{"id":80593,"date":"2025-10-13T07:00:00","date_gmt":"2025-10-13T06:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lse.ac.uk\/granthaminstitute\/?post_type=news&p=80593"},"modified":"2025-10-08T11:24:11","modified_gmt":"2025-10-08T10:24:11","slug":"facts-v-opinions-understanding-chinas-climate-performance-amid-a-polarised-debate","status":"publish","type":"news","link":"https:\/\/www.lse.ac.uk\/granthaminstitute\/news\/facts-v-opinions-understanding-chinas-climate-performance-amid-a-polarised-debate\/","title":{"rendered":"Facts v. opinions: understanding China\u2019s climate performance amid a polarised debate"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

China is frequently labelled as both a climate leader and<\/em> a climate laggard. Cutting through the noise, Mathias Larsen argues that it is critical to recognise that China’s emissions may already have peaked and could fall rapidly, despite continued investments in coal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When considering the facts of China’s climate performance, it is perhaps no surprise that opinions diverge. The country’s record-breaking development of green industries and equally record-breaking greenhouse gas emissions are well known and with good reason. For example, China dominates all key green industries and installs<\/path><\/svg><\/a> more renewables annually than the rest of the world combined. Simultaneously, China burns more than half of the world’s coal and is home to 90%<\/path><\/svg><\/a> of additional emissions since the landmark 2015 climate change summit in Paris, COP21.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some researchers emphasise the country’s green credentials: for example, Jeffrey Sachs<\/path><\/svg><\/a> argues that “China is undertaking a rapid transformation in energy structure” and “making the transformation possible around the globe”. At the other end of the opinion spectrum, US President Trump<\/path><\/svg><\/a> has said, “It costs much more to do things environmentally clean. China doesn’t do anything.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If looking only at either the clean or emissions-intensive side of China’s economy, one might indeed conclude that China is either a climate saviour or sinner. Added to that, broader political opinions on China are perhaps even more polarised, leading many to view China’s climate performance through pre-existing political opinions. Of course, while there might be clear reasons for this polarisation, this is not a fact-based way of comprehensively understanding China’s climate performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question of whether King Coal is being dethroned<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The dynamics of China’s coal consumption are both a source of and a solution to the polarised debate. Most fundamentally, coal accounts for 79%<\/path><\/svg><\/a> of China’s emissions. Roughly two-thirds<\/path><\/svg><\/a> of coal consumption is in power generation, with the remaining third being industry, such as steel, cement and fertiliser. Simultaneously, the dynamics within the coal industry are arguably some of the most misunderstood in the discourse on China’s climate performance. Consequently, they are a central piece in the currently polarised debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dissecting the latest statistics provides the nuance needed for a clear picture. The key is to be able to accurately capture coal capacity<\/em> and coal consumption<\/em> and then be able to distinguish between the two.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the capacity side, China continues to invest in new coal-fired power plants. In 2024, China started the construction of 95GW<\/path><\/svg><\/a> of new coal power capacity, and another 100GW is already in the pipeline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the consumption side, according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics<\/path><\/svg><\/a>, volumes fell during the first four months of 2025 compared with the same period last year, and were higher than in 2024 over the second quarter, leaving the total unchanged between 2024 and 2025. In combination, increasing capacity and stable consumption imply a lower utilisation rate (the proportion of the capacity actually used). The rate has indeed fallen from around 70%<\/path><\/svg><\/a> two decades ago to 40%<\/path><\/svg><\/a> today. Looking forward, it is the official policy<\/path><\/svg><\/a> of the Chinese government to further reduce the utilisation rate until coal merely ‘supports’ renewables by responding to fluctuations in supply and demand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within industrial usage, coal consumption is stagnant, as usage for steel<\/path><\/svg><\/a> and cement<\/path><\/svg><\/a> has fallen alongside the slump in the real estate sector. On the other hand, coal consumption for petrochemicals<\/path><\/svg><\/a> has increased.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Analysing the same data, leading researchers and non-governmental organisations have recently made several related findings:  <\/p>\n\n\n\n