-1)

TOP SECRET

THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST THIS

COUNTRY AND OUR RESPONSE TO IT.

The reports from the Embassy in Moscow on recent Soviet pronouncements in particular the election speeches made by Stalin, Molotov and other members of the Politibureau and the publicity campaign in connexion with the elections to the Supreme Soviet bring out the following points in the Soviet Government’s declared policy: -

(a) The return to the pure doctrine of Marx-Lenin-Stalinism.

(b) The intense concentration upon building up the industrial and military strength of the Soviet Union;

(c) The revival of the bogey of external danger to the Soviet Union.

2. The return to Marx-Lenin-Stalinism includes of course the glorification of Communism as the inevitable religion of the future, the natural antagonism between Communism on the one hand and imperialism and capitalism on the other (both Russia’s Major allies being regarded as imperialistic and capitalistic); the natural antagonism between Communist and Social Democracy; The Soviet Union’s duty to propagate Communism; and all the rest of the doctrine (o?). in other words, the Soviet Union has announced to the world that it proposes to play an aggressive political role, while making an intensive drive to increase its own military and industrial strength. We should be very unwise not to take the Russians at their word, just as we should have been wise to take “Mein Kampf at its face value.

3. All Russia’s activities in the past few months confirm this picture. In Eastern Europe, in the Balkans, in Persia, in Manchuria, in Korea, in her zone in Germany, and in the Security Council; in her support of Communist parties in foreign countries and Communist efforts to infiltrate Socialist parties and to combine left wing parties under Communist leadership; in the Soviet Union’s foreign economic policy (her refusal to cooperate in international efforts at reconstruction and rehabilitation, while despoiling foreign countries in her sphere[[2]](#footnote-2), harnessing them to the Soviet system, and at the same time posing as their only benefactors); in every word on foreign affairs that appears in the Soviet press and broadcast; and most of all in the tremendous reaction which Mr. Winston Churchill’s Fulton speech[[3]](#footnote-3) brought from Stalin, the Soviet Union’s acts bear out the declarations of policy referred to above.

4. The Soviet Union is no doubt war-weary, and, as the Soviet leaders have proclaimed, wants a prolonged peace to build up her strength. But she is practising the most vicious power politics, in the political, economic, and propaganda spheres and seems determined to stick at nothing, short of war, to obtain her objectives. Having regard to the declarations of policy referred to above, it would be very rash to assume that her present political strategy and tactics are short-term only. […]

6. Russia’s policy is normally coordinated over the whole field and she will no doubt direct attack equally against our strategic, political and economic interests, using military, economic, propaganda and political weapons and also the driving forces generated by Communism. And Communism in this connexion must be viewed not merely as a political creed but as a religious dogma and faith which can inspire such fanaticism and self sacrifice as we associate with the early Christians and the rise of Islam and which in the minds of the believers transcends all lesser loyalties towards family, class or even country. We must therefore study this Russian aggressive policy as a whole in all its different manifestations, and not only make up our minds what measure we should take to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union’s present manoeuvres, but also to try to foresee the future development of her campaign against us and how we can meet it. We should also consider whether, in some directions at least, we should adopt a defensive-offensive policy.

7. As regards Russia’s use of the military weapon, the Chiefs of Staff have endorsed the opinion expressed in the J.I.C.’s recent paper (J.I.C. (46) 1(0) of 1st March[[4]](#footnote-4)) that the Russians do not wish to get involved in another war for at least the next five years and Chiefs of Staff are considering their plans on this assumption. We understand that they will be making their recommendations shortly. It is relevant however to the political problems which concern the Foreign Office to remark in their use of military pressure, in areas affecting our vital interests of those of the Americans, the Russians will, of course, have to rely on their own appreciation to judge how far they can go without making war inevitable. As in the case of Hitler and Poland, the may miscalculate. In their anxiety to justify themselves to the British people and the world His Majesty’s Government may have misled Hitler. We should always keep this in mind in dealing with the Russian problem now.

8. In the economic sphere, the broad lines of Russian policy are clear. It is entirely selfish. It is at the same time ideological. They are ruthlessly despoiling the countries occupied by the Red Army, in the guise of booty, restitution and reparation. Simultaneously, they are using their puppets to gear the economics of these countries to the Soviet machine. They are contributing nothing to United Nations international efforts to restore economic stability and the free flow of trade and transport. They are making exclusive commercial treaties and securing a predominant share in the control of basic industries from Germany and the Adriatic right across to Manchuria. By this means they hope control the whole economic life of this vast area for the benefit of the Soviet Union, in order to speed up the achievement of their own long-term industrial development. In doing so they are reducing the standard of living throughout this area to the Soviet level, partly presumably in the process of coordinating the economic life of the whole area, partly because it is not good for their own internal propaganda that the many Soviet citizens who are likely to move about in that area should see that Russia’s satellites have a higher standard of living than the Soviet Union.

9. Russia’s foreign economic policy thus serves political, economic and ideological ends simultaneously. It will speed up the achievement of her own vast plan of industrial and military development. It will make an enormous area economically, and therefore politically, dependent upon herself. It will serve the spread of Communism and it will give the Kremlin a tremendous economic weapon to use in the Marxist-Leninist struggle against capitalism and for Russian imperialistic political ends.

[…]

15. In all this we have apparently been selected as the weaker of the two protagonists of the liberal, democratic and Western conceptions which have been proclaimed by the Soviet leaders as the rivals of Marx-Leninism. The Soviet ideological war against these conceptions has therefore been opened with an attack upon us and we are called upon to defend these conceptions in defending ourselves.

16. the threats we have to guard against are (a) the establishment of communist governments in countries where a hostile influence threatens our vital interests, (b) the weakening of the influence of elements friendly to us in the such countries, (c) the creation of troubled conditions where we are responsible for or interested in peace and prosperity (including of course, our own colonies and India), (d) Soviet blocking of schemes for restoring settled conditions in countries outside her own sphere, (e) Soviet attempts to divide us from those who share our basic political conceptions, (f) Soviet attempts to discredit us as weak and reactionary.

17. We should clearly marshal such means as we have to defend ourselves. But should we not also conduct a defensive-offensive? Should we not organise all our forces to attack and expose international Communism wherever it shows itself?

[…]

20. In addition, we could, in every country, where social democrats, “liberals”, progressive agrarian parties etc. are fighting a battle against Communism, give our friends all such moral and material support as is possible, without going so far as actually to endanger their lives or organisation. The extent of our support would, naturally, vary in each country according to circumstances and according to the importance of the particular country from the point of view of British interests. (We have, of course, done this in certain cases and on special occasions, but it has not been accepted as a principle many cases in doubt whether it is not still the policy of His Majesty’s Government in their attempt to live up to the spirit of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and for the sake of good relations with the Russians, to refrain from intervention even when Russian pressure on behalf of Communists is rapidly leading to complete Communist domination).

21. To take two examples. In no country is it so vitally important for us as in France that the Communists should not obtain control. We should therefore be prepared to consider exceptional measures to strengthen the hands of our friends in the coming elections. A separate paper is being prepared on this matter.

22. Again, in Germany, we and the Americans are now doing what we can to help the Social Democrats who are against fusion with the Communists; but should the C.O.G.A. and the British authorities in Germany not be given a general directive to make the strengthening of the opposition to the spread of Communism in Germany a primary consideration in all their work, both in the Control Council and in the administration of the British zone. Should not we adopt the same policy in Austria in order to help the Austrian Government to resist Communist infiltration and Russian intimidation? Further papers are being prepared on these German and Austrian aspects of the problem. […]

25. We should, of course, consider how far the United States Government would be likely to take part in the general, world-wide anti-Communist campaign and how they should be approached. There is a good deal of evidence that the State Department is considering their attitude to the latest developments of Russian policy at the present time. We know that the United States Embassy in Moscow has been asked for an appreciation of them and has sent in reports in which they reach similar conclusions to our own regarding the return to the Marx-Lenin ideology, the dynamic and offensive nature of Soviet foreign policy, the coordination of the economic and the political weapons etc. These reports have been favourably received in Washington and are believed to have influenced Mr Byrne’s recent speeches. The economic officials from the American Embassies and Legations in Europe have recently conferred and have recommended to the State Department that the Russian coordinated economic policy necessitates the setting up of a American economic policy, which would be constantly adapted to meet the developments of Soviet policy. American representatives in central and eastern European countries have recently been receiving instructions to play a stronger hand in support anti-Communist elements. Nonetheless the conduct of American foreign policy being as it is and American dislike of “ganging up” with us being still so strong, we should probably be well advised to make no general approach to the State Department regarding an anti-Communist campaign, but to consult them in each specific case, while seeking as at present to encourage the cooperation of the British and American representatives in the various countries, so that they may, whenever possible, send their Governments similar appreciations and recommendations.

[…]

28. To sum up, the Soviet Government, both in their recent pronouncements and in their actions have made it clear that they have decided upon an aggressive policy, based upon militant Communism and Russian chauvinism. They have launched an offensive against Social Democracy and against this country. They must have realised already that their clumsiness is alarming the whole non-Communist world, and in particular American public opinion, and is thus consolidating opposition to them and support for His Majesty’s Government. They will very probably adopt henceforth more subtle tactics and lay themselves out to allay these suspicions. But it would be in the highest degree rash to suppose that they will drop their policy of challenging this country, which they must regard as the leader of Social Democracy and the more vulnerable of the two great Western powers. The interests of this country and the true democratic principles for which we stand are directly threatened. The Soviet Government makes coordinated use of military, economic, propaganda and political weapons and also of the Communist “religion”. It is submitted, therefore, that we must at once organise and coordinate our defences against all these and that we should not stop short of a defensive-offensive policy. If general approval is given to these propositions, further study should be given as a matter of urgency to the various suggestions outlined in this memorandum.

C.F.A. WARNER

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[TNA, FO 371/56832]

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1. Scholars impute grave significance to this memorandum, seeing in it the sign of a clear hardening of the position on the USSR and the cohering of an anti-Soviet consensus at the Foreign Office: ‘No longer could co-operation be seen as the key, but rather the aggressive expansionism needed a strong response.’ (Goodman M.S. Op. cit. p. 240); Published in: Lewis J. *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942–1947* 2nd. ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 359–363. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Similar British assessments were formed back in wartime. ‘The Russians appear to be stripping the territories that they overrun’ wrote the First Sea Lord A. Cunningham in May 1945. (C.O.S. (45) 338 (O), Memo by Cunningham, 15/05/1945 // TNA, CAB 80/94). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This refers to Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech at Fulton College on 5 March 1946; for the full text of the speech see: <http://www.historyguide.org/europe/churchill.html>. Attlee’s government was apprised only of the general outlines of the speech before hand. On 11 March 1946, there was a Cabinet discussion in the wake of the speech. Both Attlee and Bevin pointed out that Churchill’s speech reflected his personal position and laid no obligations on the Government at all (C.M. (46) 23rd Conclusions, 11/03/1946 // TNA, CAB 128/5). Bevin emphasised in addition that the Government position on Russia had been formed in his speech to the House of Commons on 21 February; he had then declared, among other things, that: ‘After all, those who make up the Soviet Union are members of the proletariat, and so am I. We are used to hard hitting, but our friendship remains.’ (See: Hansard. Parliamentary Debates. 5th Ser. Vol. 419. Col. 1359.) Stalin responded to Churchill by giving on interview to *Pravda* on 14 March. In it he deemed the Fulton speech ‘a dangerous act calculated to sow seeds of discord between the Allied states and to complicate their cooperation.’ Later, in May 1946, Molotov and Vyshinsky spoke, in a conversation with Byrnes, of how Churchill’s speech ‘was nothing other than a call to a new war’. (СССР и германский вопрос. Т. 2. М., 2000. С. 475.) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee on 1 March 1946. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)