Telegram from Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.M. Molotov to the Chairman Council of the People's Commissars, I.V. Stalin, 28 September 1945

Copy

Top secret

NOT IN ORDER

TO STALIN.

...

I agree that now is the crucial moment. I agree that it is better to let the first Council of Ministers end in failure than to make significant concessions to Byrnes. I think that now you can either break the veils of well-being, the visibility which the Americans would like to have or obtain from the Americans (and, hence, from others) significant concessions in USSR’s favour.

I think we can offer the following:

The Americans should agree with us about the imminent establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania and Bulgaria, as well as to promise a specific short period of time to create the Allied Control Council in Japan. Otherwise, we abandon the agreement with them on the subject of Italy and other significant decisions of the Council. We have the means to put pressure on the Americans, if they want to show the success of the first session of the Council of Ministers, which Byrnes apparently wants to. At the meeting with Byrnes and Bevin on 27 September 27, I assailed Byrnes for the fact that he is demanding to immediately set up short deadlines for the preparation of the peace treaties, but does not agree to a discussion on the establishment of the Control Council in Japan. I declared that the United States wants to play the role of the dictator, to dictate its proposals, but does not want to meet halfway on the issue of a Control Council in Japan, which all the Allies want: the Soviet Union, Britain, and China. I said that nothing will come of this, and that in such a case, I too cannot give an immediate response on the procedure for reviewing the peace treaties with Italy and other countries, on which Byrnes wants to create an impression of success regarding the work of Council of Ministers.

Under these circumstances, Bevin only moaned and repeated platitudes, without making any suggestions.

It will probably not be possible to immediately gain concessions from the Americans on the Balkan countries and Japan. But without significant concessions from the Americans on at least one of these questions (the Balkans or Japan), it is impermissible, in my opinion, to enter into an agreement with them regarding the main present-day issues. If the Americans (and the British) do agree to give way on at least one of these questions, then it is necessary to negotiate with them. Only then will the success of the Council's work be in our favour.

I await your reply.

28.IX.45 MOLOTOV

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