

National climate advisory bodies: lessons on effective design

Submission to the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe
in *Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz
and Others v Switzerland*

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About this submission

This submission responds to the invitation by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CMDH) to Switzerland in its [September 2025 Decision](#) (CM/Del/Dec(2025)1537/H46-37) at para 5 that, *inter alia*: “invited Switzerland to consider the opportunity of establishing an independent national body suited to the national political structure to monitor its climate policy, mandated *inter alia* to issue recommendations to the political authorities, drawing as appropriate on good practices of other member States”.

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Summary and key messages

Independent climate advisory bodies have become a cornerstone of effective climate governance across Europe and globally. They provide scientific advice, monitor progress and strengthen accountability – functions essential to ensuring that national climate policies align with international commitments and the best available science (IPCC, 2023). Switzerland, following the 2024 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruling in *Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland*, is now under heightened scrutiny to improve its climate governance architecture. The Committee of Ministers has invited Switzerland “to consider the opportunity of establishing an independent national body suited to the national political structure to monitor its climate policy, mandated inter alia to issue recommendations to the political authorities, drawing as appropriate on good practices of other member States” (CM/Notes/1537/H46-37).

This submission synthesises lessons from existing climate advisory bodies, identifies design features that underpin their effectiveness, and outlines key recommendations to take into consideration in the design of such a body to enable effective implementation of the ECHR’s judgement and CMDH’s advice. It highlights the following design features as particularly important to the effectiveness of advisory bodies:

- Independence and transparency, ensured through members’ appointment procedures and operational arrangements for work programmes and budgeting, are key to the effectiveness of climate advisory bodies. Such independence must be legally anchored through laws or regulations rather than rely on informal arrangements.
- High quality and breadth of expertise among members is necessary to ensure the body is able to effectively conduct credible analysis across multiple relevant disciplines.
- Clarity and breadth of mandate matters: bodies with the authority to advise on targets and policies, and to conduct independent assessment of progress, exert greater influence.
- Sufficient and predictable funding shapes effectiveness, as evidenced by bodies supported by larger secretariats being able to conduct deeper analysis and engagement across a wider range of topics.
- Statutory obligations for governments to consider advice and to indicate their reasons for not following it improve effectiveness and accountability – as the examples of Ireland, the UK, France and Denmark demonstrate. The ‘duty to act’ provision in Denmark further strengthens accountability by requiring the Government to demonstrate how it will fill the gap between targets and planned policies if the advisory body finds an inconsistency between them.
- Alignment with international commitments is increasingly incorporated into the scope of work by advisory bodies. Independent climate advisory bodies in the UK, France, Sweden and Finland, and at the EU level, help ensure consistency of national action with the Paris Agreement. Consideration of the ambition and fairness of national efforts in the global context is at the forefront of this work.

1. Objectives of independent climate advisory bodies

The primary objectives of climate advisory bodies are to ensure consistency between national climate change policy and the latest scientific findings and international commitments, and to hold governments to account for their implementation, through independent scrutiny of the progress they have made. Independent climate advisory bodies typically serve three core functions (Averchenkova et al., 2020; Evans et al., 2024):

Expert advice. Climate advisory bodies provide independent, evidence-based advice on climate targets, pathways, and policy options, serving as a trusted knowledge broker:

- The UK Government must consider recommendations made by the Climate Change Committee (CCC) on carbon budgets before it puts a proposal before Parliament.
- The German Expert Council is asked to verify the assumptions underlying the projected impact of measures proposed by sectoral ministries before a climate policy programme or a new 2050 plan is adopted.
- Sweden's Climate Policy Council must evaluate the analytical methods and models that provide the basis for policies.

Monitoring and accountability. Climate advisory bodies assess progress towards national climate targets, scrutinise government reports, and highlight gaps in implementation, acting as a watchdog and, often, a policy entrepreneur:

- Independent assessment of implementation with parliamentary oversight provides a stronger accountability mechanism for climate change laws.
- In some countries, the primary reporting requirements rest with the Government, but reports are scrutinised by the independent advisory body (e.g. in Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Ireland).
- Other countries delegate reporting on progress to advisory bodies (e.g. France and the Netherlands). In the UK, the CCC issues a report on progress in implementation to which the Government is required to respond by law. The UK Government also produces its own annual report on emissions.

Public engagement and debate. Climate advisory bodies publish accessible reports and engage with stakeholders, elevating the quality of public debate:

- Denmark's climate change law mandates the creation of a Climate Dialogue forum as one of the tasks for its independent advisory body (Weaver et al., 2019).
- An assessment of the UK's CCC over the first 10 years of operation showed that its outputs have contributed to improving the quality of the political debate on climate change in the UK (Fankhauser et al., 2018).
- An evaluation of the work of the Finnish Climate Panel found that it had a significant impact on the public and political debate (Weaver et al., 2019).

Many advisory bodies combine the first two functions, with some bodies encompassing all of them. For example, the Danish Klimarådet by law acts in all three roles. It provides evidence-based policy advice to the Government and parliament; monitors and reports on government climate policy, national climate targets and Denmark's EU obligations; and also acts as a convener for the national policy debate. Denmark's Council is notable for having the convenor function explicitly legislated through a mandate to create a Climate Dialogue forum.

New Zealand's Climate Change Commission (He Pou a Rangi) was set to provide the Government with advice, monitoring and reporting that supported transition to a climate-resilient, low emissions future. On the consultation side, the Commission's mandate is to hear New Zealanders' perspectives before making recommendations, and the Commission consults with the public regularly. However, its consultation mandate may be relaxed in the future based on the reforms to the climate change law proposed by the Government in 2025, as discussed below.

The mandate of the UK's CCC encompasses the provision of independent advice on adaptation and mitigation, monitoring progress on reducing emissions and enhancing climate resilience, and conducting independent analysis of climate science. The UK CCC's stakeholder engagement function is substantial in practice, in particular in sharing evidence and analysis, but this derives from the Committee's own interpretation of its broad ancillary powers and its governance framework – not from specific statutory language requiring public consultation or stakeholder engagement. In recent years, the CCC has integrated deliberative participation methods into its work, starting with its engagement with the Climate Assembly UK (CAUK) in 2020, commissioned by six House of Commons select committees. The CCC used the recommendations from the CAUK to frame its Sixth Carbon Budget and has since integrated deliberative methods into its work on home decarbonisation and adaptation.

With the growing importance of public participation and the need to tackle climate disinformation and improve public awareness and buy-in into climate policies, the potential for climate advisory bodies to contribute as independent, credible conveners is increasing. Having an explicit authority for these bodies to engage with the public and stakeholders and to act as conveners of relevant policy dialogues as part of their mandate would enable them to be more effective in this context.

2. Evidence of impact

Research across multiple countries shows that independent expert advisory bodies significantly improve climate governance by enhancing the transparency and legitimacy of policymaking, ensuring the credibility of climate targets and underlying policies, advancing their mainstreaming across policy areas, and strengthening their implementation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2021; Evans et al., 2024; Averchenkova et al., 2024). These bodies enable more ambitious climate action by providing high-quality analytical expertise and maintaining a clear separation between evidence-based advice and political decision-making. They can also lend reinforcement to governments when there is political resistance to adopting targets or policy measures.

- **UK:** the UK's Climate Change Committee (CCC) has shaped national climate policy since 2008, influencing carbon budgets and the adoption of the net zero target (Fankhauser et al., 2018).
- **Ireland:** the Climate Change Advisory Council has influenced carbon tax reforms and the phase-out of peat and coal subsidies (Tallon et al., 2020; Averchenkova et al., 2024).
- **New Zealand:** the Climate Change Commission (He Pou a Rangī) has shaped national climate policy, and its advice has been upheld in court (Averchenkova et al., 2024). However, changes to the Climate Change Response Act announced by the Government at the end of 2025 may weaken the Commission's future impact due to, among other changes, the weakening of its advisory role on emissions plans, pushing back obligations to respond to the Commission's advice by two years.¹
- In **Ireland** and **New Zealand**, advisory bodies have also played a central role in fostering engagement with politically sensitive or emerging policy issues – for example, advancing the debate on reducing agricultural emissions in ways that would be difficult to achieve from within government (Averchenkova et al., 2024).
- **Germany:** the Council of Experts on Climate Change (ERK) provides rigorous scientific validation but has limited influence due to the absence of a statutory requirement for a government response (Averchenkova et al., 2024).

Box 2.1 outlines examples of the impacts of climate advisory bodies. However, the extent to which advisory bodies shape policymaking varies considerably depending on their design. Section 3 below discusses key design considerations for ensuring the effectiveness of the bodies based on the experience to date, and Appendix 1 provides an overview of design features for a selection of nine prominent bodies.

Box 2.1. Impact of advisory bodies in Ireland, Germany and New Zealand

An institutionalised platform and regular cycle for knowledge-sharing through the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) is important to areas like fossil fuel phaseout, which involve significant political, social and economic concerns. National and regional transitions away from fossil fuels, and the impacts of these transitions, are globally connected (Newell et al., 2026). The financing and production of fossil fuels are globally organised (ibid.). International cooperation is essential to ensure equity in the transition. Knowledge-sharing and open discussion on how these transitions can be carefully managed to ensure sustainable development and equitable outcomes can help foster consensus over time. Institutionalising a knowledge-sharing forum within the formal negotiations process ensures participation from all Parties.

¹ Examples related to the impact of New Zealand's Climate Change Commission below refer to the period up to March 2024 prior to these reforms, and are based on the study of the impact of climate laws by Averchenkova et al. (2024).

Various international platforms and initiatives (the G20; G7; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC); UN Sustainable Development Goals; and COP26, COP27 and COP28) have attempted to coordinate on fossil fuel phaseout, mostly by announcing joint commitments to phase out *inefficient* fossil fuel subsidies. However, these initiatives have lacked clarity across countries on, for example, the scope of subsidies covered (Hizliok et al., 2024). Cross-Party platforms like the JTM are important to building shared knowledge of more technical questions on operationalisation, such as how to develop guidelines to map and identify these subsidies (ibid.). To remain useful and relevant, the JTM must ensure it stays connected to broader international developments. This includes being aware of and engaged with international events such as the upcoming [Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels](#), co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands in April.

Across these cases, the most impactful bodies share three features: strong mandates, independence and mechanisms requiring a government response (Averchenkova A and Lázaro-Touza L, 2020; Averchenkova et al., 2024).

3. Design considerations for effective advisory bodies

To be effective, climate advisory bodies must be independent and have an appropriate status, clear and broad statutory mandates, adequate resources and capacity, and sufficient powers to hold the Government to account, including a statutory requirement obliging the Government to consider and respond to their advice.

Independence

Robust institutional design and genuine independence help protect advisory bodies from politicisation and undue influence (Seibicke, 2025). International practice shows that the independence of a climate advisory body, and the extent to which this independence is recognised by stakeholders, is a fundamental determinant of its effectiveness. Independence requires legal safeguards of appointments, autonomy over work programmes and an independent secretariat and budget (Averchenkova et al., 2020).

Appointment of members

Effective climate advisory bodies use transparent and merit-based appointment processes, include multidisciplinary expertise and avoid ex officio political appointments (Weaver et al., 2019). Appointment procedures that are opaque, politicised or dominated by vested interests risk undermining the credibility of the institution and diminishing the weight accorded to its advice (see Box 3.1 and Appendix 1). Robust safeguards of independence should be embedded within the appointment framework and, ideally, be anchored in law. Recruitment processes should be open, transparent and based on clearly defined merit criteria. Selection should prioritise professional expertise and integrity, and avoid mechanisms that allow for undue political influence, such as direct ministerial appointment without oversight or automatic ex officio membership. Transparent procedures – such as public calls for applications, independent selection panels and published criteria – enhance both the actual and perceived impartiality of the body.

Box 3.1. Risks associated with weaker safeguards of independence

In Ireland, the inclusion of several ex officio members in the Climate Change Advisory Council, including a representative of the agricultural sector, has been criticised for constraining the Council's ability to recommend more ambitious mitigation measures in areas where vested interests are strong. In New Zealand, concerns were raised that the nomination of a significant proportion of members by a single political party risked undermining the perceived neutrality of the Climate Change Commission, notwithstanding the professional qualifications of the appointees. In both cases, the issue was not the competence of individual members but the perception that the advisory body was insufficiently insulated from political or sectoral influence.

Source: Averchenkova et al. (2024).

Budget and administrative independence

Stable, multi-year and non-discretionary funding is essential to safeguard institutional autonomy and ensure that governments cannot influence the body's work programme, staffing or analytical outputs through financial pressure. Provisions on funding independence across leading climate advisory bodies emphasise stable, statutory and ring-fenced budgets that cannot be altered through political discretion (see Appendix 1).

Effective bodies have multi-year funding, control over internal resource allocation, and transparent financial reporting. They are prohibited from accepting private or sectoral funding, ensuring that their analysis remains impartial. These safeguards collectively protect the body from political or stakeholder influence and are recognised as essential to their credibility and long-term effectiveness.

- The UK Climate Change Committee (CCC) receives funding through sponsoring departments, but this is protected by statute and cannot be altered without parliamentary scrutiny.
- New Zealand's Climate Change Commission receives a multi-year appropriation, reducing annual political interference.
- France's High Council on Climate (HCC), known in French as the Haut Conseil pour le Climat, has a dedicated line within the Prime Minister's budget.
- Denmark's Klimarådet has an independent budget allocation administered through a ministry but is not controlled by it.

High quality and breadth of expertise

As climate policy spans a multitude of disciplines, a broad range of expertise among members is essential to the effectiveness and legitimacy of climate advisory bodies. Multidisciplinary membership ensures that recommendations are scientifically robust, economically sound, technologically feasible and socially informed; it also strengthens independence and stakeholder trust.

When no single sector or discipline dominates, the risk of capture is reduced and the body's independence is easier to defend. Diverse expertise improves deliberation, helps identify unintended consequences and supports integrated assessments of mitigation, adaptation and equity.

While the first advisory bodies were primarily composed of scientists and economists, there has been a shift over the past two decades towards greater representation of social sciences (see Table 3.1 for the key disciplines currently represented in climate advisory bodies across Europe):

- In Ireland, the reforms to the advisory body through amended climate legislation in 2021 improved the gender balance and diversity of expertise, including not only the climate scientists and economists that typically dominated climate advisory bodies in the early days but also behavioural scientists. Since 2021, the Climate Change Advisory Council (CCAC) has expanded and has had a stronger secretariat with increased capacity.
- The composition of the UK CCC has moved from a tight cluster of economists, financiers and physical scientists in its earlier years to a wider mix that now includes energy engineering, transport, international climate governance, climate-health research and natural capital economics. It also includes a behavioural scientist with expertise in the psychology of decision-making, language and cognition.
- Denmark's Klimarådet has historically included members with expertise in political science and economics alongside natural scientists. The Danish Climate Act specifies that the Council must reflect a broad range of expertise; in practice, this has included social scientists working on energy transitions and political economy.
- Sweden's Climate Policy Council has included political scientists and researchers working on governance, societal transitions and the behavioural dimensions of climate.

Table 3.1. Prevalent disciplines in national climate advisory bodies in Europe

Discipline	Why It Matters
Climate science/atmospheric physics	Scientific basis for mitigation pathways
Economics (environmental, energy, macro)	Costs, benefits and policy design
Engineering (energy, transport, industrial)	Feasibility of technological transitions
Environmental science and ecology	Biodiversity, land use and impacts
Law	Alignment with legal obligations
Social sciences (behaviour, sociology, political science, health)	Addresses public acceptance and societal change
Agriculture and land-use science	Emissions from land and food systems
Risk and disaster	Adaptation and resilience planning

Source: Author.

Clarity and breadth of mandate

The breadth of an advisory body's mandate determines what it can examine, who it can engage with, and what connections it can make across policy domains. Where that scope is too narrow or lacks statutory protection, the body may be unable to address the full dimensions of the problem – and whatever role it does have can be further curtailed at the discretion of successive governments (Seibicke, 2025).

A strong mandate should include advising on targets, assessing progress, evaluating policy effectiveness and supporting public engagement (OECD, 2021). Table 2 and Appendix 1 include details on the mandates of existing advisory bodies in Europe. The most impactful advisory bodies have mandates that are embedded in climate legislation, which provides stronger protection against political change over time. Such mandates include an independent expert review of the compatibility of national measures with emissions pathways and targets or carbon budgets, alongside a duty to act.

Table 3.2. Prevalent disciplines in national climate advisory bodies in Europe

Mandate element	Countries whose advisory bodies include that element
Advice on targets	Ireland, New Zealand, UK, EU, Denmark, Finland
Progress assessment	Most bodies except emerging ones
Government response to the body's advice required	New Zealand, UK, France, Denmark

Source: Author.

Government accountability

One of the central problems that climate advisory bodies are designed to address is a mismatch between the long-term timescale of the climate crisis and the short-termism of democratic politics with four-to-five-year electoral cycles. Without accountability mechanisms, there is a structural incentive for governments to accept ambitious long-term targets while delaying or

diluting the policies needed to meet them. An advisory body that is not backed up by a mechanism that ensures its advice is heard, responded to and publicly accounted for cannot effectively address this challenge. In practice, two types of accountability mechanisms emerged in relation to advisory bodies: a duty to respond to the advice and a duty to act in case the advisory body identifies insufficient action by the Government to meet the targets.

Integration of requirements for governments to respond to the advice or the recommendations of the advisory body seeks to minimise the risk of advice being ignored by politicians. A duty to respond requires the Government to publicly engage with findings, explain its position and create a record on which Parliament, courts and civil society can hold it to account. National governments are already required by law to respond to input from their independent expert councils in Denmark, France, Ireland, and the UK (Evans et al., 2024). Similar provisions have been introduced in Spain and Slovenia, whose bodies have not yet been operationalised at the time of writing.

- In the UK and Ireland, if the Government diverges from the carbon budget proposals of the advisory body, it must clearly state the reasons for doing so. Successive governments have accepted all six recommended carbon budgets and amended the 2050 target to net zero in line with the UK CCC's advice.
- In Denmark and France, the Government is required to respond to the recommendations of the advisory bodies on climate policy formulation.
- In Germany, the lack of the requirement for the Government to respond to the advice of the expert advisory body has been seen as detrimental to the body's impact on policymaking and accountability, particularly compared to the impacts of similar bodies in Ireland and New Zealand, where climate laws require a response from the Government (Averchenkova et al., 2024).

A stronger safeguard of the Government's accountability is integrated into the Danish Climate Act 2020, which introduced 'the duty to act' requiring the Government to propose additional measures when Denmark's Klimarådet finds that current policies risk falling short of their targets. The Klimarådet is tasked with assessing whether the Government's climate efforts make it probable that climate targets will be reached. The minister in charge of climate action must make their own assessment, and if targets are not probably going to be met, must present new initiatives (Articles 4(2), 7(3), 7(4)).

In Denmark, Parliament scrutinises the Klimarådet's assessment, the minister's response and the adequacy of any proposed additional measures, and may actively demand that the Government go further than what it has proposed. In contrast, in the UK, the Government must respond to the CCC's annual progress reports and put those responses before Parliament, but there is no mechanism for Parliament to assess that response or require additional measures. Parliamentary scrutiny of the Government's climate performance happens through the ordinary work of select committees and debate, not through a dedicated statutory process.

A duty to respond makes the gap between ambition and delivery visible, while a duty to act ensures that visibility triggers an obligation to close it, enhancing the effectiveness of the advisory body.

Ensuring consistency with international commitments and a fair share of global efforts

A growing number of advisory bodies explicitly assess whether national climate policies align with international commitments, including the Paris Agreement (IPCC, 2023). Some bodies explicitly focus on consideration of 'the fair share' of global efforts (see Table 3). This element is particularly relevant to the implementation of the ECHR's judgment and should be considered for inclusion in the mandate of an independent expert advisory body in Switzerland.

Table 3.3. Prevalent disciplines in national climate advisory bodies in Europe

United Kingdom	The CCC evaluates whether UK carbon budgets align with global temperature goals and assesses the UK's fair share.
France	The HCC assesses France's contribution to global mitigation.
Ireland	The CCAC ensures that Ireland's carbon budgets align with EU climate law and the Paris Agreement.
Finland	The Finnish Climate Change Panel evaluates whether Finland's long-term strategy aligns with global pathways.
EU	The European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC) provides EU-wide assessments of fair share and international consistency (ESABCC, 2023).

Source: Author.

Operation of advisory bodies in the federal decentralised systems

Countries with federal, decentralised systems of governance take a variety of approaches to the role of national advisory bodies vis-à-vis devolved administrations. The UK Climate Change Act 2008 established the CCC as an adviser to all four national authorities and built advice to the devolved administrations into the CCC mandate. Each devolved administration then passed its own climate legislation that assigns the CCC specific advisory functions within its own framework. For example, Scotland sets through its own legislation a statutory role for the CCC. The Scottish Government requests regular advice, including an annual Scottish progress report on reducing emissions, advice on emissions reduction targets and regular independent assessments of adaptation programmes.

However, other countries with decentralised systems either have separate advisory bodies at each level of government (as in Australia, where New South Wales has its own Net Zero Commission alongside the federal Climate Change Authority) or have no formal advisory architecture at the subnational level.

Key recommendations for the design of a climate advisory body

Independent climate advisory bodies address a fundamental challenge in democratic governance: the mismatch between electoral cycles that incentivise short-term thinking and the sustained action and foresight planning over the decades required to address the climate challenge. Well-designed bodies help by showing the gap between political commitment and implementation, requiring governments to justify departures from expert advice – and, in the strongest models, including a duty to act demanding additional action when policies fall short. Anchored in legislation with clear mandates, protected independence and formal accountability mechanisms, climate advisory bodies help embed climate obligations in the institutional fabric of the state and ensure the obligations continue across changes of government. They are based on a principle that extends beyond climate policy: that governance systems must safeguard the interests of present and future generations against short-term political pressures.

Establishing an independent climate advisory body in Switzerland in line with best European and international practice would strengthen its climate governance and enable stronger compliance with the ECHR judgment. Drawing on best practices from across Europe, such a body could help enhance transparency, accountability and public trust.

The design of such a body should ensure independence; high quality and breadth of expertise among members; sufficient and predictable funding; and an obligation for the Government to respond. Its mandate should be clear and broad enough to cover, at least, advice on targets and

policies, independent assessments of implementation, and a requirement to consider alignment with international commitments when providing advice on emission reduction targets.

Specific criteria to ensure the effectiveness of a climate advisory body include:

- **Personal, administrative and financial independence** through legally anchored procedures and operational arrangements, ensuring that:
 - (i) Members are selected through transparent procedures (e.g. through public calls, independent selection panels and published criteria) and in their personal capacity based on professional expertise and academic qualifications, expressly avoiding political representation and proportionality.
 - (ii) The body has full authority to define its own programme of work, and budgetary control to conduct its own analysis and commission external studies to enable it to fulfil its functions based on its best independent judgement.
 - (iii) The body is not vulnerable to political cycles and can maintain institutional knowledge (e.g. through being a permanent institution with staggered terms and ringfenced budgets).
- **High quality and breadth of expertise** among members covering natural science, economics and social sciences, to ensure the body is able to effectively conduct credible analysis across multiple relevant disciplines.
- **Clarity and breadth of mandate**, with a strong mandate including advising on targets, assessing progress, evaluating policy effectiveness and supporting public engagement. Including consideration of ambition and fairness of national efforts in the global context and alignment of targets with international commitments in the scope of work helps ensure consistency of national action with the Paris Agreement.
- **Accountability for governments** through a duty to respond to the advice and a duty to act (as in the case of Denmark) helps improve effectiveness. Statutory requirements for governments to consider advice and to indicate their reasons for not following it enhance accountability. Parliamentary oversight in this context further strengthens governmental accountability.
- **Sufficient and predictable funding** to ensure the body is well-resourced to conduct deeper analysis and engagement across a wider range of topics.

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Appendix 1. Design features of selected independent climate advisory bodies¹

Feature	United Kingdom: CCC	Germany: ERK	Ireland: CCAC	France: HCC	Denmark: Klimarådet	Sweden: Klimatpolitiska Rådet	Finland: Ilmastopaneeli	EU: ESABCC	New Zealand: CCC
Members	~8 core members; multidisciplinary experts	5 experts; gender balance required	13 members; mix of experts and ex officio participants	13 independent experts	8 independent experts	8 independent experts	~15 academic experts	15 independent scientists	~8 members + Māori advisory body ²
Secretariat Size	~65 staff ³	~3 staff ⁴	~12 staff ⁵	~15–20 staff ⁶	~28 staff	~4 staff	~5–7 staff	~14 staff ⁷	~80 staff in 2023–24 ⁸
Annual Budget	~£6–7 million ⁹	No recent data	No recent data	No recent data	~€3–4 million in 2021 ¹⁰	~€2 million ¹¹	~€750,000 ¹²	No recent data	~NZ\$18.4 million in 2024–24 ¹³
Appointment of members	Joint appointment by UK nations	Appointed by Federal Government	Government on minister's nomination	Appointed by Government; independent selection committee	Appointed by Minister for Climate based on council's selected candidate	Appointed by Government	Appointed by Government; academic institutions nominate	Appointed by the EEA Management Board	Appointed by Governor- General on minister's recommendation
Advice on Targets	Yes – recommends carbon budgets	No	Yes – proposes carbon budgets	Evaluates alignment of measures with budgets	Yes – advises on national targets	Evaluates consistency of measures with targets	Yes – advises on long-term strategy	Yes – recommends EU-wide targets	Yes – advises on emissions budgets
Progress Assessment	Annual progress reports	Annual sectoral review	Annual review	Annual review	Annual assessment	Annual assessment	Annual assessment	Discretionary; in practice, EU-wide assessment	Annual monitoring
Policy Advice	Advises on mitigation pathways	Validates assumptions	Advises on climate action plan	Advises on policy coherence	Advises on policy design	Advises on policy gaps	Advises on policy effectiveness	Advises on EU policy	Advises Emission reduction plan (proposal to remove pending 2026 amendment)

Duty for the Government to respond to the advice	Yes	No	Indirect via parliamentary committee it reports to	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes (challenged in proposed 2026 amendment)
Approach to International Commitments	International alignment + UK fair share	EU; no explicit Paris assessment	Paris + EU alignment	Paris + EU alignment	Paris alignment	Paris alignment + Swedish climate law	Evaluates Paris alignment + equity considerations	EU-wide Paris alignment	Explicit Paris alignment

Source: Author.

¹ This table is a revised version of the original, drawing on publicly available documents as of 20 August 2026.

² <https://www.climatecommission.govt.nz/who-we-are/our-people/>

³ <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmescnz/1186/report.html>

⁴ <https://expertenrat-klima.de/en/about-us/secretariat>

⁵ <https://www.climatecouncil.ie/aboutthecouncil/secretariat/>

⁶ <https://www.hautconseilclimat.fr/actualites/communique-de-presse-les-membres-du-haut-conseil-pour-le-climat-reaffirment-lindependance-de-linstance-et-poursuivent-sa-consolidation/>

⁷ <https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/about/key-partners/eu-partners/call-for-expression-of-interest-for-members-of-the-european-scientific-advisory-board-on-climate-change>

⁸ https://www.climatecommission.govt.nz/assets/Corporate-publications/annual-reports/C.31-Climate-Change-Commission-Annual-Report-2023_24.pdf

⁹ <https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/CCC-Annual-Report-And-Accounts-2024-25.pdf>

¹⁰ <https://www.altinget.dk/miljoe/artikel/biolog-biodiversitetsraad-et-skal-have-flere-midler>

¹¹ <https://formas.se/download/18.f65873b1869c967bcf24cf9/1678375786525/Budgetunderlag%202024-2026.pdf>

¹² <https://budjetti.vm.fi/sisalto.jsp?year=2025&lang=fi&maindoc=/2025/tae/hallituksenEsitys/hallituksenEsitys.xml&opennode=0:1:147:393:1429:1441>

¹³ https://www.climatecommission.govt.nz/assets/Corporate-publications/annual-reports/C.31-Climate-Change-Commission-Annual-Report-2023_24.pdf