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HOW DO STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS IN JORDAN VIEW THE EU-JORDAN COMPACT?

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU: European Union

DFID: Department for International Development

HPG: The Humanitarian Policy Group

IOM: International Organization of Migration

MOPIC: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation

NGO: Non-governmental organization

NRP: National Response Plan

ROO: Rules of origin

SEZs: Special Economic Zones

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

ABOUT THE PROJECT

The Responsible Deal Project aims to understand the impact of humanitarian and asylum policies on refugee decision-making and integration, with a special focus on Syrian refugees. By foregrounding the perspectives and interests of Syrian refugees, we offer policy-makers with the tools they need to address the challenge of migration in the 21st century from a rights-based perspective. Responsible Deal was initiated and led by Professor Erik Berglof of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and its last completion phase in 2022 was co-led by Dr Rim Turkmani. In 2022, the programme was hosted by the Conflict and Civicness Research Group, an autonomous research unit within LSE IDEAS, the LSE's in-house foreign policy think tank. Our work investigates the causes and dynamics of conflict, and the survival strategies employed in everyday life, in situations of war and intractable violence in Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

ABOUT THE REPORT

The study is part of a larger initiative funded by the London School of Economics that aims to explore where and how to best protect and integrate Syrian refugees. The overall project was motivated by the increased politicization of migration in Europe and the discourses on refugees at the level of both the EU and the governments of Syria's neighboring countries which in turn created an international pressure to deal with the Syrian refugee 'crisis'. As a result, a series of funding agreements between the EU and the governments of Syria's neighboring host countries Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey were drafted.

For the present study in Jordan, governmental and non-governmental representatives were interviewed to provide answers to the study's questions that are specific to the Jordanian context.

- These are policymakers and representatives of NGOs in Jordan who are involved in the issue of Syrian refugees and migrants, are aware of the EU-Jordan Compact, and/or participated in conferences such as the Brussels and London conferences.

The main aim of the interviews is to explore the participants' perceptions of Jordan's policies in dealing with Syrian refugees, the political environment, and the discourse in Europe surrounding migrants and refugees. Also, they seek to explain how the issue of Syrian refugees is being constructed, how it has been linked to the emergence and implementations of international agreements with Jordan, and how these agreements have been perceived in terms of many aspects related to their governance, application of rules, management, and protection of the rights of migrants and refugees. Additionally, the interviews provide insights into the intended consequences of these international agreements.

The first section of the study presents a brief about the London Compact (the name given to it in Jordan) and a summary of the issues in the compact; the second section highlights the methodology, including the selection of the stakeholders, the interview process, and the data analysis. Finally, the last section provides a summary of the findings.

1. INTRODUCTION

As one of the countries most affected by the Syria crisis, Jordan hosts the second highest share of refugees per capita in the world with over 1.3 million Syrian refugees, including 662,790 registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Only 19.2 percent of refugees live inside the camps (Zaatari, Azraq, and Emirati Jordanian Camp) while the majority, 80.8 percent, of Syrian refugees live in urban areas, in particular in Amman, Mafraq and Irbid. In the beginning, both Jordan and the refugees thought that the war would not last and that the Syrians would return to their homeland. However, as the situation protracted in Syria, it became clear that the refugees' stay in Jordan would be long term. This urged the Jordanian government, the European Union (EU) and other humanitarian organizations to develop strategies and agreements that aim to improve the situation of the refugees in host countries.

1.1. The London Compact

In September 2015, staff from the World Bank and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and King Abdullah II of Jordan, met in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to discuss a humanitarian solution to the Syrian crisis. By February 2016, they had come up with a plan, known as the London Compact¹, to address the humanitarian needs of the Syrian crisis that focused on the long-term livelihoods of refugees.

Under the terms of the London Compact, Jordan would receive concessional loans from the World Bank subsidized by international donors and in return would allow more Syrian refugees to formally enter the labor market. The EU agreed to relax the rules of origin (ROO), a tariff barrier, for 53 manufactured goods exported from Jordan on the provision that Jordan would provide employment opportunities for up to 200,000 Syrian workers in 18 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (Zaman, 2018). This utilized a similar logic to the 1994 peace deal with Israel, where the US granted preferential access to goods manufactured in Jordan in areas known as "Qualified Industrial Zones" (Howden et al., 2017). From the Qualified Industrial Zones, Jordan witnessed the growth of the apparel industry, which employed 65,000 workers and, valued at over \$1.6 billion, comprised 19 percent of the Kingdom's exports (Howden et al., 2017). Through the terms in the London Compact, the EU would provide a 10-year exemption to the ROO for factories in Jordan's SEZs who ensured at least 15 percent of their employees were Syrian refugees, rising to 25 percent in a factory's third year of operation (Zaman, 2018).

The Jordanian government additionally cited the following changes as part of the London Compact:

- 1) Allow Syrian refugees to apply for work permits inside and outside the SEZs;
- 2) Give Syrian refugees the summer of 2016 to formalize their existing businesses in accordance with existing laws and regulations;
- 3) Provide for a specific percentage of Syrian involvement in municipal works for donor-funded projects in areas with a high ratio of non-Jordanian workers;
- 4) Remove restrictions preventing small economic activities within camps, and on commerce with people outside camps;
- 5) Increase access to vocational training for Syrians and to tertiary/higher education opportunities for all vulnerable youth (Jordanian and Syrian);
- 6) Construct new and refurbish existing classrooms outlined in the Jordan Response Plan (2016-2018): and
- 7) Work to improve Jordan's investment environment (MOPIC, 2016).

The terms of the London Compact included \$1.7 billion in grants and concessional loans to Jordan over three years and a commitment from the government of Jordan to provide 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees (Howden et al., 2017). Around 50,000 of these jobs would be in sectors typically unappealing to Jordanians, such as the agriculture and construction sectors. Out of the \$1.7 billion in aid, \$700 million would fund the 2016 Jordan Response Plan to support areas with heavy refugee concentration through municipal services and infrastructure. The remaining funds would be generated in Jordan's SEZs through new investment and jobs, stimulated by the EU's removal of tariff barriers. Agriculture, construction, and service sectors would remain the open sectors for Syrian refugees in Jordan, in addition to manufacturing in SEZs.

The World Bank Program for Results signed off \$300 million to be released according to the number of work permits issued and improvement of the investment climate (Howden et al., 2017). International donors would measure the number

¹ Known in Jordan as the "London Compact", but in the EU as the "Jordan Compact".

of “job opportunities” distributed to Syrian refugees by the number of work permits issued, leaving Jordan with the deadline of December 2019 to distribute 130,000 permits (Howden et al., 2017).

1.2. Issues In the London Compact

The metric that gives funding for the number of work permits issued does not adequately account for the job opportunities or income of Syrian refugees. Government officials and employees of development agencies were the primary framers of the London Compact, leaving little space for the input by refugees themselves. This led to a focus on a numeric formula that inaccurately equated work permits with job opportunities and ignored important socio-economic indicators of Syrian refugee livelihoods. Opportunities for joint ventures between Jordanians and Syrians and cooperation benefits between Jordan and the EU were lost in the over-focus on numbers; Jordan issues an amount of work permits and in return receives a specified lump of funds. Although the Government of Jordan has previously announced they are on track to reach the stated target, their figures include expired permits and renewals and do not reflect the number of new work opportunities offered to Syrians (Howden et al., 2017).

The SEZs remain largely unappealing to Syrian workers and have so far attracted minimal foreign investment. The factories are for the majority garment and apparel factories, often described as “sweat shops”, offer little incentive for Syrians to switch from their better paying and more flexible jobs in the construction, agriculture, service, or informal sector. The majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan are from the south of Syria, where the primary industry is agriculture and thus few refugees feel incentivized to work in garment production. The south of Syria also tends to be more socially conservative and so many female refugees prefer home-based work. The preference for home-based work is exacerbated by long commutes between urban areas (where the majority of Syrians live) and the SEZs, little to no childcare opportunities, poor work conditions, and low pay in comparison to many informal sector jobs. While a major aspect of the London Compact was to improve Jordan’s investment climate, investors remain wary due to the tumultuous region and the ongoing high labor costs, despite SEZ regulations (Howden et al., 2017). Jordan is not able to compete with the cheap labor costs of many Asian counterparts, such as Bangladesh, which also receives similar preferential trade deals (Howden et al., 2017).

To increase the number of work permits issued to Syrian refugees, the Jordanian government has made multiple adjustments to the permit application process. The Ministry of Labor removed the need for social security registration and a health certificate for Syrian refugees who have a valid Ministry of Interior ID card at the time of the application, as well as the passport requirements and permit fees (Howden et al., 2017). Jordan also established a committee to consider opening additional sectors to Syrians and eased agriculture work permits so Syrians who worked seasonally could move easily between farms (Huang & Gough, 2019). In June 2017, the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions signed an agreement with the Ministry of Labor to issue 10,000 permits for the construction sector and allow day workers to work legally without being tied to a single employer (Howden et al., 2017). In 2017, Jordan implemented home-based business registration for food processing, handicraft, and tailoring businesses (Huang & Gough, 2019).

Despite the easing of restrictions for Syrian refugees to obtain work permits, Jordan still struggles to meet work permit targets and faces funding gaps as a result. The agriculture, construction, and services sectors do not often match with Syrian refugees’ previous employment in Syria, and thus many refugees prefer to find more familiar work in the informal sector. Syrians may also prefer the informal sector due to low pay rates from social security taxes in the formal sector. Employers in Jordan, who have to uphold strict ratios of Jordanian nationals to foreign employees, also face disincentives to employ Syrians formally. With each additional Syrian employee, employers must add a national to the payroll, placing stress on an already tight budget. In the agriculture sector, farm managers must deposit up to \$21,000 as a bank guarantee to hire non-Syrian migrant workers and permit renewals for non-refugees have been hiked up to \$705 (Howden et al., 2017). However, managers still prefer the skills and efficiency of solo migrant workers rather than Syrian refugees and their families. While more than two-thirds of Syrian refugees hold agricultural permits, many refugees use these permits to enter and exit the camp to work in other sectors instead (Howden et al., 2017). The focus on work permit numbers does not account for the actual work placement of Syrians and has pressured employers to employ Syrians, often at the expense of their business.

Based on qualitative research through in-depth interviews with state and non-state actors involved in the issue of refugees in Jordan, this report focuses on the following aspects: first, it examines the perceptions of actors concerning the policies in Jordan towards refugees, as well as the attitude of the host community towards the presence of the Syrian refugees. Second, it tackles the EU policies in dealing with Syrian refugees and the public perceptions in the EU. It then discusses the perceptions surrounding the EU-Jordan deal, its design, role in protecting refugees’ rights and needs, commitments of its parties, funding use and sustainability. After examining how the current situation has impacted relations between neighboring countries, if at all, it sheds light on the future of the EU-Jordan deal and its relation to the question of return.

2. METHODOLOGY

The study targeted stakeholders from organizations working on a wide range of areas related to refugees in Jordan and it aimed to learn about the perceptions of organizations with different backgrounds. For this reason, stakeholders from governmental and non-governmental organizations were contacted. It was important to consider this diversity as this provides a broader perspective and yields a better understanding of various concerns, needs and expectations of actors in different domains.

2.1. Selection Of Stakeholders

In this study, over 30 stakeholders were contacted but only 23 agreed to participate in the interviews. Out of these 23, 18 were current or former officials with strong connections to the government, while the remaining five were representatives from the private sector or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as per Annex 1. Some of these stakeholders were suggested by others who were part of the interview process.

2.2. Interview Process

The data collection process which took place in July 2020, was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic or the unavailability of respondents who were busy with their roles and governmental obligations. All interviewees were contacted by the researcher by phone first, then a time was set for the interview. Because of the safety precautions, participants were given the option of doing the interview over the phone or face-to-face, or even sending responses to interview questions in written form. This is explained further in Annex 1. At the beginning of each interview, participants gave their consent of participation. The answers to the interview questions were hand-written with no verbal recording and each question was answered separately. As for the language used, almost all respondents used Arabic in addressing the questions. Only one state actor chose to respond in English and another shifted between English and Arabic.

Finally, all respondents were assured by the interviewer that even if they are quoted, their names will not be linked to any of the quotes.

2.3. Data Analysis

The interviews were transcribed, translated, and analyzed by the researchers. The data analysis started before the fieldwork and continued during and after the interviews. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the interview transcriptions. Researchers analyzed the data simultaneously, highlighted the codes, generated the themes, spotted the recurring themes, and identified overlaps. The themes became more precise during the writing process.

3. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The following section outlines the eight major themes and subthemes that emerged from the thematic analysis of the interview transcriptions. The areas of agreement and disagreement among stakeholders are emphasized and presented along with the most important quotes from the interviews.

3.1. Jordan's Policy Responses

3.1.1. Overall perception of policies

The overall perceptions of Jordan's policies towards Syrian refugees are mixed about whether they were successful or not. The majority believe that Jordan adopted a positive humanitarian approach, and a "distinguished political stance" as described by one of the state actors. Many acknowledged Jordan's openness and respect towards the influx of Syrian refugees and they praised this response given the constraints of Jordan's resources:

In the beginning, it was [a] humanitarian approach and they considered them as guests of Jordan. This brought us closer to Syria and refugees came from Houran and Daraa. This was more like extension of the clans and kinship. But with the increase in their numbers, Jordan started to deal with them as refugees. (State actor 9)

Jordan was more humanitarian due to special relationships; they used the word guest not refugee at the beginning. (State actor 5)

They talked about Jordan's open-door policy and its positive and distinguished attitude despite being unorganized and lacking some regulatory frameworks at the beginning of the crisis:

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Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, Jordan has adopted an open-door policy with the Syrian refugees, despite the great economic challenges resulting from hosting large numbers of refugees. (State actor 12)

In the beginning it was unorganized. After 2012, international organizations such as the International Organization of Migration started building camps, and the camps grew after that. The response became more organized in terms of birth registration and security membership for those with travel documents, and it opened the way for international organizations to intervene in the relief of refugees. (NGO 2)

What was frequently repeated is that Jordan fulfilled its duty to embrace the refugees and dealt with them in accordance with international norms and the agreements that Jordan signed, especially with the EU.

The least that can be said in this regard is that it is a generous and smart position; on one hand, it alleviated the suffering of refugees, and on the other hand, it contributed to a certain extent to moving the wheel of the Jordanian economy due to external cash flows aimed at sharing the burdens. (State actor 18)

With regards to the shift in Jordan's policy towards the influx of refugees, some participants clarified that at the beginning of the crisis, everything was provided for free (schools, services, setting up camps). But when the refugee situation protracted, the burden on the government increased. Given the scarcity of its resources, it is then that Jordan had to seek help.

Although many participants described the policies as good, moderate, or positive, they had some comments regarding the humanitarian policy and its implications on Jordan. Some remarked that funding was limited and it was on short-term, not a long-term basis. Others commented on the cost or burden that Jordan bore while adopting this policy, especially amid a difficult economic situation. In their opinion, Jordan is still paying the price for this humanitarian approach because it hosted the Syrian refugees without considering the positive or negative repercussions.

A major portion of participants drew attention to the negative repercussions the crisis had on Jordan's security:

Jordan opened its borders widely without considering its national security, and this cost Jordan a lot. (State actor 6)

After many years there was a security concern, especially for those coming from far from the borders. (State actor 1)

Various stakeholders noted the burden the crisis imposed on infrastructure, particularly water and electricity, but also other services like education and health. Some also pointed out that the crisis exerted pressure on local municipalities since more than 80 percent of the refugees lived outside the camps:

The biggest mistake the government made is that it placed refugees in the two largest water basins, Mafraq and Azraq. (NGO 3)

Despite the scarcity of resources, Jordan treats refugees like Jordanian citizens as they benefit from subsidized basic materials [like bread, electricity, water]. (State actor 7)

The large number of refugees was at the expense of the health, education and labor sectors. (Private sector actor 1)

On the other hand, nearly all participants referred to the economic impact of refugees on Jordan:

Refugees were spread all over the Kingdom and started competing with the Jordanians in the informal sector, and unemployment rates increased. (State actor 4)

In a nutshell,

The Syrian crisis posed many challenges on Jordan, which endangered the Kingdom's ability to maintain its supplies of food and water and undermined its security and social cohesion. The most prominent challenges are high unemployment rates, high costs and standards of living, and the quality of services in the fields of education, health and municipal services. (State actor 12)

Yet, one participant denoted that the successive governments' response to the refugee crisis was not up to standard. In his opinion, Jordan should have dealt with Syrians as it did with Palestinian refugees, and not how it dealt with Iraqi refugees. He further elaborates by saying that Jordan should have received and employed foreign support, integrated refugees within the local community, and made use of them as an economic resource with an aim to attract Syrian capital.

And while there are competing views regarding Jordan's response to the crisis, one participant believes that the response was aid dependent:

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We could have given them more integration opportunities from the beginning, in education, for example, even though we allowed them to learn, we waited until the aid came in order to enroll them in schools. (NGO 3)

However, another state actor refutes this by saying that Jordan continues to provide services to Syrian refugees despite the fall in financial support.

Here many referred to the National Response Plans (NRP) that the Jordanian government developed in collaboration with the international community to deal with the Syrian refugees inside and outside the camps. One NGO representative thinks that the NRP lacked a needs assessment at the beginning of the crisis:

There was no knowledge of what we would ask for, most of which were buildings that the government could not operate. (NGO 3)

Commenting on the response plans, another NGO representative signified that the NRP tried to cover all aspects and sectors and was always done in partnership with local and foreign stakeholders. Also, many noted that the plan was reviewed and updated annually and that it was subject to modifications since aid was fluctuating:

*It shifted from requesting aid to ensure refugees' **resilience** to receiving aid for their **integration**. The latter was brought about with donors' increase of interest in other conflicts in the region and their lack of interest in the Syrian refugee crisis.....Refugees seeming integration became a de facto replacement of the dried-up strategy of aid for resilience to seek more aid. (State actor 19)*

NGO 2 considers that the integration approach towards refugees came as a result of pressure from the international community.

State actor 2 indicated that the government started to provide all the facilities it could on the principle of sharing everything. It almost guaranteed them the right to work, education, health, and services. It enabled them to integrate further into the economy and the local community facilitated by various international programs and institutions.

Several actors specified that Jordan adopted a policy of free, high-quality education for Syrian students in schools affiliated with the Ministry of Education, similar to Jordanian students, in addition to non-formal education programs to serve students outside schools, in collaboration with international organizations. The government was forced to establish two shifts in schools and build new schools to be able to accommodate the large number of refugee students.

Yet many specified that education was of poor quality, especially those schools with morning and evening shifts inside the camps. It was also noted that evening shifts had less time and some students experienced a level of discrimination. Some state actors complained that refugees put pressure on schools and the government was forced to build new schools.

As for the health sector, some state actors mentioned that Jordan opened its hospitals to refugees. It provided primary health services, maternal, child health, and vaccination free of charge, as is the case for Jordanians, in addition to secondary health services that are subsidized by 80 percent, similar to that of an uninsured Jordanian. Nevertheless, two NGOs noted that sometimes the provision of health services fluctuated because they were based on international support.

Several state actors also discussed refugees' economic empowerment stating that there were great facilitation of work permits and their costs, especially in the field of agriculture, construction, entrepreneurship. They also spoke about home-based businesses remarking that the policies that regulated these businesses are the same for both Jordanians and Syrians. A state actor also mentioned that refugees were given more freedom than in Lebanon and Turkey, but despite this, harassment still exists.

However, many other participants pointed out that the integration of refugees in the labor market was not fully achieved, mainly because most refugees prefer working in the informal sector in order not to lose humanitarian aid. Another reason is that refugees were geographically distributed in residential areas, away from work.

3.1.2. Jordan's experience with refugees

When being asked about Jordan's policy response to Syrian refugees, the majority of participants referred to Jordan's eminent history and positive experience in dealing with and integrating refugees:

Jordan is one of the few countries worldwide that has a long and positive experience in dealing with refugees since the establishment of the Kingdom in 1921. (Private sector actor 1)

There is no doubt that the cumulative experience that the Kingdom gained in dealing with refugees over the decades, resulted in that the Jordanian state succeeded to a large extent in managing the Syrian refugee crisis. (State actor 18)

Several pointed to the Kingdom's reception of more than three million refugees with nearly 52 nationalities like, Circassian, Armenian, Palestinian, and Iraqi, especially in light of the difficult economic conditions and the challenges that the country is experiencing:

In most cases, large numbers of refugees were integrated into society and the majority of them became citizens with equal duties and rights as other original citizens of the country. (Private sector actor 1)

3.2. General Public Perceptions In Jordan

As for the host community's response towards the Syrian refugees, the majority of participants indicated that the nature of Jordan's relationship with Syria placed an obligation on the country to receive refugees. They recalled the long open-door policy that Jordan had with Syrians over the years and that Jordanians were accustomed to the entry and exit of Syrian laborers in the agricultural seasons. When the crisis began, Syrians started to come from the south and neighboring areas where they had relatives with the ability to enter and exit easily. They indicated that by that time, there was no feeling of rejection from the host community as the numbers were still so few. At that point, Jordanians treated them with sympathy and affection and there seemed to be a popular solidarity, especially in the border areas, due to existing kinship and lineages. Many further explained that in beginning the society was excited to help through NGOs and associations. But when the numbers increased to exceed one million, some social problems emerged; refugees began to enter the labor market, compete with people, enter schools, and rent houses, and so the rent costs increased. Complaints and jealousy from the host community arose as competition increased between the refugees and the host community. After that, the camps were built, and the number of refugees started to grow inside the camps.

We thought that the events are temporary. (State actor 1)

With time local communities worried as they saw support for refugees and not from them. So, the government tried to get support for host communities to reduce tension. (State actor 5)

This also caused a reaction from the Syrian refugees who began to "taunt the Jordanians that the aid was for them and not for the Jordanians" (NGO 3).

3.3. EU Policies In Dealing With Syrian Refugees

3.3.1. Overall perceptions of the EU policies

An overwhelming majority of participants believed that the EU countries welcomed refugees at the beginning of the crisis, but later prevented them from entering Europe. In their opinion, the aim of this policy shift was to keep refugees in host countries while they provide them with support:

The logic is as such: "Keep your problems and people at home or in the neighborhood! Why change our demographics?" (State actor 19)

Many political, economic and social reasons were behind this shift in EU policies towards refugees. Several participants highlight the security concerns after some terrorist attacks that were linked to refugees.

Most interviewees considered that EU countries' political positions towards refugees were based on their economic situation. On one hand, some EU countries realized that integrating the large numbers of refugees is costly and would affect their economies. For instance, it was mentioned that countries like Hungary and Romania were against hosting refugees and they closed their borders. Their handling of the refugee issue was based on the possible economic repercussions, whether on unemployment levels or imbalances in demographics. On the other hand, some countries like Germany, Sweden, and Norway helped and hosted refugees based on the needs of their labor market. They adopted a humanitarian approach, and some of them needed human resources (professionals) as they were growing demographically. These countries considered refugees as a human and economic resource and thus facilitated their arrival.

They needed cheap labor and had acceptable unemployment rates; they allowed the entry of refugees at first. (State actor 19)

3.4. General Public Perceptions in EU

3.4.1. Increase in the right-wing sentiment in the world and its impact on refugees

The majority confirm that the refugee crisis made the right-wing extremists gain political power, leading to a policy change by EU countries towards refugees after 2015:

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During the past five years, there has been a drastic shift in the Europeans' votes in favor of the center-right parties, moving away from the left-wing parties because of their position towards immigration of refugees and this highly influences politics of the EU. (Private sector actor 1)

In their opinion, the right-wing political actors refused to receive refugees, demanding strict border controls to limit illegal border crossing. They wanted to distinguish between economic migrants and asylum seekers, preferring to deport them, and recommending to support them in the host countries. In some cases, refugees were attacked, rejected, and treated in an inhumane manner. Children were left without care and there was a great deal of exploitation and neglect.

Countries that were highly nationalistic or Islamophobia infested became subject to pressures from the right-wing entities who did not want the refugees in their borders or neighborhoods. (State actor 19)

Not accepting others and hatred towards refugees has emerged greatly as the number of refugees increased. (NGO 2)

Liberal socialist regimes had sympathy, but the right-wing parties in countries like Hungary, the Netherlands, France and Britain became stronger, some of which did not rule, but were strong in their influence. (State actor 1)

This rhetoric had a great impact on the election process following voters' concerns, especially the working class. They were afraid of waves of immigration and how it could threaten their interests.

It is clear that the issue of refugees, perhaps because of their huge size, affected the elections in Europe and was used to gain votes for the right-wing parties, affecting the political environment and the ruling parties. (State actor 13)

There is no difference between the left or the European right. Except for considering immigration issues as one of the electoral tools that move right and left with popular trends, which is affected momentarily and temporarily when the issue of what is known as death boats when the waves threw the body of the child Aylan. (State actor 18)

However, the wave of popular sympathy quickly evaporated, together with any calls for a humanitarian approach to the refugees.

Still, this does not mean that those in Europe are devoid of sympathy to refugees. There were also humanistic groups in such countries against the rejection of refugees, but nevertheless the political trend was towards the right wing gaining in popularity.

At the end, the Europeans tried to find a compromise to satisfy the right wing by limiting illegal immigration while appearing humanitarian in defending refugees through their agreement with Jordan.

The cooperation between Jordan and the EU imposed an immigration ban on refugees, which led to illegal immigration, as the Parliament of the EU took a decision to stop relief aid at sea and the funding was stopped. In return, the aid was given to Jordan to contain them in our countries. (NGO 1)

The EU countries were troubled by the flow of refugees. As they turned refugees away from their borders, they were embarrassed by appearing to be inhumane and conflicting with international laws and conventions they had committed to... Especially after the increase in number of people drowned at their shores in 2015. (State actor 19)

The agreement came as a result of the growing power of the extreme right in European countries and their tendency not to open up to others and not to cooperate on global issues. (State actor 10)

3.5. EU-Jordan Deal

The EU switched to emergency mode following the arrival of large numbers of refugees at its borders. It concluded international agreements with countries hosting refugees, including Jordan. The key points of the EU-Jordan compact agreement are as follows:

- The EU provides Jordan with humanitarian and development funding through multi-year grants and concessional loans, with pledges of \$700 million in grants annually for three years and concessional loans of \$1.9 billion;
- The EU commits to relaxing trade regulations to stimulate exports of certain products from 18 designated economic zones and industrial areas in Jordan, in return for employment quotas (at least 15 percent) for Syrian refugees in these businesses;
- Jordan commits to providing school places to all Syrian children, and some vocational training opportunities;
- Jordan commits to expanding formal labor market access for Syrian refugees in the country, including 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in specified sectors;

- Jordan will institute reforms to improve the business and investment environment and formalize Syrian businesses.

In this section, major issues related to the EU-Jordan deal will be presented from the perspectives of the stakeholders with regards to: 1) the design of the deal, 2) their opinion whether the deal prioritized refugees' rights and needs, 3) how it impacted EU-Jordan relations in terms of share of responsibility and commitment to its terms and conditions, 4) how the funding was used and accounted for, and lastly 5) how sustainable the deal was.

3.5.1. Design of the deal

Participants consider that the compact with Jordan was presented as a new approach to dealing with the consequences of the Syrian crisis and its repercussions on Jordan and other host countries. The majority agree that the compact was based on common interests of both parties and the desire of the EU countries to support Jordan politically and economically:

The Compact is the first of its nature and provided lessons on how to deal with refugees in protracted situations and where it is based on international cooperation and incentives for the overall developmental process of the hosting country. (State actor 14)

While some consider Jordan's position to be strong given its history of welcoming refugees, and that it can offer them a safe environment, several participants noted that it was the international community that had designed the frameworks and Jordan had to negotiate to integrate some key elements into the agreement, such as the ROO, which the EU accepted.

The agreement led to a discussion on enhancing macroeconomic stability; developing the private sector; improving the business environment, trade and investment; creating job opportunities; the quality of education, training and social integration; the sustainable use of natural resources; as well as strengthening cooperation in the field of security and stability, combating terrorism, management of migration and movements and refugee partnership, justice, political reforms, democratic elections, and human rights. (State actor 17)

A number of state actors referred to the "Brussels Process" which was launched by the EU as a follow-up to the London conference to monitor on an annual basis the achievements of the pledges and commitments of the international community. These conferences also aimed to maximize the commitments of the countries hosting the Syrian refugees, thereby ensuring that the pledges are translated into aid in order to continue providing services to the refugees and the host communities. One state actor (State actor 18) noted that these conferences were intended to restore empathy and remind countries of the refugee problem. As for Jordan, these conferences provided an opportunity to present the current challenges resulting from hosting the Syrian refugees, and to mobilize additional pledges to cover the gaps and lack of funding.

Jordan was seeking a new Marshall Plan through which the structure of the Jordanian economy would be strengthened through its array of aid, in order to enable it to withstand the challenges resulting from the repercussions of the Syrian refugee crisis, and the Kingdom's interests met with the requirements of European security. (State actor 18)

The deal went through two stages; first, it aimed to provide aid to Jordan, then in the second phase, it aimed to strengthen the role of the Jordanian government in issuing work permits and creating work opportunities for Syrians and Jordanians alike to stymie unemployment. It also intended to simplify the ROO with an aim to promote and increase European exports that are highly affected by ROO restrictions.

3.5.2. Opinion regarding EU-Jordan agreement

Most of the participants argued that the agreement between the EU and Jordan was not comprehensive. Two state actors asserted that it did not incorporate all the refugees' priorities, but it was based on the EU priorities instead. They described it to be limited to specific sectors, such as the industrial sector, and regions. Some NGOs said that it is aid dependent: "For example when aid stopped, the implementation of the projects stopped". Also, one state actor believed that even after the agreement, refugees faced more limitations than citizens in accessing jobs and public services.

It was made clear by a few participants that the agreement was intended for Syrian refugees as it did not take the Jordanian social context into account and the real direct and indirect implications of the refugee crisis on the Jordanian economy, which are "problematic", they argued:

It focused on providing solutions to the refugee problem, without considering the Jordanian problems arising from the presence of refugees. (State actor 10)

Several talked about the effect of the crisis on the infrastructure in Jordan, and the EU's promises to develop infrastructure, especially in the northern regions. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Furthermore, two NGOs perceived the agreements

as discriminatory; in their opinion, Jordan hosts refugees from other nationalities that were not targeted in this agreement. Here, one NGO indicated that “there are 13 Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan” (NGO 1).

Other major concerns with the design of the agreement are that it did not consider all dimensions of the socioeconomic needs of refugees:

It was a top down, quick and simplistic design and subsequent tool aimed more at receiving aid by Jordan and ending the immigration of refugees to the EU countries. (State actor 19)

3.5.3. Protection of refugee rights and needs

Many participants have no doubt that this agreement is in line with international standards, human rights, norms, and conventions and thus works to improve the environment in which refugees live and contributes significantly to protecting their rights in many ways:

The agreement contributed to a large extent, as it provided an umbrella for humanitarian work and a system of international monitoring procedures and support that would guarantee the achievement of minimum rights, whether in the health or education sector. (State actor 18)

Several state actors explain that the agreement helps refugees integrate into the economy, provides them with health and education services, and allows them to work legally, as they used to work without permits.

In terms of protecting their rights, the agreement offered better protection such as better access to health care and education, and formal employment. However, there are about 32 professions that are closed to foreigners, including the Syrian refugees. (State actor 19)

Yet, some believe that this contribution is not sufficient because there is a need for more serious protection and more support especially after the Covid-19 pandemic:

Many NGOs left Jordan thinking that refugees are not needed. But COVID brought back the need to protect refugees from many issues. (State actor 16)

It was a top-down approach, it didn't meet the perceptions, aspirations and needs. (State actor 16)

Participants were also asked about Jordan's ability to provide protection to refugees. A vast majority assured Jordan was capable and committed to provide protection to refugees regardless of whether it had ratified the Geneva Convention. For some, Jordan is doing so by its own principles and commitments. Here, Jordan's long history of securing an environment that protects refugees was reiterated in many interviews:

Jordan has always been committed and proactive in protecting the rights of refugees regardless of the agreement. (State actor 11)

The EU-Jordanian agreement reflects Jordan's policy towards the protection of refugees in general. What Jordan offers to protect and empower refugees goes beyond what was included in the agreement. (State actor 12)

Several stakeholders referred to the agreements that Jordan signed with UNHCR to deal with refugees respectfully and protect their rights:

Despite the fact that Jordan did not ratify the Geneva 1951, Jordan is committed to more than what was stated in it through national legislation governing human rights in general, and the memorandum of understanding signed with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which is the legislative framework for the presence of refugees in particular. (State actor 18)

A few also cited the *non-refoulement* policy which states that Jordan does not have the right to expel refugees. In their opinion, this obliges Jordan to protect refugees:

As far as I know, no refugee was turned back and for the most part the borders have been open for them. (State actor 14)

In many instances, participants noted that Jordan has done a great job in terms of providing protection and other health, educational and economic services to refugees despite the scarcity of resources, the financing shortcomings and pressure on its infrastructure. Yet, one participant considers that refugees' access to jobs is becoming more limited during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the rise of a conservative mindset. Moreover, many others question Jordan's ability to proceed in this manner especially in light of the current situation and the pandemic.

Some believe that as long as the convention is not signed, providing protection to refugees is not sustainable. It is for this reason the current situation is considered temporary.

Not signing the Geneva Convention limits the state's obligations towards refugees especially when it comes to giving them citizenship as part of their integration process and this is a sensitive issue for Jordan. (NGO 2)

Another stakeholder indicated that providing protection was possible because of society accepting refugees and the absence of hostility. On a separate note, protection was linked to the aid provided by the EU.

With the increase in aid, greater protection will be achieved, as all protections focus on one nationality and neglect other refugees, such as Yemenis, Sudanese and Iraqis. (NGO 1)

3.5.4. Common interests of Jordan and the agenda of the international conferences

For many, the Jordan-EU deal was a win-win situation and there was a shared interest between the two sides. On one hand, Jordan was seeking aid to support the national response plan in exchange for receiving this number of refugees. On the other hand, the EU organized these conferences to provide support for refugees and keep them in host countries like Jordan.

Jordan was a champion in these conferences, energetic and humanitarian, with a desire to obtain aid to bear the burden, especially in light of a recurring economic crisis and pressure on limited resources. (State actor 1)

In a completely opposite perspective, some NGOs consider that Jordan took advantage by hosting these refugees. In their opinion, the EU-Jordan agreement had served Jordan's economic and political interests and improved its relations with the EU:

I believe the government could not do anything about it. It needed aid, the old-paradigm aid had decreased to a trickle, and this was the only way to get it from the EU countries. So, accept it but try to make the best out of it. (State actor 19)

There is coincidence to a large extent, however, the Jordanian government is being blamed for relying on these conferences to continue to support refugees and not solve the problem or find a humanitarian way out for it. (State actor 10)

Some disclosed that the government and UN organizations have exaggerated the negative impact of the refugees on the Jordanian economy with the aim to secure more aid. It was also mentioned that former Syrian residents registered as refugees to obtain more aid. Others criticized the creation of the camps.

The UNHCR and the government have made efforts to increase the number of refugees to get more aid. (NGO 3)

There was no need for these camps, and they could have been contained in the first place. Instead of spending money in the camps, all Jordan could benefit from it. (NGO 3)

A few participants declared that the agendas of Jordan and the international conferences did not completely match, blaming the EU. Jordan negotiated to obtain the necessary support to fulfil the components of the response plan due to the additional burdens on the infrastructure, but not enough support was provided from the donors.

We were asking for a lot more than what was given. Jordan benefited from the aid and there was some kind of agreement. The EU gave us according to their numbers, not Jordan's. (NGO 3)

3.3.5. Commitment of both parties to the deal

Despite the general belief that Jordan's interests coincided with the overall agenda of the international conferences, many participants still think that this was not translated into reality and that not all the components of the deal were realized.

The only agreement among participants was in respect to education as they believe that there was strong commitment between both parties on providing education to refugee children.

There has been increase in enrolment of Syrian refugees in schools. (State actor 16)

The number of Syrian students in education ... exceeded 103 percent of what was agreed upon. (State actor 12)

For those who believe that the EU and Jordan are both committed to the agreement, they acknowledge that some issues were not adequately implemented due to some unexpected challenges, particularly when it comes to the labor market.

HOW DO STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS IN JORDAN VIEW THE EU-JORDAN COMPACT?

With regards to work permits, many state actors believe that simplifying the restrictions to apply for work permits is possible and that the government already facilitated the process and waived the fees. Yet, the bulk of participants consider that these procedures did not induce a significant increase in the number of work permits. Many reasons were mentioned to explain this small increase. One reason is that the opportunities provided to Syrian refugees are unappealing. In this regard, many assure that the numbers are achievable if job opportunities are attractive to Syrian workers, and are not limited to the industrial sector. Another reason is the desire of refugees to resettle in the US or the EU, and they believe that formalizing their work could cause them to lose their refugee status. Some participants believe that the agreement did not invest in Syrians' human capital.

As a result of the recent response plan, the Prime Minister said that there is no commitment by the European Union and also by Jordan, especially with regard to 200,000 work permits for refugees as they could not fulfill it and there was mismanagement of aid. (NGO 1)

Nevertheless, the small increase of work permits does not mean that Syrian refugees are not working. Numerous participants confirm that refugees do not want a work permit and that they prefer to work in the informal sector to ensure humanitarian aid. In their opinion, it would have been better if the aid remained with work permits and was gradually withdrawn after a certain period.

Jordan has provided great facilities for Syrians to obtain work permits and was committed to this even if this results in losses to the treasury. The biggest challenge is the tendency of Syrian refugees to informal employment, despite awareness campaigns and great facilities for obtaining work permits. This is in addition to the reluctance of Syrian refugees to work in the special economic zones, which was shown by the Fafo 2017-2018 study. (State actor 12)

The Jordanian labor market has a large informal sector, that is why there are limited incentives for refugees to get formal work permit[s]. This was simply a wrong way to design the Jordan Compact in the first place. They did not talk to the experts or read all the surveys that indicate where the Syrians are working in the first place!! (State Actor 14)

Others indicate that even the declared number is fake because some work permits are issued for the sake of residency, travel, and return. Some consider that the implementation focused on counting the work permits and not on actual formal employment:

The numbers camouflage many anomalies: The Ministry of Labor counts renewed permits as new permits, some refugees seek permits to enable exit and entry back into the country, some permits are seasonal or annual, etc. Anyway, permits do not mean employment or integration. (State actor 19)

Other problems include but are not limited to, the Covid-19 pandemic and the current economic conditions which prevent achieving these goals.

Unemployment and Corona are major challenges in simplifying the restrictions on work permits. Also, with the drop in oil prices, many immigrants will return, and this will [have an] affect. (State actor 7)

Obtaining work permits is achievable, but labor policies limit their inclusion as many professions are closed to non-Jordanians. The work permit has ambiguities in terms of continuity, and whether or not it will continue without fees. It would have been better if a general permit is given to engage in any profession. (NGO 2)

Despite the decline in funding and the difficulties of the internal economic situation, Jordan is committed to the European-Jordanian agreement, for example, the number of work permits for Syrians has reached more than 192,000 work permits, and according to the World Bank report, the unemployment rate among Syrian refugees is 22 percent, which is close to 19 percent of the unemployment rate among Jordanians. (State actor 12)

Another major issue that was not realized are the refugee employment quotas in SEZs and most participants have no hope in achieving them. They find that working in these zones is difficult for refugees, as the conditions for hosting them differ from that of a foreign worker, salaries are low, and working outside the zones enables them to live a better life. Other reasons could be the geographical locations of factories and the working conditions. On the other hand, there are challenges and conditions imposed on employers to employ refugees, such as social security and other obligations that increases the cost of the worker. Also, most Syrian refugees prefer to work in agriculture, which impedes meeting the Syrian labor quota. The initial condition of having a quota was difficult to achieve because refugees from southern Syria were farmers and they had no interest working in industry.

Nevertheless, some have confidence in meeting the employment quotas in the Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) if the EU commits to its share in real value-added investments.

It was also noted that Jordan requested simplifying the ROO with the EU with an aim of opening new horizons for Jordanian exports in reaching the EU market, in recognition of the challenges and burdens that Jordan bears due to the

Syrian crisis. But despite the fact that the EU agreed to these terms, there was little benefit for Jordan as no more than 10 companies were qualified for export and benefited from more relaxed ROO.

And when we talk about burden-sharing as one of the principles of international humanitarian law, it requires that all parties of the international community bear a fair share consistent with their economic capabilities.

While one participant thinks that the requested aid was much higher than the cost of hosting the refugees, an overwhelming majority considers that Jordan bears a huge burden as a result of hosting Syrian refugees and was left to face this crisis alone.

For several decades, Jordan has been a safe haven for refugees from various countries. Jordan was committed to providing basic services, protection, and decent livelihoods despite the lack of funding, scarcity of resources, increased pressure on the infrastructure, in addition to the rise in unemployment and poverty rates among Jordanians. Jordan believes in the principles of international solidarity, cooperation, and equitable participation in responsibility towards refugees. Although there was a decline in funding, Jordan has continued to provide services and protection to refugees. (State actor 12)

According to Jordan, the international community did not fulfil their pledges, falling short in providing what was necessary. In other words, the EU did not assume its responsibility despite the available resources. This was also confirmed by other participants:

Jordan repeatedly stressed that the consequences of the refugee crisis in its human dimension are the responsibility of the entire international community, not only the host countries. (State actor 18)

Respondents mentioned variable numbers when asked about the financial contribution of the international community to meet the needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan over the years.

Donors only paid 67 percent of the agreed response plan. In 2019 they paid only 43 percent. (State actor 8)

For the year 2019, it did not exceed 50.4 percent. (State actor 12)

Host countries like Jordan bear more than their capacity in terms of their size and resources as a state. Refugees in Jordan little suffered, and they were able to enter the labor market despite the high rate of unemployment. (State actor 7)

Others mention that Jordan and the international community are also responsible in providing a safe environment for refugees to return to their homeland. Yet, this was not achieved.

They provided humanitarian assistance instead of allowing resettlement in their country. They only agreed to provide humanitarian aid, but they were negligent in developing political solutions to end the conflict. (NGO 1)

3.5.6. Funding use and accountability

Several stakeholders mentioned that a significant part of the EU funds go directly to the EU experts and institutions. This means that the vast majority of assistance is spent directly on them through specific projects. Others noted that infrastructure aid was going to the government, where the latter is paid after implementation. Many participants referred to monitoring and evaluation frameworks adopted by the Ministry of Planning and civil society organizations that received the assistance.

3.3.6.1. Accountability mechanisms

In terms of accountability, some mechanisms were repeated several times like meetings with the EU, periodic or annual performance reports, government publications, reports of achievement, and delegations of experts sent periodically through institutions of the EU and the UN. There are expenditure controls through the financial and supervision systems in the form of matrix of activities and expected results.

It is the same as adopted by the EU in any of the partnership programs and is based on specific terms of reference as a tool for identifying and evaluating achievement. (State actor 18)

The work progress is examined through the institutional frameworks and sub-committees between the two sides and the Jordanian-European Partnership Committee meetings. (State actor 17)

As for the Jordanian response plan to the Syrian crisis (not the European-Jordanian agreement in general), there are several third-party teams that monitor the financial procedures of the projects, in

addition to the fact that all the projects within the plan are monitored by the prime minister and the Coordinating Committee for Humanitarian Projects. (State actor 12)

3.3.6.2. Opinion regarding mechanism

There were competing views regarding the efficiency of the monitoring system for the EU funds and the accountability mechanisms adopted by both parties. It was stated that the EU required periodic reports from the ministries and that there was transparency from the Jordanian government.

There was auditing and reviewing in the Ministry of Planning and response plans and they created a position within the ministry to review the agreement. (NGO 1)

Others consider that the mechanisms adopted were to a certain extent acceptable.

I think it is proceeding according to the best standards due to the development and progress of the Jordanian-European relationship. (State actor 3)

I believe that the disbursement mechanism is completely in accordance with the agreements of the size of the legislative and regulatory environment in Jordan. (State actor 11)

Grants are spent according to the Audit Bureau, and it is subject to internal financial audit in the relevant ministry. (State actor 7)

On the other hand, many consider that Europeans are strict in this matter, their procedures are very complicated, and they were continuously asking the Ministry of Planning to reinforce the monitoring in all the official reports. For them, the monitoring mechanisms were barely implemented and there was no complete control over project financing. In addition, the supervision was fragmented, not comprehensive, and that is why it did not achieve the desired result. One state actor noted that the EU tried to set certain indicators, like the numbers of work permits and ROO certificates, but this did not have the expected outcome.

3.5.7. Sustainability

Stakeholders argue that sustaining the agreement needs a stronger political, social, economic, and human will from the EU. Others consider that achieving and sustaining the conditions of the agreement is possible if the issue of flexibility is taken into account, especially after the pandemic. For them, conditions can be achieved if they are simplified, eased, and some of their rules expanded.

The agreement period must be extended, continuously reviewed and amended, based on new circumstances. (State actor 7)

Should be brought back to the humanitarian context rather than a development context. (State actor 16)

Others are convinced that the sustainability of the agreement relies heavily on receiving adequate financing from the EU that targets infrastructure and institutional capacity development, as well as directing projects towards empowering Syrian refugees and host communities and developing their capabilities:

It is applicable if there are good intentions and political will, and having the same momentum that existed when the agreement was made. (State actor 18)

Those who think that sustainability is difficult to achieve argue that there is no commitment from the EU in addition to the Covid-19 pandemic and the dire economic situation in Jordan.

3.6. Relations Among Host Countries

The majority of participants believe that the relations of the Jordanian government with other host countries like Lebanon and Turkey were not affected since the influx of Syrian refugees. One state actor remarked that “there are several projects based on the regional partnership between Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan to serve and protect the Syrian refugees” (State actor 12).

For some, the refugee crisis was an opportunity for coordination between these host countries. In this regard, one state actor believes that Jordan helped Lebanon in its EU agreement as the latter benefited from Jordan's experience in negotiating.

Others talked about the competition between Jordan and Lebanon after both countries were affected politically, especially after the closure of its borders with Syria, and Iraq in the case of Jordan.

3.7. Future Of The EU-Jordan Deal

When asked about their perceptions regarding the future of the EU-Jordan agreement, participants declared that this is determined by the size and duration of the refugees' presence in Jordan. In this regard, an overwhelming majority think that Jordan does not exert any pressure on refugees to return to their homeland. In their opinion, the return of refugees is determined by the extent to which the conditions in Syria allow refugees to go back to their homeland, and that only a small number have returned up till now.

Jordan agrees with the international community that the return of the Syrian refugees should be voluntary, with the security and safety element in place without any pressure. (State actor 12)

Some believe that the refugees' return to Syria is not possible in the near future. As a result, they argue to extend the agreement since it is a shared responsibility. For them, the agreement will continue in the medium and long term, especially in light of the new economic blockade in Syria associated with the Caesar law.

Others discuss the political reasons behind the agreement, saying it is mutually beneficial to both parties; as for the EU, it is an opportunity to improve their humanitarian image, and when it comes to Jordan, it guarantees support of the country's political decisions and stances, while, at the same time, it contributes to the multidimensional repair of the country.

The West does not want them to return yet. Neither does Jordan. (State actor 19)

One state actor considers that the agreement should be updated even with a tendency for resettlement (naturalization), because "refugees' fertility rate is twice that of Jordanians" (State actor 5).

Others consider that the presence of Syrian refugees in host countries will become a major problem and will cause unrest if the host countries' social and economic problems are not solved:

Up till now, Jordan has managed the entry of refugees based on certain regulations, but Jordan can no more host a larger number of refugees. (State actor 7)

They believe that the agreement's future is dependent on Jordan's ability to endure in light of the international parties' failure to fulfil their role in supporting Jordan. Especially now, as the Covid-19 pandemic will add pressure on the Jordanian economy. In this regard, many stress the need to evaluate the agreement and amend it based on current circumstances.

3.8. Stakeholders' Recommendations

Many emphasize the need to review and restructure the partnership agreement especially due to the pandemic.

I think especially after the Covid-19 pandemic and the current political and economic situation in Syria, a transparent review would be timely. This review should be at a policy and technical level and not hijacked by political issues (this was the previous status quo and that is why it was fraught with weaknesses in implementation). The honest review should also include all stakeholders, including the private sector and representatives from the refugees themselves. (State actor 14)

They stressed upon the importance of securing continuous and adequate EU funding. This financial support enables Jordan to move forward in its humanitarian role towards the Syrian refugees and provide basic facilities in the health, education, and water sectors. The projects should also focus on improving infrastructure and public services, as well as enhancing the institutional capacity of Syrian refugees and host communities on a medium and long-term basis.

And it is necessary to create projects and training centers for Jordanians and Syrians. (State actor 1)

One state actor recommended that "the aid must be directed entirely to the government which can bring about a comprehensive development of the economy through maintaining macroeconomic stability and therefore causing a jump in the economic growth rates. In this way the economy can maintain job creation" (State actor 2).

This assures that the international community should fulfill its pledges made at the Brussels conferences, and Jordan should support the components of the response plan bearing its responsibility in hosting refugees.

I believe that refugees, if allowed to work with equal rights in the host country, can prove to add to its development. I do not consider them a burden, provided of course that they are allowed to work, invest and reside like the rest of citizens in a country. Countries that integrate refugees tend to benefit from their human, physical and material capitals. (State actor 19)

Some recommend creating joint monitoring committees representing Jordan and the EU from private supervisory bodies or global audit companies with an aim to monitor the financial and budgetary procedures of the agreement.

Others assure that the increase in suffering of refugees creates an urgent need to find durable solutions, such as settlement in the EU or integration in Jordan.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

| No. | Date | Code | Means of Communication |
|-----|------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1 | 15-07-2020 | State Actor 1* | Phone |
| 2 | 12-07-2020 | State Actor 2 | Interview |
| 3 | 08-07-2020 | State Actor 3* | Interview |
| 4 | 21-07-2020 | State Actor 4* | Interview |
| 5 | 06-07-2020 | NGO 1 | Interview |
| 6 | 15-07-2020 | State Actor 5* | Phone |
| 7 | 14-07-2020 | NGO 2 | Phone |
| 8 | 16-07-2020 | State Actor 6* | Phone |
| 9 | 14-07-2020 | State Actor 7* | Interview |
| 10 | 18-07-2020 | State Actor 8* | Phone |
| 11 | 18-07-2020 | NGO 3 | Phone |
| 12 | 15-07-2020 | Private Sector Actor 1 | Interview |
| 13 | 15-07-2020 | State Actor 9* | Phone |
| 14 | 16-07-2020 | State Actor 10* | Interview |
| 15 | 18-07-2020 | State Actor 11* | Phone |
| 16 | 20-07-2020 | State Actor 12* | Phone and email |
| 17 | 22-07-2020 | State Actor 13* | Interview |
| 18 | 21-07-2020 | State Actor 14* | Phone and email |
| 19 | 22-07-2020 | State Actor 15* | Interview |
| 20 | 20-07-2020 | State Actor 16* | Phone |
| 21 | 21-07-2020 | State Actor 17* | Phone |
| 22 | 23-07-2020 | State Actor 18* | Phone and email |
| 23 | | State Actor 19 | Email |

*Those marked are either currently performing their role in the government or were there when the London Compact was approved.

ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Interview Guide

1. How do you read Jordan's policies in dealing with Syrian refugees?

1.1. What do you think about the position of Jordan since 2012 in dealing with Syrian refugees, taking into consideration that it is hosting big numbers of refugees?

2. Starting 2015, the refugee crisis illuminated a strong ideological distinction in political attitudes between the political left and right in Europe. Overall, how do you describe the political landscape or attitudes in Europe toward migration issues in context of the existing Syrian crisis?

2.1. To what extent has the negative discourse on migration by populist and nationalist actors in some European countries influenced the political environment and attitudes of the European Union towards refugees and asylum seekers?

3. Starting 2015, a shift in EU policies and actions towards refugees and migration occurred which culminated into convening several international conferences and international funding agreements in response to the Syrian crisis. How did this shift happen?

3.1. Many critics believe that the main objective of these policies and actions is to limit the influx of refugees to Europe and to contain the refugee crisis in the main host countries. To what extent do you agree with this statement?

3.2. To what extent did the stances of the Jordanian government converge with the international conferences' agenda?

The EU introduced a political tool in the form of international agreements with third countries hosting refugees. The key points of the EU-Jordan compact agreement are as follows:

- o EU provides Jordan humanitarian and development funding through multi-year grants and concessional loans, with pledges of \$700 million in grants annually for three years and concessional loans of \$1.9 billion.

- o EU commits to relaxing trade regulations to stimulate exports of certain products from 18 designated economic zones and industrial areas in Jordan, in return for employment quotas (at least 15 percent) for Syrian refugees in these businesses.

- o Jordan commits to providing school places to all Syrian children, and some vocational training opportunities.

- o Jordan commits to expanding formal labor market access for Syrian refugees in the country, including 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in specified sectors.

- o Jordan will institute reforms to improve the business and investment environment and formalize Syrian businesses.

4. How was EU-Jordan compact designed?

4.1. To what extent do you believe that EU-Jordan compact has been answering the recent calls for international solidarity, cooperation, and equitable responsibility-sharing? Do you believe that the EU has taken the same share of responsibility towards Syrian refugees as the host countries?

4.2. What are your perceptions regarding the monitoring of the financial and budgetary procedures of the EU-Jordan compact?

4.3. What are the accountability mechanisms that have been developed by the EU to regulate the implementation of the EU-Jordan compact?

5. To what extent do you believe that the EU and Jordan are committing to the rules or terms of the EU-Jordan compact from both sides?

5.1. To what extent do you believe that the terms of the EU-Jordan compact can be achieved and sustained?

5.2. To what extent do you believe that the relaxation of the restrictions by the Jordanian government to allow Syrians to apply for work permits can be achieved? To what extent do you believe that the employment quotas for Syrian refugees in the Special Economic Zones can be fulfilled? To your knowledge, has the number of work permits for Syrians increased lately?

6. To what extent do you believe that the EU-Jordan compact is contributing to the protection of the refugees' rights?

6.1. To what extent do you believe that Jordan can offer a protective environment to refugees given that it has not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and its protocol?

HOW DO STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS IN JORDAN VIEW THE EU-JORDAN COMPACT?

6.2. Do you think that the EU-Jordan compact has been inclusive of all refugees' priorities and of host communities in their design?

6.3. How have the relations of the Jordanian government and governments of Syria's neighboring host countries been affected by the issue of refugees and migration?

6.4. What do you think about the future of the EU-Jordan compact in light of growing pressure on Syrians in Syria's neighboring host countries to return to their homeland?



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