Note by the Soviet ambassador to the United States, A.A. Gromyko[[1]](#footnote-1), to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.Y. Vyshinsky, 26 January 1945

TOP SECRET.

TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE’S COMMISSAR

FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Comrade A.Y. VYSHINSKY

Yesterday I forwarded to you and Vyacheslav Mihailovich a list of issues which may be raised by the Americans and the British at the forthcoming meeting[[2]](#footnote-2). I also enclose remarks on some of these issues.

I. On Poland.

This issue will undoubtedly be raised at the meeting. The USA and Britain will apparently look for ways of reconciling Poland’s provisional government[[3]](#footnote-3) with the emigrant Polish government in London. I know that the US government hopes to make Mikołajczyk[[4]](#footnote-4) a member of the government. According to official American circles (apparently British ones as well), Mikołajczyk may be a suitable link between the emigrant Polish government in London and the provisional government in Poland.

The aforementioned will be considered by the US and Britain when deciding on the acknowledgement of Poland’s provisional government. It is quite possible that Roosevelt will not solve the issue of acknowledgement of the provisional Polish government by the United States, due to unprepared American public opinion and possible disapproval by the Congress […].

Such a result may only be temporary and I believe that the US government will have to acknowledge the provisional Polish government, perhaps not right after the meeting, but a bit later. Certainly a lot will depend on whether the British government will firmly and consistently stick to their point of view on this issue, which it has already expressed earlier. It is unlikely that Roosevelt shall directly raise the issue of the Soviet Union giving Lvov to the Poles.

Perhaps Roosevelt will try to mention this issue in a diplomatic way.

However, regarding the territorial Polish issue, Roosevelt will be forced to agree, and I don’t expect serious difficulties for the three parties coming to an agreement on this issue.

[…]

III. Yugoslavia.

I believe that by raising the issue of Yugoslavia, the US and Britain will aim for two things: 1) consolidation of Tito [regime] with the current Šubašić government, and 2) eliminate possibilities of a Soviet system establishing in Yugoslavia. The prospect of political events in Yugoslavia towards the establishment of a Soviet system there upsets official American circles. Such a prospect also disturbs the British official circles to no lesser degree[[5]](#footnote-5). As for Britain, its attitude to Yugoslav affairs will apparently be determined to a great extent by our attitude to the Greek affairs. Though this is only my assumption.

I believe that regarding Yugoslavia we may expect success at the meeting in conducting a definite and determined policy of support for Tito, who has progressive public forces behind him. The condition of Yugoslav affairs are such as to enable us to easily achieve more active support from Roosevelt and Churchill for Tito.

IV. Оn the organisation of an Inter-Allied Advisory Body

As I already reported earlier, the USA and Britain are not satisfied by the work of the European Advisory Commission. According to them, they are unsatisfied because the Commission is slow in making decisions on the discussed issues and has limited rights and powers. I know from Stettinius’[[6]](#footnote-6) message that at the meeting the Americans will raise the issue of forming an Inter-Allied Advisory Body. Though Stettinius did not give details of his idea, I believe the Americans mean that such a body shall include the representatives of only the great countries. The purpose of an Advisory Body organisation is for the discussion of all the issues arising during the war in order to achieve coordination between the Allies on these issues. If such an Advisory Body is formed, the activities of the Soviet Union in Europe during the war would undoubtedly be limited to a certain extent, since the USA and Britain would first of all be striving towards discussing political and other issues arising in the Southeast Europe.

Certainly, the extent to which the existence of such an Advisory Body will limit our activities in a number of European countries, will be determined not only by the mere fact of its existence, but also by its rights and powers. If it happens that its functions do not differ greatly from those of the European Advisory Commission, there would be no big difference. However, if larger rights and powers are given to such an Advisory Body, the situation would be different and such a body could limit to a certain extent Soviet Union’s activities in Europe.

[…]

Advocates of the idea of forming the United Nations Council intend for such a Council to exist until the creation of the International Security Organisation. Therefore, if the meeting manages to achieve an agreement on still-unresolved issues related to the creation of the International Security Organization and if the creation of the Organization is a task for near future, the ideas of creating a United Nations Provisional Council would seemingly fall by the wayside for the Americans as well.

In my opinion, it is necessary to resolutely object to the suggestion of creating a United Nations Provisional Council. Such a Council, bestowed with broad-ranging powers, would be an assembly making decisions not in our favour. In such a Council, the Soviet Union would be countered on decisions regarding a number of major political issues not by 2-3 countries, but by dozens of countries.

[…]

From the point of view of the Soviet Union’s interests an even more suitable way out would be a decision to conduct regular periodic meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the allied countries. Such a decision would limit the Soviet Union’s activities in Europe to a lesser degree. Such meetings would not be arranged frequently, anyway, they are unlikely to happen more often than twice a year. In this case the allies would be less importunate on decisions regarding current political issues. Therefore, I believe that the idea of organizing periodic meetings is a worthy one.

[…]

[Signature] (A. Gromyko)

[FPARF, f. 06, inv. 7a, fold. 57, file 5, pp. 23–28]

Keywords: Poland, Yugoslavia, United Nations, inter-allied relations

1. Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich (1909 – 1989) – Soviet statesman and party figure, diplomat, Soviet Ambassador to the United States (1943 – 1946), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the USSR (1946 – 1949), Permanent Representative of the USSR on the United Nations Security Council (1946 – 1948), First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the USSR (1949 – 1952, 1953 – 1957), Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain (1952 – 1953), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1957 – 1985), First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1983 – 1985), Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1985 – 1988). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Crimean (Yalta) Conference of the Soviet, US and British heads of state (4 – 11 February 1945). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland was formed on the night of 31 December 1944/1 January 1945, as a result of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa passing the law on the reorganisation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. On 2 January the Provisional Government proposed establishing diplomatic relations with the Allied states and on 5 January was formally recognised by the Soviet Union. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Mikołajczyk, Stanisław (1901 – 1966) – Polish statesman and politician, Deputy Prime Minister (1940 – 1943), Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile (1943 – 1944), Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Agriculture and Agricultural Reform of the Provisional Government of National Unity in Poland (1945 – 1947). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Such fears were very real in London. However, as evidenced by a Cabinet discussion in January 1945, both Churchill and Eden were hoping that movement towards the Tito-Šubašić agreement would avoid what would be for the British, the worst-case scenario. Eden, admitting that ‘the crude reality of the situation is that Tito is in possession of Yugoslavia’, called on the Yugoslav king to accede to the Tito-Šubašić agreement, seeing in the latter ‘the King’s best chance of preserving the monarchy and his own position’ (W.P. (45) 13, Memo by Eden, 05/01/1945 // TNA, CAB 66/60). Churchill, disowning the public pronouncements of Peter II Karađorđević in opposition to the Tito-Šubašić agreement, indicated the extreme importance of backing the agreement in force and ‘in particular the provisions contained in it for free elections, etc. Moreover, we must be at pains to avoid any impression in the minds of the Russians or of Marshal Tito that we had been privy to King Peter’s action in issuing this statement’ (W.M. (45) 4th Conclusions, Conf. Annex, Minute 2, 11/01/1945 // TNA, CAB 65/51). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Stettinius, Edward Reilly Jr. (1900 – 1949) – U.S. statesman and politician, Undersecretary of State (1943 – 1944), Secretary of State (1944 – 1945), Ambassador to UN (1945 – 1946). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)