From the circular telegram of the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the outcome of the "Tolstoy" conference, 21 October 1944

 In connection with our telegram[[1]](#footnote-1) in which we gave you the text of the Anglo-Soviet communiqué on the visit of Churchill and Eden to Moscow, I additionally report the following:

 1. During the discussion of the Polish question the main focus was on the Soviet-Polish border and the makeup of the Polish government. On the question of the Soviet-Polish border, which is a key issue for Soviet-Polish relations, the Poles initially agreed to accept the Curzon Line as only a line of demarcation, and not as a border. Only at the end of the negotiations did Mikołajczyk say that he is personally willing to agree to recognize the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish border, to which he would have to discuss the issue with his colleagues in London. Mikolajczyk added that he hopes to receive support on this matter from the Polish community in London. Thus, the border issue remains yet unresolved. In regards to the composition of the Polish government, Mikołajczyk proposed to hand out government posts evenly between the Polish Government in Exile and the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, Osóbka-Morawski and Bierut, offered only 25% of seats for the émigré government within the new government, leaving the rest of the 75% to the [Polish Committee of National Liberation]. Although, they did agree to offer Mikołajczyk the post of Prime Minister. This question remains yet unresolved. Mikołajczyk departed for London, stating that he intends to come back very quickly, after reaching an agreement with his colleagues.

2. The Anglo-Soviet communiqué describes how during Churchill and Eden's visit to Moscow, the "course of events in Southeast Europe" had been fully examined, and was done so with reference to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. With regard to Bulgaria, during the negotiations with the British on the draft of the armistice agreement with the Bulgarian government, the main issues [discussed] were 'the question of managing the work of the Control Commission and the general question of policy towards Bulgaria. Regarding the Control Commission, the dispute was over who should be given the leading role in this commission and what should be the degree of participation of the British and American representatives in it. The essence of the Anglo-American proposal boiled down to the fact that the leading role of the Soviet High Command in the Allied Control Commission was limited only to the period from the date of signing of the armistice agreement with Bulgaria until the end of military actions in Europe. In the second period, i.e. after the cessation of hostilities in Europe and until the conclusion of peace, the Allied Control Commission, according to the Anglo-American draft, must act in accordance with the instructions of the three Governments (USSR, USA and Great Britain), and not according to the instructions of the Soviet High Command. We had insisted that in the second period (i.e. after the cessation of hostilities against Germany and until the conclusion of peace) the leadership of the Allied Control Commission should also belong to the Soviet High Command, due to the fact that the degree of participation of the British and American representatives in the Control Commission in this second period will be greater than would have been the case in the first period.

As a result, the question of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria in the period between the armistice coming into force and the end of military operations against Germany was resolved in the sense that within this period the Allied Control Commission shall be under the overall leadership of the Soviet High Command. In the period directly after the cessation of military operations against Germany, the Allied Control Commission, as chaired by the representative of the Soviet High Command and with the participation of American and British representatives, will manage and supervise the implementation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement.

In a special letter addressed to Eden[[2]](#footnote-2), Comrade Molotov pointed out that the draft agreement’s reference to the fact that Allied Control Commission’s work will commence under the chairmanship of the Soviet High Command (and not chaired by the Soviet representative, as in the English draft) should essentially mean that the leadership of the Allied Control Commission will belong to the Soviet High Command during the second period. Although during the second period the leading role of the Soviet High Command in the Allied Control Commission will be limited to a certain extent in favour of the British and American representatives. In this letter, addressed to Eden, Comrade Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Government, in defining the functions of the Control Commission, proceeds from the need to preserve the leading role for the Soviet High Command, albeit in a slightly different form, as well as during the second period of the Allied Control Commission.

On the question concerning the signing of the Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria, the British insisted that the agreement should be signed not only by the Soviet Commander in Chief Marshal Tolbukhin[[3]](#footnote-3), on which we have insisted, but by two – a Soviet and a British (referring to Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, Wilson[[4]](#footnote-4)) and that the signing of the Agreement, as well as the peace talks, should take place in Cairo. We had insisted on Moscow, or if it was to be unacceptable to the [our] allies for any reason - at Ankara. As a result, we agreed on the fact that the negotiations and the signing of the agreement will take place in Moscow, and that the agreement will be signed by the representatives of both the Soviet and the British High Command.

It must be said that, during the talks it actually became clear that the British and Americans were intent on making the terms of the armistice for Bulgaria more stringent, compared with the Romanian and Finnish [armistices][[5]](#footnote-5). Yet we are guided by the principle that not only should the Bulgarian not be more stringent than the Romanian [agreement], but that, in some respects, it should be more lenient than the Romanian [agreement]. We have advocated for this point of view throughout all the negotiations, and have achieved the desired outcome. We have finally agreed amongst the English and ourselves on the draft of the Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria, which was submitted to the EAC [European Advisory Commission] for approval by US government through its representative to the EAC - Winant.

3. With regard to Yugoslavia, it was agreed that both governments would conduct a joint policy on it. The English have had concerns about the growing Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. We sought to dispel these fears by explaining that we do not consider Sovietization as the correct policy for Yugoslavia, but just as well, we stressed the importance of a correct evaluation of the national liberation struggle of the Yugoslav national forces led by Marshal Tito and the importance of uniting all democratic national forces of Yugoslavia. During the negotiations, the British made a proposal to make an appeal on behalf of Bolotov and Eden to Šubašić and Tito with the wish that they meet in Yugoslavia, and agree on the formation of a unity government. We agreed to proposal, as well as the corresponding appeal to Tito and Šubašić.

4. With regards to the nature of Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain’s representatives participating in the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, [all] agreed to the same principle that applies to the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria. In the section on reparations, we initially proposed to establish the sum of 400 million dollars in the Soviet Union’s favour, however, the British, as well as Harriman, were in favour of a reducing this sum. We agreed to reduce this amount to 300 million dollars, so that 100 million in damages would be provided to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The point of our proposal in allocating a significant amount of reparations to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia is to emphasize the friendly policy towards small Allied democracies. The draft agreement on a truce with Hungary is under discussion with [our] allies[[6]](#footnote-6).

 5. On the question of Germany, the English advocate for the maximum weakening of Germany’s industrial power. Churchill and Eden have stated repeatedly that they considered our demands to have Germany’s reparations as compensation for the destruction we endured to be primarily at the expense of the German heavy industry (machine tools, machinery, etc.). It should be noted that the British are currently taking a more decisive position on the overall question of Germany’s future in comparison to the one they had during the Tehran Conference.

 6. During the talks with Churchill and Eden mutual information was given regarding martial law and military activities, as well as mutually given explanations about the situation in different parts of the Soviet-German and western fronts. In addition, further prospects for military operations of the Allied Powers were outlined [[7]](#footnote-7).

 Reported for your personal attention.

Confirm the receipt [of message].

 A.Vyshinsky

[FPARF, f. 059, inv. 12, fold. 12, file 69, pp. 147–151]

[Опубликовано в: Советско-английские отношения во время Великой Отечественной войны, 1941 – 1945. Т. 2. М., 1983. С. 207–210]

Key words: Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary

1. A telegram (signed by Vyshinsky) with the text of the Anglo-Soviet communiqué was sent to all ambassadors and envoys of the Soviet Union on 20 October. Published in: SАNO. T. 2. p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The letter is dated 15 October and contained the Soviet interpretation of Article 18 of the Armistice with Bulgaria. Confirming receipt of the letter, Eden specified that it was a written confirmation of "observations which you made to me at the Kremlin on the 14th October”. Eden sent his correspondence with Molotov to Cabinet members on 20 November, along with the text of the Armistice with Bulgaria. See: W.P. (44) 666, Memo by Eden, 20/11/1944 // TNA, CAB 66/58. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Tolbukhin, Fyodor Ivanovich (1894 - 1949) - Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front (originally called the Southern Front) (1943 - 1944), followed by the 3rd Ukrainian Front (1944 - 1945), commander of the Southern Group of Forces (1945 - 1947, was stationed in Romania and Bulgaria), the commander of the Transcaucasus Military District (1947 - 1949). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Wilson, Henry Maitland (1881 – 1964) – British General, then Field-Marshal, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean (1944 – 1945), Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington (1945 – 1947). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. This position is reflected in an earlier correspondence between Molotov and Eden. In response to the desire of the latter to include in the conditions of the armistice conditions that would prevent the concealment of Bulgarian assets (and the subsequent payment of reparations), Molotov (in a letter dated 16 October) said that he sees no possibility of “agreeing with your proposal about the Bulgarian assets, especially as neither the agreement with Romania nor the agreement with Finland provided for such a condition with regard to the Romanian and Finnish Governments”. See: W.P. (44) 666, Memo by Eden, 20/11/1944 // TNA, CAB 66/58. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. In October 1944, it seemed as the process of concluding a truce with Hungary would go roughly according to the "Romanian scenario". Prerequisite conditions of the armistice had been signed by a Hungarian delegation (headed by Colonel-General Gábor Faragho) on 11 October, in Moscow (Sovetskiy faktor v Vostochnoy Evrope. T. 1. p. 101–102). However, the coup perpetrated in Budapest on 15 October with a Nazi puppet regime headed by F. Szálasi, delayed Hungary from pulling out of the war. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Characteristically, in a circular telegram from the People's Commissariat on Foreign Affairs there was no direct mention made of Japan - the question of future Soviet intentions in respect to this country was always held in highest secrecy. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)